In order to achieve that lower cost, we have seriously and continuously to negotiate with the Soviet Union to try to get a balance in men, materials, weapons, and in nuclear strength. If we can achieve that, we can keep our security at a lower expenditure.

It takes two to negotiate, and the President has constantly put forward detailed proposals to the Soviet Union. Such is the anxiety of the West genuinely to negotiate disarmament reductions. He has put forward the latest proposals. Mr. Andropov has replied. [5] I hope now that the proposals will be seriously discussed by the Soviet Union at the negotiating table. If they are not successful in reaching zero option, the cruise and Pershing missiles will be deployed by the end of this year. Our nerve is being tested; we must not falter now. That should not be the end of the negotiations. I hope, and it is my earnest belief, that they should continue so that although we were not able to negotiate zero option, we should be able to negotiate the deployment of a lesser number of weapons than the full total, provided, again, the Soviets will genuinely negotiate on balance.

We have also discussed, as the President indicated, the Middle East, and we're very conscious that although all eyes are focused on the Lebanon, the fundamental problem of the Middle East, a secure Israel and a legitimate deal for the Palestinian people, has still to be resolved.

I have pointed out to the President, we support his Central American policy, and particularly, the most excellent strategic view he gave of it during his very famous speech in April, [6] and we are constantly pointing out that of the aid which the United States gives to Central America, 75 cents out of every dollar goes to civil aid, and that is a record to be proud of.

We've also had a word about Belize, and I, naturally, as you would understand, have made my views known about arms to Argentina. I discussed with Secretary Regan this morning and again at lunch the wider issues affecting the economy and the importance of trying to secure lower interest rates so that we can get a full recovery in the world which would be to the benefit of the United States, and also to the peoples of the underdeveloped countries.

If I may sum up, altogether this has been another chapter in the close discussion, consultation and similar beliefs in shared ideals between the United States and Britain. Against that background, it's not surprising that we find common views and we pursue them with common purpose in the wider world.

Thank you very much.

Document 263

Transcript of an Interview With the Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), Montebello, Canada, October 28, 1983 (Extract) [7]

U.S.–U.K. Relations and the Grenada Invasion

. . . . . .

Q. There is criticism coming from Europe of our actions in Grenada, particularly from England, where our missiles are going to be deployed. There seems to be concern about who is going to have the fingers on the new missiles that will be deployed, is it a trigger-happy President of the United States? What's your reaction to that criticism?

A. Well, that criticism was made a long time ago and the British and we have both answered it, that there is a perfectly acceptable, workable agreement that we have with England, with respect to the release of nuclear weapons. I believe that argument was pretty well laid to rest.

[5] Reference presumably is to President Reagan's speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1983; see document 4. Chairman Andropov's response can be found in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, October 26, 1983, pp. 1–4.

[6] See document 623.

[7] Source: *Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Weinberger, 1983*. David Hartman interviewed Secretary Weinberger at 7:20 a.m. for the ABC television program, "Good Morning America." Weinberger was in Montebello to represent the United States in the NATO Defense Ministers October 27–28 meeting.

Q. Many are suggesting that with Prime Minister Thatcher ahead of time suggesting we not invade Grenada or take part in this action in some way, that we did not accept this advice from the British Prime Minister when this was one of their colonies in years past. Why did we not accept her advice in this case, Mr. Weinberger?

A. Well, the main problem was that we had two things as the President mentioned last night. We had a thousand American citizens and there were a number of other nationalities there whose safety we had every reason, I think, to fear for. We also had an urgent invitation, or an urgent plea really, from all the neighboring nations that regard themselves as sort of one island chain. We felt that there was no way that we could ignore either that urgent request for help in what was clearly a very major threatening situation for them and what was clearly a major threatening situation for our own citizens and those of many others. We thought we really had no choice at all but we understood that from a distance other nations would think that this was something that was rather strong action. I've found here, only in private conversations, and I certainly wouldn't want to quote anybody, very clear understanding from among the Defense Ministers and a lot of private support.

. . . . . .

K. West Germany

Document 264

Proclamation by President Reagan, January 20, 1983 [1]

Tricentennial Anniversary Year of German Settlement in America

On October 6, 1683, a group of 13 Mennonite families, coming from the city of Krefeld, now in the Federal Republic of Germany, founded Germantown, Pennsylvania, today a suburb of Philadelphia. Since then, more than 7 million German immigrants have entered the United States and made extraordinary human, economic, political, social, and cultural contributions to the growth and success of our great country.

Today there are more than 60 million Americans of German descent, a number about equal to the total population of the Federal Republic of Germany. More Americans claim German ancestry than any other nationality.

During my address to the Bundestag in Bonn in June of last year, [2] I spoke of the importance which the United States attaches to the Tricentennial year of 1983 commemorating German settlement in America. Despite the legacy of 2 world wars which found us on opposing sides, West Germany and the United States have forged an exceptionally close relationship during the past 3 decades. The success of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, and the ensuing NATO partnership have led to a recognition of our common democratic ideals and joint interest in Western economic and political strength.

[1] Source: White House Press Release, January 20, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; also printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, January 24, 1983, p. 84. This proclamation, number 5014, was filed with the Office of the Federal Register at 10:36 a.m. on January 21, 1983.

[2] For text of Reagan's June 9, 1982, address, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982*, p. 481.

American Foreign policy current documents 1983
Department of State, Washington, 1985

(3) Other creditor governments should provide new credits along with the increase in U.S. credits to assure equitable sharing of the financing burden among governments.

If the United States undertakes to provide Brazil with substantial amounts of Eximbank trade finance, the question arises as to the appropriate level of support by other governments. Under most burden-sharing formulas, whether related to trade, outstanding debt, or value of service payments, the U.S. share in the financing burden should amount to approximately 40 percent. We are in the early stages of discussing with other major developed countries the contribution they might make to an overall export credit guarantee package. We do not contemplate that the special Eximbank facility will become operative until this additional financing is raised.

(4) Official debt rescheduling arrangements are expected to form an important part of the overall financing program for both Brazil and Mexico.

Brazil has recently formally requested a Paris Club rescheduling. Estimated maturing obligations to official creditors during the period from August 1, 1983, through December 31, 1984, amount to more than $2 billion. Preliminary discussion of the rescheduling is expected in Paris on September 15.

In the Mexican case, signature of bilateral and implementing agreements under a previous rescheduling arrangement is a precondition for the Eximbank facility. As mentioned before, in June, Mexico's official creditors reached a multilateral agreement to extend debt relief to Mexico through the end of this year. Bilateral and creditor agency agreements are now being negotiated by each of the creditor countries. We are hopeful that our agreement with Mexico can be completed by October. Also, the official creditors have indicated to Mexico their willingness to consider further debt relief beyond 1983, and preparations may begin later this year.

Facilities and Normal Eximbank Programs

The new Eximbank facilities are not extraordinary, except in the amounts involved and the specified conditions. These facilities fall within the general ambit of Eximbank programs and are consistent with the Eximbank Charter:

—The facilities fall within the parameters of current Eximbank insurance and guarantee programs. Coverage would only be triggered when a U.S. export occurs.

—The facilities may be used only in support of specific U.S. exports, as is normally the case in Eximbank's programs.

—Existing insurance programs are well-suited to supporting the type of multipurpose lines of credit needed to support imports of commodities, spare parts, and capital goods.

—The facilities draw on existing Eximbank guarantee/insurance authority, consistent with the administration's Eximbank budget policy to place more emphasis on guarantees and insurance. The administration has already recognized such contingencies in its request for guarantees and insurance in FY '84.

—The facilities, with the special conditions, meet the Charter's requirement of "reasonable assurance of repayment." First, the facilities require the full faith and credit obligations of the Governments of Brazil and Mexico. Eximbank has had good experiences with government guaranteed transactions, including a very high recovery rate in case of default. Secondly, compliance with an IMF program indicates that the debtor country is undertaking a major effort to adjust and work its way out of its debt problem. Finally, parallel actions by the commercial banks and other governments will provide further evidence of international confidence that the debtor country has a good chance of solving its liquidity problems.

Conclusion

The administration strongly supports Eximbank's authorization of special guarantee and insurance facilities to Brazil and Mexico in the amount of $1.5 billion and $500 million respectively. These facilities will be used solely to support U.S. exports. The prospects for both countries offer reasonable assurance of repayment with the conditions imposed for each facility. In addition, they will significantly contribute to the multilateral effort to provide Brazil and Mexico with sufficient external financing to allow the orderly economic adjustment which will enable them to overcome their current international debt problems.

Document 608

Address by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) Before the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, November 14, 1983 [20]

U.S. Policy in Latin America

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, ladies, and gentlemen:

> "The historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations."

These words, which open the preamble to the Charter of this Organization of American States, express the central ideal that has guided the New World from its inception. Today, this ideal of democracy, of human rights, and of peace is advancing steadily in the lives of millions of men, women, and children throughout the hemisphere.

As the oldest continuing collaborative effort by nations to work together for the betterment of their citizens and for the maintenance of peace, the Inter-American System has long been a symbol of international cooperation and hope. Today, we can be especially proud. More and more of the members of our system are demonstrating once again that democratic processes and institutions are the best means of fulfilling human aspirations.

One year ago this week, nearly 60 million Brazilians voted in state and local elections. President Reagan, speaking in Brazil shortly afterwards, noted that the kinship of ideals this demonstrated between our citizens also strengthened the ability of our two governments to work together on many vital world issues. [21]

Two weeks ago, the citizens of Argentina celebrated nationwide elections in an atmosphere of intense civic freedom. Today, on behalf of my government and on behalf of the people of the United States of America, I should like to congratulate the Republic of Argentina, its people and its government. When decisions are made in freedom, everyone triumphs.

We are witnessing historic events: the return to democracy by most nations of this hemisphere. What is happening in Argentina and Brazil adds to the growing list of hemispheric countries—including Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru—that have in recent years restored constitutionalism and democracy. Next year this process of democratic renewal will gain additional strength when El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, and Uruguay, among others, hold elections. Overcoming bitter periods of instability and authoritarianism, each of these countries is reasserting the hemisphere's central vocation as a land of liberty.

Recent elections in the hemisphere have made abundantly clear that, given the opportunity, all of our peoples will choose democracy over authoritarianism. Free elections are at the very heart of any search for human rights. They are the best guarantee that governments will respect and observe the rights and aspirations of their people. By allowing political views to be expressed and weighed freely, elections facilitate the peaceful resolution of differences. And they assure the popular legitimacy without which authority becomes tyranny and dictatorship.

Regimes that abuse their own citizens cannot expect to maintain the delicate internal balance that holds just societies together. And they will find it equally difficult to convince their neighbors that their foreign relations will be governed by respect for international law.

The recent crisis in Grenada illustrates the underlying importance of democracy to internal order and regional peace. This General Assembly meets so shortly after that crisis that it is important to examine some of the implications of what happened there for our countries and for this organization.

I should therefore like to review briefly the conditions that brought about the decision by seven democratic states, all members of this organization, to undertake the collective action in Grenada that began on the morning of October 25.

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[20] Source: Department of State files. Dam made this speech in Washington.

[21] The President traveled to Brazil, November 30–December 3, 1982.

The critical precipitating event was the breakdown of government institutions in Grenada. From that condition flowed threats both to the peace and security of the Eastern Caribbean and to the safety of the foreign nationals living there.

Grenada's government dissolved in the wake of the murder of Prime Minister Bishop and other leaders. A 16-member Revolutionary Military Council was announced, apparently with Army General Hudson Austin at its head. But it was never clear who was really in charge, or that the Council was capable of functioning as a government.

The disintegration of political authority in Grenada created a dynamic of uncertainty and fear. Further violence seemed inevitable. The actions of Bishop's murderers indicated that they would have either driven the island into further chaos or turned it into an armed fortress. In either event, the threat to those living in Grenada and to the peace of the Eastern Caribbean would have increased.

On October 24, Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon appealed to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and other regional states to help to restore order on the island. We and the OECS countries accorded exceptional moral and legal weight to this appeal, for it came from Grenada's sole remaining source of governmental legitimacy.

Sometimes it is necessary to act in order to keep a bad situation from getting worse. This was such a time. Action was necessary to resolve what Article 28 of our Charter refers to as a "situation that might endanger the peace." Inaction would have made more likely a hostage situation and increased the costs in lives of any subsequent rescue operation.

Both the OAS Charter, in Articles 22 and 28, and the UN Charter, in Article 52, recognize the competence of regional security bodies in ensuring regional peace and stability. Article 22 of the OAS Charter in particular makes clear that action pursuant to a special security treaty in force does not constitute intervention or use of force otherwise prohibited by Articles 18 or 20 of the Charter. The OECS decided to act under the 1981 Treaty establishing the organization and creating a special security regime for the Eastern Caribbean.

The United States had an additional concern also recognized under international law: the same anarchy that the countries of the Eastern Caribbean saw as a direct threat to them was also a threat to the safety of some 1,000 U.S. citizens studying or living in Grenada.

For all of these reasons, President Reagan decided to act jointly with Barbados and Jamaica in response to the urgent and formal request from the OECS, which cited "the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada."

The overwhelming and positive reaction by Grenadians from all walks of life has confirmed the correctness of our collective action. Today, Grenada is beginning to reestablish itself as a functioning democracy. In that effort, it has—and will continue to have—the practical and moral support of the United States. I trust that Grenada will have the support of this Organization as well.

What happened in Grenada has important implications for peace, security, and development in this hemisphere. It is important that we understand them, whether as individual states or as members of a common system grounded in law.

What, then, are the implications of Grenada?

Perhaps the first thing to note is that the collective action was undertaken to resolve a condition of anarchy, not to alter a functioning political system. It is well known that Grenada's ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union, its poor human rights record, and its abandonment of democracy had led many governments to have serious disagreements with the Bishop regime. Nonetheless, Grenada's political system is clearly a matter only Grenadians have a right to decide. Indeed, what we found in Grenada suggests that Grenadians are now in a far better position to exercise their fundamental right to self-determination.

In the second place, there is today in the hemisphere no situation factually comparable to that of Grenada in mid-October. There is, for example, no situation in which foreigners are threatened by a generalized condition of anarchy and violence

or in grave danger of becoming hostage to a vicious internal power struggle.

Although these considerations suggest that what happened in Grenada was *sui generis,* one member state of this organization, some of its officials have suggested, feels threatened by what happened in Grenada.

The country that apparently identifies itself with Grenada is Nicaragua. This raises some troubling questions about the Government of Nicaragua.

Can it be that Nicaragua's *Commandantes* are launched on a path from which they fear they cannot return without risk from their fellow leaders? Do they fear that they will fall out among each other as did the leaders of the ill-fated New Jewel Movement?

Or is it that the *Commandantes* are beginning to worry that the very security system developed for them by their Cuban and Communist bloc associates will endanger them? That Soviet and Cuban security personnel and armaments could put the Government of Nicaragua, as they did the government of Prime Minister Bishop, into a prison from which it will be impossible to escape peacefully?

I would like to believe that neither of these hypothesis is true. I would like to believe that the *Commandantes* are beginning to recognize that, when *diktat* and imposition replace democratic institutions and legal safeguards, political differences tend to degenerate into violence. And I would like to believe that the *Commandantes* are becoming concerned at their neighbors' resistance to Nicaragua's export of subversion and armed violence.

If so, a remedy may be found in the commitments they made to the Nicaraguan people and to this organization in 1979.

In July 1979, the soon-to-be governing junta of Nicaragua pledged formally to the Organization of American States that its goals were democratic and peaceful. [22] Those pledges included specific commitments to take measures leading to political democracy, economic freedom and international nonalignment. On the basis of those commitments, this Organization called for the replacement of the then Government of Nicaragua.

Having accepted those assurances, this Organization has a special responsibility to encourage Nicaragua's government to keep its pledges. The United States has consistently sought to engage Nicaragua to this end, first providing exceptional amounts of economic assistance, then making repeated attempts at negotiation. Nicaragua's neighbors have made similar efforts. Yet instead of good faith negotiations, instead of the verified termination of the export of subversion, instead of genuinely fair political competition through elections open to all groups, Nicaragua today is characterized by swollen military forces, disregard for political dialog and religious freedom, and the presence of some 11,000 security and other personnel from Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

One approach today to restoring peace and democracy to Nicaragua and Central America is that of the Contadora process. The Contadora Document of Objectives represents a consensus about what is required. [23] It is: an end to terrorism, destabilization, and guerrilla warfare; a reduction of military forces and armaments; political reconciliation through free elections and respect for human rights; the removal of foreign troops and military advisors; and the commitment of resources more for economic development and reform than for military buildup and destruction.

The United States firmly supports the Contadora Document of Objectives. Just 10 days ago, President Reagan reiterated in the strongest terms our backing for the 21 points contained in this document. We believe they provide the basis for a lasting solution to many of the region's problems. Addressed in a comprehensive manner, they would resolve both Nicaragua's fears and those of its neighbors.

The Contadora negotiations are a responsive and responsible course of action by those best positioned to assess the danger and its remedies. In that sense, Contadora embodies what may well be the fundamental lesson of the collective response to the Grenada crisis: that the best source of knowledge, and the best guidance to action, comes from the peoples

[22] Regarding the letter from the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction to the Secretary General of the OAS, see footnote 24 to document 615.

[23] See document 636.

and countries most directly concerned, most aware of what is happening in their own neighborhood.

We hope that the nine countries involved in this effort to bring peace to Central America will push ahead with all possible speed to transform the 21 objectives into a comprehensive and verifiable agreement. We stand ready to do everything we can to assist. And I urge all OAS members to do the same.

The troubles in the Eastern Caribbean and Central America are important and topical. But they must not be allowed to deflect our attention from the crucial economic issues that challenge the entire hemisphere, and on whose resolution the achievement of lasting peace, social justice and stability so clearly depends.

In recent years, the decline of real commodity prices and the setbacks to domestic growth have been the worst since the great depression. Copper, coffee, sugar: not a country among us has been immune to falling commodity prices. For numerous countries, debt service ratios, and inflation rates are at historic highs.

Since August 1982, the international financial system has faced an increasing variety of challenges. The system has proved more resilient than many had thought, but there are many continuing sources of strain.

Even if the global recovery continues, and even if major new increases in either petroleum prices or world interest rates can be averted, debt problems will continue to be very significant during the remainder of the 1980's.

The severity of these problems will hinder rapid recovery. But let us not lose sight of our fundamental strengths. The bases for recovery are present. Hemisphere economies are fundamentally sound: they have both the human base and the natural resources that are needed for sustained economic growth. As a whole the hemisphere achieved real annual growth rates averaging 5.5–6.5 percent during the 1960's and 1970's. Basic infrastucture was built, people trained and modern economic sectors strengthened.

For these reasons, the long-term prognosis for most of Latin America's major economies remains positive. The basic issue is economic reactivation in the short and medium term.

The U.S. Government's approach to external debt problems includes five mutually-supporting elements.

The necessary first step is a broadening of the economic recovery in the United States and other industrialized countries, combined with continued efforts to resist self-defeating protectionist pressures. I am pleased to note that evidence of our economic recovery is becoming clearer day by day.

Second, and equally fundamental, are the economic adjustment efforts by each debtor country. Orderly adjustments, combined with the other elements of our approach, offer the best hope for a return to the economic growth and development levels of the 1960's and 1970's.

Third, effective adjustment efforts must be supported by IMF assistance. The IMF's role must be strengthened by approval of the pending quota increase.

Fourth, creditor countries must provide emergency government and central bank assistance on a case-by-case basis.

Fifth, but not least, prudent commercial bank lending must continue. Credit lines must be kept open and growing.

Last September's OAS external finance conference in Caracas, Venezuela, demonstrated that the nations of the hemisphere can come together and discuss major hemispheric economic problems constructively and in harmony. The recent meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Asunción, Paraguay, unanimously confirmed the decisions taken in Caracas and established a special committee to examine external debt, trade, and financing. This initiative is receiving our close attention.

The vital catalyst for economic growth is the free flow of capital, goods and services. Policies that foster free capital flows and encourage private investment, risk-taking, innovation, and competition will be the key to success in meeting the recovery and growth challenges we now confront. Economic reactivation depends on millions of entrepreneurs and workers in the private sector making daily decisions in their area of competence.

Governments can help extend the frontiers of economic and political liberty. They must guide with policy and, where appropriate, cooperate with information and resources. Bilateral commercial and investment treaties can help. In addition, the unavailability of arbitration mechanisms is viewed by many potential investors as a disincentive to the transfer of capital. The Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) is an independent regional body dedicated to the peaceful settlement of commercial disputes through arbitration. Strengthening the IACAC's ties with the OAS would promote the free flow of needed capital.

Finally, we have a major stake in each other's markets. In 1982, U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to $34 billion—and Latin America's exports to the United States amounted to $33 billion.

The U.S. Government is committed to open trade for all nations. Despite strong domestic demands for widespread protection, the United States has refrained from imposing new trade restrictive barriers. On the contrary, we are continuing to implement the liberalization agreed upon in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We are seeking a renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences—which has provided very significant benefits to Latin America. And we have succeeded in achieving a virtually all-inclusive free trade status for the Caribbean Basin.

The Caribbean Basin countries will soon begin to take advantage of the trade and other provisions of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.[24] Providing duty-free access to the U.S. market is the heart of the CBI legislation, which is designed to stimulate private investment in export industries in the region. An indicator of the program's value, even over the short term, is that about $500 million of presently dutiable exports from the Caribbean Basin will be freed from U.S. duties because of the CBI. As stability is restored, the benefits should be even greater.

Let me conclude by returning to the theme with which I opened these remarks.

[24] The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, P.L. 98–67, was enacted August 5, 1983; for text, see 97 Stat. 369.

The democratic ideal surely offers this hemisphere's best reason for optimism. But we must recognize that democracy is being restored under conditions that are far from optimal. The strains created by the inescapable need to adjust and stabilize economies are virtually unprecedented in their severity. Some observers believe these strains will prove so intolerable that they will prove incompatible with democracy.

This concern calls for closer examination. It implies that democracy is a luxury—a secondary and dependent superstructure to be erected only when certain prior conditions are met, a superstructure desirable only after basic choices have already been made. Some advocates of this view also seem to be saying that genuine democracy is not possible at all in most of Latin America.

My government holds a different view. We believe that it should be a source of confidence that the people of this hemisphere are turning to democracy not in times of plenty but in hard times—times demanding solutions to hard-to-resolve problems. In our view, democracy is a problem-solving mechanism. Democracy is not a luxury but a necessity. It is not a superstructure but a foundation.

As I noted earlier, democracy and free elections offer the best means of distributing power within a nation and therefore the surest way to prevent tensions from breaking down into internal violence. But democracy and freedom of expression also provide the best route to increased public understanding of complex economic issues and to public support for the austerity that present circumstances require. And democracy's consultative process offers the best means of translating the people's instinctive longing for peace into government policy.

My government's support for the Contadora effort is not merely a polite bow to a helpful diplomatic initiative. It is support for the *substance* of a process whose 21 points underscore our commitment to defending democracy where it is threatened, to helping build democracy where it does not already exist, and to insisting that the abridgment of democracy from whatever quarter must not be taken lightly by our community of nations.

I believe that historians of this period will record that the people of this hemi-

sphere turned to democracy not as an appealing afterthought but as the best means by which their problems could best be resolved. It is the policy of the U.S. Government to support this historic movement with all appropriate means. We are convinced that democracy is possible—indeed, that for the common good, it must succeed.

Thank you.

B. Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean

Document 609

Transcript of the Department of State Daily Press Briefing, January 7, 1983 (Extract) [1]

Arms Sales to Guatemala

MR. HUGHES. Good afternoon. I do have an announcement on Guatemala.

After extended consultations with the Congress and analysis of the situation in Guatemala, the Department has decided to permit the cash sale to the Government of Guatemala of previously requested spare parts and safety-of-flight items under the Foreign Military Sales Program. This decision has been communicated to the Government of Guatemala by our Ambassador to that country.

This decision on specific FMS items is part of a broader relationship which includes the disbursement of some $10 million in economic support funds already made available under that portion of the Caribbean Basin Initiative which passed Congress during the past session. [2] This assistance addresses the pressing economic difficulties which the Government of Guatemala shares with its other regional neighbors.

The potential sales which could result from this decision would constitute the first such FMS sales to the Government of Guatemala since the late 1970s, except for $15,000 in FMS training. The decision was made in light of human rights improvements which have taken place in Guatemala since the Rios Montt government came to power in March of 1982.

In this regard, while we want to see further progress in Guatemala in promoting respect for human rights, President Rios Montt has taken significant steps in this area. Progress has been made.

Similarly, we look forward to the continuing development of the democratic process. Since General Rios Montt assumed power on March 23 of last year, political violence in the cities has declined dramatically; recently there are indications that the level of violence in the countryside has declined as well; villagers have been provided food and medical supplies along with the means to defend themselves; plans are underway for the election of a constituent assembly; the Indian population is increasingly participating in the country's political process; the President Rios Montt has been attacking corruption within the government.

The government has declared its desire to cooperate with independent human rights groups and United Nations agencies, and has permitted a number of private groups to visit the country.

These are steps which we feel should be recognized and encouraged.

Q. Copies?

A. Surely.

Q. How much are the sales worth?

A. The total, and I could make this list available, is about $6,300,000. It's about larger-items in that list a million dollars for spare parts for UH-1H helicopters; about $1,350,000 for the inspection and repair of three helicopters; about $260,000 for the overhaul of three helicopter engines; about $2.9 million for radio equipment; and after that the amounts get—about half a million dollars for earth-moving equipment, and after that the items get progressively smaller.

Q. Could we get that list?

A. Sure, we'll make that list available.

Q. Why do you say the Department has decided? Is this not a decision that would have to be made by the President?

A. No, I think it is—I can give you a little elaboration on that, I think.

I may have to go back and do a little homework on that, but I think, basically, as you know, there's been consultation with Congress, but basically it is the Secretary's decision.

Q. These are all government-to-government sales; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Is this sale expected to have any impact on any restrictions on private sales? I don't know what the restrictions on private munitions sales to Guatemala are.

A. Neither do I.

Q. Does this mean that the Department has independently investigated the reports of massacres by the Guatemalan military and found them blameless?

A. I think what it means is that the Department is satisfied that there is progress in the right direction. As I already said, we want to see more progress, but the Department thinks that the progress that has been made should be rewarded, remarked upon and that this is an incentive for further movement in the right direction.

Q. Has there been an Embassy investigation of these reports of military involvement in the massacres in some of the villages?

A. Can't answer that specific question, but, as I say, the Department is satisfied overall.

On the response to Don's specific question, the appropriate legislation is the Arms Export Control Act, [3] and the Secretary of State is assigned responsibility for decisions of this type.

Q. Does this decision, and what you've said about the broader relationship—whatever the words were—presage a much larger program of the United States military assistance to Guatemala in the future? Do you see it likely developing into something a good deal bigger than this one sale?

A. We are talking specifically about these items which I listed today. I think if there were to be further requests, they would be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Q. But as you pointed out, there has been no sale of this kind for a number of years.

A. That's right.

Q. And you're saying you see progress in the right direction?

A. That's right.

Q. It seems to me it sort of suggests that this is the beginning of a new phase in the relationship. Is that the way you see it?

A. I think we're going to stand on the language we've offered you. We see progress. We look for more progress. We have before us at the moment this decision, and we've made this decision. It's kind of hypothetical to—

Q. Do you have any other decisions under study about further aid to Guatemala?

A. To Guatemala?

Q. Yes.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Other than that list, have you got something else that's been submitted by that government for military assistance?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Arms, ammunition?

A. Not to my knowledge.

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[1] Source: Office of Press Relations, Department of State. John Hughes, Department of State Spokesman, conducted the briefing which began at 12:25 p.m.

[2] Regarding the Caribbean Basin Initiative, see *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1982*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Committee Print (Washington, 1983), pp. 58–67.

[3] P.L. 90–629, enacted October 22, 1968; for text, see 82 Stat. 1320; amended by P.L. 94–329, enacted June 30, 1976; for text, see 90 Stat. 729.

Central America and in particular with respect to El Salvador.

I think that as Mr. Leach indicated we all agree with your very firm condemnation of those who would attempt to shoot themselves into power. But what we find lacking so dramatically is a balance of condemnation, a balance of condemnation against the acts of violence that the Salvadoran administration or certainly forces within that administration is committing upon its own people. Last year alone, death squads and members of the armed security forces were responsible for at least 5,500 political assassinations, probably much more, because these are only the documented cases. Yet we are supporting this Government to the extent of almost $300 million a year.

I would like to ask a two-part question. First, you condemn rightfully the violence of the left, but how would you characterize the violence of the administration that we are supporting? How would you characterize their continuance of death squads? How would you characterize their continued tolerance if not direction of the violence and brutality of members of their security forces?

More specifically, since there is an apparent intransigence on the part of the administration to redirect its policy toward El Salvador, could you tell the committee and the American people how long this war is going to take? I think the American people have a right to know that. How long does the State Department think then that the war, the singleminded pursuit of a military victory in El Salvador, is going to take; what is it going to cost; and what is going to be the loss in American prestige as we continue to support repressive and authoritarian forces that commit the kind of human rights abuses we have witnessed?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Well, first of all, Congressman, we do submit a report every 6 months that catalogs the situation as we are able to understand it. And I think from what I can judge, quite a thorough job is done. And we try to make an assessment and submit that assessment to the Congress of whether or not there is progress—not whether or not there is exactly the kind of situation that we would like, because, obviously, there is not, but whether there is progress. And so far it has been possible to identify quite a few factors in the situation that seem to represent progress. Progress in a situation that is far from the sort of situation that we would find genuinely desirable.

Now, I think our biggest problem is the fact that you have an insurgent group that is being supplied with armaments from outside, and which is trying to disrupt that government. That presents a problem which is a severe one for that group, and we have been trying to work at it through the development and implementation of the San Jose principles that I think are excellent principles, and which we have been trying to get out in front of people and bring into effect, because it would have the effect, if they were adopted, of reducing drastically the level of violence in that area, and it would have the effect of giving people much greater opportunity to develop their economic well-being and proceed in a much more normal life. I have no way of putting a time down on this, but we certainly are following not just a two-track approach, but a multitrack approach on the one hand helping that Government have the ability to withstand the armed attacks of the insurgents, other than trying to help create conditions under which economic development can take place. And at the same time do what we can to create an environment in the region as a whole that will lead people to more sensible arrangements than now exist.

So there is an effort on the one hand to hold firm against this military challenge, from outside, and on the other hand to develop in a constructive way both economic conditions that are an improvement and a constructive alternative to what is going on at present.

MR. FEIGHAN. Mr. Secretary, I have read the reports of the administration. What I find disturbing, though, is the refusal to be candid in its assessment of what is taking place in El Salvador today, and its refusal to condemn the kind of violence from an administration that we are supporting.

In fact, as I recall, we all do, Dean Hinton, the American Ambassador to El Salvador, made a very candid statement last October criticizing the behavior of the Salvadoran Government, certainly in its tolerance of the death squads and the kind of violence taking place at its own hands.

And he was publicly reprimanded for these candid remarks. [15]

SECRETARY SHULTZ. He is supported by the President implicitly. Dean Hinton is a very respected and well-supported Ambassador.

. . . . . .

MR. GARCIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be very brief. I would like to go back to the statement on the two-track approach to negotiations in El Salvador. It was a quote from Assistant Secretary Enders. The following week, our Secretary [*Ambassador*] to the United Nations, Ms. Kirkpatrick, said we are staying the course. Are you saying that it was not the case at all. Was Mr. Enders misquoted?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. It is very difficult to conduct anything when there are reports circulating around all the time allegedly based on what some unnamed person said that are not correct. And we simply cannot spend all our time commenting on every newspaper story that comes along.

Now, the burden of the newspaper story, and what I sought to correct was that had the U.S. Government decided that what we needed now was to encourage a negotiation between the guerrilla and the Government of El Salvador, bringing the guerrillas somehow into the Government, that approach we reject. I don't know where that came from. It was not correct. And that is what I had in mind in commenting on Mr. Kostmayer. I don't think we should get ourselves in a position of allowing somebody to shoot their way into a government.

MR. GARCIA. I have no problem with—

SECRETARY SHULTZ. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have a policy of trying to bring about reconciliation, of setting out ideas for how a more peaceful and constructive situation can exist. But as for the shooting your way into the Government approach, we don't go for it.

MR. GARCIA. I appreciate that. But the Washington Post reported that it was a statement made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders. The same Mr. Enders was written about by a leading columnist in the New York Times, Sidney Schaumburg, on the last days of our fiasco in Southeast Asia. Mr. Secretary, if he was misquoted in the last days of Cambodia, is he being misquoted again? There seems to be a consistency within his inconsistency. The problem is that this story was written by a very reputable newspaper, and the story in the New York Times by a columnist, by a very reputable reporter. Both stories were talking about the same individual, at a crucial moment in American history.

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Well, I am afraid there is always a problem with people saying what somebody said to somebody. I sat in the Cabinet room the other day and heard the President initiate what I thought was a pretty good rule. I try to follow it myself. That was, if somebody in this administration has something they want to say, let them say it on the record and identify themselves. Then we know what we are talking about. But there is all this constant unnamed White House source, unnamed State Department source, unauthorized and what not. And it is a will-o'-the-wisp. So if somebody has something to say, get up and say it, the way you people all do. Let's grow up, be men and women, speak for ourselves on the record.

. . . . . .

Document 613

Statement by President Reagan, February 22, 1983 [16]

Presentation of Freedom Foundation Award to Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga

Please be seated. It's a great pleasure to welcome all of you here this morning.

[15] For text of Hinton's speech of October 29, 1982, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982*, p. 1479.

[16] Source: White House Press Release, February 22, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the *Continued*

We're here to honor one of the foremost statesmen in our hemisphere and certainly our good friend and my good friend, the Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica.

Prime Minister Seaga's being awarded the 1982 American Friendship Medal by the Freedom's Foundation for his efforts to further democratic institutions and the free market economy and for his courageous leadership in the cause of freedom for all people. Few people are more deserving of this tribute than Prime Minister Seaga. People often say that freedom is a worthy ideal and it works. The proof of this axiom is reflected in the achievements in Jamaica of the man we're honoring today.

Before Prime Minister Seaga, there was violence and lawlessness. Now, there's peace and growing respect for the law. Before, there was despair about the future. Now, there is hope and expectation of better times ahead. In the recent past, the economy was declining. And now, through free enterprise, it is growing. And a short time ago few new jobs were being created and now there are significant employment opportunities. Without the political and economic freedom characteristic of democratic societies, these results would have been impossible.

Jamaica's demonstrating to its neighbors who share its structural economic problems and resulting political polarization that conditions of freedom and economic opportunity lead to greater prosperity and peace for all. Prime Minister Seaga's accomplishments are not limited to what he's done in Jamaica in just over 2 years. He has long opposed totalitarian inroads in the Caribbean Basin. He has fought long for the adherence of Basin states to the principles of free elections, respect for basic human rights and other democratic ideals that we all cherish.

Long-term prosperity cannot be achieved without internal conditions of political freedom and economic opportunity. But external assistance is often necessary to help overcome structural economic problems that impede development. This is particularly true in Caribbean Basin nations whose small economies are especially vulnerable to external shocks. Prime Minister Seaga's ideas about the need for outside trade and investment incentives to foster the region's economic development were an important intellectual force contributing to the development of my Caribbean Basin Initiative/CBI proposal to Congress last year.

Prime Minister Seaga has been the CBI's most persistent and eloquent Caribbean Initiative advocate and spokesman. And I am deeply disappointed that the CBI did not pass the Senate last December. [17] Last week, I sent up to Congress some legislation—on Friday as a matter of fact—on the CBI as one of our highest priorities. [18] And I am hopeful that it will pass quickly in this session.

A footnote in the text printed in *Weekly Compelation of Presidential Documents* inicates that the Congress knows this legislation is essential to help the Basin countries cope with economic difficulties not of their own making if their people are to have a better future.

In giving this prestigious award to Prime Minister Seaga, the Freedoms Foundation is recognizing a true friend of people everywhere who desire a better life through freedom and economic opportunity. And for that reason, he is, also, a friend of the United States.

It is now my great pleasure to present Dr. Robert Miller, the President of the Freedoms Foundation, who will present the American Friendship Medal to Prime Minister Seaga.

President; printed also in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 28, 1983, pp. 268–269. The ceremony was held in the State Dining Room of the White House. The President began his remarks at 10:02 a.m.

[17] Regarding congressional action on the Caribbean Basin Initiative during 1982, see *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1982*, pp. 58–67.

[18] For the President's message to the Congress, February 18, 1983, see *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 21, 1983, pp. 253–254.

Document 614

Address by President Reagan Before the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers, March 10, 1983 [19]

"It Isn't Nutmeg That's at Stake in the Caribbean and Central America. It Is the U. S. National Security"

Thank you. (Applause) Thank you, Bernie, for your kind introduction and all of you for your warm welcome. And Madam Secretary and distinguished guests here at the head table and you ladies and gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. I know that you and your President, Sandy Trowbridge, and the entire NAM organization have been an enormous help during the last two years, not only with advice and counsel but with a roll-up-your-sleeves effort to help pass the economic recovery programs that are ending this recession. And with your assistance we also were able to negotiate a bipartisan compromise solution to save our Social Security System. (Applause.)

You know, we didn't come to Washington at an ideal time, and we've—(laughter)—certainly had our share of problems. But the signs of recovery are springing up all around us. And there's no mistaking the fact that, at long last, America is on the mend—and the courage and the vision of the people and institutions that are represented here today deserve a big share of the credit for this hard-earned but inflation-free recovery. So, on behalf of all your fellow citizens who have been freed from the ravages of runaway inflation and can look again to a future of better times and then new opportunity, I thank you. (Applause.)

[19] Source: White House Press Release, March 10, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; also printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, March 14, 1983, pp. 376–382. The President spoke at noon at the Washington Hilton Hotel, after an introduction by Bernard J. O'Keefe, chairman of the association. The source text is the text as delivered. All brackets are in the source text.

America is meeting her challenge here at home. But there are other challenges, equally important, that we must face. And today I'd like to talk to you about one of them.

Late last year I visited Central America. [20] Just a few weeks ago, our Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, also toured the area. And in the last few days, I have met with leaders of the Congress to discuss recent events in Central America and our policies in that troubled part of the world. So, today I'd like to report to you on these consultations, and why they're important to all of us.

The nations of Central America are among our nearest neighbors. El Salvador, for example, is nearer to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts. Central America is simply too close, and the strategic stakes are too high, for us to ignore the danger of governments seizing power there with ideological and military ties to the Soviet Union.

Now, let me just show you how important Central America is. Here—and you can't see it from over there because I'm in the way—but here at the base of Central America is the Panama Canal. Half of all the foreign trade of the United States passes through either the Canal—(laughter)— [21] I've been dying to give you all an economic lesson, and you show up for geography. (Laughter and applause.) But as I say, half of that trade passes either through the Canal or the other Caribbean sea lanes on its way to or from our ports.

And, of course, to the north, as you can see, is Mexico, a country of enormous human and material importance, with which we share 1,800 miles of peaceful frontier.

And between Mexico and the Canal lies Central America. As I speak to you today, its countries are in the midst of the gravest crisis in their history. Accumulated grievances, social and economic change

[20] President Reagan departed Washington, November 30, 1982, for a trip to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras. He returned to the United States on December 4.

[21] A footnote in the text printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* indicates that the laughter was a reaction of the audience to the rushing of photographers from one side of the podium to the other in order to photograph the President and the map.

are challenging traditional ways. New leaders with new aspirations have emerged who want a new and better deal for their peoples. And that is good.

The problem is that an aggressive minority has thrown in its lot with the Communists, looking to the Soviets and their own Cuban henchmen to help them pursue political change through violence. Nicaragua, right here, has become their base. And these extremists make no secret of their goal. They preach the doctrine of a quote "revolution without frontiers" unquote. Their first target is El Salvador.

Important? Well, to begin with, there's the sheer human tragedy. Thousands of people have already died, and unless the conflict is ended democratically, millions more could be affected throughout the hemisphere. The people of El Salvador have proved they want democracy. But if guerrilla violence succeeds, they won't get it. El Salvador will join Cuba and Nicaragua as a base for spreading violence to Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica—probably the most democratic country in the world today. The killing will increase and so will the threat to Panama, the Canal, and ultimately Mexico. In the process, vast numbers of men, women and children will lose their homes, their countries and their lives.

Make no mistake. We want the same thing the people of Central America want—an end to the killing. We want to see freedom preserved where it now exists and its rebirth where it does not. The Communist agenda, on the other hand, is to exploit human suffering in Central America to strike at the heart of the Western Hemisphere. By preventing reform and instilling their own brand of totalitarianism, they can threaten freedom and peace and weaken our national security.

I know a good many people wonder why we should care about whether Communist governments come into power in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or other such countries as Costa Rica and Honduras, Guatemala, and the islands of the Caribbean. One columnist argued last week that we shouldn't care because their products are not that vital to our economy.

That's like the argument of another so-called expert that we shouldn't worry about Castro's control over the island of Grenada—their only important product is nutmeg.

Well, let me just interject right here. Grenada, that tiny little island with Cuba at the west end of the Caribbean, Grenada at the east end, that tiny little island is building now, or having built for it, on its soil and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the storage of munitions, barracks and training grounds for the military. I'm sure all of that is simply to encourage the export of nutmeg.

People who make these arguments haven't taken a good look at a map lately or followed the extraordinary buildup of Soviet and Cuban military power in the region or read the Soviets discussions about why the region is important to them and how they intend to use it.

It isn't nutmeg that's at stake in the Caribbean and Central America. It is the U.S. national security.

Soviet military theorists want to destroy our capacity to resupply Western Europe in case of an emergency. They want to tie down our attention and forces on our own southern border and so limit our capacity to act in more distant places, such as Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Japan.

Those Soviet theorists noticed what we failed to notice, that the Caribbean Sea and Central America constitute this nation's fourth border. If we must defend ourselves against large, hostile military presence on our border, our freedom to act elswhere to help others and to protect strategically vital sea lanes and resources has been drastically diminished.

They know this. They've written about this.

We've been slow to understand that the defense of the Caribbean and Central America against Marxist-Leninist takeover is vital to our national security in ways we're not accustomed to thinking about.

For the past three years, under two Presidents, the United States has been engaged in an effort to stop the advance of communism in Central America by doing what we do best, by supporting democracy. For 3 years, our goal has been to support fundamental change in this region, to replace poverty with development and dictatorship with democracy.

These objectives are not easy to obtain. We're on the right track. Costa Rica continues to set a democratic example, even in the midst of economic crises and Nicaraguan intimidation. Honduras has gone from military rule to a freely-elected civilian government. Despite incredible obstacles, the democratic center is holding in El Salvador, implementing land reform and working to replace the politics of death with a life of democracy.

So the good news is that our new policies have begun to work. Democracy, with free elections, free labor unions, freedom of religion, and respect for the integrity of the individual, is the clear choice of the overwhelming majority of Central Americans.

In fact, except for Cuba and its followers, no government and no significant sector of the public anywhere in this hemisphere wants to see the guerrillas seize power in El Salvador.

The bad news is that the struggle for democracy is still far from over. Despite their success in largely eliminating guerrilla political influence in populated areas and despite some improvements in military armaments and mobility, El Salvador's people remain under strong pressure from armed guerrillas controlled by extremists with Cuban-Soviet support.

The military capability of these guerrillas—and I would like to stress "military" capability—for these are not peasant irregulars. They are trained, military forces. This has kept political and economic progress from being turned into the peace the Salvadoran people so obviously want.

Part of the trouble is internal to El Salvador. But an important part is external: the availability of training, tactical guidance, and military supplies coming into El Salvador from Marxist Nicaragua. I am sure you have read about the guerrillas capturing rifles from government, national guard units. And recently, this has happened. But much more critical to guerrilla operations are the supplies and munitions that are infiltrated into El Salvador by land, sea, and air—by pack mules, by small boats, and by small aircraft.

These pipelines fuel the guerrilla offensives and keep alive the conviction of their extremist leaders that power will ultimately come from the barrels of their guns. Now, all this is happening in El Salvador just as a constitution is being written, as open presidential elections are being prepared, and as a peace commission—named last week—has begun to work on amnesty and national reconciliation to bring all social and political groups into the democratic process.

It is the guerrilla militants who have, so far, refused to use democratic means, have ignored the voice of the people of El Salvador, and have resorted to terror, sabotage, and bullets instead of the ballot box. During the past week, we have discussed all of these issues and more with leaders and Members of the Congress. Their views have helped shape our own thinking. And I believe that we have developed a common course to follow.

Here are some of the questions that are raised most often. First, how bad is the military situation? It is not good. Salvadoran soldiers have proved that, when they are well trained, led, and supplied, they can protect the people from guerrilla attacks. But so far, U.S. trainers have been able to train only one soldier in ten. There is a shortage of experienced officers. Supplies are unsure. The guerrillas have taken advantage of these shortcomings. For the moment at least, they have taken the tactical initiative just when the sharply limited funding Congress has so far approved is running out.

A second vital question is: Are we going to send American soldiers into combat? And the answer to that is a flat no.

A third question: are we going to Americanize the war with a lot of U.S. combat advisors? And again, the answer is, no.

Only Salvadorans can fight this war, just as only Salvadorans can decide El Salvador's future. What we can do is help to give them the skills and supplies they need to do the job for themselves.

That mostly means training. Without playing a combat role themselves and without accompanying Salvadoran units into combat, American specialists can help the Salvadoran army improve its operations.

Over the last year, despite manifest needs for more training, we have scrupulously kept our training activities well below our self-imposed numerical limit on numbers of trainers. We are currently reviewing what we can do to provide the most effective training possible to deter-

possible, I'll continue to work with the Congress for the urgent enactment of the long-term opportunities for trade and free initiative that are contained in the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

In El Salvador and in the rest of Central America, there are today thousands of small businessmen, farmers, and workers who have kept up their productivity as well as their spirits in the face of personal danger, guerrilla sabotage, and adverse economic conditions. With them stand countless national and local officials, military and civic leaders and priests who have refused to give up on democracy. Their struggle for a better future deserves our help. We should be proud to offer it. For, in the last analysis, they're fighting for us, too.

By acting responsibly and avoiding illusory shortcuts, we can be both loyal to our friends and true to our peaceful democratic principles. A nation's character is measured by the relations it has with its neighbors. We need strong, stable neighbors with whom we can cooperate. And we will not let them down.

Our neighbors are risking life and limb to better their lives, to improve their lands and to build democracy. All they ask is our help and understanding as they face dangerous armed enemies of liberty and that our help be as sustained as their own commitment.

Now, none of this will work if we tire or falter in our support. I don't think that's what the American people want or what our traditions and faith require. Our neighbors' struggle for a better future and that struggle deserves our help and we should be proud to offer it.

We would in truth be opening a two-way street. We have never, I believe, fully realized the great potential of this Western Hemisphere. Oh, yes, I know in the past we've talked of plans. We've gone down there every once in a while with a great plan somehow for our neighbors to the South. But it was always a plan in which we, the big colossus of the North would impose on them. It was our idea.

Well, on my trip to Central and South America, I asked for their ideas. I pointed out that we had a common heritage. We'd all come as pioneers to these two great continents. We worship the same God. And we'd lived at peace with each other longer than most people in other parts of the world.

There are more than 600 million of us calling ourselves Americans, North, Central, and South. We haven't really begun to tap the vast resources of these two great continents.

Without sacrificing our national sovereignties, our own individual cultures or national pride, we could as neighbors make this Western Hemisphere, our hemisphere, a force for good such as the old world has never seen. But it starts with the word neighbor. And that is what I talked about down there and sought their partnership, their equal partnership in we, of the Western Hemisphere, coming together to truly develop fully the potential this hemisphere has.

Last Sunday, His Holiness Pope John Paul II prayed that the measures announced by President Magana would "contribute to orderly and peaceful progress" in El Salvador, progress "founded on the respect," he said, "for the rights of all, and that all have the possibility to cooperate in a climate of true democracy for the promotion of the common good."

My fellow Americans, we in the United States join in that prayer for democracy and peace in El Salvador, and we pledge our moral and material support to help the Salvadoran people achieve a more just and peaceful future. And in doing so, we stand true to both the highest values of our free society and our own vital interests.

Thank you and God bless you. (Applause.)

Document 615

Statement by the Representative at the United Nations (Kirkpatrick) Before the U.N. Security Council, March 23, 1983 [23]

"Somocismo and Sandinismo Turn Out Not To Be Unlike Each Other"

Sir, may I begin, as in our custom, by congratulating you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council for this month and expressing what I think you appreciate—the very great esteem of my Government for the democratic traditions, in theory and in practice, for which your country stands as an example to us all. I desire also to express my Government's gratitude to the President of the Security Council for the past month, the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Oleg Troyanovsky, for his responsible and expeditious conduct of the office of President of the Security Council.

We are living through an extraordinary period. One of the characteristics of this extraordinary period in which we now find ourselves is a kind of proliferation of rights. New rights unprecedented in human history are invented and claimed and, as with all rights, outrage is expressed when these new rights are violated.

Twice this month we have heard a new right invoked. We have heard one country invoke the "right to aggression", and we have heard outrage expressed when its "right to overthrow a neighbouring Government" was violated. We have heard the same Government outraged again when its "right to occupy a neighbouring territory" was violated.

Now comes the Government of Nicaragua claiming yet a new right—the "right of repression of its own people", with impunity and with immunity from any consequences flowing therefrom. The Government of Nicaragua has suggested today that someone is violating its "right to repress its people" and perhaps even its "right actively to attempt to overthrow neighbouring Governments and to direct revolutions from its own territory against its neighbours", and it has come to the international community in this international forum appealing that we protect it against the frustration and bitterness of its own people while it builds a harsh new military dictatorship to rule those people, to repress those people, to which it so clearly promised democracy.

That is precisely the appeal of the Nicaraguan Government to this Council today: protect Nicaragua in the free exercise of its "right to repression", repression at home, aggression abroad.

This is a new right, which we have not heard invoked before, but the myths by which it is accompanied are, unfortunately, already familiar. Those myths are as follows: that Nicaragua is a democratic revolution, armed for the sole purpose of liberating the Nicaraguan people from the yoke of dictatorship; that Nicaragua wants to live at peace with its neighbours; and that Nicaragua is about to be invaded by the United States or Honduras or someone.

I think these three myths, because of their crucial role in the extraordinary arguments which are now recurrent, made by the Government of Nicaragua, deserve a bit of examination by this Council as we consider the proposals before us today and an appropriate response to those.

First, the myth that the Sandinista military dictatorship is a democratic revolution. God knows the people of Nicaragua have longed for a democratic revolution. They joined, almost unanimously, in a fight against the heavy-handed dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza. They joined in the struggle because they were promised democracy. The promises that the so-called Sandinista Junta made to the people of Nicaragua and to the Organization of American States (OAS) are very clear. I think those promises are interest-

[23] Source: U.N. document S/PV.2420. At eight meetings, March 23, 24, 25, 28, and 29, 1983, the U.N. Security Council considered a complaint by Nicaragua about "the grave increase in acts of aggression against Nicaragua and the Sandinista people's revolution;" text of the complaint is in U.N. document S/15651 (1983). At the end of the last meeting, the President of the Security Council, Sir John Thomson (United Kingdom), ruled that the "present stage" of the consideration of the item had been concluded.

C. Grenada

Document 654

Transcript of a White House Press Briefing, March 24, 1983 (Extract) [1]

The Grenadian Runway, an Illegitimate Soviet Military Interest

. . . . . .

Q. I wanted to change the subject briefly. The President mentioned last night [2] that 10,000 foot long runway in Grenada—two questions. First, what do we think is the purpose of this and secondly, what Soviet aircraft require a runway 2 miles long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. An illustration of the potential purpose was given by one of the Grenadian officials, I think a year ago. He said, Esprechio (phonetic) [*Selwyn Strachan?*] was his name, that—one way could serve strategic purposes for the Soviet Union. [3] And of course indirectly or directly—indirectly through Cuba or directly Soviet support made this airfield possible.

What aircraft would require such a runway? . . .

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. The majority of modern military aircraft require a runway longer than 8,000 feet.

Q. Aeroflot? (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. No—

Q. No, I mean, I'm talking about—not the MIG–23s that are in Cuba, or MIG–25s but does the—I mean does the Backfire Bomber require that or do the fighter planes need a—can they use a smaller runway than that—

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. The fact of the matter is, . . . I think this answers your question is that a 10,000 foot runway is not needed for commercial applications. It is required for military aircraft—either fighters or bombers. I don't think the Backfire Bomber actually takes as much runway as a fighter does.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. — good question.

Q. What is the difference in the President showing pictures of Grenada and Cuba? I don't mean this in an offensive way, but what's the difference in the Soviet Union saying, "Well, here's Diego Garcia and here's the Gulf of Oman, here's Oman, here's where we're building this runway and here's for our Rapid Deployment Force." I mean it seems that there's a symmetry here of perspectives.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. No, the difference is in the trend, the historic trend. In Southwest Asia, in the Gulf, there was the British base of Aden, now South Yemen, and the British have always been in Diego Garcia, directly or indirectly. There were U.S. bases and Whelis (phonetic) [*Wheelus*] Air Force in Libya. So, we had a military presence to—commensurate with our interests and commitments in the area.

The Soviets have not, in the past, had such a military presence in the Caribbean and in Central America. It is that shift that is of concern to us.

Q. But isn't it consistent with theirs—just as it is with ours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. No, it is not consistent. They are not importing the energy from the Caribbean area as we are from the Gulf. They don't have, therefore, this kind of legitimate interest that we have.

. . . . . .

[1] Source: White House Press Release, March 24, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President. The briefing was conducted on background by senior administration officials in the Roosevelt Room of the White House beginning at 2:08 p.m.

[2] See document 13.

[3] The reference is to a speech by Selwyn Strachan, Grenadian Minister of National Mobilization; regarding this speech, see document 601.



Document 655

Transcript of the Department of State Daily Press Briefing, October 20, 1983 (Extracts) [4]

U.S. Government Monitoring of Outbreak of Violence in Grenada

. . . . . .

Q. What can you tell us about the situation in Grenada?

A. The situation in Grenada?

Q. Is it Grenada or Grenada?

A. Grenada is the way I was asked. Based upon news reports from the area and principally the official broadcasts of Radio Free Grenada, we are assuming that Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was killed in the violence which erupted yesterday. [5] Diplomatic relations, as you know, with Grenada are conducted from our Embassy in Bridgetown, Barbados; and that presents, even under the best of circumstances, communications problems, but especially under these circumstances. The telephone communication has frequently been disrupted, and a number of regularly scheduled air flights to Grenada have been turned back.

The Radio Free Grenada's announcement of Prime Minister Bishop's death also announced a 24-hour curfew, which is in effect through 6 a.m. on Monday [6] and also announced was the warning that anybody out of their houses will be shot on sight. This obviously raises our concern about American nationals in Grenada.

The most recent Radio Free Grenada announcements have been made in the name of the armed forces, but apart from accepting the assertion that the military is currently ruling the country through a revolutionary council, we are in no position to make any comment on the current state of affairs or the likely outcome.

We are continuing to monitor developments there. The number of U.S. citizens in Grenada is somewhere between 800 and 1,000. Prior to the recent outbreak of violence, we had communicated our concerns about U.S. citizen welfare to Grenadian authorities, and as I say, we are obviously monitoring events with particular care in this regard.

I think that's really about all I have for you.

Q. Do you think that the U.S. policy which isolated the Bishop government economically and politically, or tried to do so, had anything to do with leading to his overthrow?

A. No, I don't think U.S. policy had anything to do with recent developments.

Q. John, in a more general way, how would this administration view political murder as a route to power in the Caribbean, especially by pro-Cuban forces?

A. I think we have to be careful here, Bill. We have to know what we're dealing with—it's basically radio reports from a regime that has announced it has taken over; and I think we need to have some first-hand reports of what has happened ourselves before we start making either judgments or analyses.

Q. How do we get those first-hand reports?

A. I think we'll leave it that we are trying to get better information than we presently have.

Q. John, have you talked to the missions they have here? They have an OAS mission.

A. I don't know. There is, obviously, a lot going on in connection with Grenada today on our part. There were meetings in the Department last night; there are meetings during the day. I don't know what kind of contact—

[4] Source: Office of Press Relations, Department of State. John Hughes, Department of State Spokesman, conducted the briefing, which began at 12:21 p.m.

[5] Bishop was placed under house arrest as a result of a coup d'état on October 13; he was freed on October 19 amidst a demonstration by thousands of supporters, and was subsequently fatally shot. The following day the Revolutionary Military Council under Army Chief General Hudson Austin announced it had assumed control.

[6] October 24, 1983.

Q. Did the Secretary participate in those meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that to understand that the Bishop killing, you can confirm that or are you just quoting the radio?

A. We're quoting the radio, and so far as we know, what the radio is saying seems to be the case.

Q. Have you tried to establish diplomatic contact with the Government of Grenada—diplomatic contact?

A. I think we're just going to leave it where we are, and give you the indication of the problems we have with communications, but not get into the diplomatic back and forth that is going on.

Q. Can you say at this time whether we have received any assurances from the current authorities in Grenada about the safety of American nationals?

A. Not in the present confused situation. We have not received assurances, to my knowledge.

Q. Have we asked for them?

A. We are certainly seeking assurances about the safety of U.S. citizens.

Q. You said that prior to the outbreak of violence, there had been a communication from the U.S. Government to the Grenadian authorities about the welfare of Americans. Can you say when that was?

A. I can't say. I think that was fairly recent. Obviously, this has been developing within the past few days. I can't say when that came—

Q. Would you say within the past several days or some weeks ago?

A. No, I think it's within the past several days.

Q. What was it that brought that concern here?

A. Well, there has been some turbulence there for the past several days.

Q. The British Government has official representation there. [7] Can anything be learned from that?

A. I am sure that many channels of communication are being worked by us.

Q. Is the military government that has apparently taken over a more hard-line Marxist government than Bishop?

A. We'll have to wait and see. As I say, it's premature for that kind of analysis.

Q. Did we make a mistake, though, in retrospect in not being more open to Bishop when he was here before the OAS, and wanted to meet and wanted to talk? [8] Was that now a mistake, in retrospect?

A. You mean, we were too open?

Q. He wanted to meet with the President and he wanted to discuss relations between the two countries, and we put him off at the time.

A. I'm not sure that statement is correct. I'd like to go back over the sequence of events; but as I recall the situation, I think we set up a meeting, and the Prime Minister did not appear for that—

Q. The President wouldn't meet with him.

A. The President—I don't think there was any suggestion the President would meet with him.

There was a meeting with Middendorf, and I'm not sure Judge Clark—Let me go back over the sequence, but certainly, there was a lot of activity on our side in order to bring about contact and dialogue there. There was no—

Q. President Reagan turned down a meeting with him?

A. There was never any suggestion that the President would meet with Mr. Bishop. There was never any suggestion on our side.

Q. Yes, but wasn't it the case that Bishop himself requested a meeting with the President, and that that was turned down?

[7] Reference is to Grenadian Governor-General Paul Scoon.

[8] Bishop made an unofficial visit to the United States from May 31 to June 9, 1983.

A. He may have done.

Q. Then, just for the record, did he meet with Judge Clark and Under Secretary Dam?

A. My own memory plagues me I'd like to be sure whom he asked to see, and who he did see and did not see. But, certainly, there was not a reluctance on our part to have him see officials in the administration.

Q. Are you taking that question, John?

A. Yes, I will take it.

Q. Also, the Barbadian Prime Minister, Tom Adams, today said that they had fears since last week that Bishop's life could have been in danger. Did you receive any of those reports, and are you in touch with the Barbadian Government over this?

A. I don't know whether we're in—as I say, we're working many channels on this, Jim; but I'm also not aware of any reports earlier.

Q. John, in connection with President Reagan's expressed concern about the 10,000 foot runway in Grenada, is the United States any more or less concerned now about the presence of that runway or the use to which it might be put?

A. Why don't we wait and see what kind of regime emerges?

. . . . . .

[MR. HUGHES.] . . . I can clear up the question of Mr. Bishop's earlier meeting. He did meet with Acting Secretary Dam, which we said at the time, and he did meet with the National Security Adviser Judge Clark. [9]

Q. Do you have a date on that, perhaps?

A. The date of the guidance was June 8. The meeting was requested by Prime Minister Bishop, with a duration of about an hour. The guidance does not say—

MR. ROMBERG. It was the day before.

A. The day before, is it? O.K., then it would be June 8th.

Q. June 7th?

A. June 7th. June 8th was the guidance, and June 7th apparently would be the meeting.

Q. Could I just follow with one other question on—

A. Yes, O.K. He's talking about yesterday, so it would be June 7th.

Q. There's a regional—

A. So I think that responds to your question about any reluctance on the part of the United States to meet with him.

Q. The United States helped establish a regional kind of defense grouping of the eastern Caribbean states, the smaller ones, headquartered in Bridgetown, in Barbados. There were reports yesterday that they were meeting. Now, has the United States been in consultation in the last 24–48 hours, say, with respect to any role it might play insofar as the regional defense group is concerned?

A. I don't know. I can't answer that, Jim. I honestly don't know.

. . . . . .

Q. John, have we alerted any naval vessels in the vicinity of Grenada to be prepared possibly to evacuate, anything of that nature?

A. Not to my knowledge, but why don't you talk to the Pentagon about our capability in that area?

Q. Can you give us a precise number, John, of how many Americans there are in Grenada?

A. The figures are a little vague, between 800 and 1,000.

Q. Most of them—

A. About 500 of those, I understand, are at the medical school. I think at St. George's, yes. Five hundred students and faculty, I think.

. . . . . .

[9] Regarding this meeting, see Dam's testimony in *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session* (Washington, 1984), pp. 23, 28–29.

Document 656

Letter From the Chairman of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (Charles) to the Ambassador in the Eastern Caribbean (Bish), Castries, St. Lucia, October 23, 1983 [10]

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request For U.S. Assistance in Grenada

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States presents her compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States to the Eastern Caribbean and has the honour to transmit herewith a request for assistance under Article 8 [11] of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. [12]

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States avails herself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of her highest consideration.

Sincerely

EUGENIA CHARLES

[ATTACHMENT]

TEXT OF OECS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

The authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met at Bridgetown, Barbados on Friday 21st October 1983, to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the Government led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the subsequent killing of the Prime Minister together with some of his colleagues and a number of other citizens. [13]

The authority is aware that the overthrow of the Bishop administration took place with the knowledge and connivance of forces unfriendly to the OECS, leading to the establishment of the present military regime.

The meeting took note of the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada.

The authority was deeply concerned that military forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members.

The authority further noted that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country. Furthermore the member states of the OECS have no means of defence against such forces.

The member governments of the organisation hold the strong view that such a situation would further undermine political, social and economic stability and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the OECS sub-region as a whole.

The authority noted that the present regime in Grenada has demonstrated by its brutality and ruthlessness that it will stop at nothing to achieve its ends and to secure its power.

[10] Source: *Grenada: A Preliminary Report*, released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, December 16, 1983, Washington, p. 4. The source of the attachment is the Department of State files. Milan D. Bish was U.S. Ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines.

[11] Reference is to the Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, done at Basseterre, St. Kitts/Nevis, June 18, 1981. Article 8 is entitled "Composition and Functions of the Defence and Security Committee." (American Society of International Law, *Legal Materials*, September 1981, p. 1166)

[12] The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is comprised of the following nations: Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

[13] Prime Minister Bishop, and several Cabinet ministers and union leaders were executed on October 19, 1983.

Under the authority of Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, the authority proposes therefore to take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries [14] to provide transport, logistics support and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean.

The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquility and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights pending the restoration of constitutional government.

. . . . . .

Document 657

Statements and Remarks by President Reagan and Dominican Prime Minister Charles, October 25, 1983 [15]

Announcement of the Sending of U.S. Troops Into Grenada

THE PRESIDENT. Ladies and gentlemen, on Sunday, October 23d, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada. [16] We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational effort with contingents from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the United States. I might add that two of those, Barbados and Jamaica, are not members of the organization but were first approached, as we later were, by the OECS and asked to join in that undertaking. And then all of them joined unanimously in asking us to participate.

Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean.

We have taken this decisive action for three reasons. First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet members, two labor leaders and other civilians, including children.

Let there be no misunderstanding, this collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilized society.

American lives are at stake. We've been following the situation as closely as possible. Between 800 and 1,000 Americans, including many medical students [17] and senior citizens, make up the largest single group of foreign residents in Grenada.

From the start we have consciously sought to calm fears. We were determined not to make an already bad situation worse and increase the risks our citizens faced. But when I received reports that a large number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island, thereby exposing themselves to great danger, [18] and after receiving a formal request for help, a unanimous request from our neighboring

[14] Non-OECS members providing assistance include the United States, Barbados, and Jamaica.

[15] Source: White House Press Release, October 25, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; also printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, October 31, 1983, pp. 1487–1489. The press conference, held in the White House Briefing Room, was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television at 9:07 a.m.

[16] *Supra.*

[17] Reference is to U.S. citizens attending St. George's School of Medicine in Grenada.

[18] In the October 25, 1983, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Spokesman John Hughes said that U.S. consular officials sent to Grenada estimated "that of those (medical students) they talked to, about 100 requested evacuation or said they would like to leave the island but were unable to." (Office of Press Relations, Department of State)

states, I concluded the United States had no choice but to act strongly and decisively.

Let me repeat, the United States objectives are clear, to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.

I understand that several Caribbean states are asking that the Organization of American States consider the situation in Grenada.

Our diplomatic efforts will be in close cooperation with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the other countries participating in this multinational effort.

And now I'm very proud to present to you the Chairman of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the Prime Minister of Dominica, Prime Minister Charles.

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES. I think we were all very horrified at the events which took place recently in Grenada.

We, as part of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, realizing that we are, of course, one region, we belong to each, are kith and kin. We all have members of our state living in Grenada. We're very concerned that this event should take place again.

It is true that we have managed to live with the regime since March '79. [19] And we felt quite clearly and we had good reason to believe that the Bishop regime was seeing it our way and was on the way to have elections. And we think this is the reason why [he] himself and his Cabinet were destroyed. Because he realized that the pressure we put on him to have elections was worthwhile, was right. And he began to see that the democratic institutions must be put in place in any of these small countries.

It is even more important in a small island state, poor island state, to have the democratic institutions. And this we've had for a long time and we've continued it and we wish to continue it. Grenada was an aberration in this respect.

But that these men, who had for all these years accepted the Bishop regime should then on—for their own reasons, and I think the power-hungry reasons—decide to destroy the persons whom they had accepted as their leaders for so long, made us realize that this sort of assassination must not be allowed to continue in our country. It means that our people there are not safe. It means that Grenadians had never been given the chance to choose for themselves the country that they want. And, therefore, it is necessary for us to see to it that they have the opportunity to do so.

To do this, we have to isolate the persons who have committed the acts that they did last week, in killing off most of the Cabinet. And we have to insure that, in fact, an interim government of persons of—not political greed, but persons who are good administrators and who are Grenadians who can run the country for a few months for the pure purpose of putting the country back on the democratic status, so that elections can take place as soon as possible. This is what you want to do so that Grenadians can choose for themselves the government they want and not have, every few years, have governments imposed on them by persons who will otherwise—

Q. —are all the Americans safe?

Q. Did you have information that the Soviets and the Cubans were behind this takeover of Grenada? Did the Joint Chiefs tell you that yesterday afternoon?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES. Want me to answer this? Yes, we do have this information. I can't give you all the details because of the safety of people concerned. But we noted with great—in the two weeks before the assassination took place the movements between the Soviet Embassies and known activists and the activists' return to Grenada, obviously a conduit between some of these Russians and some of these—

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us are all the Americans safe, sir? Can you tell us that? And how long will the American forces be on the ground there? What is their role?

[19] On March 13, 1979, the New JEWEL Movement led by Bishop overthrew the government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The new regime was recognized by the United States on March 22, 1979.

THE PRESIDENT. I could—well, we don't know how long that will be. We want to be out as quickly as possible, because this—our purpose in being there is only for them to enable—to take over their own affairs. As far as we know, the citizens are safe. We have been monitoring that very closely. And one of our prime objectives in the actual invasion that was almost instantly done was the securing of that St. George's Medical College where several hundred of the students were.

Q. The military situation, sir?

Q. Mr. President, as late as yesterday, your own spokesman said that Americans on Grenada were in no danger. [20] Did you have information that things had changed?

THE PRESIDENT. They were in no danger in the sense of that, right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that there was concern on the part of those, because already we'd been informed of several hundred who wanted to leave. But the airports were closed. There was no way of leaving. This was a case of not waiting until something actually happened to them. But we did manage to get some intelligence out of the island, intelligence information on this. And the tenuous situation was, as I said, the only authority that you could say of a governmental nature on that island was a 24-hour curfew with orders to "shoot on sight" anyone found moving in those 24 hours.

Q. What is the military situation now, sir, in Grenada? Can you tell us?

THE PRESIDENT. I can only tell you that we've secured both the airports. And the landings have been completed. But we are yielding to the influence of General Vessey in that we don't think in these early hours of that landing that we should be on the horn asking the Commanders to stop and give us detailed reports.

Q. Mr. President, do you think that the United States has the right to invade another country to change its government?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES. But I don't think it's an invasion if I may answer that question.

[20] Reference is probably to the October 24, 1983, White House Press Briefing by Deputy Press Secretary to the President Larry Speakes beginning at 12:16 p.m. (Office of the Press Secretary to the President)

Q. What is it?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES. This is a question of our asking for support. We are one region. Grenada is part and parcel of us—an organization.

Q. But you're sovereign nations, are you not?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES. And we don't have the capacity, ourselves, to see to it that Grenadians get the freedom that they're required to have to choose their own government.

Q. With what's happening in Lebanon, are we spread too thin, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. Wait one second here. No; we're not spread too thin. And let me augment what the Prime Minister just said. Once these nations which were once British colonies were freed, they—themselves—had a treaty. [21] And their treaty was one of mutual support. And Grenada is one of the countries, signatories to that treaty—and observe that treaty at one time when they had a democratic government and a constitution—a constitutional government, the constitution that was left to them by the British. So this action that is being taken is being taken under the umbrella of an existing treaty.

Q. Mr. Reagan, there are reports that a helicopter has been shot down, that a U.S. helicopter has been shot down on Grenada. Do you have any information of any U.S. casualties on the island, sir?

MR. SPEAKES. This is the last question. And we'll cut off after this last question.

Q. Do we have any information of any U.S. casualties on the island, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I have been in meetings. And we both have been busy since we arrived here. And I've only had the first report of our landings and so forth. So I don't know whether that's true or not.

THE PRESS. Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. What? It has—

Q. What reports have you received, sir—

[21] Reference is to the Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, June 18, 1981.

MR. SPEAKES. No, sir.

Q. —on the success of our operation—of the U.S. Caribbean operation?

THE PRESIDENT. What's that?

Q. What reports have you received of the success of the operation?

THE PRESIDENT. Of the initial operation, of landings, securing the immediate targets, taking control of the airports: completely successful.

Now, the Prime Minister and I are going to depart, but I know there are going to be a lot more technical questions of that kind and Ambassador Motley is here, and I'm going to put him before you to ask all of the technical questions you may have.

Q. What's the situation in Lebanon now?

MR. SPEAKES. I'm sorry. That's the last question.

Q. Could you answer the question, are the Soviets behind this? Were the Soviets behind the Grenada takeover?

MR. SPEAKES. I'm sorry. The President said that's the last question.

THE PRESS. Thank you.

Document 658

Transcript of a Press Conference by the Secretary of State (Shultz), October 25, 1983 [22]

Events Leading to Presidential Decision To Commit U.S. Forces in Grenada

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Good afternoon.

I'd like, first, to cover four points:

—First, the reasons for the President's decision to commit U.S. forces in Grenada;

—Second, our objectives as we undertake this effort;

—Third, the chain of events as they led up to the President's decision in the immediate days preceding it;

—And, fourth, the situation on the ground, very generally, as it was as of about half an hour ago.

There are two basic reasons that determined the President's decision.

First was his concern for the welfare of American citizens living on Grenada. There are roughly a thousand of them. And what we saw was an atmosphere of violent uncertainty: of the Prime Minister of the country first put under house arrest, freed from house arrest by a large number of demonstrators estimated in the thousands, with that demonstration in one way or another becoming attacked, and with the Prime Minister and some of his cabinet members being executed.

We see no responsible government in the country. We see arrests of leading figures. We see a shoot-on-sight curfew in effect.

Reports—their validity uncertain—but reports are rife about arrests, deaths, and so forth, and certainly random sporadic firing that one could hear.

All of these things are part of an atmosphere of violent uncertainty that certainly caused anxiety among U.S. citizens and caused the President to be very concerned about their safety and welfare. He felt that it is better under the circumstances to act before they might be hurt or be hostage than to take any chance, given the great uncertainty clearly present in the situation.

So that is the first reason why the President acted as he did.

Second, the President received an urgent request from the countries closest to the area, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, who of course followed these developments very closely over a long period of time, and intensively in recent days, and who determined for themselves that there were developments of grave concern to their safety and peace taking place. They brought in Jamaica and

[22] Source: Department of State Press Release 377, October 25, 1983; also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1983, pp. 69–72. The press conference was held at 3 p.m.

Barbados, and along with those two countries, made a request to the United States to help them in their desire to insure peace and stability in their area. So their analysis of the situation, in terms of the atmosphere of violent uncertainty, paralleled our own.

And so in response to the request of this Organization and in line with a request that they made pursuant to Article VIII of their treaty, [23] bringing them—the states—together, the President decided to respond to their request and to look after the welfare of American citizens in this atmosphere of uncertainty and violence.

Second, insofar as our objectives are concerned, there are basically two, and very simple:

—First of all, to secure the safety of American citizens—and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries—and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so;

—And, second, to help the OECS States establish law and order in the country and establish again governmental institutions responsive to the will of the people of Grenada.

Now third, let me just review very briefly the chain of events here.

I think you undoubtedly know that on October 13, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest and subsequently on October 19 the demonstration and the freeing of him from house arrest took place, and then his death—our information is by execution—taking place on that date.

On Thursday, October 20, as information about these developments was coming in to us here in the United States, of course the President was receiving them, and he had the Vice President chair a meeting in the Situation Room reviewing these events. That meeting took place in the late afternoon. I was not present at the beginning of the meeting since I was testifying before a Senate committee in closed-door session, but I came in with Ambassador Motley about halfway through the meeting; and essentially it was a meeting to review the grave turn of events and to consider their implications for the American citizens on the island.

[23] See footnote 11 above.

Subsequent to that meeting and on the recommendation of that group, the President decided to divert some naval ships in the area, among them the task force that was carrying the group that would be the normal routine replacement of the Marines who are in Lebanon, and diverted them in the direction of Grenada. Other ships were also included. That was essentially precautionary so that if the situation became worse, we would have a capability nearby.

There were various discussions during the course of Friday, but on Saturday, October 22, a message came in from Bridgetown in Barbados. It reached me at 2:45 a.m. in Augusta, and I discussed it with Bud McFarlane. About a half or three-quarters of an hour later, the Vice President convening the key National Security advisers, in Washington, in their discussion, we joined with him through a secure conference call to again evaluate the situation and the information in the cable.

The information in the cable basically gave the OECS states' analysis of the situation, and stated their very strong feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they were not able to do it on their own, and so they asked if we would help them. I think you should note that by this time they had not only gathered themselves together, but they had brought Barbados and Jamaica in their counsels.

We shortly got the President up and we went through this material with him, and went over the views of various people that were taking part in the Vice President's meeting. The President talked to the Vice President, talked to the Secretary of Defense, heard their views, gave his own reactions.

The meeting chaired by the Vice President reconvened at 9 on Saturday morning. The President spoke to them by telephone. I might say we considered whether or not to return, and we felt that if we were going to respond to this request, then the element of secrecy should be maintained; and if there was a sudden change in the President's plans, it would obviously call great attention to that possibility, so we stayed there.

On Sunday, October 23, of course, that night we received the tragic news from Lebanon of the attack on the Marines, and that stunning news caused the President to decide in the early morning hours that we should return right away to Washington, and we did so.

During the day on Sunday, we met first from 9 to 11, and then again later in the afternoon from 4 to 7.

However, tracking back to the decision on October 22, it was felt that we should explore carefully with the leaders of the OECS and Jamaica and Barbados their information, their analysis, and their intentions. So, Ambassador McNeil and Major General Crist [24] were sent to Bridgetown. They left early Sunday. They met in the afternoon and evening in Barbados with leaders there, and they were on the telephone to us through this period, giving us more information about the evaluation being made in the area and the options that were before us.

It was in the meeting on Sunday, that last meeting on Sunday, that the President made what I think one would call a tentative decision that we should respond to this urgent request, and that particularly so since their analysis and ours was of a very uncertain and violent situation threatening to our citizens.

On Monday, October 24, of course, the plans were being made, the forces organized, and so forth. The President met in the afternoon from roughly 2:15 to 3:30, something like that, with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs, and at the conclusion of that meeting, made a sort of semi-final military decision, he having had the advice of all his advisers the previous day that on general grounds we should proceed. I think the directive of the President to proceed was signed at about 6 p.m. yesterday.

That's kind of the chronology.

Finally, where do we stand on the ground? Both airports at Pearls and Port Salinas have been secured. The elements of the Caribbean Task Force, that is, of the countries from the Caribbean, are at Port Salinas. They landed approximately 10:45 this morning. I think there are about 150 there now. The southern campus at the medical college near Port Salinas airport has been secured. There are no reports of injuries to any American civilians.

There are pockets of resistance in the St. Georges area. I don't want to identify further precisely where, because this is an ongoing operation, and the military people need to be able to conduct their operation secure from any such disclosure. So that is the situation on the ground very generally at this point.

Now for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Charter of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member, provides that, "No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. This prohibits not only armed force, but also any other form of interference." [25]

Aren't we in violation of that Charter, sir? And if not, why not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States provides for their collective security. Those states are not members of the Rio Treaty, under which the clause that you've mentioned would operate. [26] So they have asserted themselves under their treaty, and asked us to help them.

As they view it, and perhaps you heard Prime Minister Charles today express her views most eloquently, [27] the developments on Grenada pose definite security and peace risks to them, and that is the basis for their desire to act. Some are members of the OAS, but they are not members of the Rio Treaty; and their equivalent of the Rio Treaty is their own treaty.

[24] Francis J. McNeil was the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica to July 1983; in August 1983, he became Ambassador in Residence and Research Associate in Public Diplomacy at Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In October the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, recalled Ambassador McNeil to evaluate the situation in Grenada. Major General George B. Crist was Vice Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[25] Reference is to Article 15 of Chapter III, "Fundamental Rights and Duties of States," of the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá on April 30, 1948. (2 UST 2394)

[26] Reference is to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), September 2, 1947. (4 Bevans 559)

[27] *Supra.*

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday, in testifying to the Senate, you said, "At stake is the right of a small country to decide for itself how to achieve its sovereign objectives, free of outside pressure, threat, or blackmail." You were talking about Lebanon there. But why should not that same standard apply to Grenada?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Well, it does; and in Grenada what you have at the present time is a set of events like this: In 1979, a constitutional government being in power, it was displaced by a bloodless coup, and Prime Minister Bishop has been in charge since that time.

In the events that I described to you, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest, and then executed. For all intents and purpose, there is no semblance of a genuine government present. There is a vacuum of governmental responsibility—the only genuine evidence of governmental authority being a shoot-on-sight curfew. So in the light of that and in the light of the affinity that the other states feel together, they felt that they had to protect their peace and their security by taking this action and that doing so would help reconstitute legitimate government in Grenada.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Cubans and the Soviets were in any way responsible for the execution of Prime Minister Bishop? And to what extent was the action taken, at least in general terms, as a signal to Havana and Moscow that the United States was prepared to act to protect its own security?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. I've tried to give very carefully what the considerations of the President were, and those are the reasons and the considerations for this action. This was not taken as a signal about anything else. It was taken in the light of the threat to the lives and welfare of American citizens and in the light of a request from the local states who are close to the situation and whose analysis of the situation was parallel, and in fact, went a lot further than our own.

Q. About the first part of the question, sir, do you have any reason to believe that the Soviets or the Cubans were in any way responsible for the overthrow of the Bishop government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. We don't have any direct information on that point. However, the OECS states feel that such is the case. But that is not the basis of this action on our part.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that one of our two objectives there was to help the OECS states establish law and order and governmental institutions. Does that mean that our troops will remain in Grenada until that is done? And what is your time estimate for how long that will take?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Our troops will leave as soon as they possibly can. The forces of the other countries in the Caribbean who have initiated this action will be in the lead and working with Grenadians in trying to establish law and order and some form of provisional government. It will be their decisions to make in seeing how this situation unfolds, and we will leave as soon as we possibly can, leaving the island to those who are closest to it.

Q. Does that mean that our troops will stay there until they are satisfied that law and order has been established—they, the other countries?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. I think they will be leaving very, very promptly, and we will have to decide for ourselves what the proper conditions are. We will work with the people from the other governments involved, and they will have a leading role in making these decisions.

I might say that the situation is one in which, in many of these countries, there really is no armed force at all. Prime Minister Charles expressed herself—I might say to the amusement, I guess, of Secretary Weinberger—she said, "When I took office, I decided the worst thing in the world you could have is an army, so I abolished it. I saved myself a lot of money, and I saved conflict between the military and the police force on the Island."

So, that's what they have. And their belief is that the way to have law and order is not to have military establishment, but just a police force. And I imagine that they will work somewhat along those lines, although Grenada has a population of 100,000, so you have to take measures.

I think you have the next question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has now invaded this island with help from some other area democracies in the Caribbean to save and protect the lives of a thousand people, none of whom so far as we know, I guess, have been injured or killed. Why did it take the deaths of 200 Marines in Beirut to send Commander Kelley there to start thinking about additional preventive, precautionary measures to save those lives?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Of course, we have been concerned about the safety of our Marines all along as they have been there. It didn't take this terrible tragedy to create that concern. I think it is certainly the right thing to do, to have the Commandant of the Marine Corps go promptly to the area and evaluate the security situation in a fresh way. And I think, also, that when you are establishing a presence in an operating, commercial, international airport, naturally, you make decisions that involve some sort of balance between security risks on the one hand, and what it takes for an airport to operate on the other.

I think that, certainly, in the light of the terrible tragedy, that balance needs to be shifted, and the emphasis on security will have to be heightened very significantly. But, of course, we look for General Kelley's report.

I think there is a certain pertinence to your question, because, it seems to me, and the President had to weigh this, with the violent and uncertain atmosphere that certainly was present on Grenada, the question is: Should he act to prevent Americans from being hurt or taken hostage? I think that if he waited and they were taken hostage, or many were killed, then you would be asking me that same question: "Why didn't you in the light of this clear violent situation, take some action to protect American citizens there?"

I don't want to get in the position of second-guessing myself, or the President, but rather to say, one has to weigh these considerations and be willing to take a decision in the light of all of the circumstances, and that is what the President did.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you know, Grenada is a former British colony, and the Governor-General there was appointed by the British, the person you spoke of a while ago. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament [illegible] against this and that the British did not wish to go along with it. [28]

I would like to ask you two things flowing from that. First of all, does the fact that the British do not go along with it cause some cloud over the Governor-General, the British-appointed person now being the one we look to? And, secondly, in view of their experience on the island, why did the United States disregard their recommendation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. We responded to the urgent request of the states in the area, which are now independent states. They're no longer British colonies. Although obviously the British have had great experience there, so have we. The Caribbean is in our neighborhood, too, so we have a very legitimate affinity for those people.

We responded to their request just as Barbados and Jamaica did. British or other states that may or may not have been asked—I don't have the list of who the OECS asked to help them. But each state has to take its own decision, and the President took ours.

As far as the establishment of authority on the island is concerned, we believe that the Governor-General is the logical person, given the fact that there is a vacuum of government there, and we expect that it will occur that way. We are, of course, always impressed with the views of the British Government and Mrs. Thatcher, but that doesn't mean that we always have to agree with them. Of course, we also have to make decisions in the light of the security situation of our citizens as we see it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us a report on casualties, including whether there have been Cuban casualties in combat with Americans, and the status of the Cubans and the Soviets on the island?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. I can't give you an account of casualties. I don't have that information at hand, but it will be made available as soon as we have it. I think probably the appropriate place, since they have it, is at the Pentagon.

[28] For Prime Minister Thatcher's remarks in Parliament, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe*, October 26, [illegible]

As far as the Soviet Union and Cuba are concerned, as the operation got underway, we notified both the Soviet Union and Cuba of the fact of the operation, of our intentions, and of our readiness to look to the safety of their people on the island. It's my understanding that the Soviets that are there have been identified; they are safe, and their safety is being looked to. On the other hand, in the case of the Cubans, there are many more there. I think there are some 600 Cubans there. Presumably, construction workers. But it is the case that some number—I don't know how many, and perhaps the military don't know at this point how many—are resisting and firing at our forces and, of course, that would cause us to fire back.

Q. I would like to ask two questions. One factual and one more philosophical. Who is in charge of Grenada tonight? I mean, at this minute? Where is Mr. Austin? Are we running the country, or are they still running the country? And, secondly, even though your intention may not have been to send a message, do you think anybody in the Caribbean or anywhere else in the world gets a message from this action?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. I don't. I can't identify the whereabouts of Mr. Austin who was not genuinely in charge insofar as we could see, in any case.

As far as who is running the country is concerned, the country has been in a state since the house arrest of Prime Minister Bishop, essentially, of a kind of vacuum of governmental authority. And that still exists although as the forces of the Caribbean task force are able to develop their contacts there, presumably a governmental structure will emerge.

As far as your philosophic question is concerned, of course, those who want to receive a message will have to receive it. That was not the purpose of this operation. The purpose was as I have stated it.

Q. Traditionally, in this part of the world, there's been a great concern about Yankee force, Yankee imperialism, Yankee aggression, et cetera.

How do you plan—how do you intend to counter the impression that the United States is once again using its overwhelming military superiority in this part of the world to achieve a specific, political objective?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. I think the principal point here is that the concerns and the requests for help came from the states in the region, and they have put their own forces into this picture. The fact that their forces are small in comparison with ours is only a reflection of the fact that they don't invest very much in the way of resources into military capability; and, of course, they don't have much to invest in the first place. It's in the nature of these countries that they're essentially peaceful. But they have put what they can of their own forces forward, and they have taken the lead in suggesting this, and they are there now in the early stages of this effort. And as law and order returns, they will basically be in charge; not us. So it is no effort on our part to gain control of any other country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I can just follow up. The British, who have been critical of this action, took an independent action against the Falklands last year when they thought it was necessary.

If they cannot accept the American justification, how do you think, or how many countries in Latin America do you feel will accept the American explanation now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Certainly, Jamaica, Barbados, and the Caribbean states are involved. They have asked us very explicitly, not only in the first instances I brought out, but on further probing from Ambassador McNeil, to really be sure that they had analyzed the situation carefully and they were making a thoughtful and thoroughly thought-through request, which they were and are.

I think that's the thing you have to rest on, and it seems to me people ought to recognize where this request came from; and, also, the fact that we will leave promptly. We have no intention of staying there, and the government that will be produced by the people of Grenada is entirely up to them as far as we're concerned.

Q. Just to clear up one thing, Mr. Secretary, you said that there were contacts with the Cubans and with the Soviet Union to inform them of what we were about to do, or had just done. Had there been any contacts at any level since then, and what have you heard from the Soviet Union about this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. I don't want to go into detail about diplomatic exchanges. But, of course, in general, their response has been that they expect us to look to the safety of their citizens. And certainly, as one might expect, they object strenuously to this action. [29]

The boss says I have to go. I have to go up to the House and talk to them and then the Senate. So I'm on my way to the Congress.

Document 659

Letter From President Reagan to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (O'Neill), October 25, 1983 [30]

President's Report to Congress on Deployment of U.S. Troops in Grenada

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On October 12, a violent series of events in Grenada was set in motion, which led to the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and a number of his Cabinet colleagues, as well as the deaths of a number of civilians. Over 40 killings were reported. There was no government ensuring the protection of life and property and restoring law and order. The only indication of authority was an announcement that a barbaric shoot-to-kill curfew was in effect. Under these circumstances, we were necessarily concerned about the safety of innocent lives on the island, including those of up to 1,000 United States citizens.

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) became seriously concerned by the deteriorating conditions in the member State of Grenada. The other members of the OECS are Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. We were formally advised that the Authority of Heads of Government of Member States of the OECS, acting pursuant to the Treaty establishing the OECS, met in emergency session on October 21. The meeting took note of the anarchic conditions and the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that had occurred, and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada. The OECS determined to take immediate, necessary steps to restore order in Grenada so as to protect against further loss of life, pending the restoration of effective governmental institutions. To this end, the OECS formed a collective security force comprising elements from member States to restore order in Grenada and requested the immediate cooperation of a number of friendly countries, including the governments of Barbados, Jamaica and the United States, in these efforts. In response to this call for assistance and in view of the overriding importance of protecting the lives of the United States citizens in Grenada, I have authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to participate along with these other nations in this collective security force.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, [31] I am providing this report on this deployment of the United States Armed Forces.

Today at about 5 a.m. eastern daylight time, approximately 1,900 United States Army and United States Marine Corps personnel began landing in Grenada. They were supported by elements of the United States Navy and the United States Air Force. Member States of the OECS along with Jamaica and Barbados are providing approximately 300 personnel. This deployment of United States Armed Forces is being undertaken pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces. [32]

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[29] For the Soviet reaction, see the TASS editorials printed *ibid., Daily Report: Soviet Union,* October 26, 1983, pp. K1–K12.

[30] Source: White House Press Release, October 25, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; printed also in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* October 31, 1983, pp. 1493–1494. An identical letter was sent to Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate.

[31] Reference is to a Congressional Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President, November 7, 1973; for text, see 87 Stat. 555.

[32] On October 27, 1983, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a markup session, ap-

Continued

Although it is not possible at this time to predict the duration of the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Grenada, our objectives in providing this support are clear. They are to join the OECS collective security forces in assisting the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States citizens. Our forces will remain only so long as their presence is required.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Document 660

Statement by the Representative at the Organization of American States (Middendorf) Before a Special Meeting of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, October 26, 1983 [33]

U.S. Explanation of Its Actions and Objectives in Grenada

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. Delegation would like to thank the distinguished Prime Minister of Dominica [34] for her initiative in requesting a protocolary meeting of the Permanent Council this morning. Her remarks clearly detail the grave concerns which motivated the actions of her government and other Caribbean states.

As our colleague from Saint Lucia pointed out just now, the decision to undertake this initiative was made jointly by the OECS acting pursuant to the Treaty establishing that organization. The appeal to other countries, including ourselves, the United States, for assistance was made on October 23. [35] Barbados and Jamaica, to whom a similar request for assistance was made, also responded favorably.

Pursuant to this decision, a collective security force made up of contingents from four member states of the OECS—Antigua, Dominica, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent—supplemented by units from Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States, disembarked on Grenada yesterday at dawn. Fortunately, there has been little loss of life, and internal order is being restored to the island. Earlier today—to correct a statement made earlier—about 140 citizens, many of whom had been studying in Grenada, were flown to the United States. Consular officers of the Department of State are in Grenada now to facilitate the orderly evacuation of others who desire to leave.

Let me review the extraordinary events in Grenada leading to this unprecedented situation. The slide toward anarchy in Grenada appears to have begun the evening of October 12 with an attempt by Deputy Prime Minister Coard to force out Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. Bishop, who had seized power in 1979 and established close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, was reportedly thought to be too "moderate" by the Coard faction.

The power struggle became increasingly violent. On October 19, Prime Minister Bishop, several Cabinet members, and an undetermined number of political and civic leaders were killed under still unexplained circumstances. At least 18 deaths have been confirmed and many more reported, some of them when troops opened fire on peaceful demonstrators.

After Bishop's death—and we recall his visit here in a protocolary meeting on June 1—the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) announced the dissolution of the existing Government and the formation of a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council of which PRA Commander General Hudson Austin was the nominal head. I say "nominal" because it was not at all clear that Austin or any coherent group was in fact in charge. There were numerous reports of continued jockeying for power, and the potential for further violence was obvious, especially with the imposition of a 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew. The Revolutionary Military Council itself stated that it did not purport to be a government.

I think it is this quality of menacing uncertainty—the violence, the violations of human rights, the disintegration of civilized governmental authority, the creation of a dynamic that held out the distinct prospect of further violence—that most alarmed the Eastern Caribbean states and led to their October 23 decision to assist the people of Grenada and request our help in doing so.

My government shared these concerns of the OECS countries but also had a particularly humanitarian concern. The deteriorating conditions on the island posed a threat to the continued safety of U.S. citizens living there, who number 800 to 1,000, largely medical school students and faculty. While there had been no specific threats against U.S. citizens, a number had already sought to flee, in the absence of organized evacuation efforts at great risk. The Military Council on the island had promised to reopen the airport on October 24 but did not do so, thus heightening concern over the continued welfare of these citizens. The lack of respect for human rights and the degenerating conditions, of course, also posed a threat to other foreign nationals and, indeed, to the people of Grenada.

After carefully considering these facts and all aspects of the OECS request, concluding that the peace and security of the Eastern Caribbean was threatened and that our assistance was necessary, President Reagan decided to cooperate with the regional initiative. Such humanitarian action has long been recognized as consistent with international law.

The objectives of the collective security force organized by the OECS are clear: to restore law and order, to help the people of Grenada restore functioning institutions of government, and to facilitate the departure of those who wish to leave. The presence of the collective security force will be continued for only so long as it is necessary to ensure these objectives.

This action is a reasonable and proportionate reaction to the deterioration of authority in Grenada and to the threat that this poses to the peace and security of the Eastern Caribbean. It is consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charters of the United Nations and the OAS, since it aims at the restoration of conditions of law and order fundamental to the enjoyment of basic human rights, so clearly in jeopardy in Grenada.

Regional collective security measures of the kind taken here are expressly contemplated by Article 52 of the UN Charter. Paragraph 1 of that article provides for "regional arrangements or agencies dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." The actions and objectives of the collective security force, in the circumstances described above, are consistent with these purposes and principles.

Articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter allow member states to take collective measures to maintain peace and security pursuant to certain collective security agreements. Article 22 of the OAS Charter expressly provides that measures taken pursuant to such agreements are not violations of the provisions of Articles 18 and 20 prohibiting intervention or the use of force. [36]

The OECS Treaty is a regional agreement which concerns itself in part with matters of collective security. The OECS countries are not party to the Rio Treaty; the OECS Treaty serves as their regional security arrangement. The OECS action was pursuant to Article 8 of the OECS Treaty, [37] which authorizes the OECS to

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proved, by a vote of 33 to 2, House Joint Resolution 402. It passed the House of Representatives on November 1, 1983, by a vote of 403 to 23. This resolution reads:

"Declaring that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, when United States Armed Forces were introduced into Grenada.

"*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That for purposes of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress hereby determines that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, when United States Armed Forces were introduced into Grenada."

The Senate had not taken action on the resolution by the end of the year.

[33] Source: OAS document OEA/Ser. G, CP/ACTA 543/83.

[34] Eugenia Charles. Prime Minister Charles was also chairperson of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

[35] See document 656.

[36] The Charter of the Organization of American States was signed at Bogotá on April 30, 1948. (2 UST 2394) Articles 20 and 22 are in Chapter IV, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." Article 28 is in Chapter VII, "Social Standards." Article 18 is in Chapter III, "Fundamental Rights and Duties of States."

[37] See footnote 11 above.

coordinate "the efforts of member states for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security." The OECS decision was, thus, a measure "adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties," as contemplated by Article 22 of the OAS Charter.

In addition, the OECS members were confronted by a "situation that might endanger the peace of America." In response, the OECS members took action consistent with Article 28's provision for "collective self-defense" in accordance with "measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject."

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I would like to point to a disturbing lesson which we can all draw from the tragic events in Grenada. We have seen how Cuban construction workers on that island suddenly transformed themselves into armed soldiers to resist the collective action forces. Plowshares were quickly transformed into swords. This development must be a source of concern to all states and cast doubt on the bona fides of Cuban "civilian" advisers and contingents elsewhere. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Document 661

Address by President Reagan, October 27, 1983 (Extract) [38]

"[Grenada] Was a Soviet-Cuban Colony Being Readied . . . To Export Terrorism and Undermine Democracy. We Got There Just in Time"

. . . . . .

Now I know another part of the world is very much on our minds, a place much closer to our shores: Grenada. The island is only twice the size of the District of Columbia with a total population of about 110,000 people.

Grenada and a half dozen other Caribbean islands here were, until recently, British colonies. They are now independent states and members of the British Commonwealth. While they respect each other's independence, they also feel a kinship with each other and think of themselves as one people.

In 1979 trouble came to Grenada. Maurice Bishop, a protege of Fidel Castro, staged a military coup and overthrew the government which had been elected under the Constitution left to the people by the British. He sought the help of Cuba in building an airport, which he claimed was for tourist trade, but which looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet-built long-range bombers.

The six sovereign countries and one remaining colony are joined together in what they call the "Organization of Eastern Caribbean States." The six became increasingly alarmed as Bishop built an army greater than all of theirs combined. Obviously, it was not purely for defense.

In this last year or so, Prime Minister Bishop gave indications that he might like better relations with the United States. He even made a trip to our country and met with senior officials of the White House and the State Department. Whether he was serious or not, we'll never know. On October 12th, a small group in his militia seized him and put him under arrest. They were, if anything, more radical and more devoted to Castro's Cuba than he had been.

Several days later, a crowd of citizens appeared before Bishop's home, freed him, and escorted him toward the headquarters of the military council. They were fired upon. A number, including some children, were killed and Bishop was seized. He and several members of his Cabinet were subsequently executed, and a 24-hour shoot-to-kill curfew was put in effect. Grenada was without a government, its only authority exercised by a self-proclaimed band of military men.

There were then about 1,000 of our citizens on Grenada, 800 of them students in St. Georges University Medical School. Concerned that they would be harmed or held as hostages, I ordered a flotilla of ships, then on its way to Lebanon with Marines—part of our regular rotation program, to circle south on a course that would put them somewhere in the vicinity of Grenada in case there should be a need to evacuate our people.

Last weekend, I was awakened in the early morning hours and told that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, had sent an urgent request that we join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada.

They were proposing this action under the terms of a treaty, a mutual assistance pact that existed among them. These small, peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don't have armies at all, and the others have very limited forces. The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.

We knew we had little time and that complete secrecy was vital to ensure both the safety of the young men who would undertake this mission, and the Americans they were about to rescue. The Joint Chiefs worked around the clock to come up with a plan. They had little intelligence information about conditions on the island. We had to assume that several hundred Cubans working on the airport could be military reserves. As it turned out, the number was much larger and they were a military force. Six hundred of them have been taken prisoner, and we have discovered a complete base with weapons and communications equipment which makes it clear a Cuban occupation of the island had been planned.

Two hours ago we released the first photos from Grenada. They included pictures of a warehouse of military equipment—one of three we've uncovered so far. This warehouse contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists. Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well, it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time.

I can't say enough in praise of our military—Army rangers and paratroopers, Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel—those who planned a brilliant campaign, and those who carried it out. Almost instantly, our military seized the two airports, secured the campus where most of our students were, and are now in the mopping-up phase. It should be noted that in all the planning, a top priority was to minimize risk, to avoid casualties to our own men and also the Grenadian forces as much as humanly possible. But there were casualties, and we all owe a debt to those who lost their lives or were wounded. They were few in number, but even one is a tragic price to pay.

It's our intention to get our men out as soon as possible. Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica—I called that wrong, she pronounces it Dominica—she is chairman of OECS. She's calling for help from Commonwealth nations in giving the people their right to establish a constitutional government on Grenada. We anticipate that the Governor General, a Grenadian, will participate in setting up a provisional government in the interim.

The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisors and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island. At the moment of our landing, we communicated with the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union and told them we would offer shelter and security to their people on Grenada. Regrettably, Castro ordered his men to fight to the death and some did. The others will be sent to their homelands.

You know, there was a time when our national security was based on the standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coasts. And, of course, a Navy to keep the sea lanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well-being.

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[38] Source: White House Press Release, October 27, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; also printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, October 31, 1983, pp. 1501–1502; for full text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1497–1502. For the President's remarks on Lebanon in this speech, see document 384. The address began at 8 p.m. and was broadcast live nationwide on television and radio from the Oval Office of the White House.

The world has changed. Today, our national security can be threatened in far away places. It is up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them. Sam Rayburn [39] once said that freedom is not something a nation can work for once and win forever. He said it's like an insurance policy; it's premiums must be kept up to date. In order to keep it, we have to keep working for it and sacrificing for it just as long as we live. If we do not, our children may not know the pleasure of working to keep it, for it may not be theirs to keep.

In these last few days, I have been more sure than I've ever been that we Americans of today will keep freedom and maintain peace. I've been made to feel that by the magnificent spirit of our young men and women in uniform and by something here in our nation's capital. In this city, where political strife is so much a part of our lives, I've seen Democratic leaders in the Congress join their Republican colleagues, send a message to the world that we're all Americans before we're anything else, and when our country is threatened, we stand shoulder to shoulder in support of our men and women in the Armed Forces.

. . . . . .

Document 662

U.N. Security Council Draft Resolution, October 27, 1983 [40]

Condemnation of "Armed Intervention in Grenada"

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements made in connection with the situation in Grenada,

Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, [41]

Recalling also the principles concerning the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, [42]

Reaffirming the sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada freely to determine its own political, economic and social system, and to develop its international relations without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,

Deeply deploring the events in Grenada which led to the killing of the Prime Minister, Mr. Maurice Bishop, and other prominent Grenadians,

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or to act in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Gravely concerned at the military intervention taking place and determined to ensure a speedy return to normalcy in Grenada,

Conscious of the need for States to show consistent respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Deeply deplores* the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State;

[39] Sam Rayburn, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.

[40] Source: U.N. document S/16077/Rev.1. The draft resolution was submitted by Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe. The vote on this draft Security Council resolution condemning the U.S. operation in Grenada was 10–1 (China, France, Guyana, Malta, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and Zimbabwe, in favor; United States, against), with three abstaining (Togo, United Kingdom, and Zaire). The United States vote against the resolution constituted a veto of the resolution.

[41] Reference is to the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 25/2625, adopted on October 24, 1970.

[42] Reference is to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 36/103, adopted on December 9, 1981.

2. *Deplores* the death of innocent civilians resulting from the armed intervention;

3. *Calls on* all States to show strictest respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Grenada;

4. *Calls for* an immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the development of the situation in Grenada and to report to the Council within forty-eight hours on the implementation of this resolution.

Document 663

Transcript of an Interview With the Representative at the United Nations (Kirkpatrick), October 30, 1983 [43]

International Reaction to Grenada Mission

MR. KALB. Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, head of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations. A political scientist and specialist in Latin American politics, Ambassador Kirkpatrick has played a key role in shaping administration policies in that region. She holds Cabinet rank and is a member of the National Security Council.

Our reporters today are Henry Trewhitt, of the *Baltimore Sun;* Robert Novak, of the *Chicago Sun-Times;* Hedrick Smith, of the *New York Times;* and to open the questioning, our regular panelist, Bill Monroe of NBC News.

MR. MONROE. Madam Ambassador, the *New York Times* says this morning that the U.S. will pay a heavy cost for the invasion of Grenada. Quoting the *Times* editorial, ". . . the cost is loss of the moral high ground: a . . . demonstration to the world that America has no more respect for laws and borders, for the codes of civilization, than the Soviet Union." What is your feeling about the cost?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I think the *New York Times*—With all due respect, I think the *New York Times* is simply wrong. I think, in fact, that the—those nations who may seriously feel that it was an immoral act already thought we were an immoral power. I expect that most of the nations in the region will breathe a sigh of relief, as a matter of fact, at the success of the operation and at the removal of what a good many of them recognize was a clear and present danger to their own security.

I think that, furthermore, the feeling of enhanced security and the certain knowledge that the legal grounds of our operation were sound will prove to be much stronger than any kind of reflexive Latin disapproval of U.S. intervention any place in the region.

It's interesting to note that the countries of Central America, with the single exception of Nicaragua, and several of the most key countries in Latin America have been very mild and ambiguous and ambivalent in their comments on the action, because they understand the extent to which their security depends on a confident, strong American presence.

MR. MONROE. Well, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, not a single nation except those allied with us in the action against Grenada have spoken up in our defense. The French and the Dutch voted against us in the Security Council; [44] the Mexicans and other members of the OAS have criticized us. Can you cite a single provision of international law, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, under which we have the right to invade a nation like Grenada if we feel there's chaos there or we worry that some of our people may be in danger?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Oh, certainly. And let me just say that I did that in my speech before the U.N., in which I presented the U.S. case. [45] I said that the U.N. Charter does not simply forbid the use of force under all circumstances as an absolute. The U.N. Charter leaves very ample

[43] Source: NBC News. Ambassador Kirkpatrick was interviewed in Washington on the NBC program, "Meet the Press" by Henry Trewhitt of the *Baltimore Sun,* Robert Novak of the *Chicago Sun-Times,* Hedrick Smith of the *New York Times,* and Bill Monroe of NBC News. Bernard Kalb of NBC News served as moderator.

[44] See footnote 40 above.

[45] For text of Kirkpatrick's speech on October 27, 1983, before the U.N. Security Council, see Department of State *Bulletin,* December 1983, pp. 74–76.

grounds for the use of force against force in protection of the other rights and values in the Charter. Those other values include security and peace and democracy, in fact, even in the U.N. Charter. We acted, of course, at the request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. We acted—You say "not a single nation." If I may say so, that's also mistaken. We acted with the full approval of other key nations in the Caribbean. Jamaica and Barbados, for example, also participated in the action.

MR. MONROE. Those six.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Those six, yes, but those are the key states in the region.

(Announcements)

MR. SMITH. Madam Ambassador, you say the legal argument for our going into Grenada is sound. If that's the case, why hasn't it been more persuasive with old allies, like the British, the French, the West Germans, the Italians, all of whom have either criticized us or voted against us in the U.N.?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Let me say that the—our European allies are principally, I believe, allied with us on matters that concern the defense of Europe. NATO was one of the collective security agreements which President Harry Truman negotiated and the Congress ratified after World War II, but it was only one of those. They do not necessarily show very much sensitivity to U.S. security in other regions, and we don't necessarily approve of their policies all the time. The fact is that we Americans have a somewhat sentimental picture about our relations with our European allies in international affairs. That alliance has always been focused on the defense of Europe, and they have repeatedly undertaken actions without consulting with us, for example, in other parts of the world. Sometimes we don't approve of those actions either. And we undertake actions independently of them, and sometimes they don't approve of those.

This is an action which above all concerned our region, our region geographically. It's only—It was not at all involved in NATO. It's importantly related, I think, to our ability to fulfill our NATO obligations in the long run, but in an indirect kind of way.

I think what's important is that the states of the region who were concerned approved the action and, indeed, requested it, and wouldn't necessarily approve what we did in—to help in the defense of Europe.

MR. SMITH. You say that they're mainly focused on Europe, but we backed the British when they were involved in the battle of the Falklands Islands, very much involving Latin America. The British didn't back us on this one. How do you explain that, and how do you react to that?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Well, frankly, I find that rather difficult to explain.

MR. SMITH. What message are the Nicaraguans and others in Central America supposed to get from this action? Does Nicaragua now have to worry about American intervention down there? Should they? Is that the intended message?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. If I may say so, Nicaragua worries all the time about U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. From the perspective in the U.N., I'm very sensitive to that, because every few months they come to the U.N. and say that we are about to launch a massive U.S. military invasion of Nicaragua. They did that first about a year-and-a-half ago. I think that Nicaragua feels continuously threatened, and what they feel threatened by is the growing competence and confidence of their own neighbors—of Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala—and by the Contadora process, which has now worked out some points, many of which are not very acceptable to Nicaragua. [46]

MR. NOVAK. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, if there had not been one American student on the island of Grenada, or no substantial number of them, do you think this administration would have launched the operation at the request of the Eastern Caribbean states?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I don't know. I argued in the United Nations that I believed there was a combination of factors, each of which played a significant role in our decision, legal factors, and—each of

[46] Reference is to attempts by the Contadora Four (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama) to promote peace in Central America. See documents 628 and 644. See also OAS document OEA/Ser.G, CP/INF.2111/84, January 16, 1984.

which figure in the legal case for our action.

First was indeed, as the President has emphasized, Secretary Shultz has emphasized, the protection of innocent American nationals, some—nearly a thousand of them on that island and in a highly vulnerable condition. Second was the request of the Organization of East Caribbean States. Third was the virtual vacuum of power on the island and—which was accompanied by very great violence.

MR. NOVAK. Let me re-phrase it, Madam Ambassador. If there were no American nationals in substantial numbers, was there ample justification on these other reasons for launching the operation?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. That's one of what my husband calls what-would-you-do-if-your - grandmother - died - next - Thursday questions. You know, I don't know. I haven't addressed that question very specifically. I know that the importance—that the defense of American nationals on the island figured very importantly in the President's decision.

MR. NOVAK. I wonder if I could quickly switch to Lebanon. As Ambassador to the United Nations, would you favor the replacement of the American Marines by a United Nations peacekeeping force?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Oh, under the right circumstances, with the right mandate, of course. I'm sure you know that the United States and the other members of the multinational force have explored at the U.N. ways of introducing UNIFIL troops in, the United Nations troops, into the region of the Chouf, and the Bekka, and other highly controverted areas of Beirut—of Lebanon, in and around Beirut.

The Soviet Union is a member of the United Nations Security Council with a veto power. They have not been enthusiastic about permitting U.N. troops into any area in which it looks like one of their client states, or close associates at least, which Syria is, might move. And so they've been very, very negative about any such move. I personally think that U.N. peacekeeping forces could do a very valuable job there.

MR. TREWHITT. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, you mentioned earlier that the allies in Europe were concerned first of all about issues that were related to NATO European defense. How does the Grenada invasion play in that regard, do you think? Is it going to change the attitude of allied governments regarding the deployment of INF weapons in Europe, that sort of thing?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. No, I don't think so, I think that those questions are going to be settled on the basis of European considerations.

MR. TREWHITT. What about European publics, which have been very vocal against INF deployments? How much ammunition does an event such as this give them?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I think that the question of deployments, missile deployments in Europe will be settled on the basis of European considerations, European security, finally. I really, truly do. I think that the Soviet and related—domestic Communist Party propaganda apparatuses in those governments, in those countries—excuse me—in those countries is sufficiently effective that they find grounds for attacking us and casting doubts and aspersions on our motives and on our behavior virtually regardless of what we do, frankly.

MR. TREWHITT. I'm going to do a quick 180 degree turn here, because I may not have another chance to ask you about your personal plans. I've heard you nominated for everything from immediate retirement to Secretary of State. Are you preparing to leave the United Nations?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I'm not preparing anything.

MR. TREWHITT. Do you plan to stay in office till the end of this term?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I'm not pre—I'm not given to long-range planning.

MR. KALB. Madam Ambassador, I'd like to go back to Grenada and try to rephrase a question asked earlier. Most people, I think, have praised the President in terms of trying to protect American lives on Grenada. The issue that comes up is whether the United States can arrogate to itself the right, because of its military power in Latin America, to change a government there, to overthrow a government there. How do you respond to that?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I think that, like all questions of politics and international affairs and law, one has to look at the concrete circumstances and not at the abstract

question. I think that given the concrete circumstances in Grenada, that the legal, as well as the moral and political case for our action, was very strong. I think that we would have to look at other concrete cases to make decisions about what would be justified in other concrete cases.

MR. KALB. But you're a specialist in this area. You know the long shadow likely to be cast by another use of massive American military power to accomplish a political aim. Does this bother you? Are you concerned about this?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Quite frankly, as a specialist in the area, I am not, and I will tell you why. I was in Venezuela two years ago, and a very high level official in that government, who shall go nameless, looked at a map of the region. It showed Grenada and Venezuela. They were 90 miles apart, and he drew a circle from Grenada, which circle was—reflected the range of a MIG leaving Grenada to show what kind of control of air—how far that MIG could attain, how far over Venezuela that MIG could get from Grenada. I have had other Latin officials show me, in very concrete terms, where the sea lanes—what it meant to the sea lanes, through which all shipping that passes through the Panama Canal into the Atlantic pass, with regard to Grenada.

I have been just recently in Central America, and I have listened to very high level officials and influential private sector journalists, publishers, writers, teachers, businessmen, all kinds of people—labor leaders—in those countries worry desperately about the vulnerability of their governments and their countries to the growing superior and aggressive force of Nicaragua in the region. I do not, quite frankly, believe that this use—limited, specific, purposeful—of force by the United States, in conjunction with the other states in the region, is going to produce the sort of backlash that you're describing in the area, and I do say that most earnestly, as someone with a longstanding interest in this area.

MR. MONROE. Many Americans support the administration action in Grenada, but I wonder if you're saying that that action, that military success, had no moral cost, no public opinion cost, in view of the unanimity shown by nations at the United Nations, at the Organization of American States, against the action we took, with the exception of the U.S. and the six Caribbean islands?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Now wait a minute. Let's not say that there was unanimity, because there wasn't unanimity. There wasn't unanimity at all, and what there was was a Security Council vote, which was heavily against us.

MR. MONROE. Eleven to one.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. But let me remind you—with three abstentions—let me remind you that there are—the United States regularly loses in the United Nations, in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. No nation is more regularly both a loser and a victim at the United Nations than the United States except Israel, who is even more totally a loser and a victim.

The United Nations is a political system, and it's a political system which is largely controlled by our adversaries. I've been talking about this ever since I've been there. It is not news when the United States is outvoted at the United Nations. It only becomes news when, for some reason or another, we're able to eke out a victory in some U.N.—

MR. MONROE. In view of the international reaction to this situation in Grenada, with nations such as the French, the Dutch, the Pakistanis, the Mexicans, and others obviously condemnatory of what we have done, are you telling us that there was no moral cost and no public opinion cost to that action?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Monroe, I'm telling you that I don't think there's any moral cost to that action. I'll go beyond that and say that I don't think there's any moral cost in France with the French government. I would say that there are at least as many Frenchmen, attentive Frenchmen who are shocked by the decision of their government to vote for that resolution as who support it. If you follow the French press, which I do all the time, let me say, I think that's quite clear. Many Frenchmen see our action in Grenada as at least as defensible, and perhaps even more understandable, morally, politically, legally, as France's action, for example, in Chad to help protect that country against terror.

MR. SMITH. Madam Ambassador, you've made a major point, and so has the President, about protecting American citizens on Grenada, and certainly Americans here want to see that done. But there are some who contend that not all was done before the invasion to get them out peacefully, that the airport in Grenada was open on the Monday before the invasion. Wasn't there more that the United States could have done peacefully to evacuate Americans without an invasion?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. All I can say is that, one, I don't think it was an invasion; I think it was a rescue. And I think that we ought to stop calling it an invasion, if I may say so. It was a rescue operation, and it was felt and recognized to be such by most of the Americans involved. I don't doubt that you can find one or two or three who think the contrary. It was, I believe, well-handled. We had to behave very prudently, because it was also very clear that those—that there was proximate, real danger already posed to those—particularly to those students, as well as to the Governor-General, I think, in Grenada.

MR. SMITH. What do you say to the 30 or 40 people who came out by air on Monday from Grenada peacefully, some of them Americans, one of them director of the President's Commission on Social Security?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. They were fortunate.

MR. NOVAK. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, a week ago today the *Washington Post* had a front page story which described you as embittered, and referred to what they said you believed to be the "weak and rudderless leadership of Secretary of State George Shultz." Is that a correct characterization of your attitude toward the Secretary of State?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I'm glad you raised that question. I would like to say that about 90 percent of what's been published about me and the Secretary of State or any other figure in our government or any other post in our government in the last two weeks has been really hopelessly distorted.

MR. NOVAK. What about this—

MR. KALB. Two minutes to go.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. That one is one of those. That is—I mean it is just simply not an accurate characterization of my views at

MR. NOVAK. Do you consider yourself embittered because—

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. No, not at all, not at all. I mean—you know, this was, Bob, a media event, which I still don't understand quite, either. I don't understand who scripted it, and I don't understand who pushed it. I just know that it was largely not so. I consider it behind me.

MR. TREWHITT. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, you just, a few minutes ago, made a fairly strong case for the position that the United States is consistently belabored and in the minority in the United Nations. Is there any plan to grade down U.S. participation in the United Nations? And if not, why not, in those circumstances, if that is a correct characterization of our role?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK. I've said it many times since I've been there, Mr. Trewhitt, I think what we have to do is be more effective in the United Nations. We let our influence in that body and our effectiveness in that body decline through a period of probably 20 years. We failed to understand what kind of a political system it is, and we have failed above all to adequately link our relations with nations inside the U.N. to our relations with nations outside the U.N.

The fact is a good many of the nations with whom we have very good relations outside the U.N. behave very badly toward us regularly, on a wide range of issues, inside the U.N. I think we need to let nations know that if they want to be friends of ours outside the U.N., they need to behave like friends inside U.N. bodies as well. That, I think, is the answer.

MR. KALB. Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."

Document 664

Resolution 38/7, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, November 2, 1983 [47]

Call For "Immediate Cessation of the Armed Intervention and the Immediate Withdrawal of the Foreign Troops From Grenada"

The General Assembly,

Considering the statements made before the Security Council in connection with the situation in Grenada,

Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, [48]

Recalling also the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, [49]

Reaffirming the sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada freely to determine its own political, economic and social system, and to develop its international relations without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,

Deeply deploring the events in Grenada which led to the killing of the Prime Minister, Mr. Maurice Bishop, and other prominent Grenadians,

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or to act in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter,

Gravely concerned at the military intervention taking place and determined to ensure a speedy return to normalcy in Grenada,

Conscious of the need for States to show consistent respect for the principles of the Charter,

1. *Deeply deplores* the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State;

2. *Deplores* the death of innocent civilians resulting from the armed intervention;

3. *Calls upon* all States to show the strictest respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Grenada;

4. *Calls* for an immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada;

5. *Requests* that free elections be organized as rapidly as possible to enable the people of Grenada to choose its government democratically;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General as a matter of urgency to assess the situation and to report back to the General Assembly within seventy-two hours.

[47] Source: U.N. General Assembly Resolution 38/7. The recorded vote was 108 in favor, 9 against (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Israel, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and the United States), with 27 abstaining. For text of Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement before the General Assembly regarding this resolution, see U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release 120, November 2, 1983. The White House issued a statement the following day regarding this resolution; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1983, p. 78.

[48] Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 25/2625, adopted on October 24, 1970.

[49] Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 36/103, adopted on December 9, 1981.

Document 665

Transcript of a Press Conference by President Reagan, November 3, 1983 (Extracts) [50]

"This Was a Rescue Mission"

THE PRESIDENT. Before this morning's announcement, I'd like to share some information with you that I received on the phone last night.

Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger called to inform me that hostilities in Grenada have ended and that he has instructed our military commanders to begin withdrawing their forces within a few days.

What this means is that the situation is stable, no sniper fire or other form of military resistance is evident on the island. Our objectives have been achieved and as soon as the logistics permit, American personnel will be leaving.

I'd like to add that the members of the Armed Forces have conducted themselves in the finest tradition of the military. We can be proud of the courage and professionalism that we've seen from the people down there. The American students called them rescuers. The citizens of Grenada have hailed them as liberators. I think the whole lot of them deserve the respect and admiration of our country.

The operation was not without cost. Those who were killed, wounded or injured in this operation I believe are heroes of freedom. They not only rescued our own citizens, but they saved the people of Grenada from repression and laid aside a potential threat to all the people of the Caribbean.

After viewing the massive horde of Soviet weapons found on that island, who knows what evil the liberation of Grenada achieved for us, or averted in the years ahead.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. President, Nicaragua says you intend to invade that country. Do you, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Who says?

Q. Nicaraguan leaders, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. I haven't believed anything they've been saying since they got in charge and you shouldn't either.

Q. Mr. President, does the success of Grenada, as you view it, does that operation mean that you might be able to apply the military in similar situations elsewhere?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I can't foresee any situation that has exactly the same things that this one had. It had exactly what we announced in the beginning, the need to protect the lives and the safety and freedom of about 1,000 Americans, most of them students down there in medical school, and in answer to a request on the part of the other nations bound by treaty together in the east Caribbean that we lend our support to them in freeing this up because they lacked the strength and capability of doing it.

Q. If somebody else asks, would you be willing to do it again?

THE PRESIDENT. As I say, if all the conditions were the same, I don't see why our reason would be any different. But I don't foresee any similar situation on the horizon.

Q. Why did 100 nations in the United Nations not agree with you that this was a worthwhile venture?

THE PRESIDENT. . . . 100 nations in the United Nations have not agreed with us on just about everything that's come before them where we're involved and it didn't upset my breakfast, at all.

Q. Mr. President, some people say that the United States has now lost a moral high ground, that there's no difference between what we did in Grenada and what the Soviets did in Afghanistan. What's

[50] Source: White House Press Release, November 3, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; also printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, pp. 1514–1516; for full text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1514–1517. The press conference, which principally dealt with the appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as special representative for the Middle East, began at 9:55 a.m. in

THE PRESIDENT. Well, for heaven sakes, anyone who would link Afghanistan to this operation, and incidentally, I know your frequent use of the word, invasion, this was a rescue mission. But in Afghanistan, if you will recall, when the Soviets installed their choice of Head of State for Afghanistan and in the process in changing the forces there, an American ambassador was murdered in Afghanistan, and then, against all the opposition of the Afghanistan people, they have used every vicious form of warfare including chemical warfare, the killing of women and children that has caused even some of their own men to desert because they will not carry out the orders to kill women and children, and they're still there after a long period of time, longer than I've been in this Office. As compared to what we did in answer, actually, to an appeal that first came from the Governor General of the island, who was in house arrest, to his fellow states there in the Caribbean who were appealing for rescue, and we helped in the rescue.

Granted that we contributed the bulk of the power, but because—only because the others were limited in their ability to do that. And this was a rescue mission. It was a successful rescue mission, and the people that have been rescued, and the Grenadians that have been liberated, are down there delighted with and giving every evidence of appreciation and gratitude to our men down there.

. . . . . .

Document 666

Address by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) Before the Associated Press Managing Editors' Conference, Louisville, Kentucky, November 4, 1983 [51]

The Origins, Development, and Impact of U.S. Participation in the Grenada Mission

This is the 11th day since the combined U.S.-Caribbean peace force landed in Grenada to protect lives and restore order. That may not be enough time to make definitive historical judgments, but it is not too early to begin to reflect on the meaning of what happened. So I would like today to talk both about the collective action itself and about its larger significance for U.S. foreign policy.

Two basic objectives motivated the President's decision last week to act jointly with Barbados and Jamaica in response to the urgent and formal request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). [52] These objectives were:

To protect the lives of U.S. citizens; and

To help Grenada reestablish order so that governmental institutions and human rights can be restored, thereby contributing also to the maintenance of regional peace and stability.

The Setting

Prime Minister Charles of Dominica recently described the countries of the eastern Caribbean as "kith and kin." Reuben Harris, the Education Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, was more specific last week at a UNESCO [UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization] conference in Paris. He noted that these nations "enjoy an economic community, a common currency, joint diplomatic representation and responsibility for . . . common defence and security."

[51] Source: *Current Policy* No. 526, November 4, 1983, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. All brackets in this document are in the source text.

[52] See document 656.

This unique institutional setting helps explain why 10 days, days of brutality and instability, ultimately brought about collective action to restore peace in Grenada. Order began to disintegrate in Grenada the evening of October 12 with an attempt by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard to force out Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. According to minutes of the party Central Committee, although Bishop had established close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Coard faction considered him a "bourgeois deviationist" for moving too slowly to consolidate a "Leninist" restructuring of Grenadian society.

Bishop was put under house arrest in the middle of the night October 14, then freed by his supporters on October 19. Troops opened fire on the crowd. Bishop and several Cabinet ministers and union leaders were taken away, then executed. Education Minister Jacqueline Creft was apparently beaten to death.

In the wake of these murders, the People's Revolutionary Army announced the government was dissolved and a 24-hour curfew imposed: anyone found outside would be shot on sight. Army General Hudson Austin was head of a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). But it was never clear that Austin or any coherent group was in fact in charge. No one knew when—or how—a new government would be formed.

Caribbean Reaction

The murders and breakdown of governmental order shocked, repelled, and alarmed leaders throughout the Caribbean. Without exception, the leaders of the eastern Caribbean condemned the murders and expressed their sympathy for the people of Grenada.

Other Caribbean leaders were equally outraged. Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados said Bishop and his fellow ministers had been killed by "disgusting murderers" who had committed the "most vicious act to disfigure the West Indies since the days of slavery."

Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica expressed revulsion at "the intensity of the barbarity" and broke diplomatic relations with Grenada. Even the Jamaican opposition party (People's National Party, the PNP), headed by former Prime Minister Michael Manley, severed all relations with the New JEWEL Movement, recommended its expulsion from the Socialist International, and declared that the RMC had no right to speak for the Grenadian people.

The Decision to Act

Sometimes action is necessary to keep a bad situation from getting worse. This was such a time. The disintegration of political authority in Grenada had created a dynamic that spread uncertainty and fear and that made further violence likely. The actions of Bishop's murderers made clear that they would have either driven the island into further chaos or turned it into an armed fortress. In either event, the threat to U.S. citizens and to the peace of the eastern Caribbean would have increased. Inaction would have made a hostage situation more likely and increased the costs in lives of any subsequent rescue operation.

The OECS decided to help its member state of Grenada and to ask Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States for assistance. In its formal request for U.S. assistance, the OECS cited:

". . . the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada."

The OECS request also noted:

". . . that military forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members; and

". . . that the capability of the Grenada armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country."

We had, of course, also been following events with increasing concern. As is well known, Grenada's ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and its abandonment of democracy and poor human rights record had led the United States to have serious disagreements with the Bishop regime. Nonetheless, Bishop's visit to the United States in June 1983 (when Judge Clark [William Clark, then National Security Adviser to the President] and I met with him

in my office) had led us to hope that Grenada might adopt a more moderate course. [53]

What became our overriding concern as events unfolded, however, was not Grenada's political system. Rather, it was the safety of U.S. citizens in the midst of a growing anarchy which the countries of the Caribbean also saw as a direct threat.

Some 1,000 U.S. citizens, mainly students, retirees, and missionaries, made up the largest community of foreigners on Grenada. Our concern for their welfare was heightened by the murders, the shoot-on-sight curfew, and the difficulty of getting accurate information. And in the absence of a functioning government there could be no credible assurances of their well-being and future prospects. I don't think that I need remind you that today is the fourth anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

After carefully considering these developments, and reviewing all aspects of the OECS request, President Reagan concluded that to wait passively would entail great and increasing risks. Before acting, however, the President sent a special emissary, Ambassador Frank McNeil, to consult with OECS representatives and with Prime Minister Adams of Barbados and Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica.

Ambassador McNeil found these leaders unanimous in their conviction that the deteriorating conditions on Grenada were a threat to the entire region and that the situation required immediate action.

Legal Authority for Action

U.S. actions have been based on three legal grounds.

First, as these events were taking place, we were informed, on October 24, by Prime Minister Adams of Barbados that Grenada's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, had used a confidential channel to transmit an appeal to the OECS and other regional states to restore order on the island. The Governor General has since confirmed this appeal. We were unable to make this request public until the Governor General's safety had been assured, but it was an important element—legally as well as politically—in our respective decisions to help Grenada. The legal authorities of the Governor General were the sole remaining source of governmental legitimacy on the island in the wake of the tragic events I have described. We and the OECS countries accorded his appeal exceptional moral and legal weight. The invitation of lawful governmental authority constitutes a recognized basis under international law for foreign states to provide requested assistance.

Second, the OECS determined to take action under the 1981 treaty establishing that organization. That treaty contains a number of provisions—in articles 3, 4, and 8—which deal with local as well as external threats to peace and security. [54] Both the OAS [Organization of American States] Charter, in articles 22 and 28,[55] and the UN Charter, in article 52, recognize the competence of regional security bodies in ensuring regional peace and stability. Article 22 of the OAS Charter, in particular, makes clear that action pursuant to a special security treaty in force does not constitute intervention or use of force otherwise prohibited by articles 18 or 20 of that charter. In taking lawful collective action, the OECS countries were entitled to call upon friendly states for appropriate assistance, and it was lawful for the United States, Jamaica, and Barbados to respond to this request.

Third, U.S. action to secure and evacuate endangered U.S. citizens on the island was undertaken in accordance with well-established principles of international law regarding the protection of one's nationals. That the circumstances warranted this action has been amply documented by the returning students themselves. There is absolutely no requirement of international law that compelled the United States to await further deterioration of the situation that would have jeopardized a successful

[53] Concerning this meeting, see Dam's testimony in *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session* (Washington, 1984), pp. 23, 28–29.

[54] Article 3 of the Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is entitled "Purposes and Functions of the Organization." Article 4 is entitled "General Undertaking as to Implementation." Article 8 is entitled "Composition and Functions of the Defence and Security Committee." (American Society of International Law, *Legal Materials*, September 1981, p. 1161)

[55] See footnote 36 above.

operation. Nor was the United States required to await actual violence against U.S. citizens before rescuing them from the anarchic and threatening conditions the students themselves have described.

Some are asking how this U.S. action can be distinguished from acts of intervention by the Soviet Union. Let me say that the distinctions are clear. The United States participated in a genuine collective effort—the record makes clear the initiative of the Caribbean countries in proposing and defending this action. This action was based on an existing regional treaty and at the express invitation of the Governor General of Grenada. Our concern for the safety of our citizens was genuine. The factual circumstances on Grenada were exceptional and unprecedented in the Caribbean region—a collapse of law, order, and governmental institutions. Our objectives are precise and limited—to evacuate foreign nationals and to cooperate in the restoration of order. Our objectives do not involve the imposition on the Grenadians of any particular form of government. Grenadians are free to determine their institutions for themselves. Finally, our troops have already begun to leave; we will complete our withdrawal as soon as other forces are ready to take over from us.

Those who do not see—or do not choose to see—these clear-cut distinctions have failed to analyze the facts. We have not made, and do not seek to make, any broad new precedent for international action. Our actions themselves are well within accepted concepts of international law.

The Rescue Operation

To minimize the potential loss of lives and maximize the chances of success, both the preparations for the multi-national peace force and our final decision to participate had to be protected by keeping them secret.

When our forces arrived in Grenada, they immediately came under fire. And the main resistance came from Cubans, not Grenadians. The Cubans were very well armed. They were deployed at the airport, at the medical school where a large number of U.S. citizens were studying, at the Governor General's house, at a Cuban military encampment at Calivigny, and at several other forts and strategic points.

Despite the Cuban-led resistance, hostilities have now ended. U.S. forces are withdrawing. The Rangers left Sunday; the Marines yesterday.

The Governor General has thanked us for our assistance as a "positive and decisive step forward in the restoration not only of peace and order but also of full sovereignty."

The OECS is assisting the Governor General and prominent Grenadians to establish a provisional government capable of restoring functioning institutions and permitting early elections.

Seventeen flights have safely evacuated, at their request, 599 Americans and 121 foreigners. Their accounts of conditions in Grenada and praise for their rescuers speak for themselves. The respected Grenadian journalist Alister Hughes evidently spoke for the vast majority of people in Grenada, Grenadians and foreigners alike, when he said of the Caribbean peace force: "Thank God they came. If someone had not come in and done something, I hesitate to say what the situation in Grenada would be now."

Cuban and Soviet Penetration in Grenada

While we are still assembling and evaluating the evidence, what we have found suggests that Grenada would have become a fortified Cuban/Soviet military outpost. I mentioned earlier that we had been concerned—well before the events which brought about our collective action—that Grenada could be used as a staging area for subversion of nearby countries, for interdiction of shipping lanes, and for transit of troops and supplies from Cuba to Africa and from Eastern Europe and Libya to Central America.

What we found in Grenada may be summed up as the military underpinnings for just such uses. We found five secret treaties—three with the Soviet Union, one with North Korea, and one with Cuba—under which these communist countries were to donate military equipment in amounts without precedent for a population of 110,000. [56] We found artillery,

[56] For texts of these and other documents relating to Grenada, see *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection*, released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, September 1984 (Washington, 1984).

antiaircraft weapons, armored personnel carriers, and rocket launchers. We found thousands of rifles, thousands of fuses, tons of TNT, and millions of rounds of ammunition. We found communications gear and cryptographic devices. We found agreements authorizing the secret presence of Cuban military advisers, some of them on a "permanent" basis.

All of the agreements stipulated that arms would be delivered to Grenada only by Cuban ships through Cuban ports. And although the Soviet Union was providing the arms and training free of charge, the Soviet Union required the Grenadians to keep all military arrangements secret and delayed the opening of a Soviet Embassy in Grenada until 18 months after entering into such arrangements.

Broader Lessons

Perhaps the first and most basic lesson of events on Grenada is that Cuban activities are not as benign as Fidel Castro would have us believe.

We have been regularly accused of exaggerating the dangers of Cuban/Soviet activities in countries like Grenada. However, what we found in Grenada suggests that, if anything, we were guilty of *understating* the dangers. We now know that we had underestimated Soviet use of Cuba as a surrogate for the projection of military power in the Caribbean. Examine again what we found—well-armed Cubans called construction workers; fortifications; stockpiled weapons; secret military treaties; personnel from Eastern Europe, Africa, and East Asia, all innocently enjoying a tourist paradise no doubt.

Think again about the facilities that all this would have secured—the Point Salines Airport, which would have enabled a MiG-23 carrying four 1,000-pound bombs to strike and return from Puerto Rico in the north to Venezuela in the south; the Calivigny military training area; a 75,000-watt radio transmitter capable of blanketing the entire Caribbean Basin; the potential for a deep-water harbor.

In light of this evidence, many Americans—and not a few Europeans—might productively reassess their estimate of the security concerns of the American Government and of the non-communist countries of the Caribbean Basin.

A second, related point worth thinking about is what happened to Maurice Bishop. His experience graphically shows what could happen to those who put their faith in military assistance and advisers from Cuba and the Soviet Union, but then try to remain non-aligned. The threat to their freedom and survival may well come from the very system their friends have helped them put in place.

In the wake of Bishop's murder, Suriname expelled the Cuban Ambassador and 100 Cuban "technicians." The nine *commandantes* of Nicaragua might also wish to ponder their relationship with their Soviet and Cuban mentors.

A third lesson, and again one of particular importance for the Sandinistas, is that in the absence of democratic institutions and legal safeguards, policy differences tend to degenerate into violence. The way to end such violence is to fulfill their original promises of democracy and free elections.

A final lesson of the events in Grenada is that neighbors have a clear, ongoing responsibility to act in ways consistent with each other's legitimate security concerns. In Nicaragua, for example, Sandinista willingness to negotiate seriously, to reduce reliance on military power, and, most importantly, to stop belligerent behavior toward their neighbors would represent the high road to peace in Central America.

U.S. Policy in Central America

Taken as a whole, what these lessons imply for Central America is that we must focus our resources on finding more creative ways to foster democratic development and regional cohesion. It is for this reason that we are firmly committed to a comprehensive approach to that region's conflicts.

As President Reagan told a special joint session of Congress on April 27, our policy in Central America is based on four interlocking elements—democracy, development, dialogue, and defense.

Our policy is to actively support democracy, reform, and human freedom in Central America—as much for El Salvador and Guatemala as for Nicaragua.

The United States supports economic development and is devoting three times the funds to such development than to military assistance. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, I should note, is as open to Nicaragua as to Costa Rica and Honduras.

We support dialogue and negotiations—the internal dialogue of democracy in each country and the multilateral negotiations of nations honestly trying to live peacefully with each other.

And we have and will continue to provide what the President has called a security shield against those who oppose democratization, economic development, and diplomacy.

In the interests of settling the conflicts in Central America before they reach a crisis stage, the United States is quietly but firmly supporting the regional Contadora process. It is no coincidence that the consensus of the nine countries involved about what is required for peace in Central America is parallel to our own. We support—as do Nicaragua's neighbors, especially the "Core Four" countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—an end to terrorism, destabilization, and guerrilla warfare; a reduction of military forces and armaments; political reconciliation through free elections and respect for human rights; the removal of foreign troops and military advisers; and the commitment of resources more for economic development and reform than for military buildup and destruction.

What this all adds up to is that the United States is pursuing a responsive and responsible role in this entire region. I believe that we have the confidence to do so, even in the face of violence and uncertainty, because we had already learned what may be the underlying lesson of the collective response to the Grenada crisis: the best source of knowledge about an area is the people of that area—those most directly concerned with what is happening in their own neighborhood.

What Prime Minister Charles and the others told us while the Grenada crisis was building proved to be accurate. The Caribbean leaders faithfully reflected the feelings, the concerns, and hopes of the Grenadian people—and, may I add, of the U.S. citizens there as well. We listened to Grenada's neighbors, and we are doing the same thing in Central America. Our policy is responsive to Central American opinion polls, the statements of respected democratic leaders, and the Contadora "Document of Objectives." And we are responding in the Caribbean Basin Initiative: we listened when Latin and Caribbean economists told us that they wanted "trade not aid."

Leadership means listening and acting intelligently on what is heard. That is what we did in Grenada. That is what we are doing in Central America. And I believe the American people are coming to understand what their government is doing and why.

Document 667

Letter From President Reagan to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (O'Neill), December 8, 1983 [57]

"U.S. Marines and U.S. Army Rangers Have Now Been Withdrawn From Grenada"

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In accordance with my desire that you be kept informed concerning the situation in Grenada, about which I reported to you on October 25, [58] I am providing this further report on the presence of United States Armed Forces in Grenada.

Since then, the circumstances which occasioned the introduction of United States Armed Forces into Grenada have substantially changed. On November 2, the armed conflict in Grenada came to an end, and our task now, together with neighboring countries, is to assist the Grenadians in their effort to restore and revitalize their political institutions in a stable security environment.

Although it is still not possible to predict the precise duration of the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Grenada, our forces are continuing to work closely with other components of the

[57] Source: White House Press Release, December 9, 1983, Office of the Press Secretary to the President; printed also in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, December 12, 1983, pp. 1667–1668. An identical letter was sent to the President pro tempore of the Senate, Strom Thurmond.

[58] See document 659.

collective security force in assisting the Grenadian authorities in the maintenance of conditions of law and order and the restoration of functioning governmental institutions to the island of Grenada.

All elements of the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army Rangers have now been withdrawn from Grenada; at this time, less than 2,700 U.S. Armed Forces personnel remain on the island. U.S. Armed Forces will continue to withdraw from the island as a part of a process whereby a peacekeeping force, composed of units contributed by friendly countries, takes over these responsibilities. I anticipate that this will be accomplished in the near future and that any members of the U.S. Armed Forces remaining in Grenada thereafter will have normal peacetime assignments, such as training, local security and the furnishing of technical services.

I am satisfied that the objectives of our operation in Grenada, including the protection of U.S. citizens, are being met successfully because of the valor and effectiveness of our forces. I ask for your continuing support as we strive to assist the people of Grenada in their efforts to restore peace, order, and human rights to their island.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

D. South America

Multilateral Developments

Document 668

Testimony by the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Abrams) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Michel) Before Two Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 21, 1983 [1]

"Our Human Rights Policy Has Been a Force for Good Throughout the Southern Cone"

MR. ABRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2]

I am pleased to be here today to discuss with you the human rights situation in the Southern Cone of Latin America, a region which has always been of particular interest to Americans. I shall be as brief as possible in my opening remarks, so as to provide more time for questions.

Let me begin with Paraguay, about which I think I will have a little bit more to say in the opening remarks than Mr. Michel. We will try not to be too repetitive.

As you know, Paraguay has been ruled under the state of siege provisions of the constitution almost continuously since 1929. President Alfredo Stroessner, an army general, has governed Paraguay since 1954 under these provisions. His rule is based on the military, and is exercised through the Colorado Party. President Stroessner is widely believed to be genuinely popular among large sections of the population, though his popularity has never been put to the test in free elections. The opposition parties are kept under control and given little opportunity to conduct a real election campaign. Only members in good standing of the Colorado Party can participate fully in the political process, such as it is.

The human rights safeguards in the Paraguayan Constitution frequently are not upheld. The judiciary, while formally independent, does not serve as an effective check on the actions of the executive. Constitutional guarantees such as protection of the integrity of the individual, the need for judicial warrants, freedom of assembly and association, the right of habeas corpus, and a prompt and fair trial for the accused often are ignored by Government officials. While the state of siege is legally in force only in the capital, security officials operate as though it existed throughout the country.

Major violations of the integrity of the individual in Paraguay have decreased since the mid-1970's. However, there were increased detentions and no improvement in the areas of political rights and individual liberties in the last year or so. The major current human rights issue is the continued detention of 3 remaining members out of about 20 persons arrested in May and June for violation of Paraguay's elastic antisubversive law 209, in connection with the Banco Paraguayo de Datos, a research organization.

Over the past 3 months the Government has released most of the detainees, but three still remain in detention. Two of those detained are believed to have been tortured by the police during their initial interrogation.

Other human rights problems of current concern are occasional instances of Government censorship of the press and radio, such as the closing down of Radio Nanduti on July 9 for 30 days, and the arrest of a columnist for the newspaper ABC Color. We are also concerned about the issue of forced exiles. On the positive side, however, we were pleased that last year's County Report for Paraguay was published in the Paraguayan press. [3] It must also be acknowledged that President Stroessner's rule has brought relative stability and economic growth to Paraguay, though at considerable cost to individual rights and political liberties. Freedom House, in its 1983 report covering 1981, classified Paraguay as partly free. [4]

The United States has used its influence in Paraguay to encourage as great a degree of liberalization as possible. We have worked quietly but steadily on specific human rights cases. And we have made it clear that we favor steps now toward a more open and democratic society.

Let me turn now to Uruguay. Mr. Michel will go into more detail. I just want to say a word about U.S. policy. United States human rights policy toward Uruguay is clear. As President Reagan stated on August 25, 1982, "As a staunch proponent of democracy, the United States warmly applauds Uruguay's decision to restore full constitutional government through national elections." Both the Department of State and our Embassy are in close touch with leaders of the political parties in Uruguay. These leaders know, and the Government of Uruguay also knows, that we strongly support the return to democracy, and that our bilateral relations will improve as the democratization process continues.

Let me move on, now, to the human rights situation in Argentina. The Argentine Armed Forces have held power since 1976. In the wake of severe and growing economic problems and Argentina's defeat in the Falklands conflict, the military government instituted major changes in 1982. The Government of President Reynaldo Bignone, installed on July 1, 1982, announced that it was a government of transition whose main task was to oversee the return to democracy. The Government has scheduled municipal, provincial, and national elections for October 30, just 9 days from now.

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[1] Source: *Human Rights in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session* (Washington, 1984), pp. 142–146, 157–158, 170, 179–184; for Abrams' prepared statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 147–157; for Michel's prepared statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 159–169.

[2] Representative Gus Yatron.

[3] A reference to *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, by the Department of State in Accordance With Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended,* Joint Committee Print, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1983), pp. 601–610.

[4] A reference to *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties,* edited by Raymond D. Gastil, a report issued each year by Freedom House, a private human rights organization.

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