

INTERNATIONAL

West Germany: divided on Grenada

By Elizabeth Pond

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

Some West German government spokesmen are weakening — some repeating — Bonn's initial misgivings about US military intervention in Grenada.

Right after the invasion the West German Cabinet position — and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's comments in parliament — noted that Bonn had not been consulted beforehand but would have counseled against the action if it had been. Christian Social Union leader Franz Josef Strauss attacked this position as not giving sufficient support to West Germany's American ally.

On Monday, government spokesman Jürgen Sudhoff did retreat a bit, telling a press conference that the initial Cabinet reaction had been a spur-of-the-moment assessment and hinting that it might now be softened.

The Foreign Ministry quickly bore in with a corrective, however. State minister Jürgen Möllemann took

pains to repeat the original reservations in a radio interview Tuesday. He noted pointedly that friends should be able to speak openly with each other — and added that since Bonn is against any form of foreign intervention, it expects that all foreign troops will soon leave Grenada and that self-determination will prevail. Möllemann, like Genscher, is a member of the junior party in the ruling coalition, the Liberals.

Christian Democratic Chancellor Helmut Kohl was relieved of direct comment because he is visiting Japan. (There he did express "understanding" for the background to the intervention, though not approval of the action.)

His political colleague Werner Marx, chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee, however, took up the controversy in an interview with Die Welt Wednesday. In it he declared that the US had acted in accordance with international law in response to the "urgent wish of allies and neighbors."

UN

Grenada after coup: new regime will be more isolated

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

The murder of Maurice Bishop, Grenada's leftist prime minister, while in the custody of that country's armed forces, seems to mark the completion of a power takeover by hard-line communist Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard.

The new regime will be considerably more isolated than Bishop's. Cuba for the moment is keeping its distance from the coup — a posture observers attribute to Cuban leader Fidel Castro's personal friendship with Bishop and his desire not to alienate English-speaking neighbors he has recently been courting. Foreign ministers of the English-speaking Caribbean countries are about to meet in Antigua to discuss possible measures in protest of the Coard takeover.

Official United States comments on the Coard takeover give no hint that it is considering any specific actions against Coard, but a measure of US concern is shown by the State Department's quick creation of a task force on Grenada — a measure it did not take during the recent Guatemalan coup.

One dilemma for the US is that it has few options with which to express anger at Coard. It has no diplomatic relations with Grenada and no significant trade.

Under Bishop, Grenada was radical but still maintained a mixed economy, with 60 percent

of all enterprises in private hands. Although unpopular with the Reagan administration, Bishop had the support of Cuba and left-of-center governments throughout the world and enjoyed cordial relations with most of his more moderate Caribbean neighbors.

It is unlikely that Coard will command much popular support either inside or outside Grenada. Observers seem to agree that the charismatic Bishop enjoyed widespread popularity among Grenadans. And because of this popularity, Coard initially attempted to maintain Bishop as figurehead prime minister, while stripping him of most of his real power.

These plans were upset when some 4,000 chanting, largely unarmed demonstrators rushed into Bishop's residence in Grenada's capital city and freed him Wednesday from the house arrest that had been enforced by Coard's military supporters. Hoisting Bishop onto their shoulders, the demonstrators paraded the prime minister through downtown St. George — their numbers increasing — until they reached Fort Rupert, the military headquarters. There, according to reliable reports, the crowd was met by truckloads of government troops, who started firing into the air.

Some of the troops directed shots into the crowd killing 4 to 10 demonstrators. During this melee, Bishop was reportedly shot in the leg.

Diplomatic observers in Grenada state that Bishop then surrendered to government troops and was seen, with his hands above his head, being led into Fort Rupert.

Reliable sources in Barbados say that Bishop was executed by Army troops shortly afterward. Killed with him, they say, were Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman, Education Minister Jacqueline Creft, and Housing Minister Norris Bain.

This contradicts Grenadan military reports that Bishop was shot in an "exchange of fire" with troops.

For the moment, the Coard regime is officially led by a military revolutionary council, headed by Hudson Austin, commander of the island's armed forces. Austin has proclaimed marshal law and declared a 24-hour curfew, stating that anyone caught leaving their homes before 6 a.m. Monday without permission would be "shot on sight."

It remains to be seen whether the regime will gain crucial Cuban and East bloc support and whether, even with that support, it can maintain control in the face of international and domestic pressures against the regime.



What the Grenada invasion tells the world

Intervention confronts island nations with hard choices

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, people are trying to make the difficult choice of the lesser evil.

While the short-lived coup in Grenada by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard was almost universally deplored, US intervention under any circumstances triggers deep anxieties in the area and raises fears for the future.

Caribbean diplomats say that the island governments that most actively pushed for intervention had all been nervous for several years about the spread of radical ideas among their own populations. These fears were not allayed by radical radio broadcasts beamed at their islands by the Grenadan regime.

Antigua and Dominica, like Jamaica, according to these sources, had experienced "their own troubles with left-wing groups" and were "nervous of contagion by the [political] virus."

In particular, Dominica's prime minister, Eugenia Charles, came to power as a reaction against these problems. Leaders of Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica also were elected on strong anticommunist platforms. During the past year, their relations with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop (who was deposed two weeks ago and killed last week) had greatly improved. But the prospect of an even more radical government in Grenada was intolerable to them.

At present, English-speaking Caribbean reaction is mixed. Bishop supporters throughout the area tend to be against the intervention in spite of their strong opposition to the Coard coup. Left-of-center intellectuals, trade union leaders, and many Trinidadian political party leaders shy away from supporting intervention.

One well-placed Caribbean intellectual stated

Please see INVASION back page


INVASION from front page


that groups opposing intervention have no great love of Coard but are troubled by the invasion's implications.

Divisions among the English-speaking Caribbean countries at the prospect of intervention emerged at a meeting of CARICOM (the umbrella organization of English-speaking states) leaders in Trinidad over the weekend. With American ships already streaming toward Grenada, the island republics of Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Antigua lobbied for armed intervention by CARICOM states. Trinidad, Guyana, Belize, and to a lesser extent the Bahamas fought the proposal, arguing that an invasion would be counterproductive, setting dangerous precedents which would lead to greater problems in the future.

With CARICOM at an impasse, the four states lobbying for intervention decided to move ahead anyway. After taking this decision they received the support of Jamaica and Barbados.

The states acted under the aegis of the subregional group, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The legal basis for the intervention was a regional defense treaty signed several months ago by OECS members which, among other things, contained a provision enabling members to call on third-party





Marines in Barbados before invasion of Grenada

assistance should any one of them feel threatened. However, Grenada never signed the treaty precisely because Maurice Bishop feared that it would be used to justify invasion.

Opposition to the intervention stems from fears that:

1. It has set a precedent for third-party states to invite forces into other states, which raises doubts about the national sovereignty of the countries in the region.

2. It brings up fears about the militarization of the area, a process which began in 1979 with the Bishop takeover. At that time, the Grenadan leader increased the

size and quality of his armed forces. In response special police officers from Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica were trained by the US in Puerto Rico and Panama. According to Caribbean sources, these special police forces make up the core of the Caribbean troops currently involved in the intervention.

3. Most dangerously it raises the specter that the eastern Caribbean will become the stage for the next round of East-West confrontational politics. Especially troubling to some are reports that some Cuban airport workers were killed.

A crucial question for many in the Ca-

ibbean is what kind of government will come out of the military occupation. Some stress that the US has a very bad track record in Latin America, leaving in the wake of 'its interventions governments that are very backward-looking, repressive, and strongly militarized.

Sources in Trinidad (which has a large Grenadan population) report that reactions of ordinary people are also mixed. They reportedly resent outside intervention, but are glad to be rid of Coard. Their fears of intervention are, however, less pronounced than those of intellectuals and labor leaders.

Action to protect US citizens also sends message to allies

By Daniel Southerland

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

American troops and their Caribbean allies appear to have had a relatively easy time invading the tiny island of Grenada.

The announced intention of the Reagan administration is to evacuate American citizens on the island and then withdraw as quickly as possible, leaving the task of building a new Grenadan government to regional allies and to the Grenadans themselves. That task may prove to be considerably more difficult than launching the invasion.

Grenada has been under the control of left-leaning military coup leaders since Oct. 13.

For Americans, the US involvement in Grenada appears to be as different from the involvement in Lebanon as it could possibly be. Grenada is a Caribbean island of only 110,000 people, whose leftist government is cut off from allies who could help it resist the invading forces. Only 21 miles in length and barely a dot on most maps, Grenada has been noted mainly for its nutmeg and its beauty — and most recently for its close ties with Cuba. It boasts of white beaches, green mountains, hibiscus flowers, and mango trees.

In contrast with the Lebanon situation, where opposition from Americans to the United States military involvement is widespread, the invasion of Grenada is expected to trigger much more limited public criticism. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Charles H. Percy, a Republican from Illinois, said Tuesday that none of the congressional leaders from either party expressed opposition to the invasion when they were informed by the President at a secret White House meeting Monday night.

Please see MESSAGE back page

MESSAGE from front page

House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., a Democrat from Massachusetts, said he did not intend to criticize the action at this time. Mr. O'Neill said that congressional leaders were not asked for advice.

But once the invasion was announced publicly, several congressmen did raise questions. One asked whether US forces were embroiled in too many conflicts. Some prominent members of the American black community who have been concerned about Grenada for some time asked whether the invasion could set a precedent for similar US actions elsewhere in the world. And questions were raised by Charles Modica, chancellor of St. George's Medical College in Grenada, who is currently in the United States. Chancellor Modica told NBC News that American medical students on the island were not in danger and could have been evacuated in an orderly manner. He charged that by launching the invasion, President Reagan had taken "some very unnecessary risks."

In announcing the invasion on Tuesday, the President listed as the first and

most important of three reasons for the action the protection of innocent lives, including those of up to 1,000 Americans on the island. The second and third reasons, Reagan said, were to forestall further chaos on Grenada and to restore order and institutions. The President charged that the island nation's prime minister, three of its cabinet ministers, and two labor leaders and other civilians had been killed by "a brutal group of leftist thugs."

Reagan was referring to the killing by Grenadan troops of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and others last week after Mr. Bishop's government was ousted. A suave London-trained lawyer with leftist leanings, Bishop had taken power more than four years ago through a coup of his own. Although he was close to Cuba's leader Fidel Castro, Bishop had apparently decided some time ago to distance himself from the Cubans and to seek a rapprochement with the United States.

An administration official said that in a meeting with Reagan's then national security adviser William P. Clark in Washington some weeks ago, Bishop had spoken of the need to build a "more constructive relationship" with the US.

Bishop's opening to the US was appar-

ently among the trends which disturbed those in the Grenadan government and army who moved against him.

By participating in the invasion, the US reassures Caribbean allies who were concerned about the leftward turn of Grenada. Ever since the island's leftist-led coup of 1979, the concern of the US and those allies has been that Grenada might become a Cuban surrogate and training ground for insurgents. The US was also concerned that Grenada's international airport, which was being extended with the help of the Cubans, might serve as a refueling stop for airplanes carrying Cuban soldiers to Africa. It is also close to important oil-shipping lanes.

Although it was not part of the officially announced purpose of the invasion, the action sends a signal to Nicaragua that the US is willing to intervene directly and with force in the region when it considers it necessary. Nicaragua Tuesday requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the invasion of Grenada.

Some 2,000 US marines and soldiers carried the brunt of the invasion, with six Caribbean nations contributing some 200 soldiers to the invasion force. Grenada's

losses were "minimal."

President Reagan said that the US had participated at the request of five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

Congressman Michael D. Barnes, the Maryland Democrat who chairs the House subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, said he would withhold final judgment. But Mr. Barnes wondered whether US citizens on Grenada were really endangered, asking: "Or is this just the excuse the administration was looking for to go in there anyway?"

Rep. Edward J. Markey (D) of Massachusetts labeled the invasion a new edition of "gunboat diplomacy." And Rep. Bill Alexander, Democrat from Arkansas and House deputy majority whip, said "the President relies too heavily on confrontation and the use of force as a substitute for foreign policy."

Staff writer Julia Malone contributed to this report.

2,200 men. Radio on the island, estimating 2,000 persons, had fought the invaders but suffered losses. Officials said American

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1983

"First the

Now Grenada

No sooner had the American public and Congress caught one shock from the Marine tragedy in Lebanon than they had to absorb the US invasion of Grenada.

Both are dramatically reported, sparing the public and political leaders no emotional jolt from the depicted violence amidst questions of what the United States government is doing there.

The Grenada adventure, involving some 2,000 US Marine and Army troops, can only heighten the perplexity of Americans about what might appear as a loose-cannon use of military might. Mr. Reagan must move quickly to reassure Americans of some consistency in the use of troops abroad.

In Grenada, the Marine mission in concert with six east Caribbean nations ostensibly was launched to evacuate some of the 1,000 US citizens and other nationals who wanted to leave, to end the deterioration in civil order under the increasingly violent new Marxist rulers, and to take over until a new democratically elected government can be installed. Despite protests from Americans on the scene that a rescue adventure could run a greater risk for their safety, the mission was undertaken after the new Grenadan regime reportedly reneged on a pact to permit an exodus.

In having to make this call, that the greater risk lay in avoiding action, Mr. Reagan can likely claim the benefit of the doubt of most Americans. Rather than assume he sought to offset the image of getting caught off guard in the Middle East by launching a more tactically controllable mission on a tiny island in the Caribbean, most Americans would assume the President would have wanted to avoid a double jeopardy for the servicemen he commands. But the Grenadan adventure will only compound the President's troubles at home. At the moment, the Republican leadership on the Hill is giving him no great support. Moderate GOP senators in leadership posts seem dismayed by the turn of events and White House rationales. On the Middle East, House Speaker Tip O'Neill is standing behind the President on the Marines in Lebanon while challenging him on his approach in the Caribbean before the Grenada invasion.

The President's motives for the Grenada action are thought to be more mixed than his assertion that events

forced his hand. It was a planned operation. The possible strategic risk from the two-mile-long runway under construction on the island — close to oil-producer Venezuela, and a prospect for Cuban-Soviet use — must be taken into account. So must the administration's desire to unseat a Marxist regime in the region. Mr. Reagan for some time has wanted to press his Caribbean-solidarity initiative, which he had always said would be an economic and not a military program. Ironically, its first manifestation appears to be chiefly military.

In sum, Mr. Reagan will likely gain the benefit of the doubt in the short run for the action itself. Many Americans share the President's dread of a Marxist advance in this hemisphere.

Still, the loss of more Marine lives in Grenada cannot help but now bring his Caribbean policies under the same anguished review at home as his Middle East policies. If he now topples a government in the Caribbean and replaces it, does he come out ahead or behind? There will be no neat answer to that question. Rather, it drives to the core of the debate about the use of might versus negotiation, about whether the gain from meddling in others' affairs is greater than its costs.

Fallout from Caribbean crisis



AP
In Boston, demonstrators question US action in Grenada

Reagan's action in the Caribbean — apparently for fear of 'another Cuba' in the region — has sent tremors from Capitol Hill to Europe and beyond. Many question the legality of the invasion; America's European allies have responded with a chorus of disapproval, and say the move has cost Reagan much goodwill. The US Congress tries to catch its breath and react to a series of domestic and foreign policy crises. (Stories below and P. 7).

Legal basis of American invasion raises questions from allies, Capitol Hill

By Daniel Southerland
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Congress reels as events in Beirut, Grenada, and Washington surge past

By Julia Malone
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Out on the street, what are Americans thinking about Grenada?

"It's ridiculous!" says a woman from Lake Forest, Ill. "What on earth are we doing there? A Russian threat? Baloney. The Cubans have been around for a long time. I don't see us spreading ourselves all over the world."

Larry Phillips of Franklin County, Ind., sees it differently. "I have no problem with the invasion. There was an imminent danger there. Grenada is too close to us and we have to stand up. We will be condemned by other nations, but condemnation didn't stop the Russians in Afghanistan."

At a moment when the high councils of the world are sorting out power and diplomacy, Americans across the nation — feeling sympathy for families struck by tragedy or concern for national and world stability — speak candidly among themselves. Their quiet concerns, or sometimes total disinterest, is part of the large, slightly recorded dimension of times of crisis.

Brief interviews with American tourists waiting to get into the White House on a sunny morning cannot provide firm conclusions about the public reaction. But even a limited sampling of opinion suggests that the events in Lebanon and Grenada are not necessarily a political liability for President Reagan.

"We should be in Grenada and Lebanon," Helen Huus of Northwood, Iowa, says emphatically. "Unless we take care of all the little pieces [areas where the Soviets are aggressive], there'll be bigger ones to take on — like Afghanistan. I support Reagan's policy."

Robert McNeil of Seattle agrees. "I'm concerned about the plot of communism," he remarks. "It grows like a cancer and infiltrates everywhere. That bugs me. We have to call a spade a spade, and Reagan had a golden opportunity."

"As for Lebanon," he continues, "the marines are supposed to be there, but they shouldn't be sitting ducks. They ought to put them on ships where they're not subject to terminal attacks."

His wife interrupts with a different view about Grenada. "I'm concerned that England and France are

Please see REACTION page 6

REACTION from page 1

not supporting us in Grenada," she says.

Possible American violation of international law, in fact, concerned many of those interviewed. "I'm appalled by the events," says Thomas Crow of Rhinelander, Wis., holding his son by the hand. "I'm surprised the government excuse is that Americans lives were in jeopardy. There's no evidence of that." "We're going in just because we did not like the government there," adds Mrs. Crow. "We have no right to respond militarily."

"I'm against intervention," says a visitor from Simi Valley, Calif., who didn't want to be named. "I don't be-

lieve in going into small countries against the international system. Let them handle their own affairs."

A worker with the National Park Service, John Terrell, was visibly eager to get his views out. "The government is supposed to be set up to keep other countries from invading," he says. "You set up rules [among nations] so your privacy isn't invaded. It's as if you didn't want your kids to do something, and then you broke the rule. What are the kids supposed to think?"

Lebanon was also a burning topic with him. "That's something that [former Prime Minister Menachem] Begin started, and now the US and the French have to end it," says Mr. Terrell. "It's Vietnam all over again. There the French started it and we had to bail them out. Israel

should pull out of Lebanon and let them [the Lebanese] elect the government they want. That's the rules."

Some felt they did not have all the facts and voiced doubt that Reagan had stated them. "Who knows?" says one California resident. "There may be all sorts of undercurrents we know nothing about. And we're not at the point where we believe our government leaders."

A willingness to help other countries and concern about losing more American lives in Lebanon were among varied themes struck by others.

Eleanor Merritt of New York City: "If the Grenada [invasion] helps the people there, I'm for it. If we're going in to aid them to establish a government of their own, that's fine."

Robert Vaughn of Washington: "We're probably in Grenada because of the length of the runway, not because of the students. Why didn't we come out and say so? But to allow that [Marxist] government to become entrenched would make it more difficult in the future."

Carmen Fernandez of Tarzana, Calif.: "It's all scary! I have an 18-year-old son, and if we go to war, he'll go."

Edward Darveau of Hemingford, Neb.: "I'm puzzled as to why we're in Lebanon — or anywhere, for that matter. I suppose we can't pull out right off and lose face."

Peter Marino of New York, a former marine: "It's OK what we're doing. The US should be in Grenada because we were asked in."

Lance Maynard of San Raphael, Calif.: "I hope we can leave both countries soon. It's all the lesser of two evils. We should stabilize things in Lebanon and get out now. Otherwise there will be more attacks."

A few people seemed indifferent to the overseas incidents or expressed more concern about the economy. What would they say to President Reagan if he happened to saunter by? David Pusateri, a law student from Pittsburgh: "I'd ask him why he hasn't balanced the budget."

"I'd ask him how Nancy is," replies one man, clearly unwilling to address the subject.

Washington

The invasion of Grenada by US and Caribbean troops has triggered debate among experts on international law.

But the legal question is not just a technical issue for experts. The legal basis for the invasion is questioned by several nations allied with the United States as well as by a number of congressmen.

If the weight of opinion on this issue shifts against the US, then it will obviously have an impact on America's image throughout the world. Some US experts argue that legal grounds for the invasion were flimsy, and that the US has now lost the propaganda advantage it held over the Soviet Union because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Others argue that the US can make a case for the invasion based on certain provisions in the United Nations Charter and a 1981 treaty establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

So far, the reaction from nations outside the Caribbean region has been far from encouraging to the US. Britain expressed doubts about the invasion plan. France called the invasion "surprising" in relation to international law.

Please see LEGAL back page

LEGAL from front page

The Soviet Union, through the official Tass news agency, accused the US of seeking to intimidate "freedom loving" people in Latin America through a "criminal" action.

The White House announced that a US military aircraft carrying 61 people left Grenada Wednesday in the first evacuation of American citizens from the island. A spokesman said that other flights would follow. There are some 1,000 Americans on the island, more than half of them medical students.

In justifying the invasion, Secretary of State George P. Shultz noted on Tuesday that the OECS treaty provides for collective security. Mr. Shultz said that President Reagan decided to respond to an OECS request to intervene in Grenada, in order to protect American citizens on the island and help OECS states establish order and popularly supported governmental institutions.

Some congressmen, as well as some Europeans and Latin Americans, note the OECS is a little-known organization, whereas the better known Organization of American States (OAS) has a charter that provides that no state has the right to intervene in the affairs of another state. The US belongs to the OAS, but it does not belong to the OECS. Officials at the OAS from key Latin American nations have criticized the action in Grenada.

Rep. Michael Barnes (D) of Maryland, who chairs the House subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, has argued that the invasion raises "some serious international legal questions."

Congressional critics like Representative Barnes note that the article in the OECS treaty that Mr. Shultz cites calls for collective security against "external aggression" and further states that decisions by member states "shall be unanimous." Although several of the eastern Caribbean countries apparently felt threatened by Grenada, it is not clear that any external aggression against them was under way. And since Grenada, a member of the OECS, did not agree to the action taken, the action was not based on unanimity.

Prof. Louis Sohn at the University of Georgia said that based on existing treaties, a good legal case could be made both for and against the American intervention. Professor Sohn said that in the end, much might depend on whether the US can help restore order in Grenada and bring about elections, preferably under international supervision.

Leo Gross at Tufts University's Fletcher School of

Law and Diplomacy said that traditionally a government has the right to protect its citizens, but that a question arises as to whether American citizens on Grenada were threatened with violence. He said that it was not at all certain the violence in Grenada that preceded the invasion resembled anything like the violence that prevailed in the Dominican Republic when the US intervened in that island nation in 1965.

Article 51 of the UN Charter permits acts of self-defense, but Professor Gross said that in the case of the invasion of Grenada, "It would require more imagination than I have to invoke Article 51."

But John Moore at the University of Virginia, a former counselor on international law to the Department of State and ambassador to the Law of the Sea negotiations under the Ford administration, contends that a strong case can be made for the Grenada intervention under the UN Charter.

Professor Moore cites the combined effect of the Charter's Chapter VIII, which permits regional arrangements to deal with international security, and Article 51, dealing with the right to self-defense. He said that Grenada's military buildup, a threat from Grenada perceived by nations in the region, and a serious breakdown of law and order on the island that might have led to the taking of American citizens as hostages, helped justify the invasion.

Moore added that the presence of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers on the island had effectively removed the small nation's ability to exercise self-determination, a fundamental underlying principle of both the UN and OAS Charters.

Washington

The US Congress is feeling the full impact of the activist Reagan presidency in the space of a few days.

In times past, lawmakers have frequently intoned that Presidents merely propose, while Congress must "dispose." This week they found that President Reagan acts, leaving little for them to do except react.

Legislators, accustomed to the painstakingly slow pace of passing laws, are reeling from events about which they can only ask questions, peppered with protests. They went from private briefings with the secretaries of State and Defense on the killings of more than 200 marines in Lebanon to more briefings following the news that Mr. Reagan had sent troops into Grenada.

And in the midst of the crises abroad, the President launched a surprise assault on the domestic front. He effectively dismantled the United States Civil Rights Commission, which has been critical of his civil rights record, by firing three of its members. This leaves only three incumbents, not enough for a legal quorum.

By midweek, some on Capitol Hill were almost

Please see CONGRESS back page

CONGRESS from front page

punchy from news shocks. Reagan had the power to dismiss the commissioners, conceded Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D) of Delaware, but he added, "I can't imagine how he found time to think about it."

"Between wars, I haven't been able to figure out who's even here," said Senator Biden, when asked if he had enough votes to establish a new independent panel to monitor civil rights progress.

"It's very frustrating for the public to sort through all of this," said Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R) of Kansas, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She told a breakfast meeting of reporters Wednesday that she was "troubled" by both the timing and the justification of the invasion of the east Caribbean

island of Grenada.

"I wondered why we decided to do this on the day that we did, why we couldn't have put it off," she said of the invasion, charging that it is diverting the administration's attention from finding a diplomatic solution in Lebanon.

She said that while earlier briefings on Lebanon had been adequate, "yesterday's briefing [on Grenada], I think, left people more troubled than before."

Along with other Democratic and Republican critics, she said that the administration had failed to provide convincing evidence that American students on the island had sought aid from the United States.

Senate majority leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R) of Tennessee contended that he was satisfied with the administration's explanation.

"Baker was pleased with the way the briefings went," a spokesman said. "You would expect some disagreement."

The deepest disagreement is among House Democrats, whose leadership has staunchly defended US policy in Lebanon and just as staunchly refused to criticize the Grenada expedition until it ends.

House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts walked into an emotional Democratic Caucus meeting, called by members opposed to the Lebanon policy, and gave a ringing speech.

"He was as tough as I've ever seen him, articulating that this is not a partisan issue," says Rep. Tony Coelho (D) of California. "There's a lot of frustration that people want to get out. But I think Tip was saying basically, 'I share your frustration, but we've got to be responsible.'"

For now Congress has few means to counter the enormous clout wielded by the President. Both critics and supporters are predicting that opposition to the Grenada action will be short lived, since the troops will probably be pulled out soon anyway.

Opponents of keeping American marines in the peacekeeping force in Lebanon will have to wait until at least next week to move in the House.

Speaker O'Neill has delayed until then a defense appropriations bill that contains a proposed amendment that would cut off funds for the military forces in Lebanon. By then it is expected that feelings will have cooled somewhat.

It is symbolic that the only return punch Capitol Hill has delivered was in overriding a Reagan veto of an obscure bill conveying 3.11 acres of federal land in Oregon to six couples and two companies.

Caribbean: a new wedge in US-European relations

By Alexander MacLeod
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

London

West European governments are again being forced to rethink their view of President Reagan as an ally and as head of the world's most powerful country.

The President's decision to send marines into the Caribbean island of Grenada is only one reason for renewed doubts about his competence and coolness as a world leader.

There is a rising belief in Western

European capitals that Mr. Reagan has allowed himself to drift into a Middle East quagmire, with the United States commitment to the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon now openly questioned as a basis for future policy in the region.

In Paris, foreign ministers of the four countries contributing to the force were set for an urgent meeting to consider the future of the multinational force. US Secretary of State George Shultz was preparing for blunt indications from his British

and French counterparts that the Europeans see no long-term future for the force.

Mr. Reagan's decision to brush aside Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's objections to the Grenada invasion is seen by Britons as undermining the special relationship between London and Washington. Leading opposition and some government politicians are saying the President cannot be trusted any longer.

Please see WEDGE back page

WEDGE from front page

A startling aspect of these negative opinions is the speed with which they have developed.

In Western Europe Mr. Reagan's reputation as a world leader had been enhanced in recent months by the flexibility he had shown at the nuclear arms talks at Geneva.

Following the shooting down of the South Korean airliner by the Soviets, he gained more points by acting in a statesmanlike way and outclassing the Soviet leadership in his "feel" for the crisis.

Now suddenly renewed doubts are arising about sensitivity in dealing with potentially touchy allies and asserting US power in world trouble spots.

In Britain, Labour opposition shadow foreign secretary Denis Healey declared that Reagan erred badly in ordering the invasion of Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth, against Mrs. Thatcher's clearly spelled-out advice.

Especially disturbing was Mr. Healey's linking of the Grenada question to the impending deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Britain and other West European countries.

"President Reagan has shown by his Caribbean action that his administration cannot command confidence, for example, in arrangements for controlling and if necessary firing cruise missiles," he said.

Privately, British government leaders are furious about what they see as Reagan's rough handling of the Grenada



Dutch police remove demonstrators protesting the invasion of Grenada

crisis. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe was criticized by members of his own party for failing to condemn outright the US action.

Similar sentiments have been expressed in France. An official statement issued in Paris condemned the Grenada invasion as illegal and unwise.

President François Mitterrand in recent months has strongly supported Reagan's handling of the Geneva arms talks. He applauded the Reagan line on the Korean airliner incident.

Now French diplomats speak coldly of a US administration acting without sufficient consideration for friends and allies. Earlier this year France and the US clashed over how to deal with Libyan pressures in Chad. Similar tensions were

evoked by developments in Grenada.

Staff writer Elizabeth Pond in Bonn reports: The invasion of Grenada is "dreadful" in its negative impact on European public opinion, a retired West German general says.

His view is representative of the private — if not public — feelings of Bonn's center-right government. Officially, criticism of the US is much more muted here than from Britain, Canada, and other US allies. But privately, officials worry about the effect of the Grenada adventure a month before controversial new NATO missile deployments are to begin.

Before Grenada, explained the ex-general, "We could argue [to peace protesters] that America was only defensive," while the Soviet Union was expansionist. Now,

US action in Grenada has "devalued" the argument about Soviet aggression in Afghanistan by making the US look indistinguishable from the Soviet Union.

The retired general was attending a security conference of the newly formed Strategic Forum.

Other active and retired West German military officers and ambassadors echoed this view. They fear Grenada could upset the grudging domestic consensus they think they had finally won for NATO deployment of the new American missiles. And they question Washington's priorities in placing this delicate consensus at risk by what they view as a minor victory in the Caribbean that makes the US look like a bully.

The American invasion is seen as reinforcing the peace movement's image of America as trigger-happy, even in areas of little strategic importance. Bonn's worry is that the Grenada attack could stimulate anti-American sentiment here and undo the impact of the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner last month. Public revulsion over that incident overshadowed this fall's initial antinuclear demonstrations.

But in public, no Bonn government official wishes to criticize the White House. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has confined his comments to regret over the loss of life in Grenada.

Similarly, a parliamentary spokesman for the Christian Democratic Party has voiced the expectation that the US action was undertaken to protect US lives and that the mission will soon be completed.

INTERNATIONAL

Behind Grenada invasion: US attempt to prevent 'second Cuba'?

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

The multitude of press briefings and declarations in official Washington Tuesday carried a multitude of explanations for United States intervention in Grenada. But it was increasingly apparent that underlying and overlaying all other expressed concerns, such as the safety of US citizens, was the administration's concern over the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean and Central America, and more specifically its desire to stop the emergence of a "second Cuba" in Grenada, a development it has feared since Maurice

Bishop took power in 1979.

ANALYSIS

The administration's action and the basic premise underlying it are topics of fierce debate.

Much of this debate focuses on the answers to four questions:

1. How important is Grenada to the US and to regional security?
2. Was Grenada under Maurice Bishop rapidly becoming a second Cuba and a threat to the US?
3. Were the Cubans and Soviets behind last week's coup by Grenadan Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard?
4. Would they have taken advantage of the coup even if they were not initially behind it, turning Grenada into a Soviet satellite?

Those justifying the invasion stress, among other things, Grenada's geopolitical significance. They empha-



size the island's proximity to the Panama Canal and the oil fields of Venezuela.

However, close analysis of Washington's statements indicates that the main fear for both Washington and its Caribbean partners-in-invasion was probably the domino theory. It was felt that any communist takeover of Grenada might begin to tilt the balance in the region and eventually throw the entire eastern Caribbean into

Cuban arms.

From the point of view of the Reagan administration, a pro-Soviet Coard-controlled Grenada would have come on top of what it sees as a basically communist regime in Nicaragua, an extreme radical government in Suriname, and serious Soviet-inspired threats to the pro-US governments of El Salvador and Guatemala.

But unlike some of the other countries on this list, the radical regime in Grenada could probably be dealt with swiftly and with relatively little military and political cost.

Some see the invasion as a message to Nicaragua. Secretary of State George Shultz stated Tuesday that there was no such message. This is possibly the case.

Although administration officials are not averse to striking fear and trembling into Sandinista hearts on the cheap, close observers of the Caribbean scene say that realists in the administration — like Secretary Shultz himself — must know that because of the size of the country, the determination of those in power, and the difference in degree of popular support for the Coard regime on the one hand and the Sandinistas on the other, an invasion of Nicaragua on the Central American mainland would be far more costly in both real and political terms than the present intervention in the spice island of Grenada.

Neither Bishop nor his regime was easy to label.

Bishop claimed Cuba's Fidel Castro as his lifelong

Please see CUBA page 10

INTERNATIONAL

CUBA from page 7

idol and model, and used Cuban advisers throughout his government. While no tyrant, he was autocratic in style, censoring the press and discouraging strong public criticism of his regime.

Most threatening to the US, Cuban workers helped build an airport that might have become a Cuban air base.

Bishop's government may have belonged to what could be a new hybrid, a Marxist-oriented government that does not follow classic communist lines. The main question for the US is: Are such governments necessarily pro-Soviet or can they be coaxed into a more neutral posture, happily playing the two superpowers against each other.

Some observers have long felt Castro's real ambition is to free himself from his dependence on the Soviet Union by heading a radicalized Latin America that would not follow the same orthodox communist economic model he did and that would not be tied to either great power. Under to this theory, Bishop's regime would have been the kind of government Castro would be likely to encourage.

There are still few indications that Cuba was behind the Coard coup. On Thursday, Mr. Shultz stated that the US had "no direct information" on Cuban involvement but that the invading Caribbean countries felt that this was the case.

In her joint press conference with President Reagan, Dominica's Prime Minister Eugenia Charles spoke of conspirators seen entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy in the weeks before the coup. Some Caribbean observers point out that most high-level Grenadian officials frequently visited the Soviet Embassy long before any talk of a coup. Press reports on Wednesday stressed that OECS leaders thought talk of Soviet-Cuban backing of Coard would be a useful tool in obtaining US intervention.

Cuba probably did not oust Bishop. But had Coard and his group remained in power and shown themselves eager to join the East bloc, it is unlikely they would have been refused. In the same statement in which Cuba condemned Bishop's murder, the Castro government said it would not break off economic cooperation. Unlike some of the other players on the Caribbean scene, Castro was leaving his options open.

UN debates invasion of Grenada

By Louis Winitzer

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

Dismay, bewilderment, sadness, and in a few cases anger.

These are the feelings expressed by many diplomats here regarding the United States invasion of Grenada.

Criticism of the US move voiced privately by many representatives runs from mild to sharp. Mexico's ambassador, Porfirio Muñoz-Ledo, the first speaker at a special session of the UN Security Council called by Nicaragua, denounced the invasion. Mexico, the main regional power in the area, was not consulted by the US, according to diplomatic sources.

Only a handful of diplomats support President Reagan's initiative. "It was a matter of credibility. If the US cannot protect its own interests and those of its friends so close to home, who will believe that it is willing to do so far away from its borders?" says an Asian diplomat.

Representatives from communist countries denounced or condemned "the

US unprovoked aggression." Cuba's ambassador, Raúl Roa-Kouri, called the invasion "imperialistic aggression."

Meanwhile, the overwhelming "middle UN" (West European, Scandinavian, moderate Asian, African, and Latin American nations) takes the US to task for its action in sorrow, and "because now it is the West which will be projecting the image of the big bully," as a Western ambassador puts it.

Many diplomats here are bothered by the following thoughts:

- The US may have violated the UN Charter and international law.

- The US action sidestepped the Organization of American States.

- The US seems to have stolen a leaf from the Brezhnev doctrine. (The Soviet Union ultimately decides who governs a country within its sphere of interest.) "We would have hoped that the US is not the USSR," says a moderate third-world diplomat.

- The US once again seems to be acting like the world policeman.

What Americans, and allies in this hemisphere and abroad, most want to hear from President Reagan tonight is an honest appraisal of what the United States is up to in Lebanon and Grenada, the immediate crisis points in foreign policy. In what overarching pattern, if any, do they fit?

The public rating of Mr. Reagan's handling of foreign policy had been turning negative since summer. A month ago, well before the past weekend's traumatic events, a plurality of Americans for the first time since Reagan took office said they disapproved of his foreign policy performance.

To be fair about it, deepening "unease" better characterizes how the nation lately views the White House's foreign ventures than does "disapproval." Opinion questions are not always answered literally. And the public's thinking sensibly reflects a foreign policy reality that is more mixed, a subtler compound of issues and interests than the art of questioning can describe.

What Americans most want is answers they can trust. "Honesty and integrity" were the two qualities that Americans, just last month, listed above all others in describing what they want of an ideal president, in a CBS/New York Times survey.

Next came expertise in handling foreign policy, caring about people, and qualities of intelligence and knowledge — notably ahead of handling the economy, domestic policy, and toughness. This was a telling response about the state of the nation the President will address in tonight's telecast.

The public is saying, We know there are trade-offs and risks, and at times you must act without full information. But given the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate, given America's history of exploitation in Central America and the violence and fixity of Middle East antagonism, we want to be sure about our government's motives. We are concerned our nation's energies and our servicemen's lives may be misspent.

The public and Congress are not about to ask President Reagan to renounce the balance-of-power role the United States has undertaken since World War II. The US cannot withdraw from the world and hunker down on this continent. Nor can it lash out when it suffers losses. What the practical-idealist American wants of his government is a judicious choosing of involvements abroad to find those his democracy can address.

This broader context and vision are what Americans worry about, more than hearing an explanation for the specific security failure at the Beirut airport, or for the specific threat to civilian life on Grenada, although these are important, too.

In making his larger case, Mr. Reagan should be cautious about reflexively invoking monolithic Marxism as the universal enemy — the Soviet-Syrian axis in the Middle East, the Soviet-Cuban danger in the Caribbean. Americans generally agree that the two systems — democratic and communist — are implacably opposed, on economic and political and religious grounds. But it is unconvincing to lump all communist systems together, just as it is to fail to discriminate among democracies. The Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean governments have competing systems and historic rivalries, as do "free" countries of the West.

Americans want reasonable talk and frank answers.

How long are we likely to stay in Lebanon? What is President Reagan doing to enlist Israeli and Syrian cooperation in Lebanon? What remains of his Middle East plan?

How long are we likely to remain as governors in Grenada? When the public there again votes for a new government, how sure is he that they will not again choose a socialist state? How comfortable is he, having just imposed the most powerful democracy's will on one of the weakest nations on earth, with the impact this will have on America's image abroad? The Reagan administration has spoken accusatorially about Soviet invasion, as in Afghanistan: How does the President differentiate his landing in Grenada from what the Soviets have done?

Remarkably, the central question of Mr. Reagan's tenure has shifted from his command of the economy and the revival of American power to unease about the wisdom and hard choices behind deploying that power. The public wants the reassurance not of easy answers, but of the candor and integrity that sometimes require the highest officials to acknowledge the dilemmas they face.

Fear of a 'second Cuba' lies behind US Grenada invasion

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

The multitude of press briefings and declarations in official Washington last week carried a multitude of explanations for United States intervention in Grenada. But it was increasingly apparent that underlying and overlaying all other expressed concerns, such as the safety of US citizens, was the administration's concern over the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean and Central America, and more specifically its desire to stop the emergence of a "second Cuba" in Grenada, a development it has feared since Maurice Bishop took power in 1979.

The administration's action and the basic premise underlying it are topics of fierce debate. Much of this debate focuses on the answers to four questions:

1. How important is Grenada to the US and to regional security?
2. Was Grenada under Maurice Bishop rapidly becoming a second Cuba and a threat to the US?

3. Were the Cubans and Soviets behind the coup a fortnight ago by Grenadan Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard?

4. Would they have taken advantage of the coup even if they were not initially behind it, turning Grenada into a Soviet satellite?

Those justifying the invasion stress, among other things, Grenada's geopolitical significance. They emphasize the island's proximity to the Panama Canal and the oil fields of Venezuela.

However, close analysis of Washington's statements indicates that the main fear for both Washington and its Caribbean partners-in-invasion was probably the domino theory. It was felt that any communist takeover of Grenada might begin to tilt the balance in the region and eventually throw the entire eastern Caribbean into Cuban arms.

From the point of view of the Reagan administration, a pro-Soviet Coard-controlled Grenada would have come on top

Please see GRENADA page 21

FROM PAGE ONE

GRENADA from page 1

of what it sees as a basically communist regime in Nicaragua, an extreme radical government in Suriname, and serious Soviet-inspired threats to the pro-US governments of El Salvador and Guatemala.

But unlike some of the other countries on this list, the radical regime in Grenada could probably be dealt with swiftly and with relatively little military and political cost.

Some see the invasion as a message to Nicaragua. Secretary of State George Shultz stated Oct. 25 that there was no such message. This is possibly the case.

Although administration officials are not averse to striking fear and trembling into Sandinista hearts on the cheap, close observers of the Caribbean scene say that realists in the administration — like Secretary Shultz himself — must know that because of the size of the country, the determination of those in power, and the difference in degree of popular support for the Coard regime on the one hand and the Sandinistas on the other, an invasion of Nicaragua on the Central American mainland would be far more costly in both real and political terms than the present intervention in the spice island of Grenada.

Neither Bishop nor his regime was easy to label.

Bishop claimed Cuba's Fidel Castro as his lifelong idol and model, and used Cuban advisers throughout his government. While no tyrant, he was autocratic in style, censoring the press and discouraging strong public criticism of his regime.

Most threatening to the US, Cuban workers helped build an airport that might have become a Cuban air base.

Bishop's government may have belonged to what could be a new hybrid, a Marxist-oriented government



Pearl Airport in Grenada — now in US hands


that does not follow classic communist lines. The main question for the US is: Are such governments necessarily pro-Soviet or can they be coaxed into a more neutral posture, happily playing the two superpowers against each other.

Some observers have long felt Castro's real ambition is to free himself from his dependence on the Soviet Union by heading a radicalized Latin America that would not follow the same orthodox communist economic model he did and that would not be tied to either great power. Under to this theory, Bishop's regime would have been the kind of government Castro would be likely to encourage.

There are still few indications that Cuba was behind

the Coard coup. On Thursday, Mr. Shultz stated that the US had "no direct information" on Cuban involvement but that the invading Caribbean countries felt that this was the case.

In her joint press conference with President Reagan, Dominica's Prime Minister Eugenia Charles spoke of conspirators seen entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy in the weeks before the coup. Some Caribbean observers point out that most high-level Grenadian officials frequently visited the Soviet Embassy long before any talk of a coup. Press reports on Wednesday stressed that OECS leaders thought talk of Soviet-Cuban backing of Coard would be a useful tool in obtaining US intervention.



**ATOMS AND
THE BIBLE**
Cyclotron
unlocks
Gutenberg's
secrets

20



**CRAFT AND
CULTURE**
Dolls relive
Scottish
heritage

18

**AMERICAN
SCHOOLING**
Editor Eloise
Leiterman
explains

16

Gunboat diplomacy wins battle, loses friends

'Send in marines' strategy
demands quick trigger finger

By Joseph C. Harsch

This has been the week when Ronald Reagan had to learn, the hard way, one of the old classic rules about military intervention by great powers in the internal affairs of small countries.

The old rule is that if you are going to do it, then do it with decisive force, as quickly as possible, and don't worry too much about the legalities. The important thing is to be quickly successful. If it is not a quick

success, chances are that the intervener will get bogged down in endless and expensive troubles.

The United States invasion of Grenada is an example of the effective way to do these things. The US Marines went in with decisive force and took all their first-day assignments, quickly and with light casualties. The quick and positive nature of that operation contrasted with the increasing difficulties with the two other ongoing US military interventions — in Lebanon and Central America.

The death count of marines from the Oct. 23 bombing of their barracks outside Beirut reached 219 at time of writing, with some 20 or 30 still missing, presumably in the rubble. The toll of French from the other bombing at the same time reached 40, also with 20 to 30 men still missing.

US intervention in Lebanon this time around began on Aug. 25, 1982. Some 800 were sent in to help police the Palestine Liberation Organization's withdrawal from Lebanon. The President promised at the time that they would remain for only 30 days.

Now, 14 months later, more Marine reinforcements are arriving, the casualty toll has become a politically important issue at home, and the top-level foreign policy managers of the government in Washington are groping, so far inconclusively, for some way of either protecting the marines or getting them out.

Please see PATTERN back page

PATTERN OF DIPLOMACY

Military action in Grenada costs
US president prestige in Europe

By Alexander MacLeod
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

London

West European governments are again being forced to rethink their view of President Reagan as an ally and as head of the world's most powerful country.

The President's decision to send marines into the Caribbean island of Grenada is only one reason for renewed doubts about his competence and coolness as a world leader.

There is a rising belief in Western European capitals that Mr. Reagan has allowed himself to drift into a Middle East quagmire, with the United States commitment to the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon now openly questioned as a basis for future policy in the region.

In Paris, foreign ministers of the four countries contributing to the force were set for an urgent meeting to consider the future of the multinational force. US Secretary of State George Shultz was preparing for blunt indications from his British and French counterparts that the Europeans see no long-term future for the force.

Mr. Reagan's decision to brush aside Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's objections to the Grenada invasion is seen by Britons as undermining the special relationship between London and Washington. Leading opposition and some government politicians are saying the President cannot be trusted any longer.



A startling aspect of these negative opinions is the speed with which they have developed.

In Western Europe Mr. Reagan's reputation as a world leader had been enhanced in recent months by the flexibility he had shown at the nuclear arms talks at Geneva.

Following the shooting down of the South Korean airliner by the Soviets, he gained more points by acting in a statesmanlike way and outclassing the Soviet leadership in his "feel" for the crisis.

Now suddenly renewed doubts are arising

Please see WEDGE back page



1974: Independence from Britain.
1979: Coup by Maurice Bishop.
1983 March: Reagan complains of
'Soviet-Cuban militarization.'
Oct. 13-19: Bishop placed under
'house arrest' by radicals.
Oct. 19: Bishop, three Cabinet
ministers, and others killed.
Military revolutionary council takes
power, orders 24-hour curfew.
Oct. 22-23: Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States asks US to help
restore democracy to Grenada.

Christian Science Monitor Oct. 29 - Nov. 4, 1983 P. 1

Some progress seen on restricting

Fear of a 'second Cuba' lies

WEDGE from front page

about sensitivity in dealing with potentially touchy allies and asserting US power in world trouble spots.

In Britain, Labour opposition shadow foreign secretary Denis Healey declared that Reagan erred badly in ordering the invasion of Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth, against Mrs. Thatcher's clearly spelled-out advice.

Especially disturbing was Mr. Healey's linking of the Grenada question to the impending deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Britain and other West European countries.

"President Reagan has shown by his Caribbean action that his administration cannot command confidence, for example, in arrangements for controlling and if necessary firing cruise missiles," he said.

Privately, British government leaders are furious about what they see as Reagan's rough handling of the Grenada crisis. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe was criticized by members of his own party for failing to condemn outright the US action.

Similar sentiments have been expressed in France. An official statement issued in Paris condemned the Grenada invasion as illegal and unwise.

President François Mitterrand in recent months has strongly supported Reagan's handling of the Geneva arms talks. He applauded the Reagan line on the Korean airliner incident.

PATTERN from front page

The Lebanon intervention was relatively small. The place is a third of the way around the world from home. The mission was vaguely defined as "peacekeeping." No end is in sight.

Precise numbers of US armed forces in Honduras this past week are not available. "Maneuvers" are going on intermittently. Numbers vary from week to week

Now French diplomats speak coldly of a US administration acting without sufficient consideration for friends and allies. Earlier this year France and the US clashed over how to deal with Libyan pressures in Chad. Similar tensions were evoked by developments in Grenada.

Staff writer Elizabeth Pond in Bonn reports: The invasion of Grenada is "dreadful" in its negative impact on European public opinion, a retired West German general says.

His view is representative of the private — if not public — feelings of Bonn's center-right government. Officially, criticism of the US is much more muted here than from Britain, Canada, and other US allies. But privately, officials worry about the effect of the Grenada adventure a month before controversial new NATO missile deployments are to begin.


Before Grenada, explained the ex-general, "We could argue [to peace protesters] that America was only defensive," while the Soviet Union was expansionist. Now, US action in Grenada has "devalued" the argument about Soviet aggression in Afghanistan by making the US look indistinguishable from the Soviet Union.

The retired general was attending a security conference of the newly formed Strategic Forum.

Other active and retired West German military officers and ambassadors echoed this view. They fear Grenada could upset the grudging domestic consensus they think they had finally won for NATO deployment of the new American missiles.

Nicaragua. US and other foreign journalists come and go, reporting from inside on the effects of the military raids mounted by counterrevolutionaries funded and trained by the US.

The operation in Honduras has failed of one of its purposes, which was to hobble the leftist revolutionaries in El Salvador. The insurgents are still in the field there. The government of El Salvador, which enjoys substantial US support, has been unable to end the work of rightist



US troops en route for Grenada board transport plane in Barbados

And they question Washington's priorities in placing this delicate consensus at risk by what they view as a minor victory in the Caribbean that makes the US look like a bully.

The American invasion is seen as reinforcing the peace movement's image of America as trigger-happy, even in areas of little strategic importance. Bonn's worry is that the Grenada attack could stimulate anti-American sentiment here and undo the impact of the Soviet shoot-down of the Korean airliner last

month. Public revulsion over that incident overshadowed this fall's initial antinuclear demonstrations.

But in public, no Bonn government official wishes to criticize the White House. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has confined his comments to regret over the loss of life in Grenada.

Similarly, a parliamentary spokesman for the Christian Democratic Party has voiced the expectation that the US action was undertaken to protect US lives and that the mission will soon be completed.

Reagan administration is its possible effect on US political patterns. Mr. Reagan's domestic policies have so far been relatively successful, but the Grenada affair is his first successful (we presume) foreign adventure. Its very success highlights the nonsuccess of his major foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East and Central America.

The bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport in Lebanon occurred

Caribbean island nations float in sea of uneasiness

By Dennis Volman
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, people are trying to make the difficult choice of the lesser evil.

While the short-lived coup in Grenada by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard was almost universally deplored, US intervention under any circumstances triggers deep anxieties in the area and raises fears for the future.

Caribbean diplomats say that the island governments that most actively pushed for intervention had all been nervous for several years about the spread of radical ideas among their own populations. These fears were not allayed by radical radio broadcasts beamed at their islands by the Grenadan regime.

Antigua and Dominica, like Jamaica, according to these sources, had experienced "their own troubles with left-wing groups" and were "nervous of contagion by the [political] virus."

In particular, Dominica's prime minister, Eugenia Charles, came to power as a reaction against these problems. Leaders of Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica also were elected on strong anticommunist platforms. During the past year, their relations with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop (who was deposed three weeks ago and killed a fortnight ago) had greatly improved. But the prospect of an even more radical government in Grenada was intolerable to them.

At present, English-speaking Caribbean reaction is mixed. Bishop supporters throughout the area tend to be against the intervention in spite of their strong opposition to the Coard coup. Left-of-center intellectuals, trade union leaders, and many Trinidadian political party leaders shy away from supporting intervention.

One well-placed Caribbean intellectual stated that groups opposing intervention have no great love of Coard but are troubled by the invasion's implications.

Divisions among the English-speaking Caribbean countries at the prospect of intervention emerged at a meeting of CARICOM (the umbrella organization of English-speaking states) leaders in Trinidad just before the invasion. With American ships already streaming toward Grenada, the island republics of Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Antigua lobbied for armed intervention by CARICOM states. Trinidad, Guyana, Belize, and to a lesser extent the Bahamas fought the proposal,

arguing that an invasion would be counterproductive, setting dangerous precedents which would lead to greater problems in the future.

With CARICOM at an impasse, the four states lobbying for intervention decided to move ahead anyway. After taking this decision they received the support of Jamaica and Barbados.

The states acted under the aegis of the subregional group, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The legal basis for the intervention was a regional defense treaty signed several months ago by OECS members which, among other things, contained a provision enabling members to call on third-party assistance should any one of them feel threatened. However, Grenada never signed the treaty precisely because Maurice Bishop feared that it would be used to justify invasion.

Opposition to the intervention stems from fears that:

1. It has set a precedent for third-party states to invite forces into other states, which raises doubts about the national sovereignty of the countries in the region.

2. It brings up fears about the militarization of the area, a process which began in 1979 with the Bishop takeover. At that time, the Grenadan leader increased the size and quality of his armed forces. In response special police officers from Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica were trained by the US in Puerto Rico and Panama. According to Caribbean sources, these special police forces make up the core of the Caribbean troops currently involved in the intervention.

3. Most dangerously it raises the specter that the eastern Caribbean will become the stage for the next round of East-West confrontational politics. Especially troubling to some is the fact that some Cuban airport workers were killed.

A crucial question for many in the Caribbean is what kind of government will come out of the military occupation. Some stress that the US has a very bad track record in Latin America, leaving in the wake of its interventions governments that are very backward-looking, repressive, and strongly militarized.

Sources in Trinidad (which has a large Grenadan population) report that reactions of ordinary people are also mixed. They reportedly resent outside intervention, but are glad to be rid of Coard. Their fears of intervention are, however, less pronounced than those of intellectuals and labor leaders.

EDITORIAL

"First the blade, then the ear,  then the full grain in the ear"

Now Grenada

No sooner had the American public and Congress caught one shock from the Marine tragedy in Lebanon than they had to absorb the US invasion of Grenada.

Both are dramatically reported, sparing the public and political leaders no emotional jolt from the depicted violence amidst questions of what the United States government is doing there.

The Grenada adventure, involving some 2,000 US Marine and Army troops, can only heighten the perplexity of Americans about what might appear as a loose-cannon use of military might. Mr. Reagan must move quickly to reassure Americans of some consistency in the use of troops abroad.

In Grenada, the Marine mission in concert with six east Caribbean nations ostensibly was launched to evacuate some of the 1,000 US citizens and other nationals who wanted to leave, to end the deterioration in civil order under the increasingly violent new Marxist rulers, and to take over until a new democratically elected government can be installed. Despite protests from Americans on the scene that a rescue adventure could run a greater risk for their safety, the mission was undertaken after the new Grenadan regime reportedly reneged on a pact to permit an exodus.

In having to make this call, that the greater risk lay in avoiding action, Mr. Reagan can likely claim the benefit of the doubt of most Americans. Rather than assume he sought to offset the image of getting caught off guard in the Middle East by launching a more tactically controllable mission on a tiny island in the Caribbean, most Americans would assume the President would have wanted to avoid a double jeopardy for the servicemen he commands. But the Grenadan adventure will only compound the President's troubles at home. At the moment, the Republican leadership on the Hill is giving him no great support. Moderate GOP senators in leadership posts seem dismayed by the turn of events and White House rationales. On the Middle East, House Speaker Tip O'Neill is standing behind the President on the Marines in Lebanon while challenging him on his approach in the Caribbean before the Grenada invasion.

The President's motives for the Grenada action are



thought to be more mixed than his assertion that events forced his hand. It was a planned operation. The possible strategic risk from the two-mile-long runway under construction on the island — close to oil-producer Venezuela, and a prospect for Cuban-Soviet use — must be taken into account. So must the administration's desire to unseat a Marxist regime in the region. Mr. Reagan for some time has wanted to press his Caribbean-solidarity initiative, which he had always said would be an economic and not a military program. Ironically, its first manifestation appears to be chiefly military.

In sum, Mr. Reagan will likely gain the benefit of the

doubt in the short run for the action itself. Many Americans share the President's dread of a Marxist advance in this hemisphere.

Still, the loss of more Marine lives in Grenada cannot help but now bring his Caribbean policies under the same anguished review at home as his Middle East policies. If he now topples a government in the Caribbean and replaces it, does he come out ahead or behind? There will be no neat answer to that question. Rather, it drives to the core of the debate about the use of might versus negotiation, about whether the gain from meddling in others' affairs is greater than its costs.

Latin America's quiet support for US intervention in Grenada

By James Nelson Goodsell
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Buenos Aires

At least one Latin America president has quietly let Washington know that, contrary to his public statements, he supports United States intervention in Grenada.

"It had to be done," he says. "The growing presence of Cuban troops and arms, the utter chaos of the island's government, and the whole threat to the peace demanded action."

But this hemisphere leader is not prepared to go public with this view — due largely to domestic political considerations which demand what he calls "an anti-American stand."


A number of other Latin American leaders are in the same bind. Non-intervention is a cardinal point in hemisphere diplomacy and many Latin Americans smart when they recall earlier US interventions in the Caribbean, Central America, and elsewhere.

This time, however, many of these leaders tend to believe that the US intervention was the least objectionable solution — that to have refrained from intervention might have had disastrous consequences not only for Grenada, but also for the Caribbean as a whole and even for the rest of the hemisphere.

That, of course, is the view expressed by most of the leaders of the eastern Caribbean. Prime ministers Edward P. G. Seaga of Jamaica and John M. G. ("Tom") Adams of Barbados, whose forces are on Grenada along with those of the US, are naturally supportive. They asked the US to intervene.

But even in the Dominican Republic, which underwent a US intervention in 1965, there has been guarded support and "understanding," as one Dominican spokesman phrased it, of the US action in Grenada.

This Caribbean attitude helps explain



American soldier with a young Grenadian

why the Organization of American States (OAS) has been slow to condemn or take any action on the intervention.

In the Caribbean, moreover, there has been support for the US action from key opinion molders.

Influential newspaper editors in the region, for example, have quickly swung around to support the American move. At the recent Inter-American Press Association meeting in Lima, Peru, there was virtually unanimous backing by Caribbean editors for the combined US-Caribbean invasion of Grenada.

Mark A. Conyers, managing director of The Trinidad Guardian of Port of Spain, said flatly: "I thoroughly agree with the forces' landing. You have to protect Caribbean democracy. There must be an elected government in Grenada and this landing should help bring that about."

Oliver P. Clarke, managing director of The Daily Gleaner of Kingston, Jamaica, said, however, the major problem now is "how quickly Grenada can return to being a democratic society and one that is governed by itself."

Both Aruba and Curaçao editors went along with these views as did Germán E. Ornes, editor and publishers of El Caribe of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

"Of course, intervention is not a very nice thing," he said, "but the Dominican experience had a happy ending — and I hope the same for Grenada."

The 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic was roundly condemned at the time and used by many Latin American politicians as a prime case of US interference in the internal affairs of the hemisphere. But Mr. Ornes noted that the results of the intervention with the building of a strong democracy in the island nation was quite the opposite of what many predicted at the time.

That may help explain the guarded support the Grenada intervention has among some Dominicans.

Elsewhere in the hemisphere, while there may not be the same measure of support for the US action as is evidenced in the Caribbean, there tends to be a less than total rejection of the US action.

Indeed, despite critical presidential pronouncements, foreign ministry protests, legislative votes, and press comment against the intervention, US diplomats have been told privately by some of these groups that Washington should not take the adverse reaction in Latin America too seriously.

"We have to protest," one foreign minister said. "If we did not, we would not be true to non-intervention. And of course we have to let the US know that we will not permit other interventions if it is thinking of others."

"Still, this one is understandable. And I cannot overlook the fact that Caribbean islands not only joined the intervention but also asked the US for it."

It is this point that Latin American diplomats say has kept the OAS from roundly attacking the US for the action.

"[Dominica Prime Minister] Eugenia Charles," said another foreign minister, "is most persuasive in her arguments in favor of intervention."

"And after all, while Grenada is part of the inter-American system, it is also an English-speaking island, composed largely of black people whose culture is quite different from that of the rest of Latin America."

Grenada invasion renews debate over presidents and the press

By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The battle with the Cubans in Grenada appears to be winding down. But the White House battle with the press is still simmering.

Following a barrage of criticism from news organizations for not letting reporters onto the Caribbean island until two days after the United States invasion, the White House and the Pentagon have now eased restrictions on press coverage. But the crisis raises anew the issue of press management and the extent to which the President — or any president — manipulates the press for his own policy objectives.

Arguments are mustered on both sides.

"The problem is that the press is shut off from information the public needs to know," a Colorado newspaperwoman comments. "The government uses the press shamefully."

"We had the problem of protecting security," says a White House official, explaining why reporters were not allowed in on Grenada with the first wave of US troops. But, he adds, "we could have handled the matter better."

It is not lost on journalists that the public does not necessarily sympathize with their trials. In the case of Grenada, despite concern in Congress and elsewhere that the administration is not providing all the facts surrounding the invasion, there seems to be considerable approval of the decision to bar reporters in the early hours on grounds that secrecy helped ensure success of the mission and thereby safeguarded American lives.

Beyond the immediate question of press censorship, however, lies the larger issue of the role of the press in the American political system in the wake of an erosion of institutions generally. This role is seen by experts to be vastly enhanced.

"The media now have a heightened impact on the presidency," says Martha J. Kumar of Towson State University, a specialist on the subject. "Today there is a lack of institutional discipline in Congress, especially with rise of the subcommittee system. The President and Congress can't get together and talk things out as they once used to. So the President has to go to the public and develop a coalition of support. The press is therefore important to him as an intermediary institution."

The same is true in the case of Congress, says Dr. Kumar. "It used to be that announcements were made after deals were already struck. Now the mark-up systems [in congressional committees] are public, the state of play is known, and so the press and interest groups come into the picture earlier."

Mindful of the heightened importance of the news media, President Reagan has skillfully used them. He is given exceptionally high ratings as a communicator and as a leader who understands the advantage of getting his message out on his own terms. Hence his preference for

speeches over formal news conferences in putting over his domestic and foreign policies.

"The Reagan staff knows his strength, and one thing they have sought to do is to present the President without a lot of commentary and analysis on TV," says Dr. Kumar. "During the Nixon period you had instant analyses after news conferences and so the 'good' of the speech was often destroyed. The Reagan administration wants the President to come across unfiltered, and the evening news conferences make this possible. TV networks don't want to spend a lot of time on commentary in that prime time."

"The Reagan people also know that with the news conference scheduled after the evening news, it is unlikely that the next day the news conference will be the first story."

Although the press conference is not Mr. Reagan's best vehicle for projecting leadership — he has held only 20 news conferences since coming to office — it is a carefully orchestrated performance, and he has grown more adept at it. He is more relaxed and self-assured. He bones up and rehearses for the event. He knows where reporters are sitting and whom he will call on. He affably uses the reporter's first name, creating an atmosphere of easy familiarity. In contrast to the hurly-burly of conferences in previous presidencies, when some reporters screamed their way to a question, Reagan has shaped the news conference into a model of courtesy and decorum.

For their part, reporters prepare carefully but are under considerable tension. Print journalists, especially, who have little experience in the TV limelight, sit self-consciously in their assigned seats. If millions of unseen viewers are not enough to arouse blips in the heart, there is the editor back home, carefully judging his or her reporter's performance — and the newspaper's exposure.

For most there is also the frustration of knowing how little chance he or she has of being picked for a question. Some 150 accredited White House journalists may attend the conference. Fewer than 20 may actually be invited to stand on their feet.

"Life was easier in the days of FDR," remarks Steve McCormick of the National News Service. "We didn't have such pressures then. [Now] most of the questions go to the wire services, the TV networks, and the big newspapers, so very few get a crack at the President."

Old reportorial hands recall the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman as a time when, in an informal get-together in the Oval Office, they really got to know the President. Most important, they gained a feel for his thinking and his policies that was helpful in reporting on the presidency fairly and accurately.

Is the modern-day format adequate to the high civic purpose of holding a president accountable to the people? Political scientists note that in democracies with a parliamentary system, the prime minister regularly answers questions before parliament. He or she is criticized by

the opposition and responds. The American president, on the other hand, goes to Congress only to make a speech. He does not testify before committees. Any move to reform the system would be regarded as a violation of the constitutional separation of powers.

Yet, though today's televised news conference is more of a show than a serious probing of the nation's chief executive, it is accepted as the only alternative in this day of mass communication.

"It's a terrible way for a president to be held accountable but it's better than anything else," comments political analyst Austin Ranney of the American Enterprise Institute. "This is the only device for asking the president what he is doing and why he is doing it. But TV is bound to dominate. You won't get maximum information to the people, and the White House of course has an interest in making the president look good."

Part of the problem with the TV format, says Dr. Ranney, is that no one reporter can hold the floor and keep pushing the president on a subject of national importance and urgency. Therefore this makes for short, snappy answers — geared to the snippets that the networks will run on their programs.

"The White House knows the public will see the snippets, and so there's a premium on answering pithily — with memorable quotes," says Ranney. "Live television at least is better because the people who do watch can see what the president does answer as against the snippets later broadcast."

For all its faults, the presidential news conference is deemed a valuable exercise, even by journalists.

"People can at least see how the president answers and decide if the answers are acceptable," says UPI reporter Helen Thomas. "Then they have more choices."

"You get a sense of the person of the president," says Dr. Kumar. "You find out what he's interested in, whether he likes details or not, what his view of the office is. You get a measure of him."

Experts note also that Republicans tend to be more management-oriented in handling of press relations. They tend to pick spokesmen not close to the president who are simply there to send the message out. In the case of White House deputy press secretary Larry Speakes, this creates concerns among reporters who are not confident he always knows what is going on.

"Speakes does not know the President's mind," says Dr. Kumar. "Jody Powell knew Carter's mind and the press could be confident that his answers reflected the president."

Journalists are critical of the way the White House has "manipulated" the news about Grenada, first lying about the invasion and then keeping reporters from the scene. In general they view their role as one of informing the public within the framework of the First Amendment, which guarantees freedom of the press. They feel it is an integral part of the democratic system.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

COPYRIGHT © 1983 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE PUBLISHING SOCIETY
All rights reserved

VOL. 75, NO. 238

AN INTERNATIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPER TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1983

R


40¢ (50¢ Canadian)



JUDITH GUEST

A chat with the
acclaimed author
of 'Ordinary
People'

35



SPACELAB

How space shuttle
delay will affect
research in five
key areas

27

Power, according to Professor Galbraith, is very, very elusive

America's tallest economist analyzes
who's got real power, how it evolves

In by Foell

Editor in chief of The Christian Science Monitor

Cambridge, Mass.

Nagging questions about Grenada



US and Caribbean troops on patrol in Grenada

As fighting ends, a simmering debate
over Reagan's decision to invade is
likely to heat up in coming months

By Daniel Southerland
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Looking beyond the immediate action on Grenada, critics are asking half a dozen key questions that are likely to be debated for months.

President Reagan gave the safety of the Americans on the tiny Caribbean island as the main reason for what he has called a rescue operation.

Some of the questions under debate:

Were the Americans on the island in enough danger to justify the use of armed force to evacuate them?

Many of the first students to come out of Grenada certainly thought they were in danger. But many also admitted they were isolated on their campuses, not knowing much about what was happening elsewhere on the island except by way of the government-run Radio Free Grenada.

Reagan administration officials have yet to provide concrete evidence that members of the leftist-led military council, ostensibly ruling Grenada at the time, had given any thought to taking Americans hostage. But the officials

Please see GRENADA back page

Argentines set out on new political course

By James Nelson Goodsell
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

For the long-dominant Peronista

argue that the situation was not only uncertain but chaotic, that council members had used violence against their domestic opponents, and that the example of the Iranian hostage crisis was in the back of their minds.

Could the United States have used negotiation to get the Americans out?

The Grenadian military council sent a cable to the US Embassy in Barbados informing American diplomats that the safety of US citizens was assured and that Americans would be allowed to leave the island. A White House spokesman said the administration distrusted the assurances because of the apparent instability of the ruling group on the island. A group of Americans did get out on one flight on Oct. 24, shortly before the invasion. But other charter flights were not allowed to land at the Grenada airport. There is still considerable confusion over the reasons for this.

President Reagan gave as a second reason for the Grenada operation a request from East Caribbean nations, which felt threatened by a military buildup on Grenada. Were those nations under any real threat?

These small island nations have armed forces that, even when combined, are no match for those that had been built up on Grenada. The islands' leaders suspected that Grenada was training insurgents. Those same leaders also observed the Cuban presence on Grenada and the construction of a new airport, which, once completed, would be capable of accommodating high-performance jet fighter-bombers.

But much remains to be learned about Cuban intentions. It is now clear that before the invasion, American intelligence on Grenada was far from complete. Some of the Cuban and Grenadian military buildup on the island may have been related to fear of an American invasion. News correspondents on the island say that many of the arms stored there are less than modern.

Speaking in the Reagan administration's favor, however, is Alistair Hughes, a highly respected Grenadian journalist who had been placed under detention by the island's military council. After being freed, Mr. Hughes said that the US troops had come just in time to prevent a further deterioration in the situation.

President Reagan gave as one reason for the Grenada action a need to restore order and democratic institutions on the island. Are those aims feasible?

An American admiral said that restoring order would require identifying hard-liners from the now-ousted Grenadian military regime. That could require an American military presence on the island for some time to come. But armed resistance to the occupying force appears to have dramatically diminished over the last day

or so. A semblance of order and normalcy is returning to the main towns.

The US would like to bring in a peacekeeping force, which could consist of troops from the Commonwealth nations and neighboring Caribbean states. This would allow US forces to leave as soon as possible.

US State Department experts are convinced that democratic institutions can be created, permitting free and fair elections. Grenada's governor general, Sir Paul Scoon, gave a radio address on Sunday saying he will appoint an interim administration within days. Sir Paul called for an early return to full constitutional government through elections. One thing that may work in favor of Sir Paul and his US and Caribbean supporters is the welcome that many Grenadians seem to be giving to the invasion forces. But press reporting on this aspect of the invasion is still fragmentary. It will take a while longer to determine how widespread the revulsion was against the now-ousted military regime and its leftist ideologies.

How severe was the damage done to US relations with key European and Latin American allies who are now protesting the invasion?

State Department officials argue that the damage done was much less severe than might be evident from public statements made by those nations. One official

US State Department experts are convinced that democratic institutions can be created, permitting free and fair elections. Grenada's governor general, Sir Paul Scoon, gave a radio address on Sunday saying he will appoint an interim administration within days.

said that the US was informed by diplomats from a number of key Latin American nations that their governments actually welcomed the invasion but could not state so publicly.

UN Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick has argued that many Frenchmen see the US action in Grenada as being at least as defensible as France's recent deployment of troops to protect Chad. Undersecretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger says it is also important to note that when the UN Security Council voted against the US, the British abstained, thus moving "in the direction of at least trying to indicate some support" for the US.

But critics in Western Europe who feared that President Reagan was trigger happy will now feel that their suspicions have been confirmed. They may now protest all the more vigorously against the planned emplacement of new US missiles on European soil.

Does the invasion of Grenada mean that the US will attack Nicaragua?

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam gives an un-

qualified "no" in response to this question. Mr. Dam notes that the US does not fear for the lives of American citizens in Nicaragua.

No request has come from any regional organization for such action, he says.

The size of Nicaragua compared with that of tiny Grenada would make an invasion of Nicaragua a much more costly operation.

But some individuals inside the Reagan administration are reported to like the idea of making Grenada a "dress rehearsal" for Nicaragua. However, State Department officials for the most part oppose this idea.

CLARK

from front page

dropped from review for possible "wilderness" designation, and increase funds for federal parkland acquisition.

But the administration hopes that without Watt to kick around, environmentalists won't be able to keep the political spotlight on the administration's Interior Department policies. And already Clark has moved skillfully to defuse some criticism.

The Interior secretary-designate has held a series of meetings with environmentalists during the last month, giving them no promise of change, but assuring them of access to his office. Groups such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society say that's not enough. But Jay Hair, executive vice-president of the National Wildlife Federation, largest of the environmental groups, says he is encouraged, and has refrained from criticizing Reagan about the appointment.

"To date we have remained neutral" on Clark's nomination, says Lani Sinclair, a National Wildlife public-affairs officer. "We're hopeful his new style will be translated into new faces and new policies."

And Clark's nomination hearings are unlikely to turn into a partisan shouting match. Some key Democrats on the Energy and Natural Resources panel — such as Sen. J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, the ranking minority member — aren't particularly disturbed by Reagan's choice of Clark for the Interior post. "The senator probably will have no problem" with Clark, says an aide.

That doesn't mean Clark will only get softball questions. Other Democrats, including Sens. Paul E. Tsongas of Massachusetts and Howard M. Metzenbaum of Ohio, are unlikely to let pass an opportunity to hit the administration on an issue where it's politically vulnerable.

But with foreign-policy issues dominating the headlines, getting people fired up about the Interior Department may be more difficult without James Watt around.

Watt, as a symbol, has already disappeared from one forum. At the Wilderness Society's Halloween party last weekend, nobody came dressed as the former Interior secretary. "We had a sheep," says a Society official. "No

The Christian Science Monitor
P. 48.
Tues. Nov. 1, 1983 Vol. 75, No. 239.

OPINION

JOSEPH C. HARSCH

Nicaragua is not Grenada

On this page two days ago I was arguing the case for US military intervention in Grenada. It seems to me that if Cubans were as extensively deployed in Grenada as current evidence indicates, then it would follow that the United States successfully prevented a regime being imposed on the Grenadians which was definitely not of their choosing.

But the logic that would justify US interference in Grenada does not apply to Nicaragua.

The United States is in fact engaged right now in an undeclared war on the present government of Nicaragua. It is training antigovernment Nicaraguan irregulars in neighboring Honduras, providing them with weapons and expert military advice, and sending them across the border into Nicaragua, where they have done extensive damage to the economy and to the people of the country.

This is an act of war without a declaration of war by the US Congress, which alone under the Constitution has the right to declare war. This war is being waged through the agency of the US Central Intelligence Agency — the CIA. It is supposed to be clandestine and covert, but it is the least covert "covert" operation on record. Its every deed is reported and noted the world around.

This war is not being waged to prevent the imposition of a foreign regime on the people of Nicaragua. It is being waged to try to bring down a government which, in its 1979 beginning, was the result of a bona fide revolution and which probably still represents the preference

of a substantial majority of the people of Nicaragua.

The regime in Nicaragua has failed to provide the free elections it originally promised. The hard-line Marxist element in it has steadily increased its influence in the ruling junta until it is now dominant. But this regime was not imposed upon the people of Nicaragua from outside. It may have been captured by the hard-line Marxists from inside, but it was done from inside. The outside help it has had from Cuba and the Soviet Union was requested from inside Nicaragua by Nicaraguans, not imposed upon them from outside.

The armed forces being used by the CIA against the Nicaragua government are made up of émigré Nicaraguans. The strongest element among them are the former members of the former national police force, the National Guard. If the counterrevolution being supported by the US through the CIA were to be successful in their undeclared war, the result would be the reimposition on the people of Nicaragua of the very people they threw out in the revolution of 1979.

In Grenada, US intervention prevented the imposition of an outside force on the people. Never have those people given the slightest indication that they wanted such a new regime imposed upon them.

In Nicaragua, US "covert" intervention would, if successful, impose a regime of US choice, made up of the old regime of repudiated Nicaraguans, upon a people who show not the slightest general desire to have their clock turned back for them from outside.

It is one thing for the US to protect a people from having a foreign regime imposed upon them. It is quite a different thing for the US to attempt to impose upon Nicaragua a regime of Washington's choice.

The US has not imposed a regime of US choice on the people of Grenada. There is no refugee or émigré group on the outside to use. Provided that the US withdraws its troops as soon as a provisional regime can be set up and can take over the maintenance of law and order, the US will not have imposed its politics in the internal affairs of Grenada. It will have allowed the Grenadians to manage their own affairs.

But if the war being waged "covertly" on the government of Nicaragua should be successful, the US would have intervened in the internal affairs of Nicaragua.

There is a question about how Marxist the regime in Nicaragua actually is. There is certainly a strong Marxist element. But to make war on it because it is Marxist would be to adopt a US equivalent of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Does the US intend to impose anticommunism on its Latin neighbors just as Moscow imposes pro-communism in its neighborhood?

To impose ideological conformity in the US neighborhood would be intrusion in the domestic political affairs of the neighbors. It would violate just about every set of international rules and regulations that exists. It would also widen the gap between Washington and the European allies.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1983

THE CHRISTIAN S

INTERN

Grenadians welcome US troops and aid

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

For the moment, as one observer of the local scene stated, "Grenada is having a love affair with the United States."


The average Grenadian seems genuinely relieved to have been saved from the doubtful future offered him by Bernard Coard and the Revolutionary Council. He also is gleefully anticipating the new economic well-being he hopes will result from the American-led invasion. [US officials Wednesday announced a \$3 million financial aid program to Grenada, which will initially be targeted toward repairing island roads and the water system.]

Even the nurses and inmates at the mental hospital accidentally bombed by US armed forces seem to be less interested in talking about the attack than in discussing the beautiful new asylum that they are confident the US will build.

With hoards of foreign reporters combing the island for dissent, the picture emerging at the end of the day when journalists gather to compare notes is that although some Grenadians have reservations about the intervention, the substantial majority of islanders supported it.

Some observers, however, wonder how long this blissful state will last. One North American teacher who has lived on the island for a year says, "People are jubilant now about the invasion, but I wonder how much of this isn't based on unreasonably high expectations."

"The Grenadians I speak to seem to expect that the US will not only continue all the projects on the island begun by the East bloc countries but also substantially increase the wages of the projects' work-



A member of 'Grenadians United' in Miami shows his approval of US-led invasion

ers. Won't these exaggerated hopes inevitably lead to frustration?"

Perhaps not. US officials in Barbados estimate that Grenada will receive \$10-to-20 million a year in economic aid from the US alone. If some of the West European countries and international organizations continue the assistance they gave before Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was overthrown and killed, Grenada might find itself receiving even more money than it got under Bishop. (Grenada received \$20 million a year in foreign assistance when Bishop was in power.)

On the other hand, Grenadians' "love affair" might end in disillusionment if final aid appropriations from Congress are

Please see **GRENADIANS** page 12

closer to \$10 million than to \$20 million and if some of the socialist-oriented West European countries decide to reduce their aid out of disapproval of the US intervention.

Some islanders, however, already express mixed feelings about the US-led invasion. Many express surprise at the scale of the intervention.

One young island woman who had supported Bishop said, "People didn't like the military council, and there was a sort of release when the invasion came. But no one expected them to come in with so much firepower. Some people expected the invasion, but not like *that*."

Some Grenadians were particularly surprised by the American aerial bombardment of the mental hospital area (located next to the Grenadian police and army stronghold of Ft. George) and bombardments in the Grand Anse area near the Grenadian television and radio stations. Some observers say some government ministries were also hit.

A young woman from St. Kitts, married to a Grenadian, sat on her balcony saying, "Grenadian have gone through a traumatic experience. Some people haven't slept since the Wednesday when Bishop was killed — I spent the first two days of the invasion last week under the bed with my baby."

Although relieved, many Grenadians have not yet assimilated what has happened to them. In less than three weeks, they witnessed Vice-Minister Coard's anti-Bishop coup, several days of turmoil and mass pro-Bishop demonstrations; the exhilaration of Bishop's liberation from house arrest, the brutality of a the massacre of Bishop and several aides and other Grenadians, a week of curfew and arrests under the military government, and finally a foreign invasion.

The trauma is felt especially by the young, for many of them were Bishop's strongest supporters. They had the greatest emotional investment in his regime, and they seem to be most concerned over Grenada's future.

One young Bishop supporter, a woman working for the government telecommunications office, said, "People are glad for the invasion — but they are still concerned. Educated people and uneducated people, they all have their concerns. The uneducated divide into two groups, those who are joyous about the invasion, and those who are relieved but concerned about where they are heading."

"They are concerned about jobs, lots of them worked for the government, lots of them worked for places that were bombed or taken over like the radio and TV stations, or the Grenada Beach Hotel."

"Everyone," she continued, "is concerned about leadership. Who will lead us after Bishop? The people I talked to are not in favor of the Revolutionary Council, and do not wish for return of Gairy. [Bishop instigated a coup that ousted Eric Gairy as prime minister.] Some of them find that colonial rule under Scoon [the governor-general] would be a step back. At present there are no serious political parties."

She went on to say that some Grenadians worried that many of the positive social changes initiated by Bishop would not be kept. "Will there still be free education in schools? Will there still be aid to buy uniforms and books?" she said.

A young electrical worker repairing a street lamp was asked, while watching American helicopters flying overhead, what he thought about all this. He said, "Fine, very good — I'm very happy."

When asked what he wanted for Grenada's future, he said, "I want us to be under American rule, then we'll be safe." He went on to say he was a fervent Bishop supporter. "Bishop was a fine man."

In addition to wiping out pockets of resistance, the intervention forces have also been picking up some Coard supporters. Among others they have detained are Coard's executive secretary, Lana Macfield, who was arrested along with her brother, Donald. Macfield had been second secretary in the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba. Reports say that detainees are being interrogated by Jamaican and American intervention troops at Ft. George.

There is still some scattered fighting in the countryside and there was some sniping in the outskirts of St. George's. Wednesday morning two local schools were evacuated after they received bomb threats. Some Grenadians believe such threats will soon end. Others foresee that "troublemakers" could continue isolated terrorist activity for a long time.

In the meantime, Governor-General Scoon called on all Grenadians to turn their arms in by Nov. 4. The number of people who comply might give a clearer picture of how long it will be until peace returns to the island.

Reagan soothes allies over Grenada move

By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

In the wake of the Grenada invasion, the Reagan administration is stepping up efforts to counter the diplomatic fallout throughout Western Europe.

Administration officials say that opinion in Europe is shifting as America states its case for the intervention. But these officials are still concerned about the magnitude of unfavorable reaction in West Germany, Britain, and other NATO countries.

A high-level US official may soon be sent to European capitals to explain the American rationale for the invasion and United States intentions regarding the Caribbean island, according to State Department officials. Since the Grenada action, they say, the US has sent a steady stream of messages and briefing papers to its embassies in Europe and elsewhere in order to inform foreign governments. Presidential communications have also been sent to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and other leaders through their embassies here.

"The reactions in Europe are not a source of overwhelming anxiety," commented one US official, "but they are not something we want to see continuing or creating difficulties in other areas. So we will make an effort to explain our position."

West Europeans are worried about the impact of the Grenada action on the coming deployment of US nuclear missiles.

So far, the governments have weathered public opposition to the pending deployments. But the US move into Grenada has given the Soviet Union a "field day" in its vigorous propaganda effort to thwart installation of the missiles, say officials here. The European antinuclear peace movement, they say, feels it has a new lease on life.

European diplomats here do not see the transatlantic row as dangerous, but they express unease at how the US has handled the issue. "It's not only the matter of a

lack of consultation," said one, "but of the fact that the evidence and justification for the Reagan policy has been coming out in dribs and drabs."

Much of the European concern will dissipate, diplomatic observers say, if the US quickly gets its troops out of Grenada, replaces them with a multinational peacekeeping force, and sets in motion the process of establishing a democratically elected government there.

The administration, in fact, seems to be moving rapidly in this direction. The Defense Department has announced that hostilities have ended in Grenada and that American troops will begin leaving the island soon. How many of the 5,000 troops will stay behind has not been made clear.

According to diplomats here, the European concern is that all the Western democracies have been tarred by the American invasion, making it harder for them to argue against Soviet actions around the world. But the view of US administration officials is that, whatever European leaders say publicly for domestic consumption, the strong American action will in the end be seen as demonstrating US resolve to stand up to Moscow — and therefore as a firm commitment to the defense of Europe.

The deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, American officials note, comes in response to European fears that the US might not be willing to employ its nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack.

"In the short term, the Grenada action is inconvenient for the Europeans and puts pressures on them," said one US official. "But the fact that the US is prepared to take risks to protect its people and interests can only heighten their confidence in the credibility of the US security guarantee, which has been undermined by US vacillation in the past."

White House officials say they believe that as more facts come out about the Grenada situation they will win European support for the invasion. It is being pointed out, for instance, that the initial call for help came from the British governor-general of the island.



Rift over Grenada?

NATO from preceding page

Probably most leaders in most of the allied and friendly countries were privately relieved to know that Fidel Castro is not going to be able to add Grenada to his mini-empire.

But the US President based his case largely on anticommunism and presented it as an issue in East-West relations. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, speaking on a BBC program, said she is "utterly against communism and terrorism" but could not go along with "a new law that wherever communism reigns against the will of the people . . . the United States shall enter."

A British diplomat, speaking of differences in perception on opposite sides of the Atlantic about Western defense and NATO, put the matter this way:

"European members of NATO believe that the Reagan administration sees NATO and Western defense as being directed 'against' the Soviet Union. Britain and the European members would see it slightly differently: that NATO exists so that we may live with the Soviet Union in security."

In other words, the allies want no part of any policy aimed at breaking up the Soviet empire or bringing down the present Soviet government. They tended to see in the invasion of Grenada an unnecessary overreaction with overtones of a forward and aggressive strategy.

Mrs. Thatcher told Parliament she felt the problem in Grenada could have been handled through a combination of diplomacy and economics.

President Reagan was obviously surprised and hurt that Mrs. Thatcher had not come to his support and defense, since he had so recently supported her in Britain's recapture of the Falkland Islands. But his surprise overlooks the fact that the West Europeans live next door to the Soviets and would presumably be a main battlefield in any war.

NATO has recovered from previous crises of a similar nature and presumably will recover from this week's damage. If constitutional government is restored promptly in Grenada and if US troops finish their work and go home promptly — this particular crisis can end up largely as a short-term propaganda gain for the Soviets comparable to the gain the US scored when the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner.

The Korean airliner deed made the Soviets appear to be the more warlike and trigger-happy of the two superpowers. The use of US force in Grenada pinned the "trigger-happy" label back on the US — in European eyes.

The underlying uneasiness that caused the Europeans to overreact (underreact in Reagan eyes) to the Grenada invasion is another matter that will call for long-term treatment.

Christian science monitor
Nov. 4, 1983

Invasion of Grenada reinforces distrust of US by its NATO allies

By Joseph C. Harsch

The NATO alliance was shaken and damaged this past week both by what the United States did in Grenada and by what the European allies did about it. The allies disliked the use of American troops in Grenada — and they said so, loud and clear.

Not a single ally spoke out in official approval either of the American deed or the reasons advanced by the President of the United States for it. He, in turn, was startled and shaken by their unanimous lack of vigorous support and approval.

The immediate effect was to undermine the stiffening of the alliance that had resulted from the Soviet shooting down of the South Korean airliner.

PATTERN OF DIPLOMACY

The US had gained the diplomatic initiative because of that Soviet act of brutality and new American flexibility in the nuclear arms talks. Through September and October the effects were seen in the weakening of Europe's "peace movement." It was largely paralyzed. Western European governments looked forward with equanimity to the arrival in December of the first of the new American nuclear weapons.

But October ended with the initiative back in Soviet hands and the West European governments having to revive their plans for handling those peace demonstrations which are expectable now in more vigorous form when the weapons begin to arrive.

If the lack of European sympathy seemed out of proportion to the seizure of Grenada and the nature of the case, there is a reason. The allies were reacting not just to a quick and decisive use of force. Their reaction was symptomatic of an underlying growing distrust of US leadership in the alliance.

Grenada is a small island with only a little over 100,000 people. Its leadership had fallen into bloodied Marxist hands. Cuban intrusion was unmistakable.

Please see NATO next page

United Nations role in Grenada elections being considered

By Louis Wiznitzer
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

The international community has clearly expressed its disapproval of the United States invasion of Grenada.

By 108 votes to 9, with 27 abstentions, it adopted a resolution which "deeply deplores" the invasion and calls it "a flagrant violation of international law."

However, Belgium added a paragraph to the text of this resolution which only two days earlier had received 14 votes at the Security Council and would have been adopted, had it not been blocked by the US veto. This new paragraph calls for "immediate elections" on the island.

Thus, while the General Assembly wanted to be on record as opposing military intervention, it also wanted to express its support of democracy.

The vote represented a big diplomatic slap at a superpower. The Soviet Union was dealt a similar slap when the General Assembly in January 1980 voted by 104 to 8

**'If we want to continue to disapprove of
Vietnam's presence in Cambodia, of Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, we have to
deplore the US invasion of Grenada.'**
— *politically moderate Asian ambassador*

to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Only Israel, El Salvador, and the East Caribbean countries that took part in the invasion voted alongside the US.

Friendly countries and allies, such as France, Italy, Norway, Egypt, Singapore, and Pakistan voted in favor of the resolution. Many delegates, otherwise friendly toward the US, felt they could not apply a double standard with regard to military intervention.

"If we want to continue to disapprove of Vietnam's presence in Cambodia, of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, we have to deplore the US invasion of Grenada," a moderate Asian ambassador says.

Another resolution, introduced by Trinidad and Tobago, is likely to be adopted by the General Assembly. It calls for "the immediate withdrawal of combat troops" from Grenada, for free and fair elections under "international supervision," and for "the deployment in that island of a security presence including elements from the Caribbean community and from the commonwealth."

Whereas the first resolution deals with the past and criticizes the US, the second one looks at the future and at the restoration of democracy in a credible manner in Grenada. Presumably the UN will be asked to play a role in this respect.

"Elections under American military occupation might undermine the legitimacy of the future regime in Grenada," says one Western diplomat. Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar is sending UN Undersecretary Diego Cordovez on an urgent fact-finding mission.

INTERNATIONAL

A Grenada casualty: Caribbean unity

Two key Caribbean nations — Trinidad and Guyana — opposed the invasion and may now withdraw economic support from the region

By Dennis Volman

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

Although the US-led intervention in Grenada has the support of most of the English-speaking Caribbean, two important countries — Trinidad and Guyana — oppose it. That dissension could seriously weaken Caricom, the 13-member economic and political association that unites the English-speaking republics.

Trinidad and Guyana have traditionally been the two countries in Caricom able to afford the goods of the other member states. Trinidad, because of its oil wealth, has been especially important.

Guyana, on the other hand, has declined in importance since the price of bauxite, its main product, seriously slumped in 1979. But Guyana remains a potentially significant market and one of the largest Caricom countries.

At the Caricom meeting in Trinidad the weekend before the invasion, Trinidad, like Guyana, opposed intervention. Most observers attribute its position to the fact that the government of Prime Minister George Chambers is facing election early next year. In addition to a strong left made up of trade unionists and intellectuals, who are likely to oppose intervention, there is also a large Grenadian community in Trinidad which could not be counted on to support a possible intervention.

The rift between Trinidad and countries in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States supporting the invasion deepened several days after the invasion when Barbados's prime minister, Tom Adams, publicly de-

clared that the OECS countries had already decided to ask for US intervention before the Caricom meeting. This brought forth an angry public denunciation from Mr. Chambers, who asked OECS countries how they could have arrived at such a decision without informing him first.

Mr. Adams responded by revealing that he had called in Trinidad's ambassador to Barbados informing him of the decision. Concluding that the Trinidadian ambassador had neglected to inform his government, Adams asked the ambassador to leave the country within 24 hours. His departure was followed by a statement last weekend by Trinidad's Foreign Minister, Basil Ince, which again denounced the intervention and stated that the serenity of all the countries in the region was now questionable.

The rift is expected to diminish Trinidad's cooperation with Caricom and to increase its reluctance to buy Caricom

goods, a reluctance already brought on by the drop in oil prices.

According to several Caribbean sources, Guyana's Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, feels so strongly against the intervention that he is seriously considering withdrawing Guyana from Caricom altogether. He is forced to take an extreme stand because of the Marxist opposition party on his left, led by Cheddi Jagan, these sources say.


Mr. Burnham also fears that after intervening in Grenada, the US might try to overthrow his own left-wing government.



Burnham (left) of Guyana and Chambers of Trinidad have served notice on their Caribbean neighbors



As Grenada quiets down, more questions surface for the US



Grenada: one of several setbacks for Cuban foreign policy and military. Story, Page 3

By Dennis Volman
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

Led by an 82nd Airborne Division paratrooper, the journalists silently filed in front of the Cuban prisoners, separated from them by coils of concertina wire.

The silence was enforced, "no talking to the prisoners" being the strict instructions given to reporters allowed to visit some 600 Cubans detained at Point Salines on Grenada.

The journalists stared into the faces of the prisoners standing in line for food and scrutinized the rows of sleeping men. Watching the scene, a French journalist muttered, "I don't know who this is more humiliating for, them or us."

As Grenada returns to normal, with Governor-General Paul Scoon setting up a new government, questions are being raised about the number of Cubans who fought in Grenada, the resistance they offered, and the Reagan administration's accounts of the level of resistance.

Most journalists who have seen the prisoners say, and US officials on the scene concur, that the age and physical condition of the detainees indicates they are (with the possible exception of 100 to 150 men) indeed only militia-trained construction workers. New US figures on the total Cuban presence on the island say there are fewer than 600 detainees, 25 killed, 40 in the Cuban Embassy, and a

Please see GRENADA back page

GRENADA from front page

maximum of 50 left in the hills.

But one week ago, administration officials were telling the press it took several days longer than had been expected to quell large-scale organized resistance in Grenada, because most of the construction workers were actually soldiers and the total Cuban presence was much larger than had been estimated, with figures ranging from a total of 1,200 to 2,000 Cubans on the island.

This alleged increased size of the Cuban presence was played up by the administration, along with the arms caches discovered, as proof that Grenada was being turned into a Cuban base.

Now, with the new figures for the Cuban presence being circulated by the administration, the figure is back to the original estimate of 600 to 700 Cubans, most of whom had no more than militia training — although this does not, by any means, rule out the eventuality that if Bernard Coard had continued in power, Cuban and East-bloc military presence would have increased.

What the new, lower figures for Cubans in Grenada do is invalidate US administration explanations of why it took longer than originally envisaged to quell organized resistance on the island.

Also, the new numbers dim somewhat the hopes of hard-liners both in and out of the administration who wanted to see the Grenada intervention as a dress rehearsal for a US-sponsored invasion of Nicaragua.

A congressional delegation led by Rep. Thomas Foley (D) visited Grenada this weekend. A question high on its agenda was whether the US intelligence community failed to provide the administration with proper assessments of the military situation in Grenada.

Ironically, these concerns about possible intelligence failures arose in the first days after the intervention, when the administration announced there were many more Cubans in Grenada than originally expected.

A high-ranking US government official stated that US intelligence sources had always correctly estimated the number of Cubans in Grenada at between 600 to 700, but that these same sources had incorrectly estimated that the Cubans would not put up much of a fight.

In addition to faulty estimates of Cuban resistance, some have asked whether US-led intervention forces should have been able to deal more quickly with the resistance they did receive, especially in view of the relatively large size of US forces involved.

All observers in the area stressed that US troops were slowed down considerably by orders to kill as few civilians and damage as little property as possible. It is also true that the breaking down of organized resistance took only a few more days than expected, while the mopping up of guerrilla resistance in the hills has gone better than many had feared it would.

But some observers share the question of a US official who speculated, "Maybe we have become so involved with high technology that we no longer know how to fight a conventional war."

Another observer of the scene stated, "The Americans have never been good at fighting in mountainous or hilly terrain. This has been true even back in the days of the Indian wars." He stated that even in the first three or four days of fighting around the capital and airport, most of the time the marines faced resistance by forces entrenched on higher ground.

Says one 82nd Airborne paratrooper: "We had orders to hurt as few Grenadians as we could, and to spare property. We don't think, if you take everything into account, that it took so long. In fact, the mopping up went quicker than I thought it would. The Cubans thought that they were fighting for their lives, and they are more used to guerrilla warfare than we are. Their regime is based on guerrilla warfare. We could have sent in our guerrilla warfare experts, the Green Berets,

but then we'd have been playing cat-and-mouse games with the Cubans for weeks."

Any guerrilla fight depends on the certainty of supply lines and communications. "And on this small island, the guerrillas just didn't have it," he said.



Sir Paul Scoon

INTERNATIONAL

The Caribbean: a flash point in heated US-Soviet relations

By Gary Thatcher

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

In the wake of the United States intervention in Grenada, Washington and Moscow are sizing each other up — and waiting for the competing superpower's next move in Latin America.

Such moves could include:

- Direct US armed intervention in Nicaragua.

- Or, a major upgrading of the Soviet military presence in Cuba.

- Or, the stationing of more Soviet submarines in the Caribbean, carrying nuclear missiles targeted at the US.

This seems to be the composite view of both American and

Soviet officials, interviewed both before and after US marines landed in Grenada.

[Uncertainty hung over US-Soviet ties amid speculation that President Yuri Andropov, not seen publicly since mid-August, was seriously ill.]

Some of these scenarios, for the time being, seem unlikely. The US has denied that the military intervention in Grenada was a "trial run" for an invasion of Nicaragua. And the Soviets have ruled out attempts to place land-based missiles in Cuba — although they have not ruled out some other way of stepping up Soviet military presence there.

What is a distinct possibility,


according to Western observers, is stepped-up Soviet submarine patrols off the US mainland.

But even this move is played down by some Soviet and American officials. These officials say they wish to avoid a head-on clash in the region similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1963.

"I personally lived through that very dangerous period of the Caribbean crisis," says a Soviet official. "No one in our country would want to pass through it again."

Nor would many US officials, albeit for different reasons. The face-off between President John Kennedy and Soviet leader

Please see **CARIBBEAN** next page



Soviet diplomats board US Army jeep on leaving Grenada last week

CARIBBEAN from preceding page

Nikita Khrushchev — which ended in a humiliating backdown for the Soviet Union — gave added impetus to an unparalleled Soviet military buildup.

Still, the military here has vowed that the Soviet Union will retaliate for the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe, which is scheduled to begin this December. Already, the Soviets have announced that one countermeasure would be additional Soviet missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

But the Soviets also have indicated that they might take further steps. Specifically, they point out, the American Pershing IIs to be deployed in West Germany could reach the Soviet Union in about 10 minutes. The demands of strategic balance, some Soviet officials argue, require that the USSR be able to pose a similar new threat to the US.

But Soviet officials say they have ruled out the possibility of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. As an official here said recently, "We will do nothing to cause security problems for our friends in Cuba."

That, in the view of many analysts, leaves only two major options open to the USSR if its threat of retaliation is to be carried through. One is to place new land-based missiles in the far eastern part of the USSR, where they would be within striking range of Alaska and several states in the Northeastern US. The other possibility — and the more likely one, in the view of some US analysts — is the stationing of submarine-launched cruise

missiles somewhere off US shores, probably in the Caribbean.

Meanwhile, some Soviet officials profess to see "four or five points of tension" in the Caribbean and Latin America that offer the potential for East-West confrontation in the region. These are:

- **El Salvador.** The US is supporting the Salvadorean government against insurgents who are reportedly backed and supplied by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

- **Nicaragua.** The US is backing insurgents who are trying to pressure, if not topple, a government backed by the Soviets and Cubans.

- **US-Cuban relations.**

- **The Falkland Islands.** This territory, over which Britain and Argentina fought a war in 1982, remains "a potentially dangerous spot," says a Soviet official. "The problem hasn't been resolved."

- **Chile.** The embattled military government of Gen. Augusto Pinochet is facing increasing domestic unrest. "The days of the Pinochet regime are coming to an end. There will be a change in this particular country," the official said.

Whether any of these views give an indication of likely future moves by the Kremlin remains to be seen. But what does seem apparent is that there are two fundamentally divergent — and perhaps irreconcilable — views in Washington and Moscow over the significance of events in the Caribbean and Latin America.

One official says the USSR favors the resolution of the problems of the region through "political means." On further questioning, however, he conceded that "political means" could include "national

revolution." But, he says, such events are purely internal matters that should not concern the US.

"To use one of your expressions," says a Soviet official, "the US should 'let sleeping dogs lie.'"

US officials claim that American policy is merely to stop the flow of arms — and the export of revolution — to neighboring countries from Nicaragua.

But US officials see the Soviets and Cubans behind much of the regional unrest and make it clear they take Soviet moves seriously.

A US official, quoted by Reuters, said events in Grenada were the result of "low-level probes . . . in areas ever closer to vital US interests."

Grenada provisional government will have to deal with a political power vacuum



US Army soldiers return to posts in Grenada after a swim

By Dennis Volman
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

After four years of rule by an authoritarian charismatic leader, followed by the startling events of the last 3½ weeks, Grenadians are beginning to emerge from their shock and contemplate what remains of their political system.

The governor general, Sir Paul Scoon, has been consulting local civic, trade union, and church leaders about the makeup of a provisional government for several days. He was expected to announce a provisional government of leading technocrats today.

But any such new government will take over a situation here that borders on a political vacuum. There are no clear parties or leaders ready to campaign in the election that Sir Paul has promised will take place within six months to a year from now, let alone ready to provide much-needed long-run stability.

Meanwhile, various groups are waiting on the sidelines, both in Grenada and abroad, hoping eventually to fill the void to their own advantage.

In such an uncertain political climate, some observers in the Caribbean and the United States are saying that it would be better if the US troops did not get sucked into a lengthy peacekeeping role. Rather, these observers say, the peacekeeping chore should be given to a lower-profile, less controversial Commonwealth group.

It is also unclear to what extent the Reagan administration and Grenada's neighbors will try to exert an influence on Grenada's political scene. The New Jewel Movement (NJM), for instance, which ran the island after its March 1979 coup until the invasion, remains an important political factor although greatly weakened.

This overall state of political uncertainty prompts many Grenadians to recommend that the elections be pushed back a full year, rather than be called in six

GRENADA from front page

months. They are concerned that not only is the NJM weak, but also that there is: (1) a right wing which is energetic but unlikely to address the social aspirations of substantial segments of the population; and (2) a former virtual dictator, Sir Eric Gairy, who has some support among the rural poor but is regarded by almost all educated observers in the Caribbean and US as a dangerous charlatan.

Today, most Grenadian observers believe that NJM's popular base, such as it ever had, has been severely eroded. Its charismatic leader, Maurice Bishop, and several other NJM leaders have been killed. The Cubans, who were imported by the NJM, were widely feared and disliked.

In addition, many Grenadians have high hopes that the Reagan administration will prove a generous new benefactor.

However, many of these Grenadian observers also feel that as the initial shock of Bishop's death and the invasion continues to fade, many of Bishop's supporters — meaning perhaps a majority of Grenada's youth — would support an election candidate committed to preserving some of the more positive aspects of the Bishop regime.

There are many Grenadians who are critical of Bishop's excesses but who worry what will happen to support for Bishop-sponsored mass education, adult education classes, literacy campaigns, and health programs that send paramedics to the villages rather than build shiny new hospitals in town.

They also praise the achievements of some of the grass roots organizations, like the village and zonal councils. These operated in some ways like old New England town meetings, discussing public budgets and giving people more say in the decisions affecting their daily lives.

Many Grenadians, also not necessarily Bishop's supporters, have misgivings about returning to what they see as old-fashioned parliamentary elections. Instead, they would prefer a system in which the people would vote for represen-



Grenadian women talk with US soldier shortly after invasion

tatives in their own villages, and the village representatives would constitute a council which in turn would elect a parliament from among its own members. This, they say, would ensure greater direct popular participation and make it more difficult for demagogic political parties or leaders based in the capital of St. George's to swoop down into the villages and manipulate or buy up the vote.

Most observers see little chance of the NJM as such transforming itself into a political party and winning elections in a year's time. The New Jewel was very much a movement, and very little an organized political party. It was started in the early 1970s when two factions largely made up of radical, idealistic students merged to form a grass-roots organization

that rejected the very concept of political parties. Influenced by Tanzania's ujamaa movement and the ideas of the US New Left, they wanted to build a series of grass-roots groups that would induce more direct participation of the average Grenadian in the political process and the decisionmaking that affected his daily life. They did not believe in the kind of strong, centralized, tightly run party which governs most communist countries.

Maurice Bishop, the murdered prime minister, had widespread popular support. Much of that support, however, was given to him rather than to the NJM which he headed.

As prime minister, Bishop was guilty of some authoritarian behavior, including press censorship and the jailing of about a

hundred political opponents, some of whom were tortured. But his overall aim was to keep the NJM as a loose grass-roots organization.

Bishop's deputy, however, Bernard Coard, pushed for the tight Stalinist type of party structure prevalent in the Soviet Union. This was one of the main reasons behind the two men's fatal confrontation.

Now that both men are eliminated (Coard is in jail after being captured by US forces), Grenadian observers see a slim possibility that some of the other NJM leaders might make a comeback. The name most often mentioned in this regard is George Louisohn, Bishop's minister of agriculture — a moderate with a base of rural support and allegedly a good public speaker although lacking in Bishop's charisma. Other NJM leaders now serving as diplomats in Washington and the United Nations are also mentioned. There is even talk of the NJM putting up some sort of collective leadership.

However, a more likely way for a left-of-center candidate to gain power would be for a progressive candidate not directly involved in the last few years of the Bishop government to emerge. Mentioned most frequently is Patrick Emmanuel, a political scientist at a research institute connected to the University of the West Indies in Barbados. Emmanuel, active in the early years of NJM is reputed to be intelligent, articulate, progressive, but definitely non-Communist. He is already involved in setting up the provisional government. For these reasons, he is seen as a candidate who might be able to command support, not only on the left but also among people who are not Bishop supporters. Such a candidate would be expected to found his own movement, rather than attempt to resurrect the NJM.

Some left of center Grenadians are concerned that they have not been represented in the consultations which the governor general held prior to forming the provisional government. Instead, by focusing on civic leaders and excluding all former politicians, the governor has relied upon a comparatively conservative group, made up largely of businessmen and representatives of the churches.

INTERNATIONAL

Grenada's potential leaders begin to jockey for power

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor



Gairy: strong man could regain power

St. George's, Grenada

The heart of St. George's in Grenada is the Carenage, a sea-side avenue winding its way around a horseshoe-shaped harbor that is almost a cliché of spectacular tropical beauty. Red-roofed stone and wood houses perch on extravagantly green hills, travel-brochure palm trees wave in travel-brochure breezes.

In the middle of all this Caribbean splendor is Rudolf's, an Austrian restaurant that, despite the trauma of a coup and an invasion by foreign forces, still turns out a good Wiener schnitzel and marinated beef salad.

During the last month of the Bishop regime, Rudolf's was often the backdrop for the hushed whispers of longtime foreign residents and local businessmen and their wives. They exchanged alarming rumors about the latest arrests and about strange ships pulling into deserted beaches at night, manned by brown-skinned men speaking Spanish with what sounded like Cuban accents.

Last week Rudolf's had changed. The mood was exuberant. A Grenadian harmonica player blew somewhat fanciful versions of the Blue Danube Waltz as the same properous local residents mingled in a relaxed manner with groups of journalists and United States soldiers. Locals greeted each other with shouts of joy and exchanged assurances that they had not suffered during the fight-

ing. They traded war stories and talked politics.

The names on their lips these days are Winston White, Alistair Hughes, and Francis Alexis, — names members of the island's conservative and private-sector forces are hoping will lead them to power in elections the governor general, Sir Paul Scoon, says will be held within a year.

And it is possible that conservative forces could gain a hold on this island which has been run by leftists since 1979. Slain leader Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement has been seriously weakened.

Although the conservatives' best shot at gaining power is just ahead, they have problems that could weaken their campaign. They are split into two factions. One is the Grenada National Party (GNP), which is the old establishment businessmen and "plantocracy" party headed by Rupert Blaze, a respected but elderly lawyer.

The second is the Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM), a group of Grenadian exiles in Barbados, Trinidad, and the US who coalesced around an anti-Bishop platform. Most GDM leaders are lower-middle-class men who became successful professionals and businessmen.

Many think that the GDM, if it gained power, would sweep aside grass-roots organizations, support completely laissez-faire economic policies, and follow US President Ronald Reagan in foreign affairs. The GDM thinks it offers a strong alternative to people whose political views may have shifted to the right during the last two years of the Bishop regime.

Most Grenadians feel the GNP could not take leadership of the right away from the brash new GDM and would have to join it as the junior partner of an electoral coalition.

Two GDM leaders are commonly mentioned as possible prime ministerial candidates:

- Francis Alexis, a professor of law at the University of the West Indies in Barbados. Alexis is described as a laissez faire liberal not sympathetic to grass-roots movements who hopes to return to the Westminster parliamentary system.

- Winston White, a politician who in the early '70s was former Prime Minister Eric Gairy's minister of labor, youth, and sport. Many think White, a dynamic man who just this week joined the GDM, will soon eclipse Alexis.

White broke with Gairy in '74 and formed his own party of businessmen. He was arrested by the Bishop government in 1979 on charges of plotting against the regime and sent to prison, where he remained until the US-led intervention.

There are two other figures to watch here:

- Mr. Gairy, Grenada's former strong man. He is almost always described as manipulative, demagogic, and corrupt, but popular in rural areas. Gairy was accused of organizing terrorist gangs that beat up his opponents. He is disliked by the left, the establishment, and neighboring Caribbean countries. Most observers say Gairy could win a fair election only if the other political groups became so polarized that he could edge his way into power.

- Alistair Hughes, Grenada's most prominent journalist. He was arrested after the recent coup, then dramatically rescued by a group of journalists. Hughes is mentioned as a potential figure in both the provisional government and in eventual elections and is viewed as the businessmen's only viable candidate.

Many other islanders think that once the initial shock of the coup and invasion wear off, Grenadians will not support a movement that rejects the positive aspects of the Bishop government.

Nov. 17, 1983

11

Press disputes justification of Grenada invasion

By Dennis Volman

St. George's, Grenada

American officials in Barbados Wednesday prepared to receive 14 bodies being flown in from Cuba. The Cuban government says these dead are really Grenadians.

If Cuba is correct, then United States figures on the number of casualties from the intervention in Grenada must again be revised — just as US figures on the numbers of Cuban soldiers in Grenada and the size of the Grenadian Army have been revised.

The issue of the Cuban death toll has become one more point of contention in a growing dispute between the international press and the US government over both the accuracy of US statistics and their role in the Reagan administration's justification for the Grenada intervention.

Most journalists here feel the otherwise minor disparity over numbers of Cuban dead is part of a long string of significant inaccuracies the US government has put out in its eagerness to emphasize the importance of the Cuban role in Grenada.

These inaccuracies, the press feels, range from overestimating the numbers of the Cubans and Soviet advisers to misjudging the size of Cuban arm caches.

Although some journalists say the US government may have a strong case for intervention, most say they have come to seriously question the accuracy of facts the US cites for the invasion.

In the first week of the intervention, President Reagan and other administration officials went on TV to tell the American public that the Cuban and East-bloc presence, both in terms of the number of men on the island and the quantity and quality of the arms uncovered, was significantly larger and more important than originally thought.

They said that instead of the 600 to 700 Cuban civilians they expected to find on the island, there were at least 1,200 and probably more, most of them soldiers. Privately, government sources told the press they eventually

Please see GRENADA page 17

GRENADA from page 11

expected to find some 2,000 men.

But recently US officials admitted that Cuban government figures, which stated that there were between 750 and 800 Cubans on the island, were probably correct.

US State Department and military officials now also admit that the great majority of Cubans were only construction workers who have militia training. Only 100 to 150 of the Cubans could conceivably have been professional soldiers, the officials acknowledge.

President Reagan, in his Oct. 27 televised speech, said that US troops found enormous Cuban arms caches in Grenada. He indicated that the quantity and quality of these arms clearly showed that they could never possibly have all been intended for Grenadian forces, but were, in large part, weapons that eventually would support a Cuban military base on the island. The base, he intimated, would be used to spread subversion throughout the Caribbean.

But most journalists who have seen the arms caches doubt the administration's interpretation of their significance. Administration officials had said there were enough Cuban arms in Grenada to maintain a 14,000-to-17,000 man expeditionary force. The arms, they said, included thousands of Soviet-made Kalashnikov rifles. Many journalists say the US government's own figures released last week on the island do not bear its contention.

Those figures show: 6,323 rifles, 13 anti-aircraft guns, 111 machine guns, 68 RPGs (shoulder rocket launchers), and 12 Soviet-made army personnel carriers.

Journalists who viewed the weapons

INTERNATIONAL

estimate that of the 6,000-odd rifles, only 400 to 800 were reasonably modern Kalashnikovs and the rest were considerably older, less efficient equipment, including many "antiques."

Most of these journalists also believe that the quantity and quality of the arms cache would tend to support the view that the arms were intended to supply Grenadian militiamen, not a 17,000-man Cuban expeditionary force. Slain Prime Minister Maurice Bishop reportedly had intended to build up a Grenadian militia.

During the first week of the invasion, the administration also said at least 30 Soviet military advisers were in Grenada, as well as an unspecified number of East German military personnel. None of these advisers has materialized.

Additionally, the latest US figures on the size of the Grenadian army (PRA) show that US figures released in the first week of the invasion were exaggerated. Initially the US estimated the PRA had more than 1,000 men. But the commanders of the Jamaican component of the Caribbean peacekeeping forces said over the weekend that the Grenadian army numbered some 700 to 900 men — a figure the US has not challenged.

Finally, the issue of the Cuban death toll has cast doubt on the US argument. The US had said 41 Cubans were killed in action in Grenada. But if the 14 bodies being returned by Cuba to St. George's are Grenadian, then it appears there were just 28 Cubans killed in Grenada. The Grenadian death toll would rise to 35.

By using questionable statistics for a hard-sell effort to justify and drum up support for its intervention, the administration appears to have weakened its case, especially among the European and third-

world press.

Most observers agree the administration could have made a strong case for the intervention without attempting to exaggerate the East-bloc's role.

The short-lived regime of former deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, who overthrew Maurice Bishop, lacked support among Grenadians, and its legal claim to power was tenuous. Most Grenadians do consider the invasion as a "rescue operation." Grenada's neighbors urged the US to intervene.

And it is possible that the pro-Soviet Coard would, once he was finally in power, have moved the country fully into the Eastern bloc — with all the economic, political, and military changes such a shift would entail.

However, most Grenadian and independent international observers on the island feel that instead of making these points simply and clearly, the Reagan ad-



US Defense Department photograph of Cuban ammunition found on Grenada

ministration attempted to make too much ideological hay out of international communist participation.

UWI Libraries

Grenada: looking beyond the US security presence

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

Everywhere in St. George's — on the beach, in the restaurants, on the main seaside drive — relaxed, animated groups of people are tentatively proclaiming a return to normality.

Even the well-armed foreign soldiers are visibly less tense than they were a week ago. They mingle freely with local residents in this small tropical port.

United States Army officers and thoughtful Grenadians, however, worry that small groups of ex-Grenadian Army (PRA) members could be hiding in the hills, perhaps regrouping for terrorist attacks.

United States paratroopers bathing at the beach and US mission members dining on the crowded terrace of the Red Crab restaurant look distinctly vulnerable to such attacks. And even many of the Grenadians and Americans who want to see US troops quickly withdrawn recognize that Grenada will continue to have some real security problems for the next few months.

The challenge, these sources say, is to handle the se-

curity problems with as little US military involvement as possible — and in a way that least infringes on the reestablishment of Grenadian sovereignty and normal political functioning.

US military sources estimate that it will take several weeks for whatever PRA elements remain in the hills to reorganize.

Any such PRA groups will face difficulties in obtaining supplies of arms. But many informed observers here say that the radical forces probably have access to arms caches hidden in the mountainous interior by the previous government. Some prominent Grenadians also fear that if US naval surveillance ends, resistance forces could also be resupplied by sea.

Meanwhile, the US Army is using all the high-technology methods at its disposal, including sophisticated radar, to ferret out any guerrilla elements before they can start any attacks.

The disquiet that many Grenadians feel about PRA members still hiding out has its roots in the shock of the Fort Rupert massacre, when Prime Minister Maurice

Please see **GRENADA** back page

GRENADA

from front page

Bishop and about 200 demonstrators were gunned down.

Until "bloody Wednesday," as the Oct. 19 massacre is called, the killing of political opponents was unknown on this small island. Many Grenadians have still not shaken off the unease brought on by that day's events.

But even some well-known islanders asked that their names not be published because of their fear of possible reprisals.

As a prominent Grenadian said, "If the soldiers at Fort Rupert could gun down their own friends and brothers from the New Jewel Movement [Bishop's political party], they are obviously madmen capable of anything. Would they not be?"

...they stop at killing anyone they think is collaborating with the American invaders?"

Grenadians' fears are currently being kept at bay by the presence of 2,300 American troops on the island, in addition to an ever-changing number of support personnel such as military engineers. US Army sources speculate that some of these forces will remain until at least Dec. 20, when, under the war powers act, President Reagan's ability to send in troops for 60 days without consulting Congress expires. The probability of US troops remaining in Grenada for a few more weeks was heightened when guerrilla snipers fired at US troops recently.

The soldiers continue to stop people coming into the country and at roadblocks, checking their names against a computer list of alleged former members of the PRA.

In some instances people have been detained because they have been denounced by Grenadians bearing grudges against them. There have also been some cases

of mistaken identity.

An example of the latter occurred a fortnight ago when Samuel Braithwaite — the son of Nicholas Braithwaite, acting head of Grenada's governing advisory council — was detained with his hands tied behind his back for an hour as he was coming in from Guyana. Thirty people have been deported in recent weeks — at least two of them Americans — and 1,100 Grenadians and Cubans have been detained since the US intervention.

Most observers feel that some sort of peacekeeping arrangement will be necessary when the US troops leave, since Grenada no longer has an army. It will also take time to train a police force capable of handling any major security problems.

Many Grenadians feel that elections cannot be held in less than one year's time. They estimate 1,000 to 1,500 troops will be necessary to keep the peace until elections.

Some prominent Grenadians and US Army sources mention these potential security arrangements:

1. Large-scale US presence in Grenada past Dec. 20.

Such an option is possible, but considered unlikely because of political opposition in the US. A continued US presence could also reduce Grenadian support for the US. An influential Grenadian says, "The US is very popular now. But if you stay too long, you will be blamed for the various security and political problems arising along with way, and your support will start to erode."

A moderate Grenadian adds, "If US troops are here for long, it might create doubts in many people's minds about the fairness and freedom of the elections."

He and others are concerned that Grenadians might begin to suspect that the electoral process, including the preparation of voter-registration lists, was in some way

influenced by the presence of US troops.

Some say that a continuing US presence would keep Grenada a subject of prolonged international controversy. They state that they prefer an arrangement that would keep the island out of the East-West tug of war.

2. A "policing force" of Caribbean and US troops.

Under such an option, described by US Army sources, US participation would be kept to one battalion. Grenadian sources say that this arrangement may still present the problems outlined in the first alternative.

3. A Commonwealth force.

This alternative is favored by many Grenadians who feel that it would be in keeping with Grenada's status as a member of the Commonwealth. Although Britain might refuse to participate in any such force because of its original objections to the US intervention, a force could be made up of Canadians, Nigerians, Australians, and others, say some Grenadians.

4. A United Nations peacekeeping force.

This option arouses less enthusiasm than the Commonwealth alternative. Grenadians say there might be a language barrier between these UN forces and English-speaking Grenadians. They also say Grenada does not fit the classic UN peacekeeping situation — one in which the UN forces keep the peace between two disputing parties. Grenada, they say, needs a security force to root out whatever guerrilla or terrorist forces remain.

The US could have a role in a UN force, much like US peacekeeping troops in the Sinai.

5. A peace force of Caribbean nations.

Members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States could compose a peace force, and Commonwealth troops could act as a backup rapid deployment force in case of a sudden deterioration of the security situation.

Next in Grenada: a welcome 'invasion' of US economic aid

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

As security problems fade into a dim threat which may still be lurking in the hills, Grenadians' thoughts are beginning to focus more on economic matters.

The islanders' outlook is both expectant . . . and tinged with trepidation. Although Grenadians welcome what they hope will be an influx of United States aid, many worry about what a flood of foreign monies might produce.

As one American foreign aid expert who is not in the US government put it, "There have been two invasions: first the military one, and now the invasion of technical assistance."

After watching their economy slide down the skids for months, if not years, Grenadians are cheered by the promise of \$3 million in US reconstruction aid. Even more encouraging is the prospect of an eventual \$20 million to \$30 million per year which, if Grenadian and US government sources here are correct, the Reagan administration has slated for the island.

But Grenadians do not want the money spent in a way that infringes on the island's sovereignty or puts

Please see **GRENADA** back page



St. George's street market is bustling again — and Grenadians hope the whole economy will pick up with US aid

GRENADA from front page

them in a position of dependence. At present, the main targets of US aid will be:

1. Reconstructing the economy after the damage inflicted by military intervention and weeks of political turmoil.

2. Employing as many Grenadians as possible, especially the hundreds of young islanders whom recent events have thrown out of work.

Specifically, US sources here say that one-third of the US funds will be devoted to health care (including funds to rebuild the mental hospital that was bombed by US forces); \$700,000 will be used to repair the road network; \$570,000 is to be spent on the water system; \$535,000 for electric power; and \$185,000 for education.

In the months before Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's government was overthrown, unemployment among Grenada's 38,000-man labor force stood at 19 percent. With 50 percent of the population under age 25, unemployment of the young was a critical problem. This has been exacerbated by the invasion and the dismantling of the Grenadian Army.

Between 1,500 and 2,500 people were put out of work when the Army was disbanded and construction work ended on the airport and other Cuban and East-bloc projects. Many other Grenadians saw their incomes cut off when their workplaces were damaged in the invasion.

US and Grenadian officials are aware that most of the unemployment is among that sector of the young who were, to an extent, radicalized by the regime of Prime Minister Bishop. Officials want to put these people to work as quickly as possi-

ble — partly in order to reduce potential political and security problems.

At the same time, the US is trying to be careful not to lavish attention on Grenada at the expense of its neighbors.

Looking at the general economic assistance picture, one US official says, "Our policy in the region will not be to reward exclusively the Grenadian prodigal son."

The US view is that it might be destabilizing to shower aid on Grenada and neglect other English-speaking countries in the eastern Caribbean. Officials estimate that the region as a whole will receive \$30 million to \$40 million a year in US aid, of which \$20 million to \$30 million will go to Grenada. They believe that Congress will agree to these figures because of the new consciousness the US public now has of the problem of the eastern Caribbean.

One reason for the high level of the US assistance is the perceived need to match the aid the Bishop government got from East-bloc and other sources.

In 1982, Grenada got almost \$20 million from East-bloc countries and \$10-12 million from the West. An important part of this assistance was funneled into the international airport, a project Cuba had sponsored and that almost all Grenadians want the US to finish. US sources speculate that the US will complete the airport.

These sources predict that after several years of channeling most assistance bilaterally — directly to a government — the administration will probably return to a more multilateral approach and give substantial aid to such regional Caribbean economic institutions as the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), and the Caribbean Development Bank.

US officials acknowledge that military and security assistance will increase, but



Grenadian woman selling spice baskets

stress that they are well aware of the political fragility of area regimes.

They note that most of the islands only have police units and do not possess military forces. These sources say neither the US nor the islands themselves want to establish such forces in the individual countries. There are plans however, for Barbados and the small islands together to form a regional security unit, which Grenada is expected to join in time.

The individual island police units could be trained by US military security teams on the islands or police officers could take classes in the US. Training assistance will probably amount to about \$1 million a year for the region, sources say.

But "The US should avoid using the big stick and trying to dictate what our people's needs are," said a prominent

Grenadian government official.

"Most Grenadians have a fairly independent way of doing things. Because of all the foreigners who came in under Bishop . . . Grenadians are fed up with non-Grenadians telling them what to do. The more high visibility the US adopts in Grenada, the more it might find that the sympathy it had for the intervention will erode."

Grenadian businessmen have their own concerns. One who welcomes the aid and expects the private sector to receive important subsidies worries that US aid projects may "unduly inflate" wages. He also hopes the US will use Grenadian firms whenever possible.

The White House has sent a team of economic analysts from several agencies to Grenada to explore how US aid should be spent and to what degree it should be extended to the private sector. Some prominent moderate Grenadians have cautioned that the US should not tie itself in too closely with the private sector.

An Caribbean economist wonders about the ability of the island to absorb so much money. He thinks the aid can be positive, but worries the US might sponsor "white elephants" — grandiose projects that are not needed and that drain the economy.

He also recommended development of agro-industry and discouraged emphasizing textile industries since textiles can be produced at lower wage rates elsewhere and thus are not competitive.

"The trick is," he said, "to identify a few key areas where people can be productive, train them . . . give them some of the necessary cash, give them competitive access to US markets, and then let them do it themselves."

Nov. 22, 1983

Commonwealth torn by Grenada, bound by love of Queen

This week's meeting in New Delhi likely to voice criticism of US

By Mary Anne Weaver
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

In the end, it could be a tale of two women, intent on avoiding an open and embarrassing split, at the biennial meeting of the Commonwealth heads of government, which opens in New Delhi on Wednesday. This could prove the least harmonious of 23 such meetings in the post-World War II years.

It will require all of the skills of the chairman, Indira Gandhi, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to heal deep wounds among the Commonwealth's 48 members on the United States invasion of Grenada — a Commonwealth member-state.

There are also sharp divisions on the lack of progress in gaining independence for South African-controlled Namibia and the ticklish issue of a new world monetary order, a move which both the US and Britain oppose.

Yet the most difficult task could be soothing tempers among Caribbean leaders, six of whose armies, in a fashion, swept across Grenada's beaches, under US command. They will be here in New Delhi, viewed by many as little more than Washington's surrogates. And they could become the fulcrum for the body's more radical states to use the six-day meeting to criticize the US.

Such condemnation could find expression in nearly all issues to be discussed — from disarmament to cruise missiles in Europe; "demilitarization" of the Indian Ocean; and the declaration of independence by Cyprus's minority Turks. Cyprus is also a Commonwealth member, but the organization has had little impact on the divided island since the 1974 Turkish invasion.

Please see QUEEN page 13



Gandhi: against troops being sent to Grenada

QUEEN from page 11

But it is Grenada and, more important, the state of the Commonwealth in its aftermath, that is bound to be foremost in everybody's mind.

The possible dispatch of a Commonwealth force to police the island, assuming the US withdraws, has in itself caused perceptible strains in the group.

Mrs. Gandhi is against it. Mrs. Thatcher will consider it "sympathetically" if its mission is clearly defined. Canada, New Zealand, and Trinidad, among others, have said they are ready to take part.

Yet it opens an unsettling specter for a number of member-states on the implications of what could become a permanent, Commonwealth "preventive peacekeeping" role in the wake not only of Grenada but also the Falkland Islands, and the demands of some of the body's tiny nations for some kind of Commonwealth arrangement to protect them.

Such a one-time force for Grenada, its proponents will argue this week, would have the advantage of removing the troubled island from superpower politics, and returning it to a familiar umbrella, even though, at the time of the invasion, that umbrella was caught nearly unawares.

For it is an umbrella that has become somewhat tattered over time. No longer is there the homogenous grouping presided over by Queen Victoria nearly a century ago, and which passed from empire to Commonwealth in 1944. Made up of former British colonies, it is perhaps one of the world's most heterogeneous, international groups, ranging from vast India to 26 "micro" nations. Such eclecticism has led critics to charge that the body, representing Conservatives and Marxists, North and South, are held together by love of Queen and cricket, but, perhaps, by little else.

Yet, it has survived longer than any other international body in modern history, perhaps, due in large measure, to its sheer informality.

All leaders are accorded individual audiences by Queen Elizabeth II, who is head of the Commonwealth, although during its sessions she plays only a discreet role behind the scenes. Yet she is bound to voice her disapproval of a foreign power simply walking into a member state, and, perhaps as she did at the 1979 Lusaka conference, where independence talks for Rhodesia got under way, she may use her position as figurehead to build additional bridges in New Delhi this week.

OPINION

The Grenadian precedent

By Wayne S. Smith

The congressional fact-finding mission is home from Grenada. Rep. Michael Barnes, among others, has concluded that the invasion of that island was justified. Rep. Don Bonker, among others, says it was not. Doubtless the argument will rage on inconclusively. But to focus entirely on justification may be to

miss the broader point: whether the President did or did not have sufficient cause to set aside international norms and invade another nation, the invasions hardly represented a foreign policy victory for the United States.

On the contrary, more than anything else Grenada was a monument to the mismanagement of foreign policy. It pointed up again the Reagan administration's incomprehension of the uses of diplomacy. For at least two years the Bishop government had been signaling its

interest in reaching accommodation with the US: Bishop had pleaded for talks. Had the administration begun a negotiating process aimed at bringing our own influence and economic leverage to bear, the situation might have developed very differently. But the administration rebuffed Bishop. It had no more interest in a diplomatic process with the Grenadians than it has in one with the Nicaraguans and Cubans.

One can only hope that the administration does not now conclude it can handle Nicaragua, Cuba, and El Salvador the same way it took care of Grenada. Landing marines worked in Grenada, a tiny island defended by a handful of Cubans and demoralized Grenadian soldiers. It has not worked and will not work in Lebanon. Nor will it in Central America. Yet, that is the direction in which the administration seems to be moving.

And even were one to grant, for the sake of argument, that the invasion itself was politically defensible, there is no defense at all for the way the administration went about it. It had plenty of time to consult with our allies, yet did not do so, with predictable results. Our NATO allies were furious. Their confidence in our leadership and our sensitivity to their needs plummeted. The NATO alliance was needlessly damaged. Why? Can this be the same Ronald Reagan who criticized the Carter administration for failing to maintain the confidence of, and strong ties with, the NATO countries? Can this be the same Ronald Reagan who said good relations with Mexico and Canada would be the foundation stone of his policies for this hemisphere?

One cannot but contrast Kennedy's effective diplomacy during the 1962 missile crisis with the lack of it during the Grenada invasion. In the first instance, there were careful consultations with our allies. They supported us to the hilt. In the second, consultations were only an afterthought. Our allies did not support us. Doubtless the two situations differed considerably in substance, but style, or lack of it, also played its role.

Nor does it bother the President that we have been isolated and condemned in the UN and that world public opinion was swinging against us at a crucial moment — just before our deployment of missiles in Europe.


Turning to the invasion's domestic implications, one must ask why American troops were sent into combat without proper consultations with the Congress. Whether in letter or in spirit, the Constitution was simply ignored. Those who believed the war powers act would restrain the President from committing troops in Central America should now know better.

Finally, what about freedom of the press and the right of the American people to be informed? Newsmen were denied access long after there were any security grounds for doing so. We were back to depending on the official version of events, and, as in Vietnam, this proved unreliable. Military briefers, as well as those in the White House and State Department, gave out statements that were contradictory, inaccurate, and in some cases deliberately misleading. The day before the invasion, for example, one spokesman said the Americans on the island were in no danger and that there were no plans to remove them. A day later, the story was the exact opposite. "Thousands of Cuban military personnel" turned out to be fewer than 200. First there was a mass grave, then there was not. And it now turns out that the light Grenadian casualties first mentioned by briefers may not have been light at all. We will never be sure. The Pentagon's statements have been so evasive and contradictory that no figure it puts out now is likely to be believed.

The President set the tone in all this. First he said it was an invasion, then insisted it was not, that it was a "rescue operation." But in a rescue operation, our troops would have gone in, rescued our citizens, and departed. They did no such thing. They deposed the government, and we are now told they may be on the island for months. No rescue mission this, as the President well knows, but he doesn't mind calling an apple an orange.

The image that emerges from the handling of the Grenada crisis, in sum, is one of an administration that was perfectly willing to set aside US law as well as international norms, which ignored the Congress, failed to consult with our allies, and, worst of all, had no qualms about misinforming the American people. It was not a reassuring performance.

Mr. Smith is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.



St. George's street market is bustling again — and Grenadians hope the whole economy will pick up with US aid

Grenada: a welcome 'invasion' of US aid

By Dennis Volman

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

St. George's, Grenada

As security problems faded into a dim threat which may still be lurking in the hills, Grenadians' thoughts are beginning to focus more on economic matters.

The islanders' outlook is both expectant . . . and tinged with trepidation. Although Grenadians welcome what they hope will be an influx of United States aid, many worry about what a flood of foreign monies might produce.

As one American foreign aid expert who is not in the US government put it, "There have been two invasions: first the military one, and now the invasion of technical assistance."

After watching their economy slide down the skids for months, if not years, Grenadians are cheered by the promise of \$3 million in US reconstruction aid. Even more encouraging is the prospect of an eventual \$20 million to \$30 million per year which, if Grenadian and US government sources here are correct, the Reagan administration has slated for the island.

But Grenadians do not want the money spent in a way that infringes on the island's sovereignty or puts them in a position of dependence. At present, the main targets of US aid will be:

1. Reconstructing the economy after the damage inflicted by military intervention and weeks of political turmoil.
2. Employing as many Grenadians as possible, especially the hundreds of young islanders whom recent events have thrown out of work.

Specifically, US sources here say that one-third of the US funds will be devoted to health care (including funds to rebuild the mental hospital that was bombed by US forces); \$700,000 will be used to repair the road network; \$570,000 is to be spent on the water system; \$535,000 for electric power; and \$185,000 for education.

In the months before Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's government was overthrown, unemployment among Grenada's 38,000-man labor force stood at 19 percent. With 50 percent of the population under age 25, unemployment of the young was a critical problem. This has been exacerbated by the invasion and the dismantling of the Grenadian Army.

Between 1,500 and 2,500 people were put out of work when the Army was disbanded and construction work ended on the airport and other Cuban and East-bloc projects. Many other Grenadians saw their incomes cut off when their workplaces were damaged in the invasion.

US and Grenadian officials are aware that most of the unemployment is among that sector of the young who were, to an extent, radicalized by the regime of Prime Minister Bishop. Officials want to put these people to work as quickly as possible — partly in order to reduce potential political and security problems.

At the same time, the US is trying to be careful not to lavish attention on Grenada at the expense of its neighbors.

Looking at the general economic assistance picture, one US official says, "Our policy in the region will not be to reward exclusively the Grenadian prodigal son."

The US view is that it might be destabilizing to shower aid on Grenada and neglect the other English-speaking countries in the eastern Caribbean. Officials estimate that the region as a whole will receive \$30 million to \$40 million a year in US aid, of which \$20 million to \$30 million will go to Grenada. They believe that Congress will agree to these figures because of the heightened consciousness the US public now has of the problem of the eastern Caribbean.

One reason for the high level of the US assistance is the perceived need to match the aid the Bishop government got from East-bloc and other sources.

In 1982, Grenada received almost \$20 million from East-bloc countries and \$10-12 million from the West. An important part of this assistance was funneled into the international airport, a project Cuba had sponsored and that almost all Grenadians want the US to finish. US sources speculate that the United States will end up finishing the airport.

These sources predict that after several years of channeling most of the assistance bilaterally — that is, directly to the government involved — the administration will probably return to a more multilateral approach and give substantial aid to such regional Caribbean economic institutions as the Caribbean Common Market

(CARICOM), and the Caribbean Development Bank.

US officials acknowledge that military and security assistance will increase, but stress that they are well aware of the political fragility of most of the eastern Caribbean's island regimes.

They note that most of the islands only have police units and do not possess military forces. These sources say neither the US government nor the islands themselves want to establish such forces in the individual countries involved. There are plans however, for Barbados and the small islands together to form a regional security unit, which Grenada is expected to join in time.

The individual island police units could be trained by US military security teams on the islands or island police officers could take classes in the US. Military training assistance will probably amount to about \$1 million a year for the whole region, US sources say.

But "The US should avoid using the big stick and trying to dictate what our people's needs are," said a prominent Grenadian government official.

"Most Grenadians have a fairly independent way of doing things. Because of all the foreigners who came in under Bishop — not just Cubans, but Jamaicans, Guyanese, etc . . . — Grenadians are fed up with non-Grenadians telling them what to do. The more high visibility the US adopts in Grenada, the more it might find that the sympathy it had for the intervention will erode."

Grenadian businessmen have their own concerns. One business leader who welcomed the aid and expected the private sector to directly receive important subsidies to make up for war damages feared that US aid projects would "unduly inflate" wages paid to local workers. He also hoped that the US would use Grenadian firms whenever possible rather than bring in outside groups.

The White House has sent a team of economic analysts from several agencies to Grenada to explore how US aid should be spent and to what degree it should be extended to the private sector. Some prominent moderate Grenadians have cautioned that the US should not tie itself in too closely with the private sector.

Finally, a Caribbean economist wondered about the ability of a population of 800,000 to absorb so much money. He thought that the assistance could be positive, but he feared that US aid would fall into the traditional trap of sponsoring "white elephants" — grandiose infrastructure projects that are out of proportion to local needs and that wind up as a drain on the economy.

The economist recommended that the US resurface existing roads rather than widen them unnecessarily. He recommended the development of agro-industry, such as the manufacture of banana chips. (Grenada's main exports are bananas, cocoa products, and nutmeg.)

He discouraged placing too much emphasis on textile industries since they could always be produced at lower wage rates in the Far East and thus were not competitive in the long run.

INTERNATIONAL

Antileftist feeling is rising in Caribbean

By Dennis Volman
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Bridgetown, Barbados



Jamaica's Seaga

A climate of militant antiradicalism — even vigilantism — is rising here in the Caribbean in the wake of the United States-Caribbean invasion of Grenada.

At least two Caribbean prime ministers, Edward Seaga of Jamaica and Tom Adams of Barbados, are taking hold of this antileft feeling and turning it against their radical, left-of-center opposition.

In a move that is provoking charges of "witch hunting" and "McCarthyism," Prime Minister Seaga recently read a list to the Jamaican Parliament of 25 citizens and permanent residents whom he called "security risks." Most of the people on the list were associated with the main opposition party, the People's National Party (PNP), led by radical former Prime Minister Michael Manley.

But some people on the list had no particularly strong political connections. They included a prominent doctor whose error apparently was attending an international conference in Cuba. In what some see as a related move, the government-controlled National Bauxite Institute dismissed Joseph Manley, son of Michael Manley.

Some observers fear these moves may be an opening round of a campaign of intimidation against the Jamaican PNP — one intended to undermine that party before the elections that are to be held in two years.

In Barbados, Prime Minister Adams has revoked the work permit of Guyanese journalist Ricky Singh, editor of the Caribbean Contact, a monthly paper put out by the Caribbean Council of Churches and widely read by area intellectuals. Singh and his paper were the only ma-

jor news media voice to come out against the intervention in Grenada, in which Barbados played a major role.

Singh has been given until Dec. 2 to leave the country.

The journalist said that in an interview he had with Adams on Nov. 9, the prime minister accused him of having links to the DGI, the Cuban security agency. Singh denies the accusation.

There have been reports that police searched the homes of at least three leaders of a left-wing, largely student group called Monali. These people reportedly were interrogated for several hours. They are Francis Bell, a student; Ricky Parris, a leader of the Barbados Workers' Union; and Norman Farrier, a free-lance journalist who edits Monali's newspaper.

Intense debates have been going on in the Barbadian parliament. Progovernment deputies spoke of radical "foreigners" (Guyanese, Jamaicans, Trinidadians, and others) who should leave the island. And a progovernment deputy accused a member of parliament of being a "communist" because he had a son named Fidel. In response, an opposition deputy warned "not to fall into the trap of thinking that people are unpatriotic because they do not agree with the prime minister."

In a more personal incident, this reporter was mistaken for a Cuban when arriving at a restaurant in St. Lucia for a lunch date with an area politician. Several diners moved to phone the police when they saw me.

An American observer says the roots of antileftism and vigilantism predate the Grenada invasion. He thinks they are grounded in an attitude in much of the English-speaking Caribbean that "turns each prime minister into a little king, thus turning dissent into *lese majesty*."



Barbados's Adams

Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1983

Grenada's underclass

Re Grenada:

As in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Central America, there are racial and social factors at play in the former British Antilles which our government seems only dimly to understand.

When the British pulled out, the largely white ruling class also left, leaving behind a mostly Afro-European set of new rulers, mostly trained in Canada and Britain. This is the class we seem to have pledged to support.

However, there exists a majority underclass, mostly African, from which future insurgent forces will be drawn. The cadre for such forces already exists in the form of Grenadian troops who have taken off their uniforms.

If the US intends to prop up the present shaky ruling class, the majority underclass will have to be either placated or suppressed by force. Either alternative will mean US money or arms or troops, or all of these.

It should also be understood that this involves not only Grenada but all formerly British Antilles, which, if Jamaica is included, involves 4.5 million people, or 6 million if Guyana, Belize, and (Dutch) Surinam are added to our task.

An additional complicating factor is the presence in the area of substantial numbers of Asians and East Indians, who have viewpoints different from those of either the ruling and underclasses.

The viewpoint of the underclass is easy to see: its members know about a better life from watching the tourists and TV, but they know that their highest realistic hope is to get a job as a bellboy or maid in a tourist hotel (if tourism continues). The present ruling class will be unable to defend itself against them and will invoke the US anti-Marxist knee-jerk reaction.

Norman D. Arbaiza
Sloatsburg, N.Y.

Letters are welcome. Only a selection can be published and none individually acknowledged. All are subject to condensation. Please address letters to "letters editor."

INTERNATIONAL

Commonwealth: a bed of odd-fellows

By Mary Anne Weaver

Special to The Christian Science Monitor



Gandhi: OKs Grenada force

SVEN SIMON

New Delhi

The Commonwealth heads of government wound up their week-long meeting in New Delhi Tuesday, with a communiqué long on platitudes, short on proposals, and containing no new initiatives.

"We are not in the business of crisis management," a participant remarked wryly.

It is a view no one could challenge, if based only on the group's response to events in Grenada and Cyprus, both members of the Commonwealth.

The United States, which came in for the most vociferous criticism during 10 executive sessions, was ignored almost completely in the final communiqué.

There was no call for the "immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces" in Grenada, due to a last minute drafting hitch. Nor was there any censure of the US for its action or inaction in Namibia (South-West Africa), on which the Commonwealth is in a unique position to bolster new initiatives.

The only rebuke in the 18-page, 10,000-word document concerned Namibia. Using the oft-repeated word "consensus" — signifying the clubbiness and urge to present a united front — the communiqué merely stated that the hopes that Namibian independence might be imminent "had been frustrated" when the US and South Africa insisted on the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

The document gave only scant attention to Grenada, after a heated debate on the subject which consumed nearly five days. Neither was there any mention of a world monetary conference to redress differences between industrialized nations and the developing world.

"Seeking headlines is not important," New Zealand's Robert Muldoon told this reporter Tuesday night. "But, finding out how you can get a formula for a North-South dialogue surely is. We have no weight in changing a Grenada or a Cyprus, and all this hassle on Grenada wasted valuable time. On the economic issues, I'm not euphoric, but we've made a first, cautious step."

Muldoon was instrumental in drafting a Common-

wealth document proposing steps towards a new economic formula to supercede Bretton Woods, which was presented to the conference, despite the reservations of Britain and Canada, and Australia to a lesser extent.

Perhaps inaction is one reason this unique grouping of nations has survived, defying the odds of pundits who view it as a last vestige of the empire, tattered and torn, yet representing the world's richest and poorest states.

There was a time when all Commonwealth eyes turned to Britain. That is no longer so. And, despite the conference's bland final communiqué, Margaret Thatcher, was the odd-woman-out.

She was the European leader of a Western nuclear nation — a dedicated capitalist. The Commonwealth, representing 25 percent of humanity, has become more and more of a third-world club, and Mrs. Thatcher was nearly always on the defensive, either arguing those very economic and political policies that she herself holds dear, or attempting to buffet the fury directed at Washington over the "invasion" of Grenada, over Namibia, and over cruise missiles in Europe.

But as biting as any, were references nearly every day to the "insensitivity, and retreat from internationalism to national self-interest" of the US.

Through Grenada, the US "has thrown us all to the lions," Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda charged, "making invasion an internationally accepted precedent. South Africa, with impunity, can swarm across our borders, never knocking at the door."

Unfailingly espousing the third-world cause, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stood in contrast to Mrs. Thatcher. But a surprise newcomer was Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, chairman of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, who was stamped as a formidable political figure, as she presented the views of the minority Caribbean states which went into Grenada under US command.

Prime Minister Charles was also instrumental in gaining acceptance for the creation of a "Caribbean security force with Commonwealth backing" to replace US forces when they leave. It was a key victory, accepted most reluctantly by Mrs. Gandhi and a number of other chiefs of government from the nonaligned world due to its implications as a potential harbinger of a Commonwealth military pact or even a security force.

Acknowledging that there were no breakthroughs, one participant said, "nothing was really solved by the meeting, but then again nothing has come unstuck."

The weakness in strong-arm tactics

Reagan may find what worked in Grenada won't in Mideast

By Joseph C. Harsch

The idea behind the Dec. 4 American bombing attack on the Syrians was that it would catch their attention and induce them to be more cooperative about Lebanon.

But the operation did not go off quite as planned. Instead of impressing the Syrians with American military power, and willingness to use it, the aftermath is a bicker in Washington over how the United States Navy lost two of its aircraft out of 28 in the attack.

And Syrian gunners came off with the military honors. They not only brought down the two US fighter-bombers, but also, two days later, they claimed to have downed two Israeli drones. (The Israelis admitted losing one.)

Add that the Italians were shaken by the American ac-

tion into thinking about bringing their own "peacekeeping" forces out of harm's way. And there were angry demands in Britain's Parliament, not only from opposition Labour benches but from some Tories as well, for a similar British withdrawal.

There remains an American dream plan in which peace arrives in the Middle East just in time for the 1984 American presidential elections.

It isn't altogether pie in the sky. One of many interesting recent developments in the Middle East is the loss by the PLO's Yasser Arafat of his more fanatical and belligerent right-wing elements. They remain behind in Syria and under Syrian discipline in Lebanon while he and his more moderate followers move on to a friendlier environment. He has lost much prestige and support. But, assuming he gets safely out of Tripoli where he still was at time of writing, he is freer than he was a year ago to a move toward peace with Israel — if he chooses.

Please see **REAGAN** back page

REAGAN from front page

Might he make such a move? He could authorize King Hussein of Jordan to enter into talks with the Israelis on behalf of the Palestinians. With such permission from Arafat, King Hussein would be free to do so — provided the Israelis show some sign of being willing to be serious about autonomy for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.

Is Israel moving towards a point where it just might be willing to compromise over the West Bank and Gaza? The answer to that question may lie deep inside the cloud of ambiguity which was spun around the visit a fortnight ago of Israel's Yitzhak Shamir to Washington.

At the time of the visit Mr. Shamir promised nothing on the record in return for the military cooperation and extra aid which President Reagan bestowed upon him. And afterward Mr. Shamir insisted that there had been no "secret clause" behind the agreement between Israel and the United States.

But is it reasonable to think that Reagan gave so much to the Israelis and asked in return only their implicit support during next year's American elections? Was there perhaps a quiet understanding that if King Hussein, with Mr. Arafat's public blessing, is willing to talk, that Mr. Shamir will find a way to call off more building of housing for Israeli colonists on the West Bank?

And of course, during the playing out of such a scenario, perhaps the US Marines could come safely home from Lebanon.

To have it all work out so nicely requires the cooperation of the Syrians. King Hussein of Jordan would hesitate to enter into serious peace talks with Israel without the consent of his more powerful neighbor. And Syrian influence is at a new and all-time high right now.

Reagan chose this moment to authorize the Navy's air strike on Syrian anti-aircraft and command positions in Lebanon. It was presented as a "reprisal" for Syrian anti-aircraft fire at US reconnaissance planes the day before. It was supposed to show that the US is determined to work toward an independent Lebanon and will use its own force to that end, in cooperation with Israel.

This was, of course, only a skirmish. Obviously, as the US Navy admitted afterward, its planes attacked with insufficient advance knowledge of Syrian anti-aircraft weapons in the area. Another similar US mission would presumably be handled differently and better.

The result, which included one US Navy pilot killed and another left as a prisoner in Syrian hands, underlined a fact. US military power in the Middle East is in a different environment than when used in the Caribbean or in Central America.

Was Reagan's White House so pleased with the way the invasion of Grenada turned out that it thinks it can

do much the same in the Middle East? But Grenada is a long way from Soviet air power. Moscow had no means of contesting the American invasion of Grenada. Nor can Moscow do anything decisive to help Nicaragua against the support Reagan is giving to its rebels.

Grenada and Nicaragua, also Cuba, live under the umbrella of US air power. In any showdown, the US holds the high cards in Central America and the Caribbean.

But the military factors are different in the Middle East. The Soviets have plenty of medium and long-range air power in the Crimea. Syria and Lebanon are under the potential canopy of Soviet medium- and long-range bombers. Syria is less than 300 miles from the nearest Soviet territory. "Big Brother" for the Syrians is just over the other side of those mountains to its north.

Besides, the Syrians seem to have learned a lot about handling anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles since the 1982 fighting when they failed to bring down a single Israeli plane. And the Soviets have since given them newer and more effective weapons.

President Reagan's use of military power to support his diplomacy does seem to be paying off in Central America. The Nicaraguan regime is at least making noises about cleaning up its act. It purports to be ready to invite political moderates back into the political process, to hold open elections, to liberate political prisoners, and to grant amnesty to many of its opponents.

Study criticizes American invasion tactics in Grenada

By Brad Knickerbocker
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The performance of US military forces in Grenada was not without serious deficiencies and mistakes, according to a report released April 5 by the bipartisan congressional Military Reform Caucus.

In a stinging review of invasion planning, elite-force performance, helicopter survivability, and overall showing of both Army and Marine Corps units, this critique raises serious questions for the armed services and lays out lessons that are particularly relevant for any future United States actions in the region.

The Grenada operation has generally been viewed as a textbook conventional attack that ultimately fulfilled its missions of rescuing American medical students and stabilizing the political situation in the small Caribbean nation.

But this new review by military reform advocates points up just how difficult and costly "unconventional" warfare can be. And with every service demanding — and in this instance receiving — a piece of the action, it also illustrates the debate over service roles and missions.

The Military Reform Caucus is a group of 38 Republicans and 37 Democrats on Capitol Hill, chaired by Rep. Jim Courter (R) of New Jersey. This past week's report was researched and written by Wil-

liam Lind, a congressional defense aide associated with Sen. Gary Hart (D) of Colorado and one of the leading scholars and proponents of military reform.

His principal findings:

- Even though US forces vastly outnumbered Cuban and Grenadan troops, deficiencies in planning allowed the latter "to form and maintain a fairly effective defense."

Mr. Lind found that early invasion plans called for using Navy and Marine Corps units only. Instead, he says, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) intervened so that the Army and Air Force were involved as well.

This resulted in some communication and coordination problems.

"In what seems to have become the standard JCS approach to military operations, one that turns them


into a pie-dividing contest among all the services, we ended up with a plan that allowed the enemy to put on a reasonably good show," Lind writes.

- While the Army Rangers did very well in rescuing the American students, the Navy's elite commando group (the SEALs) failed in three of its four missions. The Army's antiterrorist unit — formerly known as the Delta Force; the name is now classified — failed to capture the Richmond Hill prison on Grenada.

- The Army's 82nd Airborne unit moved slowly in a classic frontal assault of vastly outnumbered Cuban troops



Mobile PX on Grenada



US soldiers leaving POW camp in captured truck

rather than use infiltration and maneuver tactics. Lind thinks the Cubans could have been overcome in less than the three days it took.

- By contrast, the Marine units "did not attempt to follow a rigid plan, but rather adapted swiftly to circumstances as they changed."

- Of about 100 US helicopters used in the Grenada assault, nine were destroyed and several others damaged. "A loss rate of 9 percent in three days against an opponent with no antiaircraft missiles, only guns . . . is not easy to pass over," Lind warns. "What does it suggest our helicopter losses would be, for example, in a war in Europe?"

"Problems not corrected now will almost certainly arise again in future operations, with potentially high costs to national interests and casualties," says Lind. "By learning as much as we can

from the combat on Grenada, we may be able to save lives in the future and also improve our chances for victory."

Representative Courter, who released the report, is a member of the House Armed Services Committee and (like most committee members) generally supportive of Pentagon programs and budgets.

But he says a closed-door Pentagon briefing on Grenada in January left him feeling "that we had received one side of the story."

Lind's findings, he told reporters, "lead to some potentially disturbing conclusions."

Mr. Courter this month asked Armed Services Committee chairman, Rep. Melvin Price (D) of Illinois, to conduct an investigation of the Grenada invasion, focusing on the issues raised in Lind's report.

The Christian Science Monitor vol 76 no 99 Apr 14-20 1984. p 5.