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ISSUE BRIEF

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## SUBSTITUTING FORCE FOR DIPLOMACY: TODAY GRENADA, TOMORROW . . . ?

THIS ISSUE MAY BE  
BORROWED FROM

APR. 29 1984

On October 25, 1983 nearly 2,000 U.S. Marines and Army Rangers stormed the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. A bloody coup, which left Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and at least sixteen other persons dead, finally had provided the Reagan administration with the long-awaited excuse to resort to military intervention. In justifying the invasion, President Reagan first offered three reasons for his "decisive action:" to protect the lives of up to 1,000 Americans residing on the island, to "forestall further chaos," and to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order on the island. To shroud his blatantly illegal act in some form of legitimacy, the Reagan administration later added that the invasion had been carried out in response to a request made by Grenada's frightened neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean—Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent—and by two other CARICOM members—Barbados and Jamaica. Further, the President argued that the island had become "a Soviet-Cuban colony" being readied to strike at its neighbors. Grenada, therefore, posed an intolerable threat to U.S. national interests.

President Reagan had always believed that the U.S. had a special responsibility to maintain order in its backyard. In invading Grenada, the administration hoped to attain goals that heretofore had been unattainable. It could remove the last vestige of a government it hated; it eventually could install the government of its choosing; and it could frighten progressive governments or left-leaning movements throughout the region.

In the final analysis, the invasion also had been launched to send a clear signal to the Soviets, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, the Syrians, and all other troublemakers. Although it was coincidental that the invasion of Grenada occurred just two days after more than two hundred U.S. Marines were killed in Lebanon, both are horrifying examples of growing U.S. militarism. The message the administration intended the Grenadian invasion to convey was that the U.S. would assert its authority and impose its will from Nicaragua to Namibia through armed intervention if necessary. Consequently, "American military personnel are now . . . everywhere: in El Salvador, in the Sudan, in Lebanon, in England and West Germany, in Turkey and Greece, in Diego Garcia and South Korea and Honduras . . . and around the Persian Gulf," as British historian E. P. Thompson has written.

After the first few hours, the Reagan administration boasted that its invasion had been a "complete success." Certainly, thousands of Marines could make short shrift of the 110,000 Grenadian people and fewer than 800 Cuban collaboration workers on the island. Equally important, the invasion scored a significant domestic political victory for Reagan. Having barred the press from covering the invasion, the administration was free to feed a sanitized version of the invasion to the American people; and this version went largely unchallenged even *after* the press was allowed on the island.

The polls taken after the invasion clearly demonstrated public approval. Although constitutionally-protected rights such as freedom of the press are supposedly sacred in this country, relatively little opposition to the ban on the press was recorded. Concerns about international law, diplomacy, relations with U.S. allies, and worldwide condemnation all were completely forgotten.

The attack on Grenada seemed to instill a renewed feeling of confidence in the national psyche. In one move it seemed that Washington had magically blotted out the memories of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the Iranian hostage crisis. Returning veterans received a hero's welcome and were asked few questions by the majority of Americans who had not experienced the horrors of war firsthand. The resurgence of militarism became evident as combat uniforms and paraphernalia became popular fashion items, and the armed forces reported an increasing number of new recruits.

This ISSUE BRIEF looks at the invasion of Grenada within the larger context of U.S. military intervention throughout this hemisphere on numerous occasions since the nineteenth century. Current actions fall neatly within the long pattern of U.S. relations with its neighbors because the U.S. again relied on brute force rather than diplomacy to compel compliance with its wishes. Indeed, previous U.S. governments voiced exactly the same pretext in almost exactly the same words to explain the invasions of Cuba in 1898, Nicaragua in 1912, and the Dominican Republic in 1965. The invasion of Grenada has shown that the U.S. still shoots first and asks questions later. For the rest of the world—both friend and foe alike—undoubtedly, this is a frightening precedent. □



The Washington Post


*"I spent 33 years and 4 months in active service as a member of our country's most agile military force—the Marine Corps. . . . I spent most of my time being a highclass muscle man for big business, for Wall Street, and for bankers. . . . Thus, I helped make Mexico. . . safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. . . . I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in 1903. . . ."*

U.S. Major General Smedley D. Butler

For more than 150 years, the United States has intervened repeatedly in the political and economic affairs of its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Since warning European nations to refrain from interference in "Our Hemisphere" with the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the U.S. has attempted to assert its hegemony and to "protect" its interests throughout the region. As a consequence, the U.S. has found it necessary to participate in more than eighty instances of military hostility in this region alone. Of course, having been self-appointed as the arbiter of the affairs of the region, the U.S. has felt no need to gain the prior consent of those countries it deemed necessary to protect. Rather, it has intervened willfully in blatant violation of international law with impunity.

Through its earliest interventions, the U.S. began the process of building the American empire and of consolidating its position as the dominant economic power in the region. U.S. entrepreneurs found that neighboring less-developed nations offered cheap raw material, a cheaper labor force, and ample opportunities for investment. Thus, as the Secretary of State during the presidency of William Howard Taft described it, U.S. policymakers came to envision the region as "a game preserve from which poachers were excluded but where the proprietor may hunt as he pleases." In this context, the U.S. government began intervening in the internal affairs of other nations to protect the interests of American private investors. If a country defaulted on its repayment of loans made by private banks, the U.S. government would occupy the country, assume control of that country's government, and force repayment. Consequently, intervention in the early decades of the twentieth century resulted in protracted U.S. military occupation of five nations.

Since the Cold War of the 1950s, U.S. intervention has been directed toward preventing progressive change, popular insurgency, and social revolution in the region. Again, the threat progressive change has posed is largely to the U.S. business community. If revolutionary governments assume power and are committed to strengthening their national



economies or to lessening traditional ties of dependence, then they are perceived to represent a threat to American firms with substantial interests in those countries.

Hence, in the last two centuries the U.S. has "sent in the Marines" from Panama to Paraguay. The methods of intervention employed have been quite varied: political "protection," economic pressure, financial control, military occupation, and more discreet "shows of force," among others. The pretexts for these interventions, on the other hand, have been all too similar. As in the most recent case, U.S. governments have cloaked their baser motives by invoking "nobler" objectives—"protecting American lives and property" or "safeguarding freedom and democracy."

Clearly, American property has been a real consideration, but "safeguarding freedom and democracy" has been much less so. The historical record demonstrates that the U.S. has shown *no* ability to restore democracy through its many interventions. In fact the more likely result of intervention has been support for corrupt and repressive dictators who could not remain in power without U.S. protection. The U.S. has fought to maintain governments which suit the image of U.S. policymakers and which allow American businesses to conduct business as usual. For example, interventions in both Guatemala and Chile removed democratically-elected governments; and the invasion of the Dominican Republic prevented the return to office of a democratically-elected government which had been overthrown. As Franklin Roosevelt aptly put it, the U.S. has preferred to support "our son of a bitch" rather than risk revolutionary change no matter what the cost to the people of that country.

Until the invasion and occupation of Grenada, the one exception to the rule of U.S. intervention in this hemisphere had been the English-speaking Caribbean. As former colonies of Great Britain and as members of the British Commonwealth, these nations had not suffered the fate of the former colonies of France and Spain. What the Reagan administration's military intervention has done is to signal a renewed determination by the U.S. to exert control over the entire hemisphere.

Long after U.S. combat troops return from Grenada, the entire region will be affected by the intervention of yet another nation by the United States. The invasion of Grenada demonstrated once more U.S. disregard for the sovereignty of its neighbors, its intolerance of diversity, and its contempt for diplomatic solutions to problems. The logical question raised by the invasion is when will the U.S. strike again. Who will be the next victim? Today Grenada, tomorrow Nicaragua. . . . □

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- 1833: U.S. sends forces to Argentina to protect American interests during an insurrection.
- 1835: Marines protect American interests in Peru during an attempted revolution.
- 1846: U.S. fights war with Mexico which ends in 1848.
- 1852: Marines land in Argentina to protect American interests during a revolution.
- 1853: U.S. intervenes in Nicaragua to protect American lives and interests during political disturbances.
- 1854: U.S. destroys Nicaraguan city to avenge an insult to the American Minister to Nicaragua.
- 1855: U.S. and European naval forces land to protect American interests during an attempted revolution in Uruguay.
- 1856: U.S. intervenes to protect American interests during an insurrection in Panama.
- 1858: Forces from two U.S. warships land to protect American property during a revolution in Uruguay.  
Congress authorizes a naval squadron to seek redress for an attack on a naval vessel in Paraguay.
- 1865: U.S. intervenes in Panama to protect the lives and property of American residents during a revolution.
- 1868: U.S. sends forces to Uruguay to protect foreign residents and the customhouse during an insurrection.
- 1888: U.S. sends troops to Haiti to persuade the Haitian government to give up an American steamer which had been seized on the charge of breach of blockade.
- 1890: U.S. naval party lands in Argentina to protect U.S. consulate and legation in Buenos Aires.
- 1891: U.S. intervenes to protect American citizens during a revolution in Chile.
- 1894: U.S. sends forces to Brazil to protect American commerce during a Brazilian civil war. No landing is attempted, but there is a display of naval force.  
U.S. intervenes to protect American interests in Bluefields, Nicaragua following a revolution.
- 1895: U.S. sends troops to protect American interests in Colombia.
- 1896: U.S. sends forces to Nicaragua to protect American lives and property.
- 1898: U.S. intervenes in Nicaragua to protect American lives and property.  
U.S. intervenes in Cuban war for independence from Spain, defeats Spain, and assumes control of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines.
- 1899: U.S. sends forces to Nicaragua to protect American interests during an insurrection.  
U.S. establishes military rule in Cuba which lasts until 1902.
- 1903: U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect the American consulate.  
U.S. intervenes in the Dominican Republic to protect American interests during a revolutionary outbreak.  
U.S. sends troops to Panama to protect American interest following the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmian canal. With brief intermissions, U.S. stations troops in Panama to guard U.S. interests until 1914.
- 1904: U.S. sends troops to the Dominican Republic to protect American interests during revolutionary fighting.
- 1906: U.S. intervenes to restore order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government in Cuba. U.S.-imposed civil-military rule lasts until 1909.
- 1907: U.S. sends troops to Honduras to protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua.
- 1910: U.S. intervenes during a civil war in Nicaragua to protect American interests.
- 1911: U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect American lives and property during a civil war.
- 1912: U.S. lands a small force in Honduras to prevent government seizure of an American-owned railroad.  
U.S. troops supervise elections in Panama.  
U.S. intervenes to protect American interests in Cuba.  
U.S. sends troops to Nicaragua to protect American interests during an attempted revolution. A small force would remain until 1925.
- 1914: U.S. sends forces to Haiti to protect American nationals during a period of unrest.  
U.S. naval force by gunfire stops the bombardment of Puerto Plaza and by threat of force maintains Santo Domingo City in the Dominican Republic during a revolutionary movement.
- 1915: U.S. maintains order in Haiti from a period of threatened insurrection until 1934.
- 1916: U.S. forces intervene and maintain order in the Dominican Republic until 1924.
- 1917: U.S. sends forces to Cuba to protect American interests during an insurrection and subsequent unsettled conditions. Most of the force leaves Cuba by 1919, but two companies remain until 1922. U.S. maintains presence until 1933.
- 1919: U.S. sends forces ashore to maintain order in Honduras during an attempted revolution.
- 1920: U.S. intervenes in Guatemala to protect American interests during a period of fighting between the Unionist Party and the government.
- 1921: U.S. intervenes to prevent a war between Panama and Costa Rica over a boundary dispute.
- 1924: U.S. sends troops to Honduras to protect American lives and interests during election hostilities.
- 1925: U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect foreigners during a political upheaval.  
U.S. lands troops in Panama to keep order and protect American interests.
- 1926: U.S. sends Marines to Nicaragua to protect American interests during an attempted revolution. Some U.S. forces remain in the country until 1933.
- 1933: U.S. Naval forces demonstrate off Cuban shores during a revolution against President Gerardo Machado, but no landing is made.
- 1940: U.S. sends troops to guard air and naval bases in Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana obtained by negotiation with Great Britain against the wishes of the local governments.
- 1954: U.S.-sponsored coup results in the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala.
- 1961: U.S. sponsors invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba.
- 1962: U.S. imposes naval blockade of Cuba.
- 1964: U.S. troops kill student protesters in the Panama Canal Zone.
- 1965: U.S. invades the Dominican Republic and forces the overthrow of the elected government of Juan Bosch.
- 1973: U.S.-sponsored coup results in the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile.
- 1983: U.S. invades Grenada to protect American students and to restore democracy. □



Lucy S. Williams

The invasion of Grenada has set a most dangerous precedent. It has brought the English-speaking Caribbean within the tradition of U.S. intervention in this Hemisphere, which has been a long and formidable one for the last one hundred years. The English-speaking Caribbean had always been spared that because we have been a part of the British Commonwealth. We have now *by our own invitation* defined ourselves within that sphere in which there is a clear precedent for U.S. military intervention.

We do not know that the U.S. would have invaded if they had not been invited. I have no doubt that they did it with relish. I have no doubt that they always had a contingency plan to do it. I have no doubt that they were merely waiting for the appropriate pretext. The fact is, however, that they were invited. This is an absolutely disastrous error in its implications for the future.

One has to draw a very careful distinction between the probable motivation of the members of the OECS and that of Jamaica and Barbados. It may well be that the OECS countries felt threatened and were genuinely frightened by the whole situation. But it was also true that they thought of this as a good opportunity to get rid of any traces of a genuinely progressive political process of the sort that Bishop symbolized. They wanted to remove that political process and thereby to eliminate what they regarded as a danger to the region.

In so far as Barbados and Jamaica are concerned, I have absolutely no doubt that there was *no* question of fear of anything at all. They acted as a result of their own internal political agenda. They saw the tremendous mistake and disaster that occurred in Grenada as an opportunity to remove all traces of the kind of progressive process that Bishop represented.

The errors that were made within Grenada itself are a very real set-back to the progressive cause. On the other hand, the invasion is going to have a different effect. The invasion is now very popular in the Caribbean for a variety of reasons. Of course, this popularity represents at least a temporary setback of serious proportions. It was overwhelmingly popular in Grenada for three reasons. Everybody in the minority who was opposed to the progressive direction of affairs is thrilled about the invasion because it wipes out the progressive process for the time being. The great majority of the people who really loved Bishop very, very deeply are thrilled because they feel his execution has been avenged and that his executioners will now be punished. Therefore, they see the invasion as a great act of revenge for Bishop. Obviously, Bishop's being avenged is something that would emotionally appeal to them in the short-run. There are also a lot of other people who might not have fallen into either one of those categories but who were absolutely scared out of their wits. Their feeling was that anything that could lift the curfew and could deal with the military group who exe-

cuted Bishop and frightened them all was of benefit for the time being. Therefore, in the short-run the invasion would be popular.

Trinidad is the island closest to Grenada. A poll there found that sixty-one percent of the people favored the invasion and only thirty-nine percent were opposed. There is a tremendous inter-penetration of population between Trinidad and Grenada. The emotions, therefore, spill over. In Jamaica fifty-eight percent of those polled favored the invasion while forty-two percent were opposed. The polls are obviously accurate. But this degree of opposition to the invasion is really quite an achievement when you consider the massive manipulation that has occurred.

The tremendous propaganda build-up that accompanied the invasion was unprecedented in the Caribbean. The Cuban presence was exaggerated, distorted, and lied about. The dishonesty can have no equal in the last twenty years of international history. The Caribbean press has pushed that propaganda line and absolutely nothing else. This must be attributed to the power of the press and is a comment on the dishonesty of the press. It has literally presented a view of events that is just unbelievable.

In Jamaica the propaganda being spread through the streets is "if Manley comes back to power, that is what will happen to him and that will lead to an invasion and all the horrors will be brought to Jamaica." Though completely childish, this kind of propaganda has its effects in the short-run.

The invasion throws down the gauntlet to the political process to sort itself out. One can expect as rapidly as possible the development of a new alignment of forces in the Caribbean, in Latin America, in the Third World, and in the United States which will put the issues of sovereignty and the right of countries to be free to pursue the process of their self-determination on the line.

The invasion already is beginning to force the Caribbean political leadership to sort itself out between the neo-colonialists like Seaga and Adams—whose only interest is the promotion of the region as an out-post for tourism and U.S. multinational corporations—and what I would call the patriots—the genuine independence people, whether socialist or not, who begin with a strong sense of Caribbean nationalism. People must now stop and think: what has happened to our independence that we could by our own act wipe it out so quickly.

CARICOM had already been under tremendous strain. It, in fact, will now be under greater strain because it appears that Barbados and Jamaica sat at the CARICOM Conference on the fateful weekend before the invasion having already made their deals with President Reagan to invade Grenada. They sat at the Conference with their major senior colleagues and concealed that fact from them. Therefore, they had a CARICOM meeting which represented a very dark chapter in Caribbean history. One set of people had made a secret deal and another set of people not only disapproved of that kind of solution to the problem but also did not even know that the deal had been made. It is scandalous for members of a region to regard themselves as having a deeper allegiance and contact with a major superpower than with their own regional colleagues; and we are going to pay dearly for it. □

*Michael Manley is former Prime Minister of Jamaica and leader of the opposition People's National Party.*

*"People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for food,  
for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future  
for our children and great grandchildren . . ."*

Prime Minister Maurice Bishop

While much has been made of Grenada's alleged military threat to its neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean, the only "real" threat lay in the People's Revolutionary Government's (PRG) accomplishments since 1979. What the island's invaders actually had come to fear was the "demonstration effect" the Grenadian Revolution created for other Caribbeans who were dissatisfied with their lot and who might have been persuaded by Grenada's example to struggle to change things for the better.

When the Bishop government assumed power, Grenada, like its neighbors, was suffering from the adverse effects of the world recession. The demand for tropical exports—nutmeg, mace, bananas, and cocoa—was sluggish. In 1981 the average world market price for nutmeg was \$2.48 per pound, but it fell first to \$1.95 and then to \$1.20 during 1982. The price of cocoa, which had been \$1.54 per pound in 1981, had plunged to \$0.81 a year later. Tourism lagged, and bankruptcies increased. These conditions produced little or no growth throughout the region.

Nonetheless, Grenada was one of the very few countries in the Western Hemisphere that had per capita growth in the early 1980s. The New Jewel Movement (NJM) had implemented a comprehensive economic development strategy which attacked the problems of a previously deteriorating economy on several fronts. The government's program had four goals and produced rather impressive results. These goals were to: rehabilitate existing infrastructure and add to Grenada's infrastructure investment, stimulate productive investment both on the part of the private sector and through increased public investments, improve the efficiency of the public sector and maintain sound public finances, and emphasize agriculture and tourism. According to the World Bank, Grenada was successfully ". . . addressing the task of rehabilitation and of laying better foundations for growth within the framework of a mixed economy."

Agriculture clearly dominates Grenada's economy as the main supplier of food, the major earner of foreign exchange, and the largest employer. In implementing its goals, the PRG spent fifty-four times more on agriculture than did the Gairy government. The government enhanced and upgraded extension services and technical assistance to individual farmers. It provided substantial flows of financial assistance for banana and cocoa rehabilitation. It re-organized and rationalized state-owned farms and established private cooperatives of small farmers.

The World Bank estimated that the PRG's program resulted in nine percent per capita growth. The principal beneficiaries of this achievement were the Grenadian people. Unemployment fell from 49.0 percent in 1979 to 14.2 percent in 1982. Considered a privilege under the Gairy regime, education was made a right under the PRG. The latest census found only seven to ten percent illiteracy, down significantly from the fifteen percent projected by a 1979 World Bank report. Free milk and hot lunches were provided for primary school children. A new secondary school was constructed, and secondary school fees were reduced. University scholarships were increased from 3 in 1978 to 209 in 1981.

Significant improvements also were made in health care delivery. An increase in the number of doctors in residence on the island allowed for major expansions in health care


facilities. Each parish was equipped with a medical and a dental clinic. Twenty-eight medical stations were placed throughout the country. New departments were added to the main hospital; and the Ministry of Health offered the assistance of a professional health planner. The government created a Food and Nutrition Council to combat dietary problems and stressed the importance of preventive medicine in attacking the nation's health problems.

In sharp contrast to Grenada's progress, the situation in neighboring countries remained bleak. Life-threatening hunger may not exist, but chronic malnutrition and the lack of stable employment still are serious problems. Although Antigua has an abundance of arable land, food production in this country decreased due to government policies emphasizing tourism and foreign investment. In Dominica eighty percent of children under five suffer from intestinal parasites. The local diet is adequate in calories but deficient in proteins. Forty-four percent of the land is divided among forty-one large estates while ninety-eight percent of those who work the land are either small farmers or sharecroppers whose plots are too small to support their families. In St. Vincent nine farms comprise fifty-one percent of the arable land. Unlike the NJM, the governments of these countries have shown little concern for the needs of their poor, especially in the rural areas.

Unable to discount the social and economic progress that had been made in Grenada, its neighbors focused their most vocal complaints on the PRG's abandonment of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. After years of perverse manipulation of the electoral system by Gairy, the Grenadian revolution was directed toward creating an "alternative model of change." Although the PRG recognized that the active participation of the Grenadian people was critical, it did not give precedence to the establishment of a formal electoral mechanism for channeling that participation. Instead, the Bishop government sought to fulfill this objective by diffusing political power and by encouraging broad-based participation. In 1981 the NJM opened membership in the party support groups and mass organizations. As a result, the Parish councils—the organs of popular participation—were inundated with new members. The NJM further decentralized the political process by instituting Zonal Councils in each of Grenada's seven parishes. These bodies provided regular interaction between the Grenadian people and their government based on a principle of accountability in which officials would face the citizenry to account for their performance. At the typical Zonal and Parish Council meetings, a member of the PRG Cabinet and one or more managerial-level government officials would be present to report, listen, and answer questions concerning current policies, the implementation of programs, and local grievances or concerns.

During its last year, the PRG began the process of creating a formal, electoral system which would institutionalize popular democracy. In June Prime Minister Bishop announced the formation of a national Constitutional Commission which would draft a constitution, propose an electoral system suitable for Grenada, and hold elections in the near future.

As a result of its inability to resolve internal differences humanely, the NJM's laudible accomplishments have been destroyed. The current occupation of Grenada wipes out all possibilities that the system envisioned by the PRG will be created in Grenada. What we are left with is a noble experiment which suffered an untimely demise. □



The leaders of most of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean—including Maurice Bishop—signed a treaty which formed the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). That treaty was never registered at the United Nations; but we are told that this was a result of a bureaucratic misunderstanding and that they had planned to register it. The provisions of the treaty allow a member country to request that the other members aid them in the event of foreign intervention. No such request, as far as we know, came from the government of Grenada.

We are told, however, that the request was transmitted by the Governor General, who is a titular officer. Therefore, he has no right whatsoever to speak for the government of Grenada. Sir Paul Scoon was appointed by and owed his job to Maurice Bishop who recommended Scoon's name to Her Majesty the Queen of England. Her Majesty the Queen then appointed him as a titular officer to take over the headship of the government as her representative. Sir Paul proceeded to act extra-constitutionally according to both the 1973 constitution and the people's law proclaimed by the Bishop government. The British themselves are very wary of giving power to the Queen's representative primarily because in British Constitutional practice the Queen has no authority over Parliament. The British fought very hard to retain Parliamentary supremacy over the rights of the Crown. Sir Paul has not necessarily violated the constitution in terms of the letter of the law; but more importantly, what he has done is to destroy the conventions in British Parliamentary practice which clearly would not allow for his intervention. After all, Sir Paul was captured—some would say liberated—by the U.S. marines. He was taken to a ship off the shore of Grenada then brought back to his residence. Now he is being protected by the Barbadian army. Therefore, Sir Paul owes his position to the occupying power which enables him to govern. His Provisional Advisory Council essentially has been approved by and authenticated by the United States and the other occupying countries—thus making them spokespersons of the occupying countries.

Moreover, the OECS treaty provides that all members be present when such a decision is made. Now we are told that some of the members were not present. We were informed later, by a non-OECS member, that there was some confusion as to whether the request was coming from the countries to the United States or whether the United States was already advising them about making the request. Hence, it seems to me that the members of the OECS were determined to play this role long before the so-called request came from Sir Paul Scoon.

The major instigators of this particular move were Prime Minister Eugenia Charles from Dominica, Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia, and Prime Minister Vere Bird from Antigua, who had already indicated that they were strong supporters of the Reagan administration. They were

joined by two non-OECS members, Jamaica and Barbados, who had no business being there except for the fact that Prime Minister Edward Seaga and Prime Minister Tom Adams, like Mrs. Charles and Mr. Bird, share the foreign policy orientations of the Reagan administration. Thus, the like-minded conservative countries of the Eastern Caribbean, Jamaica, and Barbados—who shared the over-all economic, political, and social objectives of the Reagan administration—had joined together to undertake this invasion. Their aim was to create an American military bloc in the English-speaking Caribbean—thus contradicting, at least for some of them, their commitment to non-alignment.

This conservative bloc was experiencing serious internal economic problems which they have been unable to resolve. The bulk of them are mono-crop economies, who are heavily dependent on the proposed Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Hence, they saw this military alliance as a way out of the hell of underdevelopment and massive unemployment that the people of their countries face. These are also countries marked by internal political instability. They wanted the CBI eventually to be transformed into a Caribbean security arrangement, creating a mini-NATO in the Caribbean. Therefore, the internal characteristics of these countries—their inability to solve economic problems and to maintain law and order within their countries—led them to search for a military security pact that would guarantee their regimes. This particular venture has transformed the English-speaking Caribbean into a military zone—the very phenomena these countries claimed they wanted to avoid.

Curiously, after the World Bank had given Grenada such a clean bill of health, these countries began to be fearful of Grenada's mixed economy model. Up to this point, Puerto Rico had been considered the model; but it was becoming obvious that the Puerto Rican model was seriously flawed. Not only did they fear Grenada's economic model, but they feared that Grenada was embarking on a new model of constitutional democracy that would seriously threaten the existing elite structure of the Caribbean. We must remember that the two-party system—the Westminster model—was essentially designed to guarantee democracy in the Caribbean. However, this very Westminster model was responsible for the rise of Eric Gairy in Grenada because he was able to utilize it to consolidate a totalitarian regime. He perverted the constitutional process and proceeded to create a one-party system by exploiting the electoral system. This was precisely what Bishop had opposed. He had argued that this so-called Westminster model was totally unsuitable for Grenada because to a large extent it tribalized a non-tribal people. In other words, what we saw happening was that the two-party system was utilized by the political elite to divide the population into two separate groups and proceeded to use patronage to keep one faction in power and to consolidate the political power of the party that had control over Parliament. Patronage then gave rise to a machine or a gang. So what we had in Grenada under Gairy was not two-party democracy but two-gang politics in which gangs had replaced parties. Hence, Bishop's experiment with genuinely democratic institutions as an alternative to the existing two-party system which had been perverted by Caribbean governments was one of the greater threats that these neighboring countries felt came from Grenada. □

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*"Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. But it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time."*

President Ronald Reagan

Since assuming office, the Reagan administration has asserted that communism is on the march in the face of weak and vacillating U.S. policies. His goal, therefore, has been to employ the decisive action necessary to "relegate [communism] to the dust heap of history." In no region of the world has he attempted to fulfill this "sacred trust" more zealously than in the Caribbean. In this context, tiny Grenada took on special significance. If the U.S. could not stop communism in "its own backyard," then where could it? Finally, the Reagan administration had what it most wanted: the perfect opportunity—in one fell swoop and at little cost to the U.S.—to stamp out communism in Grenada, to teach all other communists a lesson, and to restore American confidence in its ability to rule the world.

From the moment the Bishop government assumed power, Grenada has been viewed as an irritant by U.S. policymakers. Open hostility toward Grenada began under the Carter administration as early as April 1979. A series of radio broadcasts from Gairy's new home in San Diego, California, calling for a counter-coup, prompted the Bishop government to ask for security assistance from the United States. Although the Carter administration refused Bishop's request for bilateral assistance, it sent Frank Ortiz, the Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, to meet with Prime Minister Bishop. Ortiz warned Bishop that the U.S. would "view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba." The ambassador added that talk of "mercenary invasions" would harm Grenada's tourist industry and offered \$5000 from his discretionary fund to aid in rebuilding the island.

When the Bishop government formalized relations with Cuba, the outraged Carter administration considered Grenada to be a threat to U.S. interests and began to act accordingly. A number of measures, including covert operations against Grenada, were discussed. The National Security Council (NSC) formulated a plan to initiate a blockade against the country. After reviewing the options, the Carter administration rejected the NSC plan, but it adopted other measures designed to harass Grenada. The State Department refused to accept the credentials of the Grenadian Ambassador-designate. Under pressure from the U.S., the Windward Islands Banana Growers Association excluded Grenada from a U.S. grant for the rehabilitation of hurricane-damaged banana trees. USAID attempted to block food damage assistance for Grenada from the OAS Emergency Fund. Charging that Grenada had not fulfilled legal requirements for extradition, the U.S. refused to return Gairy to the island. Under the advice of State Department officials, some travel agencies began to discourage their clients from visiting Grenada. In addition a massive media campaign to discredit Bishop and the PRG began in which newspapers and magazines decried "The Castroization of Grenada."

The Reagan administration merely increased the intensity of attacks against Grenada begun by its predecessor. In March 1981 the U.S. director on the Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) successfully opposed Grenada's application for a \$6.3 million of IMF Special Drawing Rights to be used for capital improvements. Grenada was refused a \$3 million loan from the International Develop-

ment Association (IDA) when the U.S. used its influence within the World Bank to prevent it from endorsing Grenada's public investment program.

Arguing that the proposed Grenadian international airport would accommodate Cuban military aircraft and would be used as a forward base to disrupt the U.S. supply routes in the Eastern Caribbean, the Reagan administration tried to dissuade both attendance and pledges at a European Economic Community (EEC) co-financing conference on the airport. The administration tried to convince EEC members that the airport's 9000-foot runway would be longer than necessary to service tourist and import/export traffic.

Despite arguments that Barbados (11,000 feet), Curacao (13,000 feet), Trinidad (10,000 feet), Banamas (11,000 feet), Guadeloupe (11,499 feet), Martinique (10,827), and Puerto Rico (10,002) had airports with longer runways, the Reagan administration continued to rail against it. When the EEC voted to honor Grenada's request, the U.S. began a vicious propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the country. Transferring the attack from print to film, the American Security Council Foundation released "Attack on the Americas," in January 1981, depicting Grenada as a Soviet stronghold. A five-part CBS television series released in May, "The Prisoner and the Police State," alleged that Grenada is a police state in which people are afraid to speak and prisoners are tortured.

In June 1982 the U.S. offered \$4 million to the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) on the condition that no money go to Grenada. And like its predecessor, the Reagan administration refused to extradite Gairy, failed to respond to the appointment of a new Grenadian Ambassador-designate, instructed the new U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean to exclude Grenada from his charge, attacked the regime in numerous public statements both here and abroad, refused to acknowledge Grenadian attempts to normalize relations, and excluded Grenada from participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration readied plans for the destabilization of Grenada. The ghastly murder of Maurice Bishop and his compatriots simply provided the first available excuse to implement it. From August to October 1981, the U.S. military staged maneuvers which constituted a practice run for the ultimate invasion of Grenada. On Vieques Island, the U.S. base off the coast of Puerto Rico, more than 200,000 military personnel from the U.S. and fourteen allied countries invaded "Red," "a mythical island interfering in the region and shipping arms to Central America" (Cuba), and "Amber and the Amberdines," "Our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean where U.S. hostages were in need of rescue," (Grenada and the Grenadines). According to the fictional scenario, after rescuing the hostages, the U.S. troops would remain on Amber to "install a regime favorable to the way of life we espouse." Thus, the groundwork for the invasion had actually been laid as long as two years ago. Although then Secretary of State Alexander Haig discounted charges that these maneuvers had symbolic implications for Grenada, two years later, the very military units that had participated in the Pentagon's hypothetical war-scenario on Vieques were being parachuted into Grenada as part of "Operation Urgent Fury." In carrying out the invasion of Grenada, President Reagan had fulfilled the commitment made first during his 1980 campaign and maintained throughout his administration: to use U.S. military power against any nation daring to challenge North American control. □



Marvin Jones

The Cuban government and party had no previous knowledge of the differences within the New Jewel Movement (NJM) which led to the coup and the events that followed. In fact we were quite surprised when we learned from the Grenadians for the first time on October 12 of the internal struggle within the party. Although we had very close ties with the NJM and in particular with Maurice Bishop, he rightly chose not to discuss his difficulties within the party with us. Even after October 12, we did not know exactly what was going on, what the different positions were, and how events were developing. We chose not to interfere in any way in those events because it was an *internal* problem to be solved by the Grenadian people.

We had had quite extensive relations with Grenada since 1979. We tried to establish cooperation and to provide assistance to Grenada in different fields. The most important project in which we were involved was the building of the airport to which we were providing basically the labor force for construction of the airstrip and the airport buildings. Other equipment and services for the airport had been granted under contract to mainly British companies. We were also involved in other assistance programs in public health, in education, in the fishing industry, and in communications. In addition we were requested to provide military assistance and advice to Grenada because they had been certain of an impending U.S. invasion since the first days of the revolution in 1979.

We had 784 Cubans in Grenada at the time of the invasion: 636 were construction workers; 43 were part of the military advisory group (22 officers and the rest support staff); 17 were public health workers; 19 were from the Education, Fisheries, and Communications Ministries; and 18 were in our diplomatic mission. Among them were 44 women. The overwhelming majority of our workers were construction workers. It would be very easy to access this just by looking at them and by talking to them: the difference in ages, for example, and in physical fitness prove that they were not the highly trained professional soldiers that the Reagan administration alleged.

Grenada was a sovereign and independent country and, as such, had all the rights to enter into agreements with any other country for its defense. Grenada had been threatened by invasion from the United States for a long time. The U.S. was a threat to Grenada—not the reverse as was alleged by the invaders. The U.S. is more than 27,000 times the size of Grenada in territory and has 2,300 times the population of Grenada. Grenada could not be a threat to the U.S. because it lacked the economic resources, the military resources, and the manpower resources to present a threat to any other country in the region.

Looking at the tapes that were shown of the kind of weapons that the U.S. military authorities have said were

found in Grenada, it is clear that they are not sophisticated weapons. Most of what I have seen were very light infantry weapons. Even the anti-aircraft weapons we have been shown are also very unsophisticated—fit for use by militias or by personnel that are not highly-trained soldiers or troops. But the U.S. officials only talk about “large numbers” or “significant amounts;” they have not provided an accounting of the weapons in terms of what kinds were found. They are trying to create the illusion that there was a large military base on the island, but there is no way to prove that anything of that kind was found in Grenada because it did *not* exist. The only weapons in Grenada were those to be used by the popular militia in case of an invasion. The tragic events that led to the coup on October 19 so alienated the people of Grenada from the group which took power that those weapons were not distributed to the people and a large part of the population did not come out to support that group.

The Reagan administration acts or reacts out of a geopolitical conception of the world. They believe that events in the world are due to the perceived weakness of the U.S. after Vietnam and Watergate. They also believe that the Soviet Union is constantly taking advantage of this perceived weakness.

In fact things are quite different from what this administration believes. The world is moving towards consolidation of the independence of nations of many sizes and the realization that any nation—regardless of size—has the right to sovereignty. What has happened throughout the world is not a question of the weakness of the U.S. It is not a question of any other power trying to take advantage of that weakness. It is a result of historical, political, economic, and social conditions objectively and concretely reflected in the different countries.

If any lesson can be derived from what the U.S. has done in Grenada, it is that Third World nations have to be bound closer together in order to make it impossible for large powers like the U.S. to act in blatant violation of international law with total disregard for the sovereignty and the integrity of any nation, whether large or small. These events show everyone in Latin America, for example, that they cannot look to the U.S. to favor their independent development. It shows that Latin American countries have to stick together and have to defend themselves if they want to maintain and consolidate their sovereignty.

The U.S. has shown that it is only willing to support solutions of a military nature which creates greater obstacles for efforts like those of the CONTADORA Group to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Central America. The invasion shows that the U.S. does not support political and peaceful solutions to problems, but only wants to impose military solutions.

Cuba is convinced that a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Central America is possible, but we have little hope that the U.S. will support this kind of a solution. We were under the impression that the U.S. was not willing to go ahead with a political solution for the problems in Central America. Now, we have seen a very concrete example of what the U.S. is capable of doing. Of course, the situations are different, but the U.S. approach is quite similar. The U.S. invasion of Grenada can lead only to more complicated situations throughout the region and the hemisphere. □

*Ramon Sanchez Parodi is Chief of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C.*

*"No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position, and no internal division can justify atrocious events like the physical elimination of Bishop and the group of outstanding, honest, and worthy leaders who died..."*

Fidel Castro

Many explanations have been offered for the collapse of the PRG both from supporters and from opponents of the Grenadian Revolution. Several surviving members of the NJM have willingly acknowledged that the Central Committee made horrendous errors, but their views have not been as widely disseminated as press speculations have been. Therefore, those who have opposed the Grenadian Revolution historically have had a free hand in deliberately distorting the facts. Unfortunately however, much of the information needed to make an accurate assessment of what led to the disaster in Grenada may never be made available.

The sequence of events which immediately preceded the invasion has been well-publicized:

- September 14: The NJM Central Committee voted to have Prime Minister Maurice Bishop share power with Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard.
- October 13: the NJM Central Committee voted to place Bishop under house arrest.
- October 14: the NJM announced that Bishop had been removed from office for failing to share power and was being replaced by Coard.
- October 15: Bishop's supporters protested his arrest and demanded his release.
- October 17: Army Commander Hudson Austin announced that Coard had taken control of the government and reiterated that Bishop was under house arrest.
- October 18: Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman announced that he and three other ministers had resigned in protest.
- October 19: Thousands of chanting demonstrators freed Bishop from house arrest. Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Fitzroy Bain, and Noel Bain as well as an unknown number of demonstrators were killed. The army established a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) to govern Grenada and imposed a 24-hour, "shoot on sight" curfew.
- October 21: General Austin announced that he had been named head of the 16-man RMC, dissolved the previous government, dismissed its cabinet, and assumed full power.

The Reagan administration was quick to explain the coup by characterizing the division within the New Jewel Movement's Central Committee as one between moderate and hard-line Marxists, insinuating that Maurice Bishop was murdered deliberately because he sought to change the progressive direction of the PRG. Caribbean leaders collaborating with the U.S. invasion suggested that it was Bishop's appointment of a constitutional commission which led to the development of a "communist" plot to remove him. Further, these officials suggested that Cuba, a staunch supporter of Bishop and the PRG, had become disenchanted with Grenada and sponsored the effort to remove Bishop from his leadership position.

The facts would suggest, however, that the most fundamental points of contention within the NJM Central Committee involved classic questions not unique to any political system. Who governs (the party or the people)? What style of leadership is best (charismatic leadership or bureaucratic rule)? What determines the rate of change (party leadership or popular sentiment)? These same fundamental controversies have been predictable problems in all political systems

at some point in their development irrespective of ideological orientation.

Prime Minister Maurice Bishop is remembered as a leader who had implicit faith in the "masses" and who hoped to restore the Grenadian people's confidence in their ability to govern themselves. Whatever the issue, he argued that the people—though their unions, mass organizations, and assemblies—were to participate in the search for a solution. Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard led the other faction within the Central Committee which expressed far more confidence in the government than in the people. This group saw the party—not the organs of popular democracy—as the most effective mechanism for resolving the revolution's problems.

Ironically, Coard's supposedly "hard-line Marxist" position was far more typical of the Caribbean's widely-touted tradition of democracy than anything else. Historically, only a tiny portion of each island's population was ever able to participate in or vote for their "representative" governments. Even after universal suffrage was extended by the British in an attempt to appease anti-colonial sentiments after WW II, most Caribbean leaders viewed themselves as an elite representing those less capable of self-government. It was this contemptuous and paternalistic view of the people that the NJM had been trying to change through the structures of popular power and by expanding the party base. Thus, even when faced with charges that he was violating the party tenets of collective leadership and inefficiently handling the business of the state apparatus, Prime Minister Bishop urged that the allegations be brought to the people. Similarly, when accused of initiating rumors that Bernard and Phyllis Coard were trying to kill him, Bishop allegedly refused to respond only to his fellow Central Committee members but insisted that his case be heard by the general population.

On the question of how best to allocate responsibility and tasks however, Maurice Bishop was true to the Caribbean tradition. Like other Prime Ministers throughout the region, Bishop held several governmental positions of responsibility. Bernard Coard argued that this was ineffective and hindered both the making and implementation of decisions. It was Coard's growing frustration with the supposed inefficiency of the NJM decision-making process—coupled to be sure with a large measure of personal ambition—which reputedly led him to push for a formal system of collective leadership.

This notion of collective leadership, nonetheless, was no more typical of the Caribbean tradition than was the attempt to ensure mass participation in the political process. Throughout every era of their history, Grenadians had been loyal to charismatic leaders—not sophisticated ideologies or political parties. Almost uniformly, these popular leaders represented elements of the relatively large black and "colored," middle-class elite which had had access to educational opportunities and professional training abroad. Bishop and Coard, like most of the NJM leadership, came from this family background; but Bishop had developed and maintained stronger ties with the general populace. In recognition of this, those advocating a new division of leadership responsibilities never suggested that Bishop be removed from office publicly. Instead, they wanted Coard to assume control of the party quietly while Bishop maintained the party's link to mass organizations, unions, and popular assemblies. Ostensibly, it was Bishop's decision to revoke his prior agreement to the proposed change which marked the beginning of what became the Grenadian Revolution's end. □



When Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O'Neill asked me to be part of the Congressional leadership delegation to investigate events surrounding the invasion of Grenada, I agreed to go with a commitment to investigate all aspects of the situation, not just those that might reinforce my initial view. The trip not only confirmed my initial assessment, but in fact raised many new questions—questions whose answers are to be found in Washington, not in Grenada. Were the President's publicly-stated rationales the real reasons for this invasion? Were peaceful alternatives ever considered or proposed; if so, why were they rejected; and if not, why weren't they considered? Is this use of military force an indication that, for this administration, the military option is the preferred solution, rather than a last resort, in resolving international disputes? What are the implications—political, diplomatic, military—of the invasion? Why was the press forcibly denied permission to cover the invasion, and what are the implications for a free press in a free society? Had the American people been provided initially with all of the information which has now come to light, would they have reached the same conclusions they reached as a result of the information manipulation carried out by the administration?

Congress should make a *full* investigation of the Grenada situation, and I have introduced a Resolution of Inquiry to begin this process. Although many questions remain to be answered, I can say with virtual certainty that the safety of the students was never the primary concern of either the policymakers or the commanders of the U.S. forces in planning for or carrying out the invasion.

Our delegation could find not *one* confirmed instance in which an American was threatened or endangered before the invasion. If the safety of the students was the primary goal, why did it take the U.S. forces over two days to reach the Grand Anse campus which was a mere twenty meters from an unprotected beach? The inescapable conclusion is that the students' safety was a secondary goal of the invasion.

In a two and a half hour meeting that the Congressional delegation had with the Prime Ministers from the Eastern Caribbean States, the question of the students' safety was never once raised. Instead, the Prime Ministers raised their concern that a "leftist" Grenadian government "threatened" the Eastern Caribbean. The Prime Ministers emphasized their desire that the region might have more leaders that reflected their own "moderate" views. What they apparently feared was not an external invasion launched from Grenada, the supposed rationale behind invoking the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States charter, but rather that improved conditions in Grenada would provide an example to their own citizens that might result in internal opposition to their policies. The desire of these officials to pro-

tect themselves from internal opposition surely must not be seen as sufficient justification to legitimate the U.S. invasion of another country.

It should be remembered that the Reagan administration has threatened the invasion of Grenada since the Pentagon conducted "Operation Ocean Venture" from August to October 1981—a military exercise directed at invading a fictitious island chain in the Caribbean called "Amber and the Amberdines" (no relation—according to the administration—to Grenada and the Grenadines). This administration continually frustrated and opposed the Bishop government. President Reagan went on television early this year denouncing the construction of the new airport as an indication of the military threat supposedly posed by Grenada. Yet, when I visited Grenada in April 1982, I was told by all concerned that the airport was necessary for commercial and touristic purposes. Now, on my return trip following the invasion, I am again told by everyone including Mr. Scoon, the Governor General, that the airport is of vital importance for the future of the island. Any attempts to justify the invasion based on Bishop's murder is the height of hypocrisy.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the U.S. mission was to rescue Americans on Grenada, that mission has already been accomplished and the troops should be immediately withdrawn. We were told at first that the troops would be staying only *one* week. Now it is expected that they will have to remain well into 1984. Each additional day alters their role. They are increasingly acting as an occupying, rather than as a peace-keeping force. They have been involved in the tracking of alleged subversives. They have participated in the interrogation and incarceration of people whose only "crime" was to be an alleged supporter of the Bishop government. They have stuck people in makeshift prison camps with shipping crates as beds. They have even participated in searching for "subversive" books and other reading materials which they have considered illegitimate. Clearly this is not the proper role of the American military.

I would like to make one final point concerning an exchange between Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados and myself. In front of the entire Congressional delegation, Mr. Adams strongly stated that Congressional Black Caucus opposition to the invasion showed a paternalistic attitude toward Third World nations. I firmly responded to Mr. Adams, stating very clearly to him that the Members of the Caucus have never once taken the position that they knew what was best for countries in the Caribbean or for any other country. I stated to him that I am, as are my Caucus colleagues, an American elected to the U.S. House of Representatives; my obligation and my responsibility are to give my analyses and make my best judgments. That Members of the Congressional Black Caucus believed the invasion wrong is not a paternalistic statement toward Third World countries, rather it is a statement of what our country stands for and of our interest as American citizens. As an American and as a Member of the House of Representatives, I neither gave up the right to make independent judgments about world events, nor should it be my role to acquiesce without question to the self-interested policies of other world leaders where U.S. actions are involved. It would be the height of irresponsibility for me, or any other Member of Congress—black or white—to do otherwise. □

*Ronald Dellums represents California's Eighth Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives.*

"I think the American people were hungry for a military success, to have something go right after we got involved."

Senator Sam Nunn

Less than two weeks after the New Jewel Movement Central Committee voted to place Maurice Bishop under house arrest and only two days after the bombing of U.S. Marine Headquarters in Lebanon, the U.S. Armed Forces invaded Grenada. Shortly thereafter, President Reagan appeared with Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles by his side and began offering duplicitous rationales for the U.S.-sponsored invasion. In order to best manipulate public opinion, the administration excluded members of the press from the island until "hostilities" had ceased, citing as concerns the reporters' safety and the need to preserve national security. Although hailed by Reagan supporters as a victory, the invasion of Grenada has raised new doubts and rekindled old fears throughout the world about the nature of U.S. foreign policy.

President Reagan first argued that the invasion was necessary to protect the lives of U.S. medical students studying on the island. Only after it was known that officials of the medical school and parents of the students had opposed the invasion and had been convinced that the students were in little jeopardy were the administration's claims investigated.

Next, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles was thrust forward as the representative of Grenada's "threatened neighbor states," who requested the U.S. invasion. Quoting the obscure and unofficial OECS treaty, President Reagan and Prime Minister Charles attempted to convince the world that the invasion was not only legal, but the fulfillment of an obligation under law. These arguments quickly were dismissed once the actual treaty was obtained and its language examined.

Again, as more information became available, it became clear that the OECS treaty was only a pretext for the Reagan administration's own decision to invade. Indeed, the "invitation" from the OECS countries to the U.S. was drafted in Washington and transmitted to the meeting in which the proposed invasion was discussed by Milan Bish, U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean. Both the U.S. Ambassador and Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica were present at this "OECS" meeting held in Barbados, a non-OECS country. Although not parties to the treaty, both Seaga and Bish participated in the discussion, urging that an invitation to invade be issued in the name of the OECS. Staunchly proclaiming that the islands of the region were inseparable and that the action taken against Grenada was done out of familial concern, Caribbean leaders supporting the invasion made no mention of the proposed action to the regional heads of state in attendance at the CARICOM meeting held in Trinidad to consider the crisis. Instead, the supporters of the invasion carried favor with the Reagan administration while deliberately deceiving fellow CARICOM members (the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad) which strongly opposed military intervention.

When the administration's first two justifications were debunked within two days, Reagan offered another rationale for the invasion which proved equally ludicrous. Supposedly, the island of Grenada had become a Soviet-Cuban military base. Therefore, he argued U.S. forces had arrived "just in time" to prevent such a takeover. To buttress this argument, administration officials focused only on the resistance of Cuban construction workers and the potential impact the

invasion might have on Cuban policies. No mention was made of Grenadian resistance or casualties, and commentators noted that it often seemed that the administration considered Cuba's expulsion from the island to be the real goal. Not until the press ban had been lifted and Canadian journalists reported finding a mental hospital destroyed were U.S. officials even willing to estimate the number of Grenadians killed and injured. Spokespersons for the administration were instead anxious to shift world attention to the sheds containing handguns and ammunition found by U.S. forces. Most of the equipment was antiquated, and even the most modern of the weapons constituted no threat to the U.S. After examining the "huge arms cache," Mike Royko wrote in the *Chicago Sun-Times* on November 1:

The weapons in one of the warehouses turned out to be sacks of rice and cans of sardines. Another had truck parts. A third was filled with canteens and clothing. As for the three warehouses that did have weapons—they weren't stacked to the ceiling, as the president said. They were about one-fourth full. Many of the rifles were made in 1870—old breach-loading saddle guns. Others were WW II vintage . . . It was an arsenal, all right, but you'll find more bang for your buck in any American gun shop.

Although each of the three justifications offered by the Reagan administration came to be eventually discredited, the reasons they publicly stated for the invasion seemed almost immaterial. The important fact was that three years of hard-line rhetoric against the Grenadian Revolution had been transformed into action—not that it had taken seven thousand specially-trained U.S. forces, eleven warships (including aircraft and helicopter carriers), and dozens of transport planes to conquer a virtually unarmed people. Returning combat troops were treated as heroes, but the equipment malfunctions and self-inflicted accidental casualties were rarely mentioned. Off the record, military advisors commented that against any force other than one as marginally equipped as Grenada's, the military objectives of the invasion would not have been met. Publicly however, the invasion was portrayed as an experiment for the military designed to test the logistics of conducting certain kinds of intervention.

The tragic aspects of the Grenada invasion go far beyond the loss of at least 160 Grenadian, 71 Cuban, and 18 American lives. Several dangerous precedents were established, and accepted principles violated. The relatively sacred first amendment right of a free press—one that the United States is quick to impose on countries even with no similar provision in their constitution—was ignored and then disparaged by administration officials who proudly revealed that military officials had been allowed to decide that reporters should be excluded from the scene. The callous indifference exhibited toward Grenadians themselves once again reinforced the notion that black lives are expendable: exact figures were available on the number of bullets used before there was any accounting of Grenadian casualties. The government of Grenada, like those of progressive African states, was portrayed as incapable of action without Cuban or Soviet directions. President Reagan denigrated the use of international fora or regional institutions to preserve peace by scorning the significance of worldwide condemnation which followed the invasion. Instead of considering force to be a last resort, the U.S. government had proven again that it will first move unilaterally against those daring to attempt another process of societal development and that only countries capable of presenting a military threat will be entitled to peaceful co-existence. □



Marvin Jones

Under the view of international law held by the vast majority of Western scholars, there are only three legal justifications for sending troops into a foreign state. One is the rescue of one's own citizens. Most Third World scholars and governments categorically reject this rationale in part because invasions were carried out during the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century not so much to rescue citizens as to protect property. Hence the doctrine of so-called "Humanitarian Intervention" carries disagreeable historical baggage. Nonetheless, most Western scholars would argue that at least where a substantial number of citizens are at risk, the prohibition against projecting power across national frontiers does not control.

There are, however, certain conditions which have to be satisfied before a country can legally carry out an invasion to rescue its citizens. One condition is prior exhaustion of remedies. If the danger to human life is not so imminent that immediate action is required, then non-military remedies must be tried. If time permits, a country must, for example, negotiate with the target state in an effort to obtain necessary guarantees.

It seems awfully clear now to the outsider—as it apparently was clear to the Reagan administration at the time—that there was no imminent threat to American citizens in Grenada. Since the coup leaders seemed to be in control and had gone out of their way to reassure U.S. citizens that they would not be harmed, the existence of any threat is debatable. In any event, as long as no imminent threat existed the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement could not be satisfied.

The U.S. alleged that the airport was closed on the Monday before the invasion. We now know that the airport was useable, at least for chartered flights, since some persons in fact were evacuated. The only authentic fear concerning the safety of the U.S. citizens seems to have stemmed from the belief that in the event of a decision to invade Grenada—in the event, that is, of a decision to violate international law—the Grenadian security forces would be terribly tempted to use U.S. citizens as hostages. Obviously, the U.S. cannot bootstrap a legal justification for the invasion by invoking the possibility of an illegal act (taking hostages) occurring as a consequence of its own, prior illegal act. That's hardly a serious argument. So we can simply reject the protection-of-nationals rationale.

Only two possible legal justifications remain. One is the argument that the U.S. was responding to an invitation from the Island's duly constituted authorities. This argument has not been pressed very hard because it is so palpably ludicrous. The so-called authority, who may or may not have issued such an invitation, was Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General. But in Commonwealth states that have achieved full independence, as Grenada had, the Governor

General occupies a purely ceremonial position. He is the representative of the Queen in her capacity as nominal and entirely ceremonial head of the host state. It is a measure of his authority that the Governor General is nominated—in effect named—by the Prime Minister of the state where he serves.

Rhodesia was a semi-independent country in 1965 at the time of its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Great Britain still retained ultimate authority over the country's foreign and defense policy. Nevertheless, when prior to UDI, Rhodesia withdrew from the Central African Federation, a step which many regarded as preliminary to a unilateral declaration of independence, the British government took the position that it had no right to reassert authority over this *semi-independent* colony. When it was argued that sovereignty and hence final authority in all matters rested with Parliament, the British government answered that an act of Parliament narrowing Rhodesia's internal self-government would violate British constitutional traditions.

To suggest that the Governor General had the authority to invite in a foreign force is to betray either hypocrisy or ignorance. And the U.S. cannot avoid this point by manipulating its recognition of the government of Grenada in order to attribute authority to someone who clearly did not have either formal authority or effective control.

We are now reduced to the final rationale. One would have to argue that Grenada had been occupied by a foreign power and its lawful government eliminated. Therefore, although there was no one to invite the U.S. in to rescue the country, the U.S. could engage in an act of "collective self-defense," on the assumption that, under the stipulated conditions, a request for assistance should be implied. Certainly, one could imagine a case in which some sudden, rapid movement of foreign forces into a country resulted in the extermination of the government. In such a case, the government would revert to the people of the country. Clearly, there would have been an act of aggression and an occupation of the country; and under the UN Charter, intervention would have been permissible.

In the case of Grenada, the argument would have to be made that Cuba had occupied the island. Are there facts to support that argument? It seems to me that the answer is *no*. There were some allegations made. Indeed, the Reagan administration tried in the first several days to present or at least imply such an argument. But we now have enough facts to see that the implication is baseless. Most Cubans were in fact engaged in construction and other aid activities. All were there at the invitation of the indisputably legitimate Bishop government. And there is no evidence that they conspired with the persons who seized power from Bishop. On the contrary, now having the minutes of the Grenadian Central Committee meetings, we can see that the Cuban condemnation of Bishop's overthrow was an honest expression of its views. There is no shred of evidence that the coup against Bishop was planned by the Cubans or even subsequently and tacitly approved by them. The country remained in the hands of Grenadians. The hands were bloody. Unfortunately, the fratricidal coup is not a singular phenomenon in today's world. If every coup were held to justify armed intervention, little would be left of the doctrine of non-intervention. □

*Tom Farer was President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 1980-1982 and is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.*

Contrary to the assertions made by the Reagan administration, the invasion of Grenada found no sanction in international law. *None* of the documents cited by proponents of the invasion actually read in support of the action taken by the invading countries. In fact the language of relevant provisions directly contradicts any argument offered in support of the invasion. The action was neither authorized by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) or Rio treaties, nor was it in conformity with the Charters of the Organization of American States or the United Nations.

Article 8 of the *Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States* has been most frequently invoked to justify the request for a U.S.-led invasion of Grenada. However, the provisional language of Article 8 clearly requires unanimity and authorizes collective action *only* against external aggression:

The Defense and Security Committee shall have responsibility for co-ordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defense and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among the Member States of the Organization in matters of external defense and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations . . . The decision and directives of the Defense and Security Committee shall be unanimous and shall be binding on all subordinate institutions of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Authority.

While other members of the OECS voted to invade, Grenada was not represented at the meeting in which the issue was being considered. Since none of the parties has seriously tried to argue that Grenada constituted an external threat, clearly neither of the two conditions of Article 8 was satisfied. Advocates of the invasion who cited these OECS provisions during the UN debate on the issue were quickly reminded not only of the failure to meet Article 8 criteria, but of the fact that the treaty never had been duly registered with the UN Secretariat (pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter) so could not be invoked before that body as a basis for action.

Not surprisingly, proponents of the invasion omit any reference to Articles 18 or 20 of the OAS Charter because the actions taken by the United States and its six Caribbean allies are in direct violation of each. Articles 18 and 22 state:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements . . . The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

Instead, those arguing on behalf of the U.S. invasion cite the Rio Treaty, which established a permanent defensive alliance among the republics of the Americas in 1947, one year before the Charter of the Organization of American States was signed. None of the English-speaking Caribbean states was independent at that time, however, and so were not parties to the Rio Treaty which has in any case been superseded by the subsequent OAS Charter.

Proponents of the administration's Grenada action have

also chosen to selectively cite Article 22 of the OAS charter to buttress their claim of the invasion's adherence to norms established through international law:

Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 18 and 20.

However, legal analysts concur in an understanding that the Article 22 reference to "existing treaties" pertains only to agreements that existed at the time of the OAS Charter (1947) or its latest Amendments (1967). The 1981 signatory date of the Treaty establishing the OECS thus excludes it from consideration within the parameters of this provision.

Defenders of the United States "splendid little war" also chose to cite Article 52 of Chapter VII from the UN Charter to bolster their claim of legality. However, while Subsection 1 of Article 52 states that regional arrangements are not precluded by the Charter, Subsection 2 of the same article is equally clear in asserting that regional agencies should make every effort to achieve pacific settlements of local disputes:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations . . . The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

Further, Article 53 states that regional agencies are not to take enforcement action without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council—except in cases against the Axis powers of WWII:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state . . . The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

The misrepresentation of documentary provisions is only one aspect of the administration's effort to disguise the illegality of its action in Grenada. An illusion of legality can only be maintained through public unawareness of the fundamental concepts adapted by international consensus through Chapter I of the UN Charter:

. . . The [UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members . . . All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .

Using any standard of international law, the territorial integrity and political independence of the Grenadian state have been violated by the U.S.-sponsored invasion and occupation. □



There have been many reports that the invasion of our country was welcomed by the Grenadian population both at home and abroad. This is a very sad and unfortunate position for our people. Against the background of confusion, fear, and grief over the losses of loved ones and respected leaders and given the psychological program which has been employed since the moment the soldiers landed, I understand why some have reacted in this way. We must be honest and acknowledge that on the 25th of October a very tense and politically very difficult situation existed in Grenada. But the views of the Grenadian people which have been reported also must be seen as part of the psychological program being orchestrated by the invaders.

I do *not* expect, however, our people to continue to hold this position for very long. It will be one of the more complex political issues for a long time to come, but it will never be considered politically correct to have welcomed an external military occupying force as a freedom train. This would be a break with our history and with our principles. As our people are allowed to be free psychologically to analyze the events, to search for internal solutions, and to express themselves—as they cannot do under U.S. occupation—we will see further clarity on this point.

Now, the program of occupation is very intense. The United States government is lord over decisions which should be made by the sovereign state of Grenada. The U.S. forces have decided whom to expel and whom they will allow to remain. They have arrested, interrogated, searched, warned, and harassed more than two thousand Grenadian citizens, including George Louison and Kendrick Radix, two surviving leaders of the People's Revolutionary Government. They have established military camps around the country to house those who have been detained in little boxes. Ironically, the Reagan administration recently established in tiny Grenada one of the largest embassies that it has in the Caribbean. Grenada, with which the U.S. government refused to establish diplomatic relations, now has a U.S. Embassy that employs nearly eighty people.

I am clear and confident that the occupation of Grenada cannot last and will not last. My optimism is based on a number of factors. We must remember that the New Jewel Movement was a party which was grounded in the people. It was a party of ordinary workers, students, housewives, women, and others who understood the historic role that we were playing in our country. We were working to move Grenada out of those dark, dismal days of brutality and poverty and into a new phase of popular participation, progress, and betterment for all of our people.

The party, which grew over these last ten years, had this character, this origin, and this relation with our society. That does not go away because six thousand U.S. soldiers have

overrun the country. What the party stood for and the way in which it carried out that process will eventually grow and go forward.

The Revolutionary Military Council—of which so much has been heard—must be condemned as a force that broke the tradition of the party. One of the most basic and fundamental traditions of the party was its unrelenting and continuous link with the people. The People's Revolutionary Government, led by a very able and committed cadre, was a reflection precisely of these social, political, and other realities in the country. They had a commitment to a small, poor country that was struggling to get out of the claws of dependent underdevelopment and were willing to put their shoulders under the wheel.

The Central Committee which existed for one week before the execution of Maurice Bishop and the Revolutionary Military Council which was formed immediately after the executions had divorced themselves from that reality. They had lost touch with what was happening in the country. They became alienated from the most important and critical pillar of our revolution: we must be grounded in the people, we must abide by the wishes of the people, and we must march with them not run ahead of them.

While we do not know the full reasons or the full forces both internal and external that have contributed to this serious setback in the process of our revolution, we must understand that blame must be fully and squarely laid at the feet of those who comprised the decision-making structure during those critical hours because they broke ranks with the people. How could a revolution which brought so many issues for decision before the people—legislation about women, decisions on the budget, decisions on other major issues—consider removing the leader of the revolution without bringing it to the people? That in itself represented a total abrogation of the most basic and vital element of our political philosophy and culture. Those who made the fatal errors merely created an artificial political structure (one could hardly describe it as a leadership) which failed completely to understand the continuum along which the Grenadian revolution had developed.

What is happening in Grenada now in terms of the program of fierce and brutal occupation is both absolutely unjustified and totally dishonorable. The American people ought not allow such a program to be carried out in their name. They also have an obligation to seek to avert yet another invasion, yet another military expedition into Nicaragua or El Salvador or some other country for that matter. There are 7,000 American troops in Honduras on the Nicaraguan border now. Over the last several years, we have seen the continued expansion of U.S. military personnel in Lebanon, the Philippines, and in other places. I ask the American people to stand guard so that there are no more Grenadas in this or any other part of the world. I also ask that they assist Grenada in the search for its sovereignty. No good can come for either the Grenadian or the American people by having Grenada transformed into another Puerto Rico in the Americas.

The Grenadian Revolution which so many of us embraced, supported, criticized, learned from, and lived with is going through a very difficult period. We go forward, however, saying and believing that it is truly forward ever and backward never. □

*Dessima Williams was Grenada's Ambassador to the Organization of American States.*

"... [T]he island's independence is not very much in evidence. Grenada looks like nothing so much as a new U.S. dependency. There is hardly an aspect of Grenadian life that is not tinged by the overwhelming U.S. presence..."

Loren Jenkins, *The Washington Post*

Since the first days of the invasion, the United States has been establishing the mechanisms for its domination of Grenada for the foreseeable future. U.S. military forces—not Grenadian police or Caribbean troops—arrested and detained individuals, conducted warrantless searches of people and property, interrogated citizens and foreigners about their political beliefs and associations, warned people not to participate in "anti-government" activities, and seized so-called "pro-Marxist" literature. American troops built the detention facilities that consisted of small, wooden cells used to contain 1200 people suspected of being active in the former People's Revolutionary Government. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Psychological Operations Battalion prepared and circulated posters of Hudson Austin and Bernard Coard in humiliating positions and demeaning states of undress, broadcasted public service announcements for the U.S. Navy technicians operating the lone radio station, and otherwise attempted to general popular sentiment against the revolution.

Reports of constitutional violations and civil liberty abuses only served to highlight the very nebulous nature of any legal authority on the island. Although the U.S. thrust Sir Paul Scoon into the limelight, the preeminent authorities on the island indisputably were first Major General Jack Farris, commander of the U.S. forces in Grenada, and now Charles Gillespie, the new U.S. ambassador to Grenada. The interim Attorney General already has resigned stating, "I have never known a situation where a Governor General appoints himself as savior for his people, calls in foreign armies, and then does very little to bring about a restoration of constitutional civil government."

The relationship between the formal authority of interim government officials and the substantive power of U.S. authorities can be illustrated by their divergent approaches to the resolution of questions surrounding the circumstances of Bishop's death. One of the interim government's earliest pronouncements concerned the formation of a commission to conduct an official inquiry into the deaths at Fort Rupert. Yet the interim government's legal advisor announced that such an investigatory commission would inherently compromise the right of any accused to a fair trial. Instead, U.S. civilian authorities—reported to include CIA interrogators—are to acquire and present evidence of official conduct during the power struggle which led to the murder of Bishop. Perhaps because U.S. forensic experts had claimed earlier that no positive identification of Bishop's body was possible, even Grenadians who did not support PRG policies suspected that U.S. officials would deliberately withhold the truth in order to prevent popular affection for Bishop from becoming a renewal of support for "the revo." With only Grenada's traffic officers functioning in their normal capacity however, Grenadians have no source of redress. Even police functions have been assumed by U.S. soldiers and CIA interrogators or by the Caribbean peace-keeping force led by Major General Farris.

In addition the Reagan administration has been seeking to win support from Grenada's private sector by flooding the island's economy with dollars. According to *Newsweek*,

"Now that the U.S. invasion of Grenada has made the island safe for capitalism, the Commerce Department has been deluged with inquiries from businessmen looking for cheap labor or beachfront property." Fifty representatives of trade associations, corporations, and non-profit associations were invited to the White House for a pep talk on the potential value of an investment in Grenada. Reagan administration officials have been urging U.S. businessmen to take their credit and technology to Grenada where raw materials and labor are relatively cheap. USAID has facilitated the exploration of profitable investment opportunities in Grenada by arranging for potential businessmen to travel together and to meet their "small but vital" Grenadian counterparts. Although careful to explain that the current level of government aid to Grenada will have to be tapered down in the future, Reagan administration officials also have stressed that Grenada's tax policies and investment codes will be changed to fit the provisions of the CBI. USAID spokespersons have announced: a \$5 million assistance grant has been awarded the new Grenadian government, \$4.5 million has been allocated for the rehabilitation of 12 to 14 miles of the worst roads and the short-term training of public works personnel, \$2.5 million has been granted for social service programs, \$2 million for agriculture, and \$1 million for such private sector initiatives as a local Chamber of Commerce study of "laws and regulations." Another \$15 million is to fund a military training program for Grenada and the 6 nations which contributed to the 300-man Caribbean contingent of the U.S.-led invasion. Almost \$3.5 million more will be sent to Grenada for emergency aid.

The \$34.4 million financial assistance program designated for Grenada in the current fiscal year and the \$18.4 million given Grenada by the United States since the invasion have been used by the Reagan supporters to imply that the \$22.5 million granted Grenada by the "Communist Bloc" in 1982 was stingy and inconsequential. Nonetheless, even U.S. State Department officials have had to acknowledge that currently the island's most pressing need is for doctors to replace the Cuban physicians who were expelled. Reagan administration officials also have had to concede that Grenada is in dire need of a modern airport and that it would make little sense to leave the Point Salines site only two-thirds complete. Some U.S. spokespersons have suggested that any modern airport be named after Paul Scoon, their "man of the hour," but they have quietly voiced their fear that Grenadians will consider only one name—Maurice Bishop.

Shortly after the invasion, Grenada's interim government promised that true self-governance would be achieved when elections were held within six months. More recent pronouncements indicate that this is highly improbable: current predictions are that elections may be as much as three years away. Moreover, the Reagan administration will relinquish ultimate control over Grenadian affairs *only* when the last vestiges of the PRG have been swept away and the election of a government more to its liking is assured. Until such time, U.S. combat troops may have been sent home, but real power will remain in American hands. Consequently, some Grenadians have begun to ask when the once-welcomed Americans will leave. As one young Grenadian inquired, "... who is going to rescue us from our rescuers." Despite the U.S. largess, open hostility toward a protracted occupation of the island will grow. Unless the Reagan administration allows genuine self-determination for that nation soon, Grenadian support for the invaders will surely fade. □

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
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