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CHRIS SEARLE

## Maurice Bishop on destabilisation: an interview

The following interview was first conducted in November 1982, then proof read by Cde Bishop in August 1983, just nine weeks before his death, when some additions and further points were made.

March 1984 is to be the fifth Anniversary of the Grenada 'Revolution, and it was to be celebrated by the opening of the international airport at Point Salines, the largest capital project that the Revolution had undertaken and its most impressive physical symbol. The Grenadian people and their government had struggled tenaciously throughout the previous four years to raise the money and resources to complete this most beautiful of airports, filling in bays of the sea and salt ponds, slicing hills in half, elevating valleys and rolling out their runway of freedom alongside Cuban construction workers and, for a period, American dredging workers from Miami. In August Cde Bishop was clear that the closer the opening of the airport came, the more intensive would be the energy of US imperialism to prevent its completion. The people's unity and vigilance and the Revolution's inner organisation would have to be sharper than ever, Cde Bishop emphasised.

Just five months before, in March 1983, the Revolution had faced yet another direct threat of a US invasion, coming on the heels of the 'Amber and the Amberines' manoeuvres of August 1981 on Vieques Island off Puerto Rico, which was a direct dress rehearsal for the eventual invasion, down to the very place where the US Marines landed – Amber, an area adjacent to the Point Salines airport. Cde Bishop had

warned his own people and the people of the world:

Only a few days ago, on March 17th, to be precise, I revealed the analysis of our party that the war-mongering Reagan was becoming increasingly desperate and in that desperation, the possibility of military intervention against the revolutionary processes in the region, particularly Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, seemed inevitable.

This seemed the likely way out for the fascist clique in Washington because their arrogant designs for regional and world domination continue to fail. The continuing economic crisis in the US and its effects, the increasing successes of the popular liberation movements, particularly in El Salvador, the continued deepening and strengthening of the revolutionary processes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, the total collapse of Reagan's so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the growing popular opposition to his mad nuclear policy, has made imperialism more desperate and determined to halt revolutionary processes in this region.

A few weeks later, Cde Bishop spoke in London at Kensington Town Hall, and during his two-hour address he referred again to the designs of Reagan:

Reagan's dream is that he can construct a new Pax Americana to destroy the socialist world, the non-aligned world. But why should we be dragged into his geo-political game? Reagan is the greatest disaster to hit mankind since Hitler.

While the Grenada Revolution preserved its imperative unity, it was unassailable. US imperialism had flailed out at it from every conceivable direction, using strategy after strategy of overt and covert destabilisation. This process I have attempted to chart and describe in the book from which this interview with Cde Bishop is taken, *Grenada: the struggle against destabilisation*.<sup>\*</sup> Yet the US always retained outright military invasion as an option to destroy the Revolution. It was always there, ready, prepared to strike when a pretext or a rift in the Revolution emerged, and since November 1979, a few months after the Revolution emerged, there has been a Caribbean Task Force based in Miami eager for 'rapid deployment'. When the breach in that fundamental unity came in October 1983 it struck out immediately and mercilessly, as is the wont of imperialism, with all its machinery of death, terror, lies and regression.

Maurice Bishop lived to fight and organise against imperialism. He was a revolutionary patriot, a loving and brilliant human being, every

inch a Marxist-Leninist who never left the struggle and shoulder of his people. His fight lives on in the Grenadians who are still fighting in the hills and crests of their island, like the heroic army of Julien Fedon which built a revolution against British imperialism in 1795 and which is one of the great inspirations of the heroic Grenadian people. His fight lives on in the ideas of the Revolution which blazed across the region for the first time in the English language, and gave an alternative model of economic development and people's democracy to a people who had been bound in an economic stranglehold and institutional mimicry for centuries. It lives on in those words of repudiation, 'Four hundred years – we shall take no more! Forward ever, backward never!' painted across the walls of Grenada. It lives on in the vision of the *youth* who were taken up on the wings of the 'Revo' and who saw and lived the beginning of a future their parents and grandparents had only dreamed of, who realised that Grenada was also Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador and Palestine, a part of the only future the world has.

Whatever tragedy happened in October in Grenada, whatever the part directly played in it by the intervention of imperialist destabilisation, the profound and continuing influence of the Grenada Revolution can never be minimised or erased. For the truth is as clear as the Caribbean Sea itself: that one jewel in that necklace of incomparable islands, *Grenada*, has made a revolution, with a minuscule population has successfully challenged the hugest and most demonic power of our century, has stood up head high with resolute courage with its bold, independent institutions and inspired the struggling people of the Caribbean towards the realisation of their magnificent and intractable destiny.

\* \* \*

*Chris Searle:* Why do you think that imperialism is so obsessively afraid of the Grenada Revolution, an obsession out of all proportion to the size of the country?

*Maurice Bishop:* There are several reasons for this. The first is the fact that Grenada was the first country in the English-speaking Caribbean to have had a successful revolution, and different US administrations have always shown a mortal fear of any revolutionary process, of any attempt by any people by revolutionary means to overthrow different dictatorships or oligarchies that are oppressing them. These administrations have, of course, conveniently forgotten the history of their own country and their own revolution in 1776.

The second reason is even more fundamental and relates to the gains, successes and achievements of the Grenada Revolution. The fact

<sup>\*</sup> London, Writers and Readers, forthcoming.

is that coming from a base that is no different and in many respects much worse than most other Caribbean territories of similar size and a similar type of economy, we have been able in three and a half years to reduce unemployment from the fantastically high figure of some 50 per cent of the total workforce – and among women 70 per cent – down to 14.7 per cent, which means a drop of over 35 per cent in the unemployment rate. And this at a time when other countries both inside and outside our region were continuing to have difficulties in finding jobs for their people, and this too as Grenada was being subjected to massive propaganda destabilisation, economic aggression, military threat and diplomatic isolation.

Third, there is the question of health, and the fact that we have been able to bring free health care to our people, to more than double the numbers of our doctors, quintuple the number of our dentists and increase by seven times the number of dental clinics in our country. All of this again is something that the people of the region are watching very closely. And there is education too. At this point in time, through the Centre for Popular Education programme, illiteracy has been virtually wiped out in the country and is estimated now at being something like 3 per cent of the population. A massive adult education programme has also started as Phase Two of the Centre for Popular Education, and at the same time we have been able to increase dramatically the number of places for students going to secondary schools. Before the Revolution only 11 per cent of all the eligible students were able to get into the secondary schools; now that figure has been increased to 36 per cent and we hope within the next two to three years to move to universal secondary education. The availability of free university scholarships abroad is also a part of that process. Moving from a situation of three in the last year of Gairy, we increased that paltry figure within the first six months of the Revolution to 109 students being able to go abroad on free university scholarships. Then there is free secondary education which we have introduced for all secondary schools in the country, and there is also a programme of subsidised school uniforms and school books for the poorest children.

Over the past three years in our economy we have been able to achieve an accumulated growth rate of some 10 per cent. The World Bank, in its last report of August 1982, spoke in very glowing terms about the strides which we have been able to make in the economy, in terms of economic management, planning, fiscal and budgetary controls – really in terms of all aspects of the development of our economy. That again is something that has certainly not gone unnoticed by the people of the region. Another significant point to made in relation to gains and benefits are the structures of revolutionary grassroots democracy that we are building in Grenada, away from the Westminster parliamentary system to a form which allows the people

themselves to participate on a regular basis, at least once a month, through the system of mass organisations that have been built very rapidly, and the organs of popular power – the Zonal Councils, Workers' Parish Councils and the Farmer, Women and Youth Councils.

In the critical area of housing, too, the Revolution has realised many advances. The Housing Repair Programme has been a major achievement. In 1980 this programme saw the renovation of the homes of 593 families; the figure rose to 981 in 1981 and will be about 1,300 by the end of 1982, constituting an overall total of 2,874. The money spent amounted to 2,243,415 Caribbean dollars. We have to remember that in Grenada the average size of the family in the low income bracket for which the programme is designed is seven persons. Thus, the number of persons benefiting from the Housing Repair Programme is in fact 20,118 – a figure which represents nearly 20 per cent of our population.

The Revolution has also witnessed the introduction of several housing schemes. These have been completed in Telescope and Grand Anse, while others are on stream in Corinth, Grand Anse, Telescope and Waltham. Construction here will receive a tremendous boost with the new Sandino Plant which has the capacity of producing some 500 houses per year.

Infrastructural development too has been a major achievement of our Revolution. The truth is that the face of Grenada is changing before our very eyes. By early 1984, we would have become the very first Caribbean country to have built an international airport after its independence – everyone else had theirs built during the colonial era. By the end of 1982, we would have built about fifty new miles of farm and feeder roads, which is an unprecedented rate of progress, and our new Eastern Main Road (being one of the three main roads in our country) should be nearly halfway completed. By August 1983 we should have direct dialling facilities to our sister islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique for the first time in our history, and shortly after that we would have more than doubled the number of existing telephone lines in the country. Electricity output will go up by over 50 per cent in 1983 when we install our two recently purchased generators. We now deliver daily 50 per cent more pipe-borne water into the homes of our people than could have been done before the Revolution, and this process will be further enhanced in 1983 when construction of the new Mamma Cannes Reservoir in St David's is completed. Two new schools were built this year and at least one more will be constructed in 1983, while at the same time more community centres, day-care and pre-primary facilities and health centres will continue to be rehabilitated and built throughout the course of next year.

So, for reasons such as these concrete benefits, imperialism is doubly worried and concerned about our revolutionary process, because it

fears that the new socio-economic and political path of development which we have embarked upon may prove to be an example to the rest of the region, and therefore the people of the region may begin to press their own governments for a similar process to start in their countries. Additionally, there is the fact that since the Revolution, Grenada has pursued an independent and non-aligned path, and different US administrations over the years – but in particular this present administration of President Ronald Reagan – is deathly afraid of any independence, of non-aligned commitment in the world, particularly by countries of the Third World, which they feel they have a divine right to dominate and exploit. So, when we take firm positions that we are entitled to legal equality, to mutual respect for sovereignty, to non-interference in our internal affairs, to ideological pluralism and the right to develop our own process free from all outside interference and *diktat*, obviously it is seen as a mortal insult to this American administration. Equally, when we decide that as a part of our policy of non-alignment, that we are entitled to diversify and develop our relations with countries of the world, particularly the socialist countries, then this is seen as adding insult to injury. So the fact is that this firm and fundamental position of maintaining an independent and non-aligned path of development, and a non-aligned position in our international relations, is one that has caused us real problems with this American administration.

Finally, we have gleaned from their own security reports which they have put out – not publicly, but which we have nevertheless seen – other insights. In one of these reports the particular point was made that Grenada's process has two big differences to the other two revolutionary processes in the region, in Cuba and Nicaragua. For on the one hand, we speak the same language – English – as the people of the US, and on the other hand we have a largely black population. What they have pointed out from this is that the Grenada Revolution therefore has a facility of speaking directly to, and appealing directly in their own language to the people of the US overall, but more so to the exploited majority. Then in the case of black Americans, meaning something like twenty-seven million black people who are a part of the most rejected and oppressed section of the American population, US imperialism has a particular dread that they will develop an extra empathy and rapport with the Grenada Revolution, and from that point of view will pose a threat to its own continuing control and domination of the blacks inside the US.

CS: How did your experience of fascist terror under the Gairy regime serve as an efficient apprenticeship to organising against imperialist destabilisation since the Revolution?

MB: What we learned from our experiences in the struggle against the

dictator has proved to be very critical in many respects. Firstly, of course, it deepened our organisational skill and ability and gave us a tremendous experience in fighting in underground situations. We had to produce our newspaper, for example, in clandestine conditions, which meant that every single week we had to go to some new venue in order to print it, and thereafter our network of distributors had to sell the newspaper without being caught by the Gairy repressive apparatus. This was the invaluable kind of organisational ability we had to develop from underground in the building of our party. We had to hold meetings while the dictatorship was searching for us, and this served to force us to develop a strong sense of security and to build firm alliances with the people of our country coming from many different classes and strata. Very often we had to hold meetings in houses that would be unlikely to attract attention. That whole experience certainly helped us in our subsequent policy of building a concrete alliance to fight the 1976 elections, and it continues to help us today in pursuing a policy of alliances with sections of the upper petite-bourgeoisie in our country, and even with the bourgeoisie, as part of our overall policy of socialist orientation.

It also helped to steel our comrades, helped to make them much, much more disciplined, helped to ensure that once they were given tasks then they would carry them out, because in situations that we faced it was absolutely critical to be dead certain that everybody was actually doing what he or she had promised to do. And this was linked to the necessity of collective leadership. We found from our very hard experience that the repression was so constant and consistent, that at any given time any number of our people might be arrested or charged or jailed or sometimes, and this happened quite frequently, beaten, and therefore unavailable. So this made it necessary for us to build a strong collective leadership and rely very much upon each other, ensuring that each of us was responsible for specific critical tasks and areas. That also has stood us in very good stead in terms of ensuring that our principle of collective leadership, that we still follow, is fully maintained.

That period certainly helped us in making us much firmer. That quality of firmness has come out of the repression, out of the need repeatedly to show courage in the face of numerous difficulties, of having to come back from behind after temporary setbacks which we never accepted as defeats, and which also forced us to see things always in strategic terms and not just in tactical terms. We were always very certain that, no matter how many individual skirmishes Gairy and his forces might win, eventually our revolutionary forces would triumph.

Those years of fighting against the dictatorship also made us very aware of the international situation. Gairy's closest links and friendships were with dictatorships and fascist regimes in Chile, in South Korea and Haiti. Seeing those alliances at work, and seeing also in the

context of the Caribbean those reactionary regimes out here who gave him support – some of whom now are precisely the ones that are most opposed to our Revolution – really helped to teach us a lot about the international situation, about who our friends and enemies really were, and what we have subsequently seen as being the pillars of our foreign policy.

But, most crucially, the experiences of combating the Gairy dictatorship taught us the fundamental importance of having the firmest and most constant contacts with the people, working with the masses at all times, being totally honest with them at all times, in periods when we had to hide and in periods of relative lull, whether it was for the mass mobilisation activity which we did so well before the Revolution and which we have continued to stress since the Revolution, or whether it was creating democratic structures and the embryonic youth and women's organisations which have flourished so prosperously since our grasp of power on 13 March 1979. We have learned to develop a truly deep and abiding respect for the people of our country, particularly the working people, and have understood more and more their enormous creative power and ability to confront and solve all their problems.

CS: What precedents and new techniques has imperialism devised in its strategy of trying to destabilise the Grenada Revolution?

MB: In this present phase, imperialism has created a number of new strategies which themselves are different from its onslaughts over the last twenty-five years upon Guyana, Chile and Jamaica. Our Revolution has clearly forced imperialist destabilisation to find new approaches and become more and more wickedly original in its counter-revolutionary techniques. In Grenada there is no US Embassy, and this has clearly placed a powerful brake upon their potential to destabilise the Revolution internally, not having the permanent base for their mischief which they had in the three other countries mentioned. The US imperialists and their CIA are thus forced to rely upon local agents which they first have to recruit internally and then contact clandestinely from time to time, but in Grenada they do not have this fixed facility and infrastructure to operate, they do not have this ready-made system. The guise of normal diplomatic relations – which only hid on-the-spot organisational and recruitment centres – enabled them to reach their agents and gain information on a daily basis, as well as to provide guidance to those unpatriotic elements within the country who were prepared to carry out the dirty work of the CIA. This is a critical disadvantage for them in relation to Grenada.

Then our dismantling of the Westminster parliamentary system is also important in this context. Along with that dismantling has come an end to the traditional tribalism which continues in other Caribbean

countries. A part of the political tribalism, as used by the CIA, has been to get some of the parliamentarians to use the medium of parliament in such a way as to destabilise the country. Masterminded by their American puppeteers, they raise bogus concerns about the economy, they spread vicious propaganda from outside the country and seek to make the people lose faith and confidence in their revolutionary government, raising a million and one other such provocative matters through the medium of parliament – and thus claim to do it in that sense with a certain measure of legitimacy.

In relation to the media, we made it very clear at an early stage that we were not prepared to countenance counter-revolutionary literature in our country, or media that were being used for the purpose of inciting sections of the population to violence or disaffection. So within the first six months of the Revolution, one counter-revolutionary newspaper, *The Torchlight*, was closed down, and that too has meant that a powerful arm of their destabilisation machinery has been amputated in our situation.

Then there is the question of the armed forces, which in the Chile and Jamaica situations, for example, remained intact after progressive governments had taken power. For us it was very different. In the first hours of the Revolution the Green Beast army of Gairy was completely disbanded. That meant that thereafter a new army came into being, an army of patriotic youth, young farmers and sections of the unemployed. Right from the start it was possible to imbue this young army with a patriotic, anti-imperialist consciousness, and that has proved to be a decisive factor. The possibilities of infiltration or of coups d'état are much more difficult in this army than in those countries where the armed forces of the previous regime remained intact. On top of that we have built a people's militia in addition to our regular armed forces, something that did not happen in the three countries that were mentioned before, where the progressive regimes did not move to arm the people in that way. The value of the people's militia is that the whole question of defence becomes the responsibility not just of a standing, full-time, professional army, but also of the whole people, who are ready to face any threat.

Within three years we have made greater attempts to disentangle our economy from the clutches of imperialism. The Marketing and National Importing Board which we established now has removed the opportunity for unpatriotic elements of the bourgeoisie to create artificial shortages of essential foods and supplies, a factor which was very prevalent in Jamaica in particular during the last years of the Manley government. Furthermore, we have attempted to involve our people in the planning and running of the economy, to get them to understand that the question of economic construction is not just an issue for the government, but is also the responsibility of the people. Therefore

there has been a great deal more voluntary involvement in the building of the economy in our situation than perhaps there was in either Chile or Jamaica. That too has been a major factor in terms of the room imperialism would have to manoeuvre in our situation.

Inside our country there are no media which they can use, so they have moved very powerfully into the regional media, the newspapers and the dozens of radio stations of the region daily beaming into our country, trying to spread lies and distortions about the Revolution. This has been a dramatic and unprecedented factor of huge intensity that we have had constantly to confront. We have seen the spectacle of five of these regional newspapers – the *Jamaica Gleaner*, the *Advocate* and *Nation* from Barbados and the *Express* and *Guardian* from Trinidad – coming out, as they did in November 1981, with the same headlines, the same front-page editorial attacking the Revolution and calling for our isolation. Again, this month, exactly one year later, we have seen almost an exact repetition, this time on the occasion of our presence at the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in Jamaica, when all five newspapers carried the same back-page paid advertisement, prompted by its publication in the *Gleaner* on the first day of the Conference – another vulgar attack which had the effect of completely exposing who really runs the media in the region and what the so-called independent ‘free press’ really means. We saw again the same small minority tied to corporate interests speaking each time for their class and never for the interests, concerns and issues facing the masses of working people in the region. In fact, following the classic front-page fiasco of November 1981, journalists in the region, most notably the Trinidad and Tobago journalists, came out totally condemning the actions of their newspaper bosses, with one editor declaring that he had no idea that coordinated attacks on Grenada, such as his newspaper had been party to, were being waged right through the region, with newspapers such as the one he himself edited! This only showed once again who were the real controllers, the real bosses, the real dragons of big business.

This extraordinary level of coordinated vulgarity, not even known in the western European or American press, is highly significant, and says a lot about the deep penetration of imperialism into the regional press to force it to carry out its masters’ dirty orders. Recently again the same newspapers all carried an article which alleged that in ten crates our government had received ‘Russian Migs’. All of the forces behind these newspapers know well that Grenada does not have the capacity to operate ‘Migs’, in terms of what would be required in the way of hangars, maintenance facilities, trained pilots and technicians – it is a physical impossibility in Grenada, and all of them know that. They know, too, that if such planes came into our country, it could not be done secretly. Of course, the very way in which these articles were

written exposed that they knew all that. One article declared that one of our government officials had been contacted and had said that the story was impossible and must be a journalistic joke. But then the writer of the article continued: ‘But in any case, *if it is true*, then it shows how dangerous this Grenada government is etc. etc.’, and then went on to spend the rest of the page attacking us with a whole pile of lies. So it is quite clear that this was yet one more attempt at propaganda destabilisation, but this time using a higher and clearer form, because they were discovering that their lies about the economy or human rights violations did not convince the Caribbean masses, so now they try another grotesque tack to try to make us appear as if we are a military threat to our neighbours.

Another precedent set in the methodology of destabilisation was shown to us by the United States International Communications Agency (USICA) in May 1981. This propaganda limb of the US State Department summoned all the editors of the various Caribbean newspapers to Washington and showed them the best they could offer in facilities in the media and press, then held a number of seminars and workshops with them. One of the things that emerged was that an offer was made to these editors of assistance to develop their own facilities, but that it would only be forthcoming if they collaborated in helping to isolate Grenada through adverse propaganda. And sure enough, within a very short time from the return of these editors, a massive propaganda campaign started against us from their pages in the region. So the USICA Conference type of approach was certainly one new and creative destabilisation strategy developed by US imperialism to try to bring down our Revolution.

Then we have recently discovered yet another destabilisation phenomenon. Just prior to any major conference in the region that we go to, or any significant event in our own country, they will try to get reactionary trade union leaders or other individuals and backward institutions in the region to host conferences, sometimes conferences ostensibly dealing with conventional areas, maybe just normal trade union questions or questions of so-called democracy or human rights as interpreted by them. But these conferences will be set in the particular countries we are about to go to a few days before we are due to arrive. So that when we recently went off to Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States for a Heads of Government conference in St Lucia, we found that the week before a number of these reactionary trade union leaders were in St Lucia holding a conference. This conference was apparently dealing with regular worker issues like national insurance schemes, but what additionally happened was that a well-known Grenadian counter-revolutionary exile, called Stanley Cyrus, plus a Cuban counter-revolutionary exile arrived at the conference and steered it into vulgar attacks against Grenada in particular, but also

Cuba and Nicaragua. A number of documents were also distributed, obviously preparing the ground for when we arrived a few days later. Then something very similar happened in Jamaica a few days before we landed for the CARICOM Heads of Government meeting, when another conference was focusing upon issues like democracy and elections – and that was precisely one of the issues, Westminster parliamentary democracy, that Tom Adams and Edward Seaga, Prime Ministers of Barbados and Jamaica respectively, were attempting to push at the CARICOM meeting, hoping to secure an amendment to the CARICOM Treaty to institutionalise the Westminster approach to the question of democracy.

CS: How has the Revolution managed continually to beat back destabilising mischief, whilst other processes have failed?

MB: We have only done this through our relations of total honesty with our people. We start from the basis that destabilisation can only really work when it is covered up, when it is operating under darkness. Thus, from the earliest days of the Revolution, whenever we perceived any threat we always informed the people. The speech that I gave just one month after the Revolution, dealing with the threats made by US Ambassador Ortiz to us, was on national radio and television, and it exposed these threats to Grenada and the young Revolution to the people in the first few days. Then after three months, there was another speech, 'Organize to fight destabilisation', in which we exposed the CIA Pyramid Plan. Again, there was the national address given on the issue of the two Roman Catholic priests who were developing a whole strategy of destabilisation, and that again was a national address, when we dealt fully with the issues raised. Or there was the way in which we handled the 'Gang of twenty-six', who published the so-called *Grenadian Voice* as a cover for their counter-revolutionary activity, and they also were totally exposed at the rally of 19 June 1981.

So our first line of defence is complete openness and honesty: tell our people all the facts and call upon them for a response and involve them in what is happening. Linked to that is the necessity of the maximum preparation we can have through the involvement of our people, and here the militia is crucial, ensuring that at the level of national defence the people are always there and are always ready and able to defend the process, the Revolution and the country. We believe that the Revolution can only develop around three pillars: first, the people and their democratic organisations, second, the building of a strong national economy, and third, the building of a national defence capacity. We try at all times to integrate these three pillars because we feel that if any one of the three is missing at any particular time, then the Revolution will be in danger and will be weakened.

But we can also speak of a fourth pillar, the pillar of international

relations, and that too has been a major way of fighting destabilisation. Whenever there is any threat to our process, we immediately appeal to all our friends around the world for their support. This was very evident, for example, during the US 'Amber and the Amberines' manoeuvre, staged by the imperialist armed forces in August 1981 off the island of Vieques, near Puerto Rico. Our response was to go on a major international offensive around the issue and to call upon all friendly governments and international institutions, political parties and organisations we had contacts with, and ask them to come out with strong statements against the provocation which was a dress rehearsal for the invasion of our country. In the case of friendly governments, we asked them to summon the American ambassadors in their countries to demand explanations. That proved to be a very successful diplomatic offensive on our part, and we struggled in a similar way when we were having difficulties with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund after we had made an application for the Supplementary Fund facility, and it was rejected at the last minute as a result of the veto by the American director on the Board of Directors. Again we went on a worldwide offensive and mobilised all our friends to come to our support and intervene on our behalf on that question.

We have also seen – and there is much evidence of this in the account that precedes – the Revolution laying great emphasis upon the cultural awareness and educational developments of our people, through literacy programmes and rallies, mass events, councils and panel discussions, and through our growing and prospering organs of people's democracy, so that our people fully understand the extent of the imperialist penetration and the ways in which they can systematically and successfully fight against it.

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Moore, Colin A., "Grenada, Part of a Scheme?", NEW YORK AMSTERDAM NEWS, Vol. 74, No. 48, 26 November 1983, pp. 15, 34.

Freedom of the press was not the only casualty of the invasion of Grenada. What was left of US credibility was also sacrificed. The US critique and moral self-righteousness over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, military repression in Poland, and the shooting down of the South Korean airliner are now put into perspective. The US conducts itself no better than do the Soviets. Furthermore, the invasion of Grenada was a cheap victory. The US military's reputation was not improved. Troops shot at each other, aircraft bombed friendly positions, and hardened Cuban combat troops turned out to be construction workers. Warehouses full of modern Soviet weapons contained half-empty boxes of Second World War rifles. Secret documents turned out to be no more than bilateral agreements. Speculation that Grenada is only a trial run for a US invasion of Cuba or Nicaragua should be put to rest. Given the difficulty that US troops had in taking Grenada, invasions of Cuba or Nicaragua would be catastrophic. Unlike Grenada, both countries have popular and well established governments which have not been overthrown. Also their military and population would put up a fierce and spirited opposition.

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# US FORCES TO LEAVE GRENADA BY MARCH '85

LONDON, Sat.,  
(Cana)  
THE UNITED States plans to withdraw its remaining peacekeeping forces from Grenada at the end of March next year, according to "Caribbean Insight", a monthly newsletter published here.  
In its latest edition, "Insight" quoted a highly-placed Grenadian government official as saying that a

small military mission will remain in St. George's attached to the American Embassy.  
Its purposes will be to liaise both with the remainder of the Caribbean peacekeeping forces and the future regional defence force, the framework of which is currently under discussion.  
Insight said it is expected that the Caribbean peacekeeping force in Grenada will be

finally wound up in early 1986, by which time, the newly trained and equipped Grenada police force will be ready to assume all remaining security duties.  
Last October 25, the U.S. led a multinational Caribbean force into Grenada to topple a leftwing military junta that had seized power six days earlier killing Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several Cabinet colleagues.  
"URGENT FURY"  
By the fifth day of the invasion, codenamed operation "Urgent Fury," the U.S. had up to 5,000 troops on the island. These are now about 300 American military police and other personnel in Grenada.

"Insight" said discussions on the future deployment of the U.S. Coast Guard service in Grenada are underway and it may be withdrawn sooner than the troops as it was proving very expensive to maintain.  
"One option under discussion is that Grenadian waters would be patrolled by the Barbados Coast Guard as and when required in conjunction with a better equipped Grenadian service," the publication said.  
It added that the decision to withdraw in March was in line with Washington's desire to remove its military presence from Grenada at the earliest possible date.  
Insight said the U.S. had initially wished to totally

withdraw its forces by October/November this year to coincide with the arrival of an elected government.  
However, at the urging of Jamaica, Barbados and certain east Caribbean governments, it said, the U.S. agreed to delay until the Regional Security System (RSS) was established.  
Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and St. Kitts-Nevis have agreed to the creation of full-time regional forces to be based in Bridgetown.  
Its primary functions would be to protect those governments against armed insurrection and external threats from mercenary or other schemes.

## EDITORIAL:

### Grenada Will Rise Again!

US interventionist forces are still in Grenada, 6 months after the rape of that sovereign country. The puppet regime is at present hastily trying to organise "elections" for a "new government". The USA and its lackeys in Caricom realise that the key to recognition of the rape, lies in "elections" no matter if they are blatantly rigged. The progressive forces in Caricom, in the wider Caribbean Region, in the Hemisphere and in the world at large will not tolerate any such thing!

Elections in Third World countries where the class struggle is sharp, and which are held under US supervision are notoriously suspect, and do not represent the wishes of the people. It is also noted that under the puppet regime, anti US sentiments cannot be uttered, on pain of immediate detention. Under these and other adverse circumstances, elections in Grenada at the moment can only be rigged, stage-managed, totally irrelevant and a farce. At least they can never be free or fair!

For genuine elections to be held and recognised by all as fair, certain prior conditions are necessary:

- 1) The US and puppet troops must get out of the island, and cease intimidating the people.
- 2) Campaigning must be free, and US imperialism must be subject to criticism openly.
- 3) Proper enumeration must be undertaken whereby every Grenadian citizen 18 years and over must be registered to vote, free from fear or coercion.
- 4) All legitimate political parties should be allowed to participate in the elections including the NJM whose government it was which was demolished by the invasion forces.

Despite the setback in Grenada, and the loss of that beacon light to the rest of Caricom, the crisis in Caricom still persists. Grenada was showing the way out of the crisis, and had become an attraction without precedent in the Commonwealth Caribbean and to the other colonies of Dutch and French imperialism.

The PPP recognises the legitimacy of the Grenadian revolution, and the revolutionary martyrdom of Maurice

Bishop whose name will always be revered in Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary, progressive, and patriotic circles throughout the world. The overthrow of his administration by the military was a serious error, which was promptly pounced upon by US imperialism and its lackeys in Caricom, to snuff out the revolutionary process.

The PPP recognises the burning need for the NJM (still the most advanced party in Grenada) to regroup, heal the wounds extant, and re-gear itself for a fresh struggle ahead. **Where are the Marxists and revolutionaries in Grenada, if not in the NJM?** This being so, US imperialism and its lackeys are sure to take measures aimed at widening the rift in the NJM, so as to paralyse that party into nothingness. This must not be, for in the ensuing ideological vacuum, the rightists will rise to prominence, and dictator Gairy can return to power by simply fielding his party in the elections.

The New Jewel Movement must rise again, recapture the dynamic leadership of the masses, and once more place the country onto a correct revolutionary democratic footing. US imperialism and its lackeys are anxious to break out of the isolation of Grenada, and to get diplomatic relations normalised. Progressives all over the world should therefore not be hoodwinked by the US ploy of "holding hurried elections" and should demand the immediate withdrawal of the invasion forces **before the elections are held.** They should also demand that elections in Grenada should be held under UN supervision with the preparations first approved by the Security Council or the General Assembly. **The People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada is still a member of the UN, not the puppet regime set up by the USA!**

Bishop's revolutionary government in Grenada was an active part of the world revolutionary process, and therefore there should be no "business as usual" following the savage rape of the country by US imperialism, which is the enemy number one of the world revolutionary process. **US pretensions and plans must be vigorously opposed.**

## Women Unite: Stand Up And Fight!

The 9th, Congress of the Women's Progressive Organisation which met at Grove, East Bank, Demerara from November 5 to 6, 1983 dealt with a wide range of women's problems, setting them in the context of international and regional developments and in the particular and extremely difficult conditions of Guyana. Congress was held under the theme: "Women Unite, Organise and Fight!"

There were two main documents of the 9th., Congress, the full and detailed report of the Central Committee and the Action Guide. The Action Guide, a new type of document, set out the historical role of women as a social force and dealt fully with the conditions of Guyanese women, the tasks and targets of the WPO, its work in the community, in mass organisations and in trade unions. Vital resolutions were adopted, there were amendments made to the organisation's Constitution, messages were read from a large number of overseas women's organisations and elections were held.

The 9th., Congress was declared open by the General Secretary of the People's Progressive Party, Cheddi Jagan who praised the advances made by Guyanese women and pointed to their loyalty and devotion to the cause to which they are dedicated. He warned that US imperialism was on the offensive and discussed the situation in Central America and the Caribbean.

Dr. Jagan dealt with the Grenada situation. He charged that the US government excused its invasion of Grenada in order to bring about "law and order," but pointed to Chile after US connivance led to the murder of Salvador Allende and the installation of the Pinochet military regime. There is no democracy in Chile; instead the people live under a ruthless dictatorship, their living standards have deteriorated drastically and now the people are fighting back.

He called for one minute's silence in respect for those who were killed in Grenada — Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Creft and others. In closing his address, Dr. Jagan observed that imperialism, despite its belligerent posture, is in deep crisis. World capitalism is sick and falling. "Time," he said, "is on the side of Marxism-Leninism. The future belongs to socialism."

## LEEWARD and Windward Islands:

## Grenada:

Coup—PM believed to have been replaced by deputy, Oct. 15, 6h; PM under house arrest as power struggle continues, (ST) 16, 1d; details of events leading to arrest; photo, 17, 6d; State radio denies coup, 18, 5a; explosions and shooting follow release of PM, 20, 1e; armed forces impose curfew; death of PM confirmed; map, 21, 1e; recent events examined, 21, 5d; diary note, 21, 10a; profile of deputy PM and army commander, 22, 4d; new Govt calls for better relationship with US, (ST) 23, 1b; further details of coup and death of PM, (ST) 23, 10c; EEC deplores recent events, 24, 10c; Govt assures US of foreign nationals' well-being; US denies plan to invade, 24, 10e; summary of island's history and recent events, 26, 6a; provisional gov't and elections expected, 27, 1e; Governor's role disputed; deficiencies of Foreign Office communications highlighted by events, 28, 5a; local troops hold out on neighbouring island, 29, 6e; legality of Governor-Gen.'s actions examined, 29, 22g; preparations for transition to civilian rule begin, (ST) 30, 1b; preparations for future begin, 31, 1b; technocrat team to assist Governor; details of events on Carriacou, 31, 6a

International reaction—US and Caribbean concerned over events; US fears for citizens on island, Oct. 21, 5e; Caribbean leaders hold emergency meeting, 21, 24g; Cuba condemns murder of PM and other Mins; Jamaica and Dominica sever relations, 22, 1b; EEC to consider halting aid; US blames Cuba; Socialist International condemns murder, 22, 4d; UK and US warships arrive, (ST) 23, 1b; suspended by Caribbean Community; UK prepares to evacuate Britons, 24, 1b; US Marines land on Barbados, St Vincent and St Lucia; Canada charters aircraft to remove citizens; UK holidaymaker describes conditions, 25, 1b; US and Caribbean troops invade capturing Soviet and Cuban advisers; UK rejects involvement; MPs shocked by Govt's failure to restrain US; USSR condemns aggression; photo, 26, 1a; summary of world opinion, 26, 6a; exiles celebrate; Trinidad reassessing attitude; illus, 26, 32f; UK refuses to condemn US; American civilians evacuated; Cuba ends resistance, 27, 1a; survey of world opinion; Caribbean unity threatened; photo, 27, 5a; summary of Anglo-

## LEEWARD and Windward Islands:

## Grenada:

## Coup:

## International reaction (continued):

US consultations, 27, 26a; US Pres. claims Cuba planned occupation; Govt response dismays Conservative MPs, 28, 1b; dispute over who first suggested intervention; further survey of reaction; US promises closer consultation with UK in future, 28, 5a; Kremlin hopes growing anti-US mood will reduce support for Nato deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, 28, 6e; US task force doubled; UK envoy meets Governor-Gen.; photo, 29, 1b; US Pres. justifies intervention; UK abstains at UN amid international furor; photo, 29, 6a; USSR claims Embassy attacked; MP warns US could use similar reasoning to justify intervention in UK, 29, 22g; Grenadian reaction to US troops examined; results of opinion poll on US intervention, (ST) 30, 1b; previous week's events reviewed; photo, (ST) 30, 15a; UK PM gives comments on rift with US; US public support actions; US Ambassador to UN accuses Europe of insensitivity to US security, 31, 1b; Grenadians hope US will not overstay welcome; Cuban Pres. accuses US of panic and fantasy; US dampens hopes of Nicaraguan exiles; photo, 31, 6a

Articles—"Resolution - or moral blunder?", Oct. 26, 12b; "A battle for the small nations", 27, 10b; "A vacuum Europe should fill", 28, 10f; "Gunboats in Grenada are 'just fine'", (ST) 30, 16a; "Invade in haste, repent at leisure", 31, 10f

Correspondence, Oct. 27, 11e; 28, 11d; 29, 9d

Leading article, Oct. 26, 13a; 27, 11a; (ST) 30, 16a; 31, 11a

Leading article, Oct. 21, 11a

LEFANU, William:

**ST. GEORGE'S, Fri., (Cana):**  
**THERE ARE** no records in the Grenada Treasury on the size of salaries of individual members of the disbanded People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), nor does the Government department have information on the number of ex-soldiers who paid income tax and national insurance contributions, Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon said last night.

"The Ministry of Finance was merely required each month to provide a cheque in the sum of approximately \$300,000 to \$350,000 for the payroll," Sir Paul told Grenadians in a 27-minute radio address.

"It is my humble view that such an arrangement was open to corruption," he added.

The Governor-General said he had also learned that a total of \$3.6 million was owed to the State by members of the deposed People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) and public officers, who drew the amount as advances between 1979 and 1983.

These disclosures by the Governor-General came two days after the three-week-old caretaker administra-

## PRG members owing \$3.6m

tion said it had inherited a "grave" liquidity problem from the left-wing Maurice Bishop administration.

The Advisory Council, installed after the U.S.-led military intervention six days later, blamed this on the maintenance by the PRG of capital and current expenditure at "unsustainable levels."

Citing the need for greater accountability of public funds, Sir Paul said: "The state of the Treasury and of our finances is not really what we have been told."

While the former administration was expanding its diplomatic representation abroad and was placing "high priority" on foreign travel, the State could not pay a \$5.1 million debt owed to regional and international organisations and local concerns for goods and services.

# Security is G'da Govt's chief worry

**ST. GEORGE'S, Fri., (Cana)**  
**NATIONAL SECURITY** is the main concern of the new Grenada Government, and the authorities have already put measures in place for the continued security of the country after US combat troops pull out later this month, Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon said last night.

"...provisions have already been made for the continued security of our entire country after the American combat troops leave our shores," he told Grenadians in a 27-minute radio address.

"Let me warn those home and abroad, who think that they can stir up trouble here, that they will have a rude awakening. The hand of the law will fall heavily on them," the Governor-General said.

American troops spearheaded the October 25 multinational intervention here, to oust a Marxist military junta that had seized power in

bloody coup, six days earlier, in which Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was assassinated.

Sir Paul called on "friendly" countries, including those in the Caribbean and the Commonwealth, that are interested in giving Grenada a helping hand, to come to the island "without further delay," to discuss with the authorities how best they could help.

He said plans were already in train for a reorganisation of the local police force and the training of officers. A batch of Grenadian policemen would go to Barbados, next month, for training at the Regional Police Training Centre, he indicated.

The Governor-General also said



### CARIBBEAN HIGHLIGHTS

that arrangements were being made for senior officers to go to the United Kingdom for further training.

"All the police stations which are now closed will reopen, once the necessary repairs now in progress are completed, and we shall have again a police presence in the various districts," Sir Paul told Grenadians.

He added that the US-led "rescue mission" had given Grenadians "another chance" to build their country in the way they wanted, and to practise Christian love and fellowship.

"Truly, there is a new breath of freedom in our land, the kind of freedom Grenadians want. But freedom can only be sustained by eternal vigilance, and never again must we allow common humanity, which we hold so dear, to escape from our grasp," Sir Paul said.

both political and military—would be dramatic and dangerous. It is absolutely necessary therefore that every effort be made so that these talks can reach a successful conclusion.

The problem of the medium-range missiles in Europe can and must be solved in order to prevent a new and extremely dangerous round of the arms race in Europe and in the whole world. This is possible on the basis of the acceptance of and respect for the principle of the equality and equal security of all the parties concerned. The lowest possible level of armaments should be reached, thus leading to a Europe free from the threat of war and nuclear weapons.

The organizations represented here, in common with all the peoples of Europe, are following the INF talks with great interest. The positive example of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid and the important agreements reached there are clear proofs that if the political will exists, solutions can be found. It gives the hope that the present very tense political situation in Europe can be improved and the achievements of détente can be safeguarded and further promoted.

The document was signed on November 8, 1983, by the following organizations:

**THE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN NATIONAL YOUTH COMMITTEES (CENYC)**

Alan Christie, Secretary-General  
Thoril Johnssen, Vice-President

**THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF LIBERAL AND RADICAL YOUTH (IFLRY)**

Jules Maaten, President

**THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (IUS)**

Alexander Zharikov, Vice-President

**THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF SOCIALIST YOUTH (IUSY)**

Robert Kredigk, Secretary-General

**THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF FINNISH YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS (SNT)**

Hannu Taavitsainen, Secretary-General  
Merja Hannus, Vice-President

**THE EUROPEAN UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (EUCDY)**

Filippo Lombardi, Secretary-General

**THE WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (WFDY)**

Miklos Barabas, Secretary-General  
Vsevolod Nakhodkin, Vice-President  
Francisco Filipe, Vice-President

**THE NORDIC CENTRE YOUTH (NCY)**

John Erickson, Secretary-General

In our evaluation, the two meetings provided the delegation with an opportunity to hear and compare the positions of the two negotiating parties, as well as to raise a number of concrete questions. The IUS Secretariat welcomed the discussions as a source of information about the state of the negotiations. However, a number of important questions remained unanswered, first of all due to disposition of the US-side, including those listed below:

How to deal with the French and British nuclear forces?

If both sides declare their desire to enhance security, why not start reducing the present levels of nuclear armaments on both sides, rather than raising them?

Why not create a nuclear-free Europe?

What will Europe gain by the deployment of the new missiles?

Why is it better for the US to launch its missiles from Hanover, rather than from Chicago or Boston?

In fact, the answers to these and similar questions are quite simple, and our stand entirely unambiguous: We don't want Europe to become a nuclear battlefield and Europeans hostages of the Pentagon.

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## The Invasion of Grenada – An Eyewitness Account

Gert Eisenbürger from the FRG was in Grenada for a study project and was an eyewitness of the US invasion of Grenada. The following article sums up his impressions and comments.

What we saw in Grenada before the invasion made a great impression on us; a small nation was beginning to build a future for itself. I have also visited two other West Indian islands, Barbados and Trinidad. If you talk with the young people of these islands, it seems that their prospects for the future lie either with the USA, Canada or Great Britain, whereas since the revolution of 1979, the people of Grenada saw a real chance for the future in the development of their own country.

The Bishop administration had great popularity with the masses. This does not mean that it was not subjected to any criticism. Grenada had a system of joint decision-making on various levels, involving councils, from village to district level, which met on a monthly basis, or more often, to discuss all questions

of political importance. And these councils frequently voiced very sharp criticism of the government—evidence, to us, of Grenada's liberality. It is true that there were many Cubans in Grenada; the majority of them were skilled workers involved in the construction of the airport, and there were Cuban specialists working in all fields, particularly in health care.

It came as a complete surprise to us, when it suddenly became known around the town that Maurice Bishop was under house arrest; the official grounds for his arrest were that he had stood out against the collective party leadership of the New Jewel Movement.


If we look at the background—and we did have a few contacts in Grenada—it becomes clear that for the past year there were sharp conflicts over policy between two factions within the New Jewel Movement.

After Bishop had been placed under house arrest the situation developed in rapid succession of events. A continual stream of rallies, demonstrations and

strikes was launched in support of the Prime Minister. On Wednesday, October 19, 10,000 people from all over the island gathered in the capital, St. George's. It was a mass demonstration in support of Maurice Bishop, and finally the crowd marched to his house, disarmed the guards and released him. Bishop, accompanied by several thousand supporters, then moved to the army headquarters in order to disarm the soldiers in attendance there, and finally he tried to meet in conference with some of his ministers.

Meanwhile, another detachment of soldiers had arrived and opened fire; the military coup had begun.

After the military coup, Grenada sunk into a mood which is almost impossible to describe. Previously, there had existed a strong sense of identification with the revolution, above all with Bishop, and after he and all the key ministers had been killed, the whole island sank into despair and fear. It was also rumoured that this coup was not simply the outcome of power struggles



US Marines and paratroopers landing at Punta Salinas, Grenada.

within the party, but that it was possibly backed by outside forces.

On Thursday, October 20, it was announced on Radio Grenada, and also on other radio stations in the region, which we have listened to regularly, that a detachment of US ships was heading in the direction of Grenada, and that a cruiser which had been sailing for Lebanon, had changed direction, and was moving towards Grenada. The USA justified this by saying that it must protect the 1,000 US citizens in Grenada, whose lives there were endangered. It was considering, above all, the safety of the 600 students of a private American medical college.

The claim that these people were in danger of life and limb is pure propaganda. Of this there is a mass of evidence:

Once the ban on leaving the country, which had been imposed by the military council, had been lifted, the military government declared that all foreigners were free to leave the country; moreover, they had offered help through the services of the charter flight organization, since the Caribbean Airlines had discontinued all flights to Grenada. Some of the medical students had expressed interest in leaving the country. When they voiced their desire at a

plenary meeting, which was also attended by the acting US Ambassador from Barbados, the Ambassador assured them of the possibility of organizing charter flights, but pointed out that those interested must meet the costs incurred themselves.

The Vice-Chancellor of the university went even further. Anyone, he said, who evacuated the country, must be either a "chicken" or a "rabbit". Furthermore, the semester would continue until November 15, and anyone who left the country before that date could naturally not be recognized as having completed the semester. Since the establishment in question was a private university with high fees, this implied a heavy financial penalty, the more so because, having started a course at this university does not automatically qualify a student to continue his studies in any other American college. Thus, there was considerable pressure exerted on the part of the USA to discourage people from leaving the country.

There is another piece of evidence that the foreign nationals were needed as a pretext for intervention; on the day before the invasion, 30 Canadians wanted to leave Grenada; a charter flight had already been arranged. The plane was waiting in Barbados, ready to fly to Grenada and pick up the Canadians. However, the Barbados government did not give permission for it to take off.

Forebodings that the upshot of all this would be an invasion grew stronger after several radio announcements had been made, to the effect that the Organization of East Caribbean States—which is a federation of seven small Caribbean states, all, with the exception of Grenada, having extremely right-wing, pro-American governments—had decided to go through with an invasion of Grenada. This would be carried out with the support of Jamaica, Barbados, and, of course, the USA.

On Tuesday night, shortly after 4 a.m., we were roused by the sound of aeroplanes. We saw several planes circling over the capital of Grenada. We were staying in the direct vicinity of St. George's. They were American transport planes. Shortly afterwards, it was announced on Radio Grenada that, at 5.30, American troops had landed on the island in three places.

There was fierce fighting between the US troops and the Grenadan army on Tuesday and the following day. At first the troops only landed at a few points on the island, as the USA was attempting initially to destroy the entire Grenadan military machine using helicopters, aeroplanes and sea launches.

We observed this action for ourselves. We saw, for example, the shelling of the main fort in the capital, which was attacked from the sea. Similarly, we saw another military fort bombed from the air, in the attack which destroyed the St. George's psychiatric clinic.

The Grenadan army was mainly responsible for putting up any resistance. Because of the military coup, the readiness of the population itself to show resistance was minimal. The people were in despair, frightened of the military regime, and were initially indifferent to the fact of the intervention. However, they did not welcome it with jubilation.

Indeed, the attitude of the population quickly changed when they became aware of the massive scale of the US military intervention. Ultimately it became clear that the invaders had not come to free them from the military regime. This became abundantly obvious on the third day of the attacks, when the Americans began to land stronger military detachments, and when they searched through every last house on the island and arrested many of Bishop's supporters, the avowed opponents of the military coup.

Then the majority realized that the Americans had actually come in order to destroy the political and economic system which had been built up since the revolution.

(Taken from the student magazine "Frontal")

# HANDS OFF GRENADA!

by ABELARDO CUETO


The International Youth and Student Emergency Meeting in Solidarity with Grenada and against the US Invasion, co-organized by the IUS and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), was held on November 8, 1983, in Vienna, Austria.

The event took place amidst a powerful wave of indignation aroused among world public opinion by the criminal US invasion of the small island of Grenada. As a militant component of the peace-loving forces, youth and students could not remain impassive in the face of this brutal attack against a nation's sovereignty. While raising their voices in protest, they decided to organize this meeting which, however modest in scope, did provide tangible expression of the younger generation's condemnation of the aggressive policy of US imperialism and its reactionary allies.

The event was attended by representatives from 32 national youth and stu-

dent organizations and eight international and regional organizations. In their contributions, all participants pointed out the brutal character of the US invasion, underlining that it represented not only a flagrant violation of the most fundamental norms of international law and the UN Charter, but also an overt threat for those peoples around the world who dare to put up even the least hint of opposition to the designs of the Reagan administration, as in the future, using the pretext of protecting its national security, the latter could intervene anywhere in the world. The participants also paid tribute to the Grenadan patriots for the heroic resistance with which they confronted the invading troops. Homage was equally paid to the Cuban internationalists who shed their blood alongside their Grenadan brothers in defence of the sovereignty of Grenada.

Particular impression was made by the speech of the Grenadan delegate to the meeting who, having thanked for the solidarity offered, reiterated the Grenadan people's firm will to defeat the invader and recover their independence. The event was closed by the participants' adopting an appeal of solidarity and against the invasion, to be disseminated under the title "Hands Off Grenada!" The document voices the worldwide condemnation of the invasion and reaffirms international solidarity with the people and students of Grenada. It was delivered by the participants in the meeting to the US Embassy in Austria and to the UN Centre in Vienna, and circulated at a press conference held in the Austrian capital on the occasion of this international youth and student solidarity meeting.



"America for the Americans".

## APPEAL Adopted by the Youth and Student Emergency Meeting

We the participants from 32 countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America and eight international and regional organizations, gathered in Vienna on November 8, 1983 for the International Youth and Student Emergency Meeting in Solidarity with Grenada, to express our resolute condemnation of the US invasion of the independent sovereign state of Grenada, which constitutes an act of aggression against a peace-loving people of a small country that has been threatening nobody with nothing.

The invasion itself falls within the brutal interventionist policy of the US government which pretends to become the world gendarme, trampling on



US troops  
hoist the flag  
of aggression  
on Grenada.


the sovereignty and self-determination of all peoples of the world. In Latin America, the US aggression is manifested with particular intensity in the Central American region and in the Caribbean, it aims at toppling the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua, and attempts to defeat the patriots of El Salvador and Guatemala.

There is no excuse for the invasion of Grenada which represents violation of the most fundamental norms of international law. It is in breach of all the provisions of the UN Charter, and tramples on the right to national self-determination and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Grenada.

This aggression today manifests that the Reagan administration reserves for itself the right to intervene in a sovereign state, for the so-called re-establishment of law and order, threatening the security and independence of Nicaragua, Cuba or El Salvador. As a result,



The aggressors bombarded this psychiatric clinic in Richmond Hill, Grenada, using naval guns. The clinic was completely destroyed, and at least 50 patients were killed.



"We have restored law and order in Grenada. And as the whole world lies, so to speak, at our front door, we want to work our way slowly forward."

tomorrow it may well happen that no part of the world will be safe.

We call the attention of the peoples, youth and students to the fact that the aggression against Grenada was launched by the same forces that clutch the trigger of nuclear arms in Europe and elsewhere, aimed at peace-loving people all over the world, trying to turn the whole of mankind into the hostage of the military-minded Reagan administration. The peace-loving forces cannot stay impassive in face of this blackmail.

We, representatives of millions of those who are struggling throughout the world for peace, security and national independence, are today raising our voices to demand the immediate withdrawal of the US and other invading troops from Grenada and respect

for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We demand respect for the lives and the immediate release of the imprisoned Grenadan patriots.

At this moment of danger for the independence and sovereignty of Grenada we declare that Grenada has not been, and will not be alone. We appeal for boundless solidarity of youth and students, of all people in the world. We call them to raise their voices in defence of the independence and peaceful future of Grenada for the security of all the countries of the world.

**Hands off Grenada!**

**Yankees, get out of Central and Latin America!**

## FLAGRANT BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

### The Resolution on Grenada adopted by the UN General Assembly

The General Assembly

taking into account the representations made to the Security Council in connection with the situation in Grenada,

referring to the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning the friendly relations and cooperation among countries in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

referring to the inadmissibility of invasion and interference in the internal affairs of countries,

confirms the sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada to decide freely about its political, economic and social system, and to develop its international relations free from invasion, interference, undermining, coercion or intimidation from outside, in whichever manner,

regrets profoundly the events in Grenada which led to the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and other leading Grenadan officials,

(Continued on page 14)

what the rule of law is all about. As we confront the clear and present dangers in the contemporary world, we must recognize that the belief that the U.N. Charter's principles of individual and collective self-defense require less than reciprocity is simply not tenable.

## THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE: IS ARTICLE 2(4) STILL WORKABLE?

The panel was convened at 2:30 p.m., April 12, 1984, by the Chairman, Richard B. Bilder.\*

### REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

We all know that in 1945 the states establishing the United Nations—determined, as they stated in the Charter's Preamble, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"—sought to outlaw the aggressive use of force in their international relations. They embodied this prohibition in article 2, paragraph (4) of the Charter which reads:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

We all also know that things have not worked out as well as the nations meeting at San Francisco hoped. By one count, there have been at least 120 significant armed conflicts since 1945, involving over 80 countries. Ruth Leger Sivard, in her recent study of *World Military Expenditures*, lists 65 major conflicts during the period 1960-1982 alone, accounting for more than 10 million deaths. And currently, our colleagues interested in international conflict have had more conflicts than they can handle to write about—occurring in the Malvinas-Falkland Islands, Grenada, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan, Chad, Lebanon, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other places. More than 25 million men and women are now under arms and the world military budget approaches 700 billion dollars. Clearly, something has gone wrong.

As early as 1970, Professor Tom Franck cast a skeptical eye on the Charter prohibition on the use of force in his *American Journal of International Law* article entitled "Who Killed Article 2(4)?" (64 AJIL 809 [1970]) giving us a profound analysis of both the corrosive mirror effect of the growing range of individual state claims of special limitations and exceptions to the application of article 2(4), and of how state self-interest and clever lawyers could erode an important and farsighted principle. Professor Lou Henkin—a more hopeful sort—responded with a piece called "The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated" (65 AJIL 544 [1971]). The debate whether article 2(4) is still alive, even if ailing, has continued ever since. Indeed, some cynics argue that article 2(4) was stillborn and never viable—unworkable and an illusion from its inception, while others say that article 2(4), even if initially it seemed to have a bright future, is now out-of-date and senile—a child of a former age and spirit, who real politics, the outbreak of the "cold war," and the "paralysis" of the U.N. collective security system have made irrelevant.

Our job today is finally to put this debate to rest—to give the definitive answer to all of these perplexing questions! Luckily, we have a most distinguished panel, each of

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whom has worked and written prominently and extensively in the field, to guide us through this thicket, pointing out both the forest and the trees.

Perhaps we will decide that article 2(4) *is* workable—that it is as much as we could reasonably hope for and working about as well as we could expect, given the realities of our present international system. Perhaps we will decide that there are ways in which we can still breathe new life into article 2(4)—making it more relevant to present realities and needs. But, if we find otherwise—that article 2(4) is *not* workable—clearly we have to go on to the question of what to do about it. Can we think of some better or more workable rules? Or do we just give up the ship, resigning article 2(4) to the role of a legal parlor game, in which foreign office lawyers, given the job of justifying even the most outrageous actions of their governments, demonstrate their finger exercises?

Let's turn to hear our panelists' answers.

#### COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE USE OF REGIONAL OR SUBREGIONAL AUTHORITY AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE

*Domingo E. Acevedo\**

##### *Introduction*

Under the U.N. Charter, article 2(4) sets forth the fundamental restriction against the use of force. It prescribes: “. . . all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

For many, that provision constitutes a clear example of a peremptory norm of general international law as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Professor Louis Henkin, among others, has pointed out that “the principal development in international law in our time is the law of the United Nations Charter outlawing the use of force in international relations.”<sup>1</sup>

The main aspects of the general prohibition of the use of force are: (i) the nature and scope of the “force” referred to in article 2(4); (ii) the sphere of application: international relations; (iii) the exceptions or qualifying circumstances; (iv) the degree of restriction that can be inferred from a wording that, verbatim, prohibits the threat or use of force “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” and (v) the consequences of unlawful use of force.

A number of recent events in the form of military actions have raised, once again, certain questions with regards to the legitimacy of such actions and with regard to the legal justifications offered by some of the countries that have used military force. In addition, in part as a result of the invasion of Grenada in October 1983, some legal scholars have argued that the provision of the U.N. Charter regarding the nonuse of force may now be somewhat out-of-date.

It has also been argued that good policy may sometimes require violating the rules or may call for interpretations that bend treaty language, and that the United States cannot protect its interests as a superpower and still comply with a literal reading of

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<sup>1</sup>L. HENKIN, *HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY* (2nd ed. 1971) at 135.

the U.N. Charter in the face of Soviet aggression and subversion and internal repression by certain types of regimes. If the Russians "insist on violating these rules," said Professor Eugene V. Rostow, as quoted in the *New York Times* on October 30, 1983, "then pretty soon we are going to start violating them."

Of course no one would deny that the U.N. Charter can only be effective if it is interpreted and applied in a manner commensurate with the requirements of an evolving international community. But the question of how much the language of a peremptory norm that prohibits the threat or use of force can be bent—particularly when the language is bent as the result of a unilateral decision of a single state—is an interesting and difficult problem.

I would like to focus primarily on one aspect of the topic we have before us, namely the question of collective self-defense and the use of regional or subregional authority as a justification for the use of force. Two specific cases will be examined: (a) the Malvinas-Falklands conflict, and (b) the invasion of Grenada.

### *The Malvinas Conflict (1982)*

#### *Background*

On April 2, 1982, Argentine forces invaded the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands. The following day the Security Council demanded an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the islands and called upon both Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to the fundamental dispute. Immediately thereafter the British Government, invoking article 51 of the U.N. Charter (the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense), initiated military preparations with the objective of securing the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the islands.

On April 21, 1982, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), at the request of Argentina, convoked the Organ of Consultation (pursuant to articles 6 and 13 of the Rio Treaty), in order to consider the "serious situation in the South Atlantic," and decided that the Organ of Consultation should meet on April 26, 1982, in Washington, D.C.

The Twentieth Meeting of Consultation acted twice on the Falklands-Malvinas conflict, first, between April 26 and 28, 1982, when the meeting adopted a resolution urging the Government of the United Kingdom "to cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and also to refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security" and urging the Government of Argentina "to refrain from taking any action that may exacerbate the situation." The resolution also asked both governments "to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict."

On May 29, 1982, the same Meeting of Consultation condemned the "unjustified and disproportionate" aggression carried out by the United Kingdom against Argentina and urged the United States "to order the immediate lifting of the coercive measures applied against the Argentine Republic and to refrain from providing material assistance to the United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemispheric solidarity recognized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance."

#### *Action of the OAS: an Appraisal*

There were, of course, several aspects of legal significance which are not directly related to the issue of regional authority and consequently will not be dealt with here.

*The Situation of Grenada*

On October 25, 1983, the United States and seven Caribbean states invaded Grenada. At the outset this action was justified on the grounds that it was designed to: (1) protect innocent lives, particularly those of approximately 1,000 Americans on Grenada; (2) forestall further chaos on the island; and (3) "assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada."

In his testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on November 2, 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam mentioned that two fundamental objectives motivated the President's decision to act in response "to an urgent and formal request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States" (OECS), namely:

- to protect the lives of U.S. citizens; and
- to help Grenada reestablish governmental institutions capable of restoring order, protecting human rights and maintaining peace and stability.

Three grounds were cited as the basis for the invasion: i) a request from the Governor General of Grenada; ii) lawful protection of nationals and humanitarian intervention, and iii) an invitation from the members of the OECS for collective action under the framework of the OECS Treaty.

Intervention in the form of military action for the protection of the intervening state's own nationals is, as Professor Bowett has pointed out, "part of the customary right of self-defense,"<sup>2</sup> provided that the normal requirements are met. These are: failure of a state to accord the protection demanded by international law, actual or imminent danger requiring urgent action, and action proportionate and limited to the necessities of extricating the nationals from the danger. It is not the author's intention to raise here the issue of whether or not those requirements were met. However, the question of whether there exists a broader right of intervention, on purely humanitarian grounds, is a controversial issue. Nevertheless, as Professor John Norton Moore observes, ". . . there is today substantial and growing support for the proposition that 'humanitarian intervention' is lawful under the [United Nations] Charter."<sup>3</sup> There is disagreement on whether or not the action in Grenada was in the interest of humanitarian protection.

With regard to the request of the Governor General of Grenada the issue is by no means clear. *The Economist* reported that Sir Paul Scoon, when confronted on the issue, told the BBC's Richard Lindley that he did not consider intervention necessary until "late Sunday evening" [October 23]. Even then, "what I did ask for was not an invasion but help from outside." In that case, the Governor General's request came after, not before, the decision to invade.<sup>4</sup>

In any event, a review of these questions would require more time than is available here. Therefore, this paper will only examine the reliance on regional authority as a justification for the invasion of Grenada.

This writer is not persuaded by the contention that the legal basis found in article 8(4) of the OECS Treaty, of which Grenada is a member, constitutes an acceptable basis for the intervention that took place.

<sup>2</sup>See Bowett, *The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-defense*, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore, ed. 1974) 44.

<sup>3</sup>See Moore, *Grenada and the International Double Standard*, 78 AJIL 145 (1984) at 154.

<sup>4</sup>*Britain's Grenada Shut-Out*. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 34.

Article 8 of the OECS Treaty provides that collective action may only be undertaken "against external aggression . . . in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations," by unanimous decision of the seven states parties. Apparently neither of these two conditions was fulfilled.

Thus, the members of the OECS and Barbados, Jamaica and the United States justified their action on the basis of an extraordinary interpretation of article 8 of the OECS Treaty, which deals with defense in case of external aggression; that is to say, the action carried out was precisely what the OECS Treaty was designed to protect against.

Professor Moore has argued that

. . . the use of force is lawful under the Charter . . . if authorized by a competent organ of the United Nations, if in individual or collective defense, or if pursuant to action of a regional arrangement "relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" as provided in chapter VIII of the Charter.<sup>5</sup>

He then states that ". . . the Grenada mission by the OECS countries and Barbados, Jamaica and the United States is a paradigm of a lawful regional peacekeeping action under Article 52," and that the OECS Treaty of 1981 is a special regional treaty within articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter.<sup>6</sup>

The question to be asked is: could one call the invasion of Grenada a regional peacekeeping operation under article 52 of the U.N. Charter? The basic characteristics of any peacekeeping force are rather simple: the force must remain above the conflict and never become part of it. Its aim, by definition, is to ensure the cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of peace between conflicting forces. It should not use force except in self-defense, and it must not be one-sided and partisan. Even if this were the case, the fundamental issue is whether a regional (or in this case a subregional) agency can authorize an action involving the use of force without the authorization of the competent organs of the United Nations.

Another important question is whether the size and intensity of the domestic conflict in Grenada (prior to the invasion) could have been categorized as a threat to international peace.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the matter related to *Certain Expenses of the United Nations* is invoked by Professor Moore to support his argument that the invasion of Grenada constituted a peacekeeping operation.

However, the distinction that the Court made concerning peacekeeping operations was based on two factors: (1) the consent of the interested state, and (2) the nature of the mission assigned to the forces, which was not one of combat.

Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force individually. By extension, then, the use of force is prohibited in the case of groups of states and even regional agencies and subregional groups.

Thus, if a regional or subregional agency uses armed force against a given state without the authorization of the Security Council, that agency would be violating (except in the case of collective self-defense) article 2(4) of the Charter.

The Charter does not establish differing criteria vis-à-vis the use of force, be it by a state acting individually and on its own or by a regional or subregional group.

<sup>5</sup>See, *Grenada and the International Double Standard*, *supra* note 3, at 156.

<sup>6</sup>*Id.* at 156-7.

The United States has legitimate security concerns and responsibilities which it cannot neglect. No one is suggesting that it should. Certainly some of the invading countries had reason to be alarmed by the confusion and disorder that was engulfing Grenada at the time of the invasion, but armed invasion was not the only possible response, nor necessarily the best. However desirable the end achieved by the invasion of Grenada may have been for some governments, it is still very difficult to justify the use of regional agencies or arrangements so as to circumvent article 2(4) under the guise of regional peacekeeping action.

### *Conclusion*

Specific instances of impermissible threat of use of force do not stem from any gaps in article 2(4). The prohibition is formulated in very clear terms.

However, the Charter treats such prohibition in the context of a comprehensive collective-security system and the recourse to methods of peaceful settlement of disputes. All aspects of that system are interrelated and equally important.

Therefore, from a strictly legal perspective, the development of a rationale for the effectiveness of the principle of the nonuse of force shall entail, *inter alia*, improving the functioning of the collective security system of the United Nations and the recourse to methods of settlement of disputes. It would not be realistic, however, to expect such an outcome at the present time.

On the other hand, from a close examination of recent—and not so recent—cases, one can hardly argue that article 2(4) is unworkable or outdated.

To consider article 2(4) as unworkable would be equivalent to allowing force as an instrument of international policy. That, of course, would constitute an impermissible conduct, even in the case where it is designed simply to preserve a sphere of influence or, as Professor Reisman would say, to maintain critical defense zones.

#### ARTICLE 2(4): THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

*by W. Michael Reisman\**

“It always lies within the power of a state,” the American doctrinalist Charles Cheney Hyde wrote in 1922, even after the formation of the League of Nations, “. . . to gain political or other advantages over another, not merely by the employment of force, but also by direct recourse to war.”<sup>1</sup> Under traditional international law, war was a licit instrument both for vindicating international rights and for changing them. Under this regime, each state enjoyed a *jus ad bellum*, a right to resort, at its discretion, to war or lesser forms of coercion. Other doctrines, for example, about acquisition of territory by virtue of occupation and effective control, were consistent with this authoritative acknowledgment of the legitimate unilateral and discretionary use of force.

A system of unregulated violence—in which, in the language of the Old Testament, “each man did that which was right in his own eyes”—is inimical to optimally productive human interaction and, of course, loathsome to all but the morally defective. From Bodin and Hobbes on, the international situation was viewed by many as unde-

\*Wesley Newcomb Hohfield Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Myres S. McDougal and Andrew Willard read drafts of this paper and made many useful comments and criticisms. Part of this paper elaborates ideas touched on in an editorial in the *American Journal of International Law* (Summer, 1984) entitled “Construing Article 2(4).”

<sup>1</sup>HYDE, *INTERNATIONAL LAW*, at 189 (1922).

In 1983, the United States entered Grenada and installed a new government. The Security Council resolution calling for, inter alia, ". . . immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada" was vetoed (S/16077/Rev. 1, Oct. 27, 1983). The General Assembly did not issue a resolution.

The differences in international response to these interventions would suggest that there will be tolerance for military interventions which remove a government deemed to have lost its international authority through atrocities and violations of internationally recognized human rights, if the action is not used as a camouflage to change the international political alignment of the government. The international security concern to maintain basic zones and to view efforts at changing such zones as destabilizing, which I will examine in a moment, may account for the relative ease of general acceptance of the actions in Uganda and the Central African Republic and for the continuing appraisal of the interventions in Cambodia and Afghanistan. The Grenada incident would appear to have excited more controversy in the United States than abroad; the critical test there will be the consequences which are not, as yet, clear.

#### *Use of the Military Instrument Within Spheres of Influence*

The term "sphere of influence" which fell into disuse with the rise of the United Nations has been openly used since 1980 by Western political leaders. Its invocation suggests that a rough allocation of the planet into defensive zones underlies their thinking and evaluation. The conception, when used to justify coercive interventions in the affairs of other states, is incompatible with the text of the U.N. Charter. Nevertheless, practice in Eastern Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America suggests that there is a greater tolerance for interventions in spheres of influence or critical defense zones. There are obvious reasons for this pattern of tolerance. Conflicts may erupt from mistakes and misperceptions. Because of the increasing speed, total destructiveness, and irrevocability of the contemporary instruments of violence, minimum world order requires that states communicate to their adversaries, clearly and in advance, exactly which parts of the planet they deem indispensable to their own security and, hence, which expansive political or military changes initiated by or enuring to the benefit of an adversary will be unacceptable and likely to lead to war. These processes of communication are complex. Not all that is demanded is deemed reasonable. Not all that is demanded wins acceptance. The areas referred to in such communications may be reciprocally accepted as what I have called critical defense zones (CDZs). In the past, failure to indicate such zones unequivocally may have contributed to the eruption of conflict.

Since World War II, explicit as well as tacit communication with regard to critical defense zones has been fairly routine. The Soviet Union has insisted on eastern Europe as a defense zone. Without explicitly conceding the propriety of the claim, the Western states have, in effect, complied with the demand. Even at moments of opportunity, such as the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czech "spring" a decade later, the West exploited the events for propaganda value, but refrained from adventures or overt support. This part of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine has been accepted in practice. Conversely, the Monroe Doctrine and corollaries such as the Selden resolution may be viewed as the clearest communication by the United States to adversaries that expansions of power and changes in alliance pattern in the designated zones will be opposed by force. Smaller states have also communicated critical-zone messages to their adversaries with deterrent effect.

CDZs are not tantamount to proprietorship. Unlike spheres of influence in some earlier periods, they do not impart an option erga omnes to annex territory in the zone at some future time. Yet unquestionably, they attenuate the political discretion of elites in the states within the zone and limit the self-determination options of the rank and file there. In this respect, they are offensive to such basic policies of contemporary international law as self-determination and political independence of states, even though they resonate positively with urgent demands for the maintenance of global minimum order.

### *Treaty Sanctioned Interventions*

On a number of occasions, states have sought to intervene militarily by virtue of a bilateral or regional treaty. Such intervention treaties raise special problems in contemporary international law. A treaty between two or more states that purports to allow one state to interfere in the territory of the second state under circumstances to be determined only by the first state would in fact involve a permanent right of intervention in that state, for the interferences would be effected without regard to the conditions prescribed by international law for such actions.

Do treaties that authorize unlimited and untestable interventions by one state in the territory of another state violate per se contemporary international law, or should they be deemed to be of a provisional or even general lawfulness? What are the criteria for regional treaties allowing intervention? Given the stabilizing function performed by defense and latent war community treaties whose lawfulness may be derived from the U.N. Charter, should international law adopt a similarly permissive policy for intervention treaties? These are issues raised in such diverse cases as Iran-U.S.S.R. relations, Egypt-Sudan relations and in the Grenada case. There are marked differences between these cases, but the legal valence of the differences has yet to be gauged. They will require serious consideration.

### *Use of the Military Instrument for the Gathering of Evidence in International Proceedings*

In the *Corfu Channel* case, the International Court of Justice imposed a purely nominal sanction on the United Kingdom for using the military instrument to acquire evidence for international litigation, but permitted the evidence to be admitted and relied substantially upon it in finding in favor of the United Kingdom. In the *Diplomatic Hostages* case, the International Court appears, by implication, to have reversed its thinking on this matter. Hence, it is as yet unclear to what extent international law has developed a type of Fourth Amendment regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained by use of the military instrument.

### *Use of the Military Instrument for International Judgment Enforcement*

Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter provides a centralized method for the enforcement of international judgments. But because the agency of enforcement is the Security Council, efforts at enforcement through the Council are likely to be paralyzed by the veto of a permanent member having a contrary interest. The experience in the *Diplomatic Hostages* case was mentioned earlier. Professor Quincy Wright suggested

a State can use armed force to defend its territory or armed forces against armed attack, to assist others that are victims of such attack, or to assist the United

These instances are merely illustrative. Additional time would permit me to offer many more examples, even if I were to limit myself to the pages of the *American Journal of International Law*. For whatever reasons, our professional history is replete with enthusiastic endorsement of the compatibility of our hemispheric aggressiveness with prevailing norms of international law, and with explanations of the practicality of policies whose lawfulness cannot otherwise be defended.

We should learn. Our forebears' rationalization of the use of force by the United States against the smaller republics of this hemisphere became so humiliating to Latin Americans that the delegitimation of force in the Americas became a major objective of Latin American diplomacy. In 1927 the Inter-American Commission of Jurists recommended the adoption of a principle of noninterference that was simple, direct and uncompromising: "No nation," it said, "has a right to interfere in the internal or foreign affairs of an American Republic against the will of the Republic."

Initially, the United States opposed adoption of the principle. Then, following Franklin D. Roosevelt's election to the Presidency, the United States accepted the Commission's proposal, tentatively at first (in 1933 at the Conference of American States in Montevideo), but by 1936 completely, without reservation (at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, at Buenos Aires). At Buenos Aires the American states declared as "inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any of the Parties" to the declaration. Towards the end of World War II, the principle was reiterated in the so-called Act of Chapultepec, adopted by the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace.

Thus, by the time article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter came to be drafted and adopted at the San Francisco conference, the unilateral resort to armed force in foreign relations had already been deprived of legitimacy in this hemisphere, through the untiring efforts of Latin American diplomats and their insistence that hemispheric relations be based upon this bedrock principle. Following the adoption of the charter, the principle was embodied in the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty, the two major instruments defining the legal regime governing international relations in the Americas. This history, it should be remembered, is not some footnote in the archives of international law. The adoption of the principle of nonintervention, its acceptance by the United States and its emergence as a preeminent element in the law governing hemispheric relations for half a century represent one of the finest achievements of Latin American diplomacy.

Surely, then, its omission from Ambassador Kirkpatrick's remarks earlier today and, I regret to add, from the heart of the Kissinger Commission's report should not go unchallenged. At best, it represents indifference; at worst, outright contempt. The effect in either case is to pretend that, like article 2(4) of the Charter, inter-American treaty commitments are minor impediments to any inclination to interpose American military force to bring about a change of policy or governments in the Americas.

I have so little time remaining that I can only allude briefly to what was to have been the subject of the concluding portion of my remarks; that is, the techniques (other than blatant omission) international lawyers have used to justify otherwise intolerable violations of article 2(4). I will try to be brief, mentioning only one and leaving to another occasion a fuller development of this topic.

One technique one sees being used is that of saying that article 2(4) is simply one provision among many in the Charter and that in appraising the lawfulness of a state's resort to force it is necessary to refer to the purposes for which the force is employed. When Ambassador Kirkpatrick spoke to the U.N. Security Council last October in a

vain attempt to persuade the other members of the Council that the use of force in Grenada was legally justified, she said: "The prohibitions against the use of force in the United Nations Charter are contextual, not absolute. They provide ample justification for the use of force in pursuit of the other values also inscribed in the Charter—freedom, democracy, peace . . ." (Reprinted at 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74 [1983]) Thus explained, article 2(4) is reduced to an incidental means to the attainment of a primary goal, rather than—as its negotiating history would suggest—an objective rule of treaty law and, by now, general international law.

What is unfortunate is not so much that a U.S. Government official should seriously advance this proposition as that we who are committed to the influence of international law should let it go unanswered. Here, too, I think the explanation lies in a kind of permissive pragmatism. But clearly I have now used the time available to me and I must hope that these brief thoughts stimulate you to wonder how pragmatic we have been, and are being, in allowing the executive to assume the province of international law for us.

#### COMMENT BY JORDAN J. PAUST\*

My comments will be directed primarily to Professor Reisman's paper, with apologies to the two other main speakers. I am in partial disagreement with the other two speakers, but with Michael Reisman I must necessarily agree, for the most part.

Professor Reisman's analysis of post-charter trends in normative formation is apt. He has successfully shown that the issue of permissibility can involve complex assessments of relevant charter precepts, other legal policies at stake, and various features of context. I agree with much of his analysis of the trends and his identification of relevant policies at stake. What is troubling, however, is his implicit assumption that article 2(4) was initially, and by textual structure, designed to prohibit *all* forms of "unilateral resort to coercion." A similar point is made about "mechanistic interpretation" or "strict construction." In contrast to such an assumption, and to Mr. Acevedo's introductory point, and perhaps as recognized by Ed Gordon (who speaks of ambiguity with regard to article 2(4) and of merely a "core" of prohibition), *not all* force is prohibited under article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter. In clear terms, the only force prohibited is that used (1) "against the territorial integrity" of a state, (2) "against . . . the political independence" of a state, or (3) "in any other manner inconsistent with" the major purposes of the Charter, which include, of course, the promotion of self-determination and the serving of human rights. Thus, impermissible force would include that used to deprive a people of self-determination, say in South Africa, or of their human rights (*e.g.*, the right to equal participation in the political process and to a government that is responsive to and represents the will of the people, as recognized in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Further, as Reisman must surely agree, there is express recognition today in the authoritative 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law of the right of a relevant people to receive self-determination assistance (SDA, if you wish) or what Professor Blaustein and I recognized in the Bangladesh context as the right of a people seeking self-determination to assistance and the correlative right of outside parties to provide that assistance when armed force has been used against the people entitled to self-determination or in some other appropriate context.

As the 1970 Declaration affirms, "Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives" a relevant people "of their right to self-determination

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...” and “. . . in their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action . . . such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.” Indeed, self-determination assistance, in a proper context, is not only compatible with the purposes of the Charter set forth in article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3 for example, but it is also serving of such charter precepts and of the obligations of member states under articles 55(c) and 56 of the charter. Importantly, self-determination and human rights are also significant charter precepts. Stability, or an Orwellian peace, at the price of human rights and self-determination is certainly not required by article 2, paragraph 4. As Reisman notes with a slightly different emphasis: “Without effective international machinery, the alternative to self-help,” we might add, to collective help, “is no help.”

Importantly also, Reisman notes that article 2(4) was designed, at least in part, to serve “political independence” in order to promote “political legitimacy” or, one might say, to promote the precept of authority documented now in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, article 2(4) was not designed to promote domestic elite oppressions, tyranny or the denial of human rights and self-determination. Indeed, it is now commonplace to affirm that the pretended cloak of “sovereignty” or “political independence” ends where human rights begin. He and I agree that, at least today “. . . each application of article 2(4) must enhance opportunities for ongoing self-determination.” Rightly he relates some of these points also to Grenada, although Grenada involves additional complexities.

Again, we seem to disagree, in part, only with reference to the early prohibitions under, and the textual language of, article 2(4). To stress a point, it is not difficult today to read article 2(4) as allowing, or at least not prohibiting per se, (1) evacuation missions a la Entebbe, (2) self-determination assistance, or (3) other forms of force which are not used against territorial “integrity” or political “independence” as such, or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the charter, but which in fact serve such purposes and otherwise meet traditional norms or principles of necessity and proportionality. Similarly, it is too simplistic for others to read nonintervention clauses as prohibiting per se these forms of force. To pretend, for example, that self-determination assistance is prohibited necessarily by language proscribing intervention “in the internal or external affairs of” a given state is to beg the very question raised by such language, *i.e.*, whether in an interdependent world the oppression of human rights an self-determination is the “affair of” a single state and not also an affair of the international community or a regional organization. Taking Reisman’s sheriff hypo a bit further, if in one community the sheriff is utterly incapable of maintaining order, or if the sheriff would deny human rights to participation and self-determination, it is not difficult to imagine that a marshal would be welcomed and could properly enter to restore law, self-determination and human rights. These points have implications with respect to Grenada, but my time is severely limited. Let me add with regard to Grenada that an interesting complication involves the dichotomy posed between articles 20 and 22 and articles 28 and 137 of the OAS Charter, article 137 referring back necessarily to the prioritization of U.N. Charter norms, since peace is ultimately inter-related with self-determination and human rights, especially under the primary instrument, the U.N. Charter.

Let me end, however, with the following points. Recently in the *American Journal of International Law*, Chris Joyner has written: “[I]nternational law regards civil strife as strictly a domestic matter, beyond the legal purview of other states.” And Professors Boyle, Falk, Nunes, Weston et al have written that: “. . . chronic disorder in a country does not permit neighboring states to intervene for the purpose of reestab-

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice who, in a related context said: "Aiming at order and liberality, his concepts by their very breadth open the door to anarchy and abuse."

I think it is also incumbent upon me to make some response to comments that have been made with regard to Grenada. I think the U.S. Government exercised a degree of modesty at the legal level in carefully indicating three reasons why it felt the act was justified without attempting to ground it on any one of them alone without prejudice to whether or not the act could be justified on any others of those grounds, and I appreciate the closing modesty of Professor Gordon as he directly approached the Grenada problem and indicated that it was complex, and judgments were not easy. I think it is worth bearing in mind—and I do not agree with a contextual analysis of article 2(4)—that this menacing action was urged by a very menacing group of countries: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, Jamaica and Barbados. That's where the urge to act as a collective came from. It came in response to a request from the lawful authorities. The action which was taken involved the protection of nationals. By any reasonable definition of the term regional or regional organization, *ie.*, one which is regional in character that is concerned with the maintenance of peace and security and that has principles consistent with the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is a regional organization. I will touch later on why I am not troubled by the idea of a regional organization engaging in a peacekeeping activity. I don't think there is any doubt of the right to protect nationals. I think it is fair to demand a very high standard of threat before action is taken. I think probably one could quote the *Caroline* language and not be too far off. It should be instant, overwhelming and leave no choice of means and no moment for deliberating. I think in light of the circumstances that were obtaining and the chaos that existed on the island—the refusal to respond to U.S. requests for the removal or permission to leave of American nationals, by whatever means was considered convenient, by charter, by ship, by commercial airline; the failure to respond to those requests; the promise to open the airport followed by the failure to open the airport—that those criteria were reasonably met, and it is unreasonable to attempt to argue that they were not met. The United States, I believe did not ground its action exclusively on the protection of nationals because we did not intend to go in, get the nationals out and then leave. We intended, in cooperation with the states whose names I have read out, to engage in a peacekeeping operation response to the request of the Governor-General of the island. I don't think one can have an enforcement action by invitation. So I am not much impressed by the idea that it's an enforcement action. I am also not much impressed by the notion that somehow the OAS Charter forbids it. Article 22 of the OAS Charter says: "... measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties, do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in article 18 and 20," which are the key principles that were complained of. This language, I think we can all recognize, means something other than self-defense. I don't think any lawyer we know would draft language speaking of "... measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties" not constituting a violation if all they had in mind was self-defense. They have in mind, it seems to me at least, possibly the exact kind of actions that were undertaken, or at least they cannot be said to rule it out, and I also cannot understand how a term like "existing treaties" and I emphasize the plural, can be thought to mean only the Rio Treaty. I presume that if people meant the Rio Treaty they would have said the Rio Treaty.

I think that in light of that measure of justification, which I have sketched out so very briefly, it is exceedingly hard to maintain that the action of the United States, acting in concert with a number of other countries, indeed with the OECS, is in some way an activity which should cause us all immense concern that there is a failure in the legal system and yet another example of the demise of article 2(4). I would like to explain why I think it is important to act in concert with the OECS in addition to the technical arguments relating to it being a peacekeeping operation. I think if you recognize the interests of those states, the concerns of those states, then I think the fact that the United States was requested by those states to act casts a very clear light on the nature of the act itself, and I don't think it is possible to understand the nature of the act by ignoring who it was who made the request. I think that ought to move one further along the road to a relative lack of concern that this is yet another example of a nail being driven into the coffin of article 2(4). Now I must say I share the view that it is not dead, and I am concerned that temptations to regard it as dead or as inextricably linked to articles which are not functioning run much greater risks than are run by—what am I guilty of? facile post facto justifications? There are limits to what you can get away with, no matter how facile you are by way of a post-facto justification, but I think the other routes probably lead to trouble without limit.

#### DISCUSSION

In opening the panel to questions and comments from the floor, Professor BILDER raised two questions which he suggested the panel members might like to address: First, how would Ambassador Kirkpatrick answer the question, "Is article 2(4) still workable?" Second, what did the panel think of the administration's position, as stated by Ambassador Kirkpatrick at this Annual Meeting, that Nicaragua's alleged assistance to the rebels in El Salvador constituted an "armed attack" on El Salvador, justifying U.S. action against Nicaragua in the exercise of "collective self defense" with El Salvador? What effect was that position likely to have on the continued viability of article 2(4)? Professor BILDER added that he was sure that he was not the only one to feel a sense of *deja vu* on hearing this argument, which seemed reminiscent of the U.S. position during the Vietnam War and the famous State Department White Paper issued at that time with the title, "Aggression from the North."

BURNS H. WESTON:\* I, too, with Professors Gordon and Reisman, share a common intellectual paternity, to use Michael's phrase. And I'm proud of it. But I have some reservations that I wish to express in light of the discussion here today. My question is directed primarily to Professor Reisman, secondarily to Professor Gordon.

By the way, for those who may enjoy the spectacle of former McDougal-Lasswell students battling it out, let me hasten to add that, like any theoretical system, the McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudence is subject to differing interpretation and therefore disagreements even among its followers. Anyway, it's a very healthy sign, I think, that those of us who are struggling to come to grips with the most monumental contribution to international law in this century should find ourselves in honest intellectual debate. I offer what I have to say in that spirit.

The question I wish to pose represents, I believe, a joinder of the issues that exist between Professor Reisman and Professor Gordon.

One of Ed Gordon's basic themes is that we live in a voluntarist legal community where processes of autointerpretation predominate. The question naturally arises as

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To Michael Reisman, a few words. Without dwelling upon the gloomy picture one notices after undertaking an appraisal of state practice on article 2(4) and of the unilateral use of force in the international arena, it is desirable that ambiguities in article 2(4) be carefully studied, as many of my colleagues have done. Obviously, territorial integrity, political independence, and use of force inconsistent with the charter provisions are all normatively ambiguous concepts and have a direct bearing on the ambiguities plaguing article 2(4). However, I would still not discard article 2(4), but would rather explore mechanisms to strengthen the existing international norms and institutions and to fashion new ones where necessary so as to minimize the impermissible use of force. In my article on Grenada (14 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 398 [1984]), I have concluded that the legal basis for the U.S. action "are at best tenuous."

YOZO YOKOTA:\* I am a little annoyed by repeated reference by a number of previous speakers, to the ambiguity of article 2, paragraph 4, of the U.N. Charter. As I read the text, the wording is quite clear, simple and easy to understand. It unequivocally tells us that all U.N. members should refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. This provision is much clearer and much less ambiguous than article 11 of the charter which defines the power and responsibility of the General Assembly regarding the maintenance of international peace and security or article 51 which stipulates the right of self-defense. It seems to me that the cause of the problem is not so much the ambiguity of article 2, paragraph 4, itself, but rather the efforts of some people who try to justify certain actions that are essentially unjustifiable under this provision. In the process of such efforts, the meanings of certain words contained in the provision have suffered distortion and overly broad or narrow definitions. This is the cause of the problem—not the text of article 2, paragraph 4, which in my view still stands today clear, simple, and easy to understand.

MORRIS WOLFF:\*\* I would like to ask Mr. Rosenstock a question, *i.e.* since he is within the governmental structure. It is hard for some of us as international law enthusiasts to determine the chronology or the log book that may have existed when the "invitation" by the Eastern Caribbean States was issued to the United States to come in and to take certain initiatives in Grenada. Could it have been like crashing a party to which a person was not invited, and having not been invited the person asks some of the people who were closer to the scene, Would you be kind enough to invite me so that I may come to the party? or was it the other way around? Was it an aroused interest and concern by the member states you have cited which led to an invitation to the United States, as you have indicated? Or did we invite ourselves in because of an aggressive interest in becoming involved in internal matters of a sovereign nation? I would enjoy your perception or clarification on that, because you occupy a status different from that which many of us occupy.

Mr. ROSENSTOCK: It was very definitely the case of the request coming to us. If you think about it, and I read off the names of the countries involved, assuming that they acted in good faith and of their own free will, it would make some considerable amount of sense that they would be disinclined to take on the armed camp that existed in Grenada at the time, and therefore it ought not to be the least bit surprising that they came and sought help, and that is precisely what happened. The indications are that at a certain stage we did discuss with some other governments whether or not it

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\*\*Professor of Law, Delaware Law School.

would be a good idea to get Mr. Bishop out alive. Among the responses was, Hell no, we didn't try to get the people he put in the slammer or killed out, how are we going to justify getting that guy out? Now, I don't think that was an invitation to go in in an operation of the nature that occurred. I am trying to avoid using either the loaded term "invasion" or perhaps even a term some might regard as loaded, "peacekeeping," but I do not think it is reasonable to conclude, and I think it somewhat disturbing to suggest, that we somehow twisted their arms until they asked us to please do it. That's not what happened. If you think about the facts, it is really much more plausible that they were concerned living next to what was going on down there, and it is much more plausible that they were not prepared to take that situation on without help, and it is not implausible that they turn to us, and that is substantially what happened.

Professor GORDON: Let me say two things to Professor Wolff. First, as to Bob Rosenstock's status. There are some things that Bob is in a position to say, and some things that he is not. The same is true for lawyers with the Legal Adviser's Office. I may not get any other appropriate occasion to say this, so let me say it now: Those of us on the Grenada Committee have a great deal of respect for Davis Robinson and his reply to our memorandum. It's a very intelligent reply, very narrowly focused. It is to his and the Legal Adviser's Office's credit that they have tried to make the Grenada intervention a very isolated case. It is possible that they were not involved in the planning of the action, they were not necessarily involved in the initial justification of what was done, and it is even conceivable that to this day they don't know what was actually done. *The Economist* which—on other grounds—supported the action by the United States in Grenada, three or four weeks ago came out with a four-page summary of what had happened and concluded that the story of the invitation by Sir Paul Scoon appears to have been wholly concocted by the State Department after the fact to calm the diplomatic uproar. I don't know whether that's true or not: I don't know whether Mr. Rosenstock knows whether it's true or not. There is a tendency to point one's finger and say, You should have done this, and you should have done that. The fact is the government's lawyers are not always in a position to do what they would like to do.

ROSALIND THOMAS:\* My question is specific to the Grenadian issue and directed to Mr. Rosenstock. You emphasized that the legality of the U.S. action was based on the OECS Treaty; I would like to ask if he is aware of three points that I would like to make. First of all, that the treaty was not registered at the United Nations at the time it was invoked in defense of the action, and in terms of article 102, paragraph 2, it cannot be used in its defense; second, that article 53, paragraph 1 which deals with regional arrangements expressly forbids enforcement action by any state without Security Council authorization, and third, that the OECS Treaty itself—I think it's in article 8—calls for unanimous agreement by all the member signatories to the treaty to act on collective defense matters. Not all the countries that called on the United States for assistance were signatories to that treaty; two of the members were not parties to that decision, and furthermore Barbados, and I think Jamaica was the other one, were not parties to the treaty, and also they had no right to even involve themselves with the OECS Treaty. How does he explain that, or does he merely ignore those points?

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Mr. ROSENSTOCK: I think myself that the fact that the treaty was not registered is a *de minimus* matter. The treaty was sent to the United Nations. The failure to have it officially registered was due to minor technical defects which in any event don't go to the validity of anything other than pleading it before the United Nations where we are not. I said I didn't think it was "enforcement action." If that was enforcement action, well then there is a legal problem, but I don't think it is for reasons I already gave. I don't particularly want to get into the minutia of the operation of the OECS in relation to the treaty; I would just note that some of the defects which might be thought to exist with regard to article 8 do not exist with regard to article 6 which is broader in its scope, and in the hope I don't stimulate a request from Professor Wolff to prove how I know it. I would suggest that maybe article 8 was complied with in the sense of unanimity by way of the fact of the request from the Governor General, and I would also note that if one had a case in which there really was absolutely no authority on the island worthy of the name "government," then I think one would probably be in the awkward position of invalidating the entire organization in exactly those cases in which it is meant to function if that incapacity to assent were to be regarded as a reason for taking no action.

#### CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Mr. ACEVEDO: I'll just answer the question concerning the concept of armed attack. Someone in the audience asked why we didn't refer to the concept of armed attack as mentioned in the speech by Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and of course, if there is an armed attack article 51 is very clear, it authorizes the exercise of the right of self-defense. Now whether there is, or there has been, an armed attack by Nicaragua, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated; that is the main and most important point. Her views seem somewhat reminiscent of the so-called "accumulations of events" theory. I would also like to respond to the argument that the invasion of Grenada was not inconsistent with article 2(4) since it did not impair the territorial integrity or the political independence of Grenada. Of course that is not necessarily a requirement according to the prevailing view in international law, by virtue of the rejection of that argument by the International Court of Justice when it was made by Great Britain in the *Corfu Channel Case*, in relation to Operation Retail (a mine sweeping operation in Albanian territorial waters) which was considered impermissible by the Court in that case.

Professor REISMAN: I have a few comments to make in response to some of the statements made by the commentators, and I would like to make a few remarks about some of the very interesting comments made from the floor today. I agree completely with Mr. Ferencz and Ambassador Elaraby, that in the long term we have to bring about basic structural changes. If one can revive the fundamental enforcement operations of the charter, that would be fine. But I would emphasize that that is a long-term operation. None of you believes for a moment that this can be accomplished in time for the next Grenada, the next Central African Republic, the next Uganda or whatever. Hence the question is, How do you evaluate unilateral coercion in the absence of an effective centralized operation? You cannot evade that issue by saying that we ought to bring about structural changes. This is a pressing question. It must be addressed.

I disagree strongly with Mr. Rosenstock's characterization of what I am suggesting as a just war, unjust war doctrine. It is not. Putting it in those terms makes it more difficult to think about an aspect of unyielding reality we simply have to face. Whether you call it just or unjust war, degrees of violation of article 2(4), or as Mc-

Dougal and Feliciano have called it, permissible and impermissible coercions, in the final analysis, you have to make judgments about whether coercions applied unilaterally are lawful or unlawful. Was the French entry into the Central African Republic and the removal of the government there lawful or unlawful? Was Tanzanian entry into Uganda lawful or unlawful? Was the U.S. entry into Grenada doing the same sorts of things lawful or unlawful? Was the Soviet entry into Afghanistan lawful or unlawful? Our visitor from Michigan said that textually the article is not ambiguous. I agree it is not. But the moment you acknowledge either as Mr. Nanda says that there is a discretion as to some issues that can be brought in or as I've suggested that the entire organizational context in which article 2(4) was to have been put is not effective, you have to develop some method for making appraisals. That seems to me to be the task to which we ought to apply ourselves.

How do we make judgments on those matters? I agree completely with Professor Gordon. We are in a position of some influence. We are consulted; many of us play roles in decision; many of us can influence the media indirectly and in a larger sense influence democratic processes that influence decisionmakers. We need some method for making appraisals. If you say that article 2(4) is an absolute prohibition, then all the cases I have cited are unlawful, and it's very easy. If, like me, you don't say that, in cases I have just cited and many more that I have treated in my paper, then the question is what are the criteria for determining lawfulness when they occur or for advising decisionmakers before they occur. That is the central issue. With all due respect to Mr. Rosenstock, whose remarks I enjoyed very much, I don't think that he succeeds in getting away from it. After the conclusion of his presentation we come back to the same question, How do we make judgments about unilateral uses of coercion and determine whether or not they are lawful or unlawful?

I can't conclude without making a remark about Professor Sundburg's observation. My use of the notion of "contending public order systems" rather than "superpower" betokens the view of the school that I am a part of which says that the content of different public order systems, different states and the values they are concerned with are important factors in understanding how they behave and also what they will do if they are successful in particular.

Mr. ROSENSTOCK: I agree with Professor Reisman that there are problems. I just had problems with his answers, and if indeed he is right, that my thoughts on graduation lead to the same end, well then, obviously that is also not a successful way out of the dilemma.

Ambassador ELARABY: To wind up in a minute, I believe that so many hear that article 2 paragraph 4 is alive, it's not dead, it's not ambiguous, that we have to interpret it in a very large sense, exactly as we have to interpret article 51 in a very strict sense. We cannot encourage member states to go to the United Nations and to go to the Security Council unless we give them hope that something will come out of it. We have to define certain ideas. We have to institutionalize and use and develop some of the useful concepts that are now more or less neglected by peacekeeping by the United Nations, and as a final point in answer to Professor Reisman, I think that no one will be able to identify the criteria that he is looking for but a centralized organization like the United Nations. In his illustration about the sheriff, I believe that most of the western films I have seen had happy endings in which a new sheriff came and was able to restore order.

Professor PAUST: I agree that article 2(4) is not dead, but it seems that its meaning is clear in several directions. Having criticized a single portion of the statement of Weston et al, in the *American Journal of International Law*, I would like to point out,

since Grenada has come up at several points in our discussion, that I am really unpersuaded by the notion that the United States went into Grenada to protect our nationals who, under the relevant test, must have been under a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm, and I am equally unpersuaded that the actual use of force was proportionate to such a threat, if it existed, although the use of force was possibly much more proportionate in the Grenada circumstance than in the case of mining of harbors of Nicaragua that seemed to lead to the destruction of ships of our friends.

Professor GORDON: I have three points to make. The first is in defense of Professor Sundberg, having heard him at the American Branch Meeting of the International Law Association last fall. I can assure you, Michael, he is equally enthusiastic in excoriating his own colleagues from Scandinavia. He took the occasion of the American Branch meeting to rake one of them over the coals thoroughly. We are getting off fairly light. My other two points really relate to something more fundamental about what Professor Sundberg said: the notion that we hadn't really responded to Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think we have, and I think we've been kind to her. In fact I think the best response to her is the one that John Stuart Mill once gave. He said that nations, like individuals, ought to suspect some fault in themselves when they find they are generally worse thought of than they think they deserve, and they may well know that they are somehow at fault when almost everybody but themselves think them crafty and hypocritical. Another response goes back to something that Tom Franck said in an article not too long ago, and that was that "... any nation to remain great must sustain a self image of its greatness." I think one of the tragedies of the past week, certainly, is that we have been deprived of our sense of greatness. I consider that to be a violation, not just of a particular legal norm, but of a part of our national heritage.

ROBIN A. COOPER\*  
*Reporter*

### CYPRUS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT

The panel convened at 2:00 p.m., April 12, 1984, John Lawrence Hargrove\*\* presiding.

#### REMARKS BY JAMES H. WOLFE\*\*\*

Events on Cyprus have entered a critical phase. In May 1983 the U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution calling for withdrawal of occupation troops from the Republic of Cyprus and an intensification of the U.N. effort to restore the constitutional unity of the two communities. A subsequent initiative by the U.N. Secretary General proved unavailing; on November 15 the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared its intention to strive for statehood and has adhered to this position despite a U.N. Security Council resolution denying validity to such a secessionist act. Although both sides presented proposals for negotiation to the Secretary General in January 1984, the gap between the two positions on constitutional and territorial questions remains

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Eventually, Professor BOYLE noted, U.S. military intervention in Central America and the Caribbean Basin proved unpopular at home, generating 75 years before much of the same debate heard today. The U.S. Government gradually pulled the Marines out of the area, starting in the Hoover Administration and finishing during the Roosevelt Administration. With the withdrawal of the Marines, however, the United States put in a series of military dictatorships throughout Central America and the Caribbean Basin. According to Professor BOYLE, at the root of the current problems in the area were the same dictatorships or their lineal successors. It was these dictatorships, originally put into power as surrogate of the United States, which the people of Central America and the Caribbean Basin were trying to overthrow.

Referring to a dual tension in U.S. policy at the time, Professor BOYLE said that many international lawyers had believed that unilateral military intervention was prohibited by international law and was undesirable as a long-term course for U.S. foreign policy. This group of American international lawyers had built the foundation of the inter-American system; they had been instrumental in organizing the first International American Conference and successive conferences as well. They also had been instrumental in the creation of the Pan-American Union and in the negotiation and sponsorship of a series of international arbitral conventions and treaties prohibiting the use of force and intervention which had been meant to lay to rest the specter of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Charter of the OAS also had been framed with this purpose, especially the provision of the charter prohibiting intervention in the domestic affairs of American states for any reason. While this provision was supposed to represent the interment of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Professor BOYLE said, the Reagan Administration just didn't see it that way.

President Reagan was patterning himself, Professor BOYLE said, on Theodore Roosevelt. He commented that the Reagan Administration's geopolitical approach to American foreign policy, its strategic design, simply represented a Machiavellian approach to international relations. The situation in Grenada was mentioned by Professor BOYLE as indicative of the drift of the Reagan Administration's approach toward the entire Caribbean Basin, which perceived that area as a whole strategic region because of its proximity to the Panama Canal.

Referring to an article he had written in 1982, Professor BOYLE said that it had been obvious from a number of developments at that time that the Reagan Administration was planning either to invade Grenada or launch a coup. He mentioned the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) proposal for a coup in Grenada which had been submitted to the Senate Intelligence Committee; it had been rejected subsequently. He also noted that a dress rehearsal for the coup had been held one year prior to the actual invasion. Professor BOYLE went on to mention a letter in the April AJIL in which he and other international lawyers elaborated the legal arguments against the invasion of Grenada. In response to a piece by Professor John Norton Moore stressing the legality of U.S. actions in Grenada on the basis of the request by the Governor-General of Grenada for U.S. assistance, Professor BOYLE mentioned a special report in *The Economist*, which stated that the request came after, not before, the decision to invade Grenada had been made by President Reagan. According to *The Economist*, as quoted by Professor BOYLE: "This Scoon request was almost certainly a fabrication concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy."<sup>2</sup> Professor BOYLE added that

<sup>2</sup>THE ECONOMIST, March 10, 1984, at 34.

only the gullible would believe that the invitation to invade should be credited with any legal significance at all.

Commenting on Professor Moore's discussion of the capacity and role of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), Professor BOYLE said that he was confusing the OECS, an article 51 collective self-defense arrangement analogous to the Rio Pact, with a chapter 8 regional organization. One could not transfer chapter 8 powers to an article 51 arrangement like the OECS and hope to turn it thereby into a chapter 8 arrangement. Professor BOYLE reiterated that if there had been a real threat posed by the situation in Grenada, President Reagan should have gone to the OAS, the only chapter 8 organization in the Western Hemisphere; this action was never taken because it was clear that the OAS would never have supported a U.S. intervention in Grenada. Professor BOYLE contrasted this with the actions of the Kennedy Administration during the Cuban missile crisis. Realizing that the proposed naval blockade would be difficult to justify under article 51, the Kennedy Administration went to the OAS for an endorsement of the blockade. President Reagan didn't even bother, Professor BOYLE said, because he realized the futility of such a move.

In the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965, President Johnson had invaded without anyone's authorization, claiming, like President Reagan, threats to U.S. lives and property. Once the U.S. intervened, Professor BOYLE noted, President Johnson realized that the legal basis for continued occupation was weak and went to the OAS for endorsement of continued U.S. presence in the guise of an Inter-American peacekeeping force. Professor Boyle went on to argue that the real origin of the Brezhnev Doctrine lay in the actions of the United States in the Dominican Republic in 1965. He commented that the arguments raised by the Soviet Union in the Security Council to justify the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia had been remarkably similar to those made by the Johnson Administration during the invasion of the Dominican Republic.

U.S. intervention in Grenada was significant because the Reagan Administration was relying on the same precedent in Central America. Professor BOYLE said that the Administration had taken the Condeca Pact, which was functionally similar to the OECS Charter, had reactivated it, and had intimated that it might repeat in Central America its actions in Grenada. Professor BOYLE commented that the Reagan Administration was pursuing a lawless policy toward Nicaragua, in violation of the OAS Charter, the U.N. Charter, and even of U.S. domestic law, including the Neutrality Act, the Boland Amendment and the War Powers Act. Furthermore, the Reagan Administration was disputing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the brainchild of Elihu Root.

Professor BOYLE went on to argue that if the facts in the Nicaraguan case were as clear as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said they were, the Reagan Administration should be prepared to submit its case to the World Court. Professor BOYLE said he didn't agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that the facts were clear. The U.S. Government's refusal to make its case before the World Court raised suspicion in Professor BOYLE's mind that the facts even existed.

Professor BOYLE argued that a unilateral military intervention by the Reagan Administration would not resolve the problem in Central America; rather, the solution to the problem lay in negotiations within the OAS framework. He emphasized that the United States was a founding member of the OAS, which had been created as a mechanism for nations of the Western Hemisphere to resolve their own regional problems, apart from the threat of external attack and aggression. Yet Reagan had completely ignored the OAS.

To interdict the alleged flow of arms across the border to El Salvador from Honduras and Nicaragua, Professor BOYLE suggested that an OAS peacekeeping force be put in. Or, since Nicaragua wouldn't accept the legitimacy of the OAS because of the absence of Cuba, a U.N. peacekeeping force could be used to monitor the flow of arms in one direction and the flow of Contras in the other. Similarly, in El Salvador, where only the Reagan Administration and the military dictator did not want negotiations, an OAS peacekeeping force could be used to supervise the elections, much like the OAS did successfully in the Dominican Republic.

According to Professor BOYLE, the solution to the problem in Central America lay in a collective multilateral response through the OAS, not through unilateral military intervention as envisioned by the Reagan Administration. This was the way the founders of the ASIL had seen it 75 years before; this was the approach Professor BOYLE himself supported. He closed his remarks with an expression of hope that others in the audience would see it that way also.

#### REMARKS BY ALLAN GERSON\*

I will not begin this evening by correcting at length the inaccurate characterization of Ambassador Kirkpatrick's remarks this afternoon by Professor Francis Boyle. Suffice it to say at this point that the thrust of her remarks was that individuals serious about the rule of law cannot ignore, cannot afford to ignore, that the first rule of law is the equal application of the law. Such individuals cannot dismiss summarily that argument in the way that Professor Boyle has. Professor Boyle talks about past U.S. mistakes. We have made mistakes. And I'll have more to say about that later. What I wish to do this evening is talk as one international lawyer to another about certain common problems.

After being introduced at past meetings of the Society, I usually began with the caveat that although a U.S. Government official (then with the U.S. Department of Justice) my remarks were not being made in my official capacity and should not, therefore, be construed as representing the views of the U.S. Government. Tonight, I speak in my official capacity, although I would express the same views were I to speak in my nonofficial role as a writer and student of international law.

In preparing for this evening's talk, I wondered what was there that I could say that was new, that had not been said previously by the President, by the Secretary of State, by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, that had not been addressed by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, and in various congressional hearings. The answer, I am afraid, is not very much, but I shall try.

The political problems faced by the United States in dealing with the crisis in Central America are complex and multifaceted, as are the factors that give rise to the conflict; the legal issues involved are not, I believe, difficult to deal with. As with any political or legal problem, it is useful, I believe, to begin with an examination of who wants what and how they seek to achieve what they want. What do the people and government of El Salvador want? What do the anti-El Salvador government FMLN-FDR guerrillas want? What are the goals of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and of the coalition of Nicaraguan opposition forces popularly known as the Contras? And what is it that Nicaragua and the United States want, and how do they seek to obtain their objectives? Without understanding the premises and presumptions underlying the behavior of the parties, we cannot expect, I am afraid, to deal adequately with the legal issues presented.

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intimidating the Nicaraguan Government. In the last week, we have learned that the CIA has mined three ports of Nicaragua to the damage of Japanese, Dutch, Panamanian, Soviet and other vessels. The United States has since been in the role, once unique to the USSR, of vetoing Security Council Resolutions otherwise unanimously supported with the exception of the abstention of the United Kingdom, criticizing this blockade.

From my own service on an interdepartmental blockade committee during World War II—I was with the Board of Economic Warfare then—I have no doubt that the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors constitutes an act of war, that it is in conflict with international law, and as Premier Mitterand has said, with humanitarian considerations. The other situation indicating the administration's propensity for going it alone is the Grenada invasion, which was an invasion searching for a justification. I would like to indicate what the justifications were, and how they have been successively abandoned. For example, if the United States is intervening to preserve democratic institutions, why, under international law, couldn't the USSR do the same to preserve socialist institutions, as it was doing in Afghanistan? In fact, the U.S. invasion of Grenada was cited as a precedent by South Africa when it recently bombed guerrilla outposts in Angola. I'm not shedding tears over the Communists who massacred Maurice Bishop for the crime of trying to establish better relations with the United States, but I want to call attention to the fact that the OAS has criticized the United States for going in this direction, not out of any sympathy for Communism, but simply because there is machinery available under the OAS Charter. Likewise, there was an overwhelming vote in the U.N. General Assembly condemning and criticizing this kind of intervention.

I would conclude by noting the Declaration of Independence; the colonies promulgated it out of decent respect for the opinion of mankind. The United States was a fourth-rate power then, but it received international support for the Declaration. Now the United States is a world power and must still maintain a position of decent respect for the opinions of mankind. I am afraid that's not being done with respect to Grenada, Nicaragua or El Salvador.

MARTIN FEINRIDER:\* Professor Boyle has compared the substance of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America with that of 75 years ago, an observation I generally agree with. But as troubling as that comparison is, more troubling is the fact that the style of the present administration harkens back 15 years ago to the days of Richard Nixon, or 20 years, to Lyndon Johnson. As one of the people who applauded Professor Copelon's comments, I want to have the decency of explaining to Mr. Gerson why I did so. This has been a whale of a week for me as an international lawyer, beginning with an Orwellian tour de force by the President which provoked the near-impossible, an almost unanimous resolution by this very heterogeneous Society deploring the rejection of World Court jurisdiction. This afternoon, Ambassador Kirkpatrick filibustered us, taking bits and pieces apparently from various speeches she has delivered previously, taking only two questions and rather cynically not answering either of them. This evening, in comparing the good versus the evil empires in the world, you called to mind the 1962 deception by the USSR in the Cuban missile crisis, and you called to mind the Korean incident, the airliner incident. Do you think, sir, that we don't remember the U-2 affair? Do you think, and I have a real problem going into detail, because we've only reserved these rooms until Saturday, do you think we don't remember the lies regarding Vietnam? Sir, this administration underestimated

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we have never purported to do it; only in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. And why? Again, the historical record shows that Wilson and his successors have always used this policy as a pretext to intervene and use force to put in governments favorably disposed to the interests of the United States. It had nothing at all to do with democracy the first, second and third times we intervened in Nicaragua; it had nothing at all to do with democracy when we intervened in Grenada; and it has nothing at all to do with democracy in El Salvador or Nicaragua today.

Professor COPELON: I have a few brief comments. In response to Alfred Rubin, I am shocked to hear that the attempt to enforce international norms is fun and games. I take very seriously the effort to enforce international law, even when one does not anticipate that the courts will approach this with open arms, as is particularly the case where issues of foreign policy are involved. The *Filartiga* case is a good example. The court did not initially approach the case with open arms. When we reached the circuit level—where, by the way, the defendant was very well represented by counsel—we were told that we should give up. What in the world were we doing in a U.S. Federal court with an international claim involving events that had no contacts with the United States and would be seen as meddling in the internal affairs of another nation? We insisted that domestic law authorized a remedy for the violation of international law. There were many who thought this was absurd. But it goes to the issue of whether or not we allow the disregard of international law in controversial political contexts to remain the custom.

I have also been thinking about whether it would be possible to apologize to Mr. Gerson for using the term "lies." It seems to me that he himself several times contended that other nations lie, and I see little reason to exclude our own. I suppose I could have been more literary and used a term like "doublespeak" to describe the stance of the administration. But I cannot apologize because I have felt horrified, as I did during the invasion of Grenada, at the administration's lawlessness and the transparency of its excuses. The claim that our aggression against Nicaragua is based on their passing arms to El Salvador is a cover for a policy designed to destabilize and destroy a legitimate government whose threat to U.S. interests in Central America comes not from its exportation of war but from its aspiration to build a peaceful society which addresses human needs. If I ruffled some feathers, it was my responsibility to do so. Euphemisms dull the sensibilities, mask the depth of horror and reassure the responsible. It feels no more comfortable to me than to Mr. Gerson, but it is necessary to call a spade a spade.

Finally the idea that a resolution from this body is designed to pressure the courts is simply an argument against taking the responsibility that our specialty, let alone our humanity, casts upon us.

Mr. GERSON: I share some of the concerns expressed by the other panelists. I share the concern about where the United States goes from here. I also share a certain concern that so many people would think this was all by way of protest, in order to allow the United States to do as it wishes with Nicaragua, which it supposedly views as the spoiled child of the hemisphere and that we had manufactured all of the claims. The claims of Nicaraguan violations of the borders and territorial integrity of El Salvador, the supply of arms, training, command, control did not originate with the Reagan Administration. They originated with the Carter Administration. And shortly after the Reagan Administration assumed office, a White Paper was issued, largely on the basis of material put together by the Carter Administration. It was the first White Paper, and it's publically available, published on February 23, 1981, entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador." There are lots of photos showing the nature of

made the teaching of international law an ever more problematic enterprise. These pose a serious challenge to teaching international law in U.S. law schools.

The first factor has to do with the changing role of international law in U.S. foreign policy, a matter of equal concern to the international lawyer and to the foreign policy community. Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (1983), has put the issue squarely:

I take as my central theme . . . the proposition that a measure of the current disorientation in American foreign policy derives from our having abandoned, for all practical purposes, the concepts that international relations (and also to a degree the internal conduct of government) can and should be governed by a regime of public international law. Further, that this idea has not yet been succeeded by some other reasonably comprehensive and coherent notion as to the kind of world order we do seek, or which at all events we would accept and try to cope with.

This bold statement reflects growing doubts among students and the legal profession about the reality of the field, especially in the wake of the U.S. action in Grenada, support for the Contras in Nicaragua and mining of ports in that country. It brings to mind the comment by Raymond Aron in *Peace and War* that “[a]t the present time international law is a permanent incitement to hypocrisy,” and Jean Giraudoux’ charming observation that international law is a great training ground “for the imagination.”

The second factor has to do with the impotence of the international legal order in the face of new forms of warfare, among them nuclear intimidation, state support of terrorism, criminal conduct by diplomats, hostage taking and revolution without frontiers. Legal restraints on the use of force have broadly functioned to provide lawless states like Libya, Syria and Iran with a legal shield from armed reprisals and other effective sanctions, behind which they are able to persist in their outlaw policies. The acts of these states have revived the question debated in the 19th century whether the same legal code could govern relations between all nations. John Stuart Mill wrote in volume 3 of *A Few Words on Non-Intervention, Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical* (1864-67):

To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into. . . . Among many reasons why the same rules cannot be applicable to situations so different . . . the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But the barbarians will not reciprocate . . .

The third factor is related to the deterioration of the constitutional environment in the U.N. system and the loss of faith in international organizations as an instrument for the conduct of foreign policy. Indeed, the very belief that procedures and institutions of liberal democracy could function in the international arena has not been vindicated. Recently Leo Gross reviewed some of the abuses committed in the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Unesco and the International Labor Organization which led him to conclude in volume 2 of *Essays on International Law and Organization* (1983) that:

If the United States and other Members are serious about preserving the rule of law and preventing a further degradation of the constitutional environment of the United Nations and its agencies . . . they will have to vote, regretfully perhaps, more often “with their feet” as the saying goes, and with their purse, and not merely with their voices or hands.

- Notified UNESCO of our intention to withdraw, alternatively stating that the decision is final or that it is subject to review;
- Similarly notified the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development;
- Reneged on our pledge to increase funding for the International Development Agency;
- Held up and refused to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty—and later refused to pay assessed dues for the treaty's implementation;
- Seen its Deputy Representative—a student of rhetoric but not of geography—offer to wave goodbye while ships carrying U.N. representatives sailed into the sunset—only to be wrecked on the shores of New Jersey.
- Established a policy of delayed payment of assessments resulting in exacerbation of the cash-flow problems of the United Nations;
- Held that U.N. Peacekeeping forces are part of the problem—not as we traditionally held, part of the solution;
- Systematically withheld assessed dues for programs of which we do not approve;
- Invaded a small island nation under the flimsiest of pretext and probably in violation of international law, and then vetoed the resolution critical of our actions;
- Indiscriminately laid mines in the harbors of Nicaragua and, upon learning that we would be hauled into court, in a hurried and undignified manner informed the World Court that we would not accept its jurisdiction in the matter.

You, as students of international politics and law might recognize a familiar historical ring in some of these actions. You would be correct. Several are precisely the kinds of actions which have characterized the Soviet Union in the past. The Soviets are the invaders of defenseless countries, the withholders of funds, the critics of peacekeeping, the evaders of courts, the champions of strict limits on international institutions. The role is a strange and new one for the United States.

I wish it were possible to conclude that each of these incidents is separate and unrelated. But I am afraid they are part of a pattern. It is not simply an errant Unesco which is being attacked. Notwithstanding Secretary of State Shultz's denials, these actions are part of a broad attack on the U.N. system and on the concept of U.S. participation in any institution which the United States does not dominate. It is an attempt to sail against the current of interdependence and a rejection of the idealistic notion that our long-term interests are best served by the rule of law and by the nurturing of institutions which attempt to improve relations among nations.

More than that. Our actions are an indication of a loss of confidence in ourselves. Have we reached the point that we believe that our ideals and way of life cannot compete? Where we believe that our actions cannot stand the scrutiny of a court of law? Must we now take refuge within the ranks of the lawless?

Are we so blind that we do not recognize that it is not simply our adversaries and the Third World who question our actions, but our closest allies as well?

The time has come for those individuals and institutions who believe that our interests in multilateral institutions transcend a single administration to make their voices heard. Your statement yesterday regarding the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua and U.S. efforts to avoid the Court is encouraging. So was the response of the United Nations Association at the time of the unheard of invitation to U.N. representatives to sail into the sunset. But more needs to be done. The United Nations Association must be revitalized. We cannot allow the Heritage Foundation to have a monopoly on expressions of U.S. policies. Nor, frankly, can we allow information on legal and other procedures to come solely from the administration as if they are authoritative.

To do so will result in the kind of misinformation which you received yesterday regarding the legal basis of the mining.

- The United States must once again play a leadership role in building the U.N. system, not in denigrating international cooperation, or putting matches on a pool of flammable liquid, or engaging in rhetoric and policies every bit as dogmatic as those we criticize.

- The United States must be represented in the United Nations by those who have a vision of the task and a willingness to work tirelessly. We cannot allow government or our representatives to be captured by those who would reverse the accomplishments of four decades of efforts by both political parties and then cry about the absence of a bipartisan foreign policy.

The position of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations is a full-time job. Those who wish to be Secretary of State, a White House staffer, a candidate for the Senate or to participate in the intrigue of Washington should be appointed elsewhere.

- Our representatives have a duty to articulate the policies of the United States. But equally important they have a duty to listen to the views of others. Only then is there mutual benefit.

- We must accept that we live in a world of diversity, and the United Nations will continue to reflect that diversity.

We must keep our long-term interests firmly in mind. It is short-term thinking that leads us to believe that we can withhold funds and not suffer eventually.

It was short-term thinking which led our officials to accept the view that U.N. peacekeeping forces are part of the problem, not part of the solution. The result was the loss of several hundred American lives, a serious blow to U.S. credibility in the Middle East and our inability to deploy U.N. peacekeeping forces when we needed them later.

Short-term thinking leads to actions such as Grenada and Nicaragua—thinking which we will regret during the next Soviet Afghanistan.

And surely it is short-term thinking to believe that a late evening rush to withdraw from the World Court's jurisdiction was politically wise even if found to be legally correct. Either way we have succeeded in further undermining an institution which we have long nurtured, not to mention our own reputation.

I do not wish to leave you with the impression that the problems faced by our country are not difficult or frustrating. Nor do I speak from the perspective of one who has not experienced the battle scars of U.N. duty. I believe Adlai Stevenson's observations of 1952 are no less valid today than when he spoke:

The early years of the United Nations have been difficult ones, but what did we expect? That peace would drift down from the skies like soft snow? That there would be no ordeal, no anguish, no testing, in this greatest of all human undertakings?

Any great institution or idea must suffer its pains of birth and growth. We will not lose faith in the United Nations. We see it as a living thing and we will work and pray for its full growth and development. We want it to become what it was intended to be—a world society of nations under law, not merely backed by force, but law backed by justice and popular consent. We believe the answer to world war can only be world law. This is our hope and our commitment. . . .

# A 14-1 victory for Blaize's NNP

From JOHN BABB in Grenada

ST. GEORGE'S Tues: MR. HERBERT BLAIZE, leader of the New National Party (NNP) which swept into power last night winning 14 of the 15 elected seats in the Grenada House of Representatives, was sworn in at 2 p.m. today as Prime Minister at Governor General's Residence after attending a special thanksgiving service at the St. Paul's Anglican Church here in St. George's.

As the simple swearing-in ceremony was taking place witnessed by a few of the victorious candidates, downtown St. George's took on a carnival atmosphere with music, dancing and singing in the streets.

There were motorcades headed by a jeep carrying some people who rang bells loudly proclaiming the death of Sir Eric Gairy and his Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). Later in the morning there was a symbolic burial of "Uncle". Some people chanted: "We doh want him no moh." While others sang "All we want for Christmas is the NNP."

## BY-ELECTION LIKELY

Gairy, who was ousted as Prime Minister on March 13, 1979, by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement, remained in seclusion after the worst electoral defeat his party ever suffered.

While the merry-making was taking place earlier today Election Commission officials waited for the returns from four seats that were outstanding — St. George's South, St. George's Southeast, St. Andrew North west, and St. Andrew Southeast.

St. Andrew Southeast was the last preliminary result to come in shortly before 3 p.m. today.

The count ended with the NNP winning three more seats to bring its tally to 14, the remaining one, St. Andrew Northeast, going to the GULP.

But hardly had the results been announced, Grenada seems headed for a by-election shortly.

The lone GULP winner — Marcel Peters, who won the St. Andrew Northeast seat from the NNP candidate, McLean Pope said he was going to resign. He charged that there were election irregularities.



PRESIDENT REAGAN

## Reagan hails NNP victory

WASHINGTON, Tues. (Cana-Reuter) PRESIDENT Reagan today hailed Grenada for its first free election since 1976, held 13 months after U.S. forces invaded the tiny Caribbean island to topple a Marxist regime and evacuate American students there.

"The election represents an achievement of historic importance," Reagan said in a statement.

"The United States is proud to have played a part in the return of democracy to Grenada," he said.

The President said the United States looked forward to working closely with the new government of Grenada.

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IN ORDERLY fashion voters at a polling station in St. George's, Grenada, await their turn to cast their ballots on Monday. (Photo by John Babb).

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# Poll: 86% Grenadians say *Invasion* was a 'good thing'

**DURING** the last week of December 1983 and the first week of January 1984, a public opinion survey was conducted in Grenada by St Augustine Research Associates of Trinidad and Tobago to try and determine in some quantified form the reaction of Grenadians to some of the traumatic events which took place in their country following the execution of their Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop.

Note on the Sample. Seven hundred and eleven persons were interviewed by seven Grenadian field workers in carefully selected areas of the country. The demographic characteristics of the sample were based on the 1970 census. Males constituted 46 per cent of the sample, while the remaining 54 per cent were females.

In terms of age, the 16-21 cohort constituted 16 per cent; the 22-30 group, 29 per cent; the 31-40, 20 per cent; the 41-50 15 per cent and the 51 and over, 20 per cent.

In terms of class, 59 per cent were classified as lower class, 30 per cent lower middle or middle class, while 11 per cent were described as belonging to the upper class. These classifications were determined by the interviewers themselves in terms of ascribed social class criteria using indices such as job held, place of residence, colour and deportment.

Questions were also asked to try and determine attitudes to the political options which might be available to Grenada in the near future.

The first question asked related to the issue of intervention or the rescue mission as some prefer to call it. As many as 86 per cent of those polled regarded the intervention by the multi-national force as a "good thing". Only 7 per cent were unequivocally opposed to intervention of any kind. The 41 to 50 and the 51 and over groups were a bit more hawkish on this issue. Ninety-five and 93 per cent of them respectively saw the intervention as a "good thing" compared to 80 per cent for the 22 to 40 year age group.

Per cent

1. Intervention by multi-national force made up of



MAURICE BISHOP



EUGENIA  
CHARLES

SEE PAGE 12