

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
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FACULTY OF ARTS AND GENERAL STUDIES

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Course: U300

Title: On the Development of the Welfare State
in the Era of the Administration of
Eric Williams

Submitted in part fulfillment of the requirement of an
undergraduate degree - BA History

Date: August 29, 1994

This is Dr Williams' own special contribution. The impact of his individual personality, the historical accident. And yet in the Hegelian dialectic, the organic movement proceeds by way of accident and the sum of accident constitutes the organic movement.

CLR James "A Conventional Appraisal" May 12, 1960 (ed) Selwyn Cudjoe, Eric Williams Speaks. p. 349.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my supervisor, Ms Rita Pemberton for her patience and guidance throughout this project. I am also grateful to my typist, who assisted in the final production of paper.

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PREFACE

This paper is an attempt to trace the evolution of welfarism, as a policy of the state of Trinidad and Tobago, particularly during the administration of Eric Williams. Its aim is to place into historical perspective the relationship between welfarism and Williams' administration. It is not expected to be seen as an assessment of the failure or success of the Williams administration nor is it a discourse on the advantages and disadvantages of welfarism. Indeed it tends more to incorporate a history of social policy over a longer period and less of an assessment of the efficacy with which economy and society were politically managed in his own time.

Yet, for all the distinctions that one might wish to make between these themes, they are not entirely discrete and the reader might be suspicious of attempts to make them seem so. If it is not particularly commonplace to introduce a discourse by seeking to emphasise as much what it does not set out to do as what it does, one would hope that this peculiarity might be permitted since short of making such distinctions it might prove impossible, albeit necessary, for a national to write about Eric Williams without conjuring in the mind of readers some notion of political bias.

Indeed, a guarded approach by the writer ought not to be entirely unexpected. Today, after nearly thirty- two years of national independence, successive governments under two political parties and four Prime Ministers, Eric Williams, the party he founded and the administration he headed, continues to be the focus of all of unabashed adulation, equally intense abhorrence and acrimonious debate. This in itself is enough to inspire the writing of this paper. There are other reasons, none of which ought to be perceived as being in any way connected to intentions to derail, indict, exonerate or praise the Williams administration.

In one aspect of the overall controversy, it has become fashionable for some, perhaps those of more intense political persuasion, to twin the notions of the welfare state and the Williams administration in recognisably pejorative or defensive terms, depending on political affiliation and prejudices to which all are ultimately entitled. So intense have been the debates, that those who are unaware of them are oblivious to a wealth of polemic material, the value of which ought not to be lost on the students of contemporary history, if only because it joins, among other things, issues of social policy, class and race.

The controversy is implicated in a wider dialectic that has its basis in the distinctions such as exist between Keynesians, Socialists and Marxists on the one hand and Hayeks, Friedmans, Capitalists and Monetarists on the other. It relates to the appropriate choice of political economy and methods of adjustment that countries should adopt to meet the challenge of a changing world order. As a consequence, much of the commentary on the development of a welfare state in Trinidad and Tobago have come from economists, sociologists and politicians.

While the debate rages there appears to be the need to locate more precisely the welfare state in the historical records of Trinidad and Tobago. Thus far, the essentially political thrust of the argument has ignored the absence of historical analysis on the subject. The historians themselves, have ignored the issue in the context of failing to develop a significantly evident historiography. Whether on the basis of the recency of the Williams regime or otherwise, the silence of historians and historiographical enquiry has been deafening. Important questions such as whether or not there existed a welfare state in the era of the Williams administration, how and why it developed, still need to be

examined from a historical perspective. Such a perspective should aim at providing a holistic approach, linking inter alia, social, political, economic, intellectual, international and psychological factors. In the absence of such an approach events and data, notwithstanding their relevance, are explained in vacuous terms that can hardly explain past reality let alone adequately inform current thinking.

It is in recognition of this that this paper is written. Given the long period to which the paper seeks to relate, the approach here is not one of providing a 'ball by ball' commentary of developments, but one that appeals to historical facts in so far as they serve to highlight critical developments.

As with any other it can make no unassailable claim over objectivity and inevitably must constitute a rejoinder to viewpoints that it countervails. If, however, it stimulates further inquiry and debate, it would be on its way towards serving its purpose.

INTRODUCTION

The first burden of this section is to define the welfare state in empirical terms applicable to Trinidad and Tobago. The second is to draw attention to a number of key concepts involved in modern analysis of the development and character of welfare states. These are important in establishing the frame of reference of this paper.

The welfare state, according to John Clegg in his Dictionary of Social Services, "is a society that accepts the principle of promoting the well-being of all its members"¹. Indeed, unless the welfare state is seen as that section of the state's policy related to the promotion of the welfare of its members, methodological problems arise and there is the risk of tautological discussion.

The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, for example, defines the welfare state as:

... the institutional outcome of the assumption by a society of legal and therefore formal and explicit responsibility for the basic welfare of its members. Such a state emerges when decision-making groups become convinced that the welfare of the individual is too important to be left to customs or informal arrangements and private understanding and is therefore a concern of government. In a complex society such assistance may be given to individuals directly or, just as often, to the economic interest most immediately affecting their welfare.²

Such a definition bespeaks, in its reference to "such a state", of either a kind of political state or system, or of a condition, position or situation that characterises the relationship between the state and individuals in a society. Despite its relevance, in its acknowledgement of the fact that welfare can be conferred directly or indirectly to various groups, the definition is difficult to apply in the empirical sense for the following reasons. If the welfare state is seen as a kind of

political state, then the theories of such a state must be inter-related and welfare states as a whole are seen as having this or that particular system of government, political economy, ideological orientation and so on.

In practice, however, the welfare state is a composite entity made up of different dimensions, varying in time and place, its different aspects sometimes related to different theoretical models. Secondly, if the welfare state is seen as a condition, this poses other problems:

The rubric is a relatively recent one not found in the traditional lexicon so that the point at which a state, in extending social services to its citizens, earns this label is imprecise and controversial, the term... has and will be construed variously.³

It is a fact, therefore, that any account of the welfare state must struggle against a legacy of ambiguity. Theories applied simplify what is essentially a very complex situation and the views one holds on the notion of the state will affect one's definition of the welfare state. Notwithstanding this, it is generally agreed that some time around the late 1940's the term acquired international popularity in Britain and West Europe with the advent of the British National Health Service and National Insurance and similar governmental agencies.⁴ Most students tend to see the British Welfare State as beginning in 1948. Since then, governments all over the world and politicians in and out of office have committed themselves to the adoption of formal measures and channels to improve the welfare of the society.⁵

Some see the welfare state as social betterment provided for the working class and developing en route in the transition from capitalism to socialism.⁶ But what is becoming more apparent is its global nature. According to George Vic and Paul Wilding,

nearly all capitalist states today are welfare states of sorts: they spend between one-half and one-third of their income on public services, half of which is taken up by what is now as the social services.⁷

It is on account of the universalistic nature of the welfare state that modern scholarship has tended to define it in more objective terms. Norman Ginsburg, for example, writes:

The terms "social policy" and "the welfare state" are virtually synonymous. They are both conventionally used to describe government's action in the field of personal and family incomes, health care, housing, education and training. Government's action embraces not only direct provision of benefits and services but also the regulation and subsidy (including fiscal relief) of various private forms of welfare provided by employers.⁸

Another writer, Richard Titmuss, identified two categories of welfarism that are almost universal aspects of social policy. The first, social security, involved benefits in cash, subject to a test of needs or eligibility.⁹ The second, social services, involved benefits in kind such as medical care, prevention of physical and mental illness and disablement, rehabilitation and training, provision of housing, school meals, nurseries and homes for the aged.¹⁰

The objective of such welfarism was threefold. Those such as education, tax reduction for higher income groups and transfers to farmers, were seen as forms of future investment.¹¹ Others, like pension payments and free or subsidized medical attention, were to increase immediate welfare by reducing consumption costs.¹² A third category sought to compensate for disservices or diswelfares - circumstances such as changes in technology or an industrial accident, for which the society rather than the individual was responsible.¹³

In as much as the welfare state is seen as social policy, one existed in Trinidad and Tobago during the Williams era, as is the case at present. Trinidad, like Britain, like much of Western Europe and the Caribbean, demonstrated then, a commitment to the welfare state. J. St Cyr noted in 1970 the existence of the following welfare categories: labour welfare, social services for children; social services for the mentally handicapped; social services for the aged; social services for the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders and; youth and welfare development.¹⁴ Other constituent elements of the welfare state were to be found in the nature and function of various government¹⁵ departments, legislation related to pensions, gratuities and public assistance, voluntary and friendly societies.

For methodological purposes, however, an important factor is to be able to distinguish between the imperatives of a discussion on the development of the welfare state as compared to one on the development of social services. A discussion of the former tends to draw a closer co-relation between government, political, economic, social and other factors: a discussion of the latter tends to examine the development of various institutions that provide welfare. A discussion of the development of the welfare state is a broad inclusive one incorporating a discussion of social welfare. But it involves much more. As Ginburg points out, the boundary of social policy extends into areas which are usually called economic policy.¹⁶ It incorporates a discussion of employment, industrial, monetary and fiscal policy and the activities of agencies to which governments frequently delegate responsibilities, regional and local.¹⁷ Even government's inaction or non-decision becomes a policy and must be examined.¹⁸

Titmus, for example, pointed out that social security and social service programmes are both necessary parts of a broader package of economic and social policies that involve measures to

stimulate employment and economic growth. To this must be added measures to promote political stability and social integration.¹⁹

Since most societies possess welfare states, how is the issue of the development of the welfare state of a particular society to be examined? The peculiarities of a society's welfare state exist mainly in relation to what can be seen as firstly, the degree of welfare statism and secondly, the culture of that welfare state. Assessments of the first tend to be more objective than the second.

With regard to the first, social scientists have been able to provide indices in relation to which the welfare state can be examined. Such indices are mathematical models which enable the examination of social policies in factual ways. The most significant are those that examine the level of social expenditure in relation to GNP and those that examine levels of income and wealth taxes and the uses to which they are put. Important too, are those which examine levels of government consumption expenditure and the extent of public sector spending on wages and salaries. Then too, there are those which seek to examine income levels among different classes and groups.²⁰

The critical significance of these indicators lie in the fact that the objective behind the welfare state is the reduction of social inequality, due to the redistribution of incomes by macro-economic policy measures. Increased social expenditure indicates increases in the welfare state: decreases mean retrenchment in welfare state provisions. Increases are reflected not only in greater social expenditure on health, education and housing, but in higher public sector expenditure on wages and salaries. This may be reflected in government's increased consumption expenditure on transfers and subsidies. Increases in wealth taxes, where accompanied by increased social expenditure, are indicative of income redistribution. Finally, statistical indicators showing

greater equality of incomes constitute evidence of welfare state policy measures.²¹

As was pointed out, the second context in which a country's welfare state assumes peculiarity is with respect to culture. By culture is meant the sum total of the ideas, ways of doing things, knowledge, habits, values and attitudes passed on by one generation to the next. Each state develops its own systems, norms and institutions forged from its historical, political, social and other experiences. Culture is reflected in the needs of different groups in the society, in what government seeks to provide, to whom and why. It is similarly reflected in the role of the state as perceived by the citizenry. Culture itself is shaped by forces older than one generation.

This paper seeks to trace the development of the welfare state in Trinidad and Tobago, with particular reference to the era of the administration of Eric Williams. It will examine emerging perspectives on the relation between Eric Williams and the development of the welfare state. Since historical forces invariably help to shape developments in any era, it will be necessary to examine how these forces influenced the development of the welfare state in the Williams era. As a consequence the subsequent discussion begins with an overview of the history of the colonies of Tobago and Trinidad. Chapter two outlines emerging perspectives on Williams' contribution to the development of the welfare state and identify a number of assumptions which are tested here. One problem is that the welfare state is not formally defined in relation to the developments before the 1940's. This paper argues that the welfare state existed long before then and had its roots in the period of West Indian slavery. Williams' welfare state policies are thus located on a historical continuum.

An attempt is made in chapter four and five to place the development of the welfare state under the Williams administration

into theoretical perspective. The welfare state, during this period, is seen as having developed in two phases: a conservative period of liberal-collectivism between 1956 - 1970, and thereafter, a more intense period involving Fabian socialist welfare state policies. Finally, an attempt is made in the last three chapters to delineate Williams' contribution to the development of the welfare state. Throughout, the paper relates to questions of how, why and with what effect.

CHAPTER 1
BRIEF HISTORY : 1948-1962

The island of Trinidad was first claimed by the Spaniards on Columbus' third voyage to the West Indies. On that same voyage he is alleged to have sighted Tobago. What is certain is that he did not land there but proceeded from Trinidad to Hispaniola. Tobago's colonisation therefore, post-dated that of Trinidad despite their proximity to one another.¹

In terms of development this was of small consequence for after the arrival of Columbus in 1498, Trinidad itself remained until the last quarter of the eighteenth century an economic backwater, forlorn, under-populated and under-developed. Spanish governors came and went but the colony languished as they had no agenda for its development. The Spanish monarchies of the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and much of the eighteenth century preoccupied themselves with a quest for gold and silver. Trinidad had none of these to offer and proved unattractive to Spanish conquistadors with the result that economic activity on the island was limited to exploitation of the labour of the Amerindian population and contraband trade with French, Dutch and English men. The resulting decimation of the aborigines left Spanish colonisers poor and hungry, while dependence on illicit trade left the island vulnerable to attacks from any enemy.²

Tobago, meanwhile, experienced another kind of problem. It was no man's land. The French, English and Dutch each laid claim to it but there was little concern for its development. Each appeared interested in Tobago purely to prevent it from falling into the hands of the other and was content to ensure that it remained a wasteland. By 1815, when the Congress of Vienna finally conferred British ownership on Tobago, it had changed hands between the Dutch, French and English about half a dozen times, sometimes by invasion and capture, often by treaty between contending powers.

In a sense, economic development of the islands of Trinidad and Tobago began only in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. By 1770 the Spanish crown had recognised the need to transform her colonies into sugar plantation economies similar to those already existing in other West Indian islands. The Spanish colonial system, designed exclusively for the benefit of the crown without any regard for the development of agriculture and settled population on the West Indies, had left Spain as the sick man in Europe. Economic transformation of the colonies was therefore a necessity long overdue. Sugar plantation colonies were stimulating trade and advancing exchequer revenues of other European powers bring, according to Josiah Child, profits to the merchant and power to the nation state. To effect such a transformation, sugar planters and slaves were needed, the former for management, the latter for labour. The Spanish crown therefore heeded the advice of French planters already in Trinidad and embarked on a scheme to

attract more French planters from Martinique, Guadeloupe, Dominica, St Lucia and Grenada. As a consequence he issued, in 1783, the Cedula of Population which opened the flood gate of Trinidad to French white and coloured immigrant planters offering them lands, tax concessions and production necessities at prime cost.

The Cedula of Population transformed the economy and society of Trinidad. The island moved from a desolate and largely unproductive Spanish territory into a thriving sugar economy propelled by French planters and slave labour.⁴ Similar measures adopted in Tobago did the same there.⁵

In both colonies population and agricultural output grew. Thus was established the plantocracy and slavocracy of these colonies. The former established hegemony over political, economic and social institutions. The slaves formed the masses, the labouring class.⁶

Britain captured Trinidad from Spain in 1797. The island had by then become a prized possession on account of its newly found prosperity. The British government instituted in the island a system of crown colony government different from the representative system that planters were allowed to retain in Tobago. Crown colony government allowed Britain to have greater control over the legislature in Trinidad than was exercised on islands with the representative system where planter more effectively opposed the

imperial will. Notwithstanding this, a remarkable political feature in both islands was the way in which the plantation interests were able to influence the decisions of the crown. The reason was that their principal interest often coincided, it being sugar.⁷

In 1807, partly in response to pressure from anti-slave trade abolitionists, but more out of a desire to cut off supplies of slaves to rival sugar producers in the West Indies, Britain abolished her own slave trade. This left Trinidad in particular without an adequate supply. Being a late starter to sugar production and having large reserves of fertile land the island had, in terms of its needs, a relatively small slave population. By 1823 therefore, the British crown instituted a package of measures, designed to ameliorate the condition of the slaves for in the absence of fresh supplies, this was a practical necessity if sugar production was to be continued.⁸

Tobago itself had, since 1798, instituted a much more humane package of measures to strengthen the slave population by natural increase. In this regard, slaves in Tobago seemed the recipients of some of the best conditions extended to slaves in the British West Indies. Always, however, the welfare of the working class was dictated by production needs. The termination of the slave trade necessitated improvements in the quality of their lives.⁹

In 1834 Britain abolished slavery in all her colonies. This left planters in Trinidad in dire need of labour for, following abolition, former slaves largely abandoned the plantation to pursue other forms of economic activity. Britain had been in the habit of buttressing the ailing sugar producers in her colonies. Faced with competition from rival producers in the West Indies, systems of bounties, drawbacks and preferential treatment conferred a virtual monopoly over the British sugar market on them. In 1846 Britain decided to remove these preferences. Planters in Trinidad were compensated for this loss of advantage by a loan to facilitate importation of East Indian indentured labours. By 1917, when the immigration of East Indian labourers was terminated thousands had already been brought into the country so that together. Blacks and Indians constituted the bulk of the working class.¹⁰

Tobago's request for a similar loan to finance immigration was denied and the two islands fared differently after emancipation. Trinidad emerged as one of the most efficient sugar producers among the British colonies. Tobago reflected increasing pauperisation among its planter classes though the peasantry dominated by blacks seemed to be expanding. In order to effect economies in administrative costs and deny the emerging black proprietor class access to the legislature, Britain united both colonies in 1898 amidst dissent from the planter elite in both islands. The affairs of Tobago were henceforth to be administered from Trinidad.

All of this took place amidst growing political sensitivity of the non-planter classes. The last two decades of the nineteenth century were characterised by agitation for political reform in favour of a wider franchise removed from continued domination by the planter classes. A riot in 1903 during which the Red House was destroyed by fire certainly reflected the volatility of the masses for many of the urban poor who participated in it had no stake in the issues involved.¹²

By 1919 labour leaders emerged with greater capacity to command the support of the working class and grassroot elements in the society. The interest of political and labour agitation were being increasingly fused. This resulted in the dock-workers' strike of 1919. This was of course the precursor to more extensive confrontation between the colonial regime, local labour leaders and the children of the former slaves and indentured Indian immigrants. In 1937-38 a spate of labour riots throughout the British West Indies sent clear signals that, in the interest in continued hegemony of the planter classes and British imperialism, certain concessions had to be made to various elements in the society.¹³

To the local political aspirants, Britain decided it was necessary to grant reforms that allow them greater participation in political decision making. As regard labour organisations, it was necessary that they became more disciplined agitators in the pursuit of the cause of the working class. To the proletariat it

was necessary that they be granted greater social welfare.¹⁴

In Trinidad, in the aftermath of the 1937 labour riots, Britain extended the franchise and the first election based on adult suffrage was held in 1946. The stage was thus set for the gradual transfer of power from the metropolitan government to locals even though the economy was still dominated by capitalist interests. By 1962 when Trinidad gained its independence the task facing the society and its leader was to create a nation out of the various elements, often discontent and antagonistic, that had been made to intermingle since the arrival of the European colonisers.¹⁵

It can be said of Trinidad and Tobago, indeed of all European colonies in the West Indies, that until their attainment of independence circa mid-20th century, theirs were political economics largely dominated by the interest of metropolitan government and commercial enterprises. Well into the twentieth century, for example, the development of social, political and economic institutions as well as the relationship between state and societal groups were largely dictated by the necessities of sugar production. In retrospect it was in response to this that a suddenly benevolent Spanish crown first systematically bestowed welfare on the propertied and propertyless classes in 1783. Henceforth, even when sugar declined in importance, social policy was still a reflection of the need to safeguard new metropolitan and foreign interests and a stop-gap measure to placate the working

class. Genuine economic and political independence of the masses in the society were often retarded in the interest of needs fostered by European rivalry and newly independent countries remained plantation economics of sorts, all and sundry dependent upon metropolitan governments for their survival. The granting of independence was in fact designed to shift this dependence away from metropolitan governments unto the now independent political entities of a historically exploited territory.¹⁶

CHAPTER 2

EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON WELFARE STATE

Well-known polemist, Morgan Job, recently assailed what he perceived as the "Destructive legacy of Williams".¹ He contended that the country's "tragedy" was linked to Williams' ideas and deeds.² Williams had ruined black people through affirmative action while injuring others: in the process he created black societies of illiterate criminals, trained to hate businessmen, honest work and Americans.³ Turning his attention to education, for example, Job surmised that although "Williams gave everyone five years of free secondary education our schools are another Williams' disaster, effectively producing illiterate child-mothers, strumpets and amoral decrepits".⁴

Compare Job's comments with those of another writer, Selwyn Cudjoe who contended that Eric Williams' articulation of the colonial problematic and his understanding of the socio-political needs of the society "is yet to be surpassed by any contemporary politician or political organisation".⁵

The two perspectives attach overwhelming significance to Eric Williams and reflect controversy over the nature and extent of his contribution to the political, economic, social and cultural life of Trinidad and Tobago. On closer inspection, they relate with varying degrees of directness, to the issue of the development of

a welfare state in the country. Tracing its emergence to the election in Britain of the Labour Party after the second world war, Job contends that since then Caribbean leaders have adopted "cradle to grave" welfare statist measures that involve state enterprise hegemony, excessive government controls, expropriation taxes, large number of public servants, paternalism and hatred of foreign capitalists.⁶

For Job, the Williams' era was crucial to the development of the country's welfare state. In 1950, wrote Job, the victorious political party promised free milk and secondary education; free dental and medical care; free uniforms and transportation; plenty water and three square meals per day.⁷ Job contends that by 1956 the responsibility for fulfilling this promise was passed to Eric Williams and the People's National Movement: by 1981, when Williams died, the promise had been achieved and it was largely a case of "freedom and state domination... and so magnum erat et prevalebit".⁸

Job was not the only one to concern himself with this presumed legacy of Williams. Lloyd Best, noted Caribbean academic, placed it in the context of culture. Attributing much to the PNM under Williams, he noted that present difficulties had been gathering for many years, converging into a massive legacy or institutions, habits and preferences that constitutes the culture.⁹ Kamal Persad, another columnist sought to allude to a specific aspect:

traditionally, he surmised, most of the state's aid for employment under the PNM had gone to blacks.¹⁰

Williams has had as many defenders as assailants. Paul Sutton, for example, contends that Williams retained an essential belief that economic developments equalled industrial development and in all his actions followed an essential pragmatism rather than socialism, communism or capitalism.¹¹ Selwyn Ryan contends that some critics in recent times have been very hypocritical, painting an erroneous picture that the contribution of Eric Williams and the PNM has been entirely negative and without redeeming qualities.¹²

To a large extent, even when it is unsaid, the whole controversy centres around what has developed in academia as the "Burden Model of the Welfare State". In this model, social welfare expenditure, particularly those that are redistributive are seen to result in the development of a culture of dependency: people depend upon the state even when they are able to provide for themselves. The model also associates welfare statism with wastefulness: people are given goods and services that they do not really need.¹³

The concept of the welfare state as a burden is one that joins criticisms of the macro-economic policies of the state with criticism of dependency trends in the culture. Thus far, the most serious and concentrated of these attacks have come from Jobism, to coin a phrase depicting a current wave of acid criticism coming

from Morgan Job et al and linking the PNM administration under Williams with the burden concept of welfare.

In the main, Jobism argues as follows: firstly, that the welfare state of Trinidad and Tobago is mainly a legacy of Eric Williams; secondly, that it developed as a result of Williams' pursuit of his anti-American, anti-capitalist and anti-free market ideologies, and was thus based on his socialist ideologies; thirdly, that it created a dependency syndrome; and fourthly, that Williams' welfare statist policies stultified economic growth potential.¹⁴ Finally, Job contends that welfare statism in Trinidad was largely affirmative action for Blacks and discriminated against the East Indian community. This paper tests these assumptions. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not Williams contributed to the development of the welfare state, and to what extent.

In support of Jobism, it would amount to misdescription and illogic were this paper to argue that no welfare state existed during the period of Williams' administration or that tremendous augmentation in welfare statism was not realised then. An appeal to macro-economic trends rather than to micro-policy indicators (which attempts, for example, to state where and when a hospital, school or playground was constructed), will show the development of welfare statism within the period.

Take, for example, levels of recurrent expenditure in relation to recurrent revenue. Up to 1970, on an annual basis, recurrent expenditure exceeded recurrent revenues. Much of this expenditure consisted of emoluments to public sector employees, the majority of whom were employed in the social services departments.¹⁵ Between 1961 to 1967 government maintained this pattern, in a situation in which government was foregoing significant amounts of revenue in granting tax concessions to foreign firms in order to encourage investments.¹⁶ During the period 1966 - 1973, government current receipts reflected growth at an average annual rate of 11.4%, while current expenditure accelerated at an average annual rate of 14.0%.¹⁷ Compensation of employees was chiefly responsible for high expenditure, accounting for over 60% of total current expenditure during the period 1966 - 1968.¹⁸ In the interest of social welfare government was sustaining a level of employment it could not afford.

The period 1974 - 1981 represents massive increases in government's commitment to welfare statism. During this period government's current receipts grew at an annual rate of 23.5%, most of it attributable to increased oil prices and government's new regime of higher direct taxation on corporate incomes.¹⁹ Of significance, is the fact that the share of subsidies and other transfers increased by 23.9% in 1974 to a peak of 44% in 1980.²⁰ Indeed subsidies grew at an annual rate of 44.4% increasing from \$88.4 million dollars in 1974 to \$1,674.4 by 1982.²¹

The effect of government policy was felt in a number of areas. Table 1 below demonstrates the nature of some of the increases in welfare provisions.

TABLE 1

Key Socio-economic Indicators 1970 - 1980

Welfare Categories	1970	1980
Housing		
Percentage Rented	35.9	33.7
Percentage Owner Occupied	60.8	64.6
Percentage of Dwelling Units with Piped Water	35.9	48.5
Percentage with Water Closets	27.7	41.5
Water Availability - Daily Average Water Supply (000 cubic meters)	266.9	400.8
Education Indicators		
Crude Enrolment Rate (per 100 population)	33.52	28.96
Percentage of Population attaining No Education (15 years and over)	7.98	4.90
Percentage of Population Attaining Secondary Education (15 years and over)	21.35	32.44
Percentage of Population Attaining University Education (15 years and over)	0.98	2.17
Secondary Enrollment per 100 Primary Enrolment	13.50	51.97

Source: Unpublished Social Indicators Reports Volume 2.C.S.O
 Quoted by M Rampersad and LC Pujudas in Selwyn Ryan (ed)
Independence Experience, 1988, p.562.

Trinidad and Tobago was one of the countries in the Caribbean and environs that had significantly increased government's

consumption expenditure, and government expenditure in general during the Williams' era. This is shown in the data provided below.

TABLE 2

Central Government Expenditure

Country	Central Government Consumption Expenditure as a % of GDP		Total Government Spending as a % of GDP
	1955	1977	1978
Barbados	4	16	38
Trinidad and Tobago	10	14	45
Bahamas	n/a	n/a	21
Jamaica	6	22	38
Puerto Rico	12	17	27
Panama	10	14	27
Guyana	12	27	62
Cuba	n/a	n/a	75
Nicaragua	7	8	28
Haiti	7	8	20

Source: World Bank Tables (1980); Economic and Social progress in Latin America (Inter American Development Bank, 1978)

Quoted in Carl Stone Power in the Caribbean Basin, IHSI, 1986, p.100.

It should be noted that during the Williams era, Trinidad and Tobago was one of the leading welfare statist countries in terms of government's spending on social services as exemplified by government spending on education.

TABLE 3

EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION

Countries	School Enrollment 5-19 years 1976 - 1979	%GNP Spend on Education
Bahamas	70	5.4
Barbados	75	7.5
Trinidad & Tobago	68	4.1
Jamaica	63	6.9
Cuba	75	9.9
Guyana	62	7.0
Haiti	32	0.9

Source: World Bank Tables (1980); Size Distribution of Income (Shail Jain, World Bank, 1975); Jamaican data based on survey by author; World Military and Social Expenditures (World Priorities, 1981).

The augmentation of welfare statism in the era of Williams' administration is thus a foregone conclusion. In fact, other categories of welfare statist measures, brought into existence then would be examined later.

A fundamental flaw in the Jobist perspective is that it attributes so much to Eric Williams that it attaches very little significance to historical forces and ignores the fact that capitalism creates its own welfare state. The impact of historical forces will now be examined in greater detail.

CHAPTER 3

THE ROOTS OF THE WELFARE STATE

The roots of welfare statism and dependency in Trinidad and Tobago are not to be found in the ideas and deeds of Eric Williams, but in the legacy of European capitalism and imperialism that antedated the Williams administration by centuries. The hallmark of this capitalism was the exploitation of labour and raw materials to make profits: that of imperialism involved political, social and economic control over mainly non-white groups transplanted to colonies to facilitate the get-rich-quick schemes of the planter classes. One of the earliest offspring of this marriage between planter capitalism and European imperialism was the welfare state.

Among the misconceptions in current thinking is one to the effect that the welfare state of Trinidad and Tobago originated out of the social disturbances of the 1930's. Job, as intimated earlier, shares this view.¹ Developments in this period reflect however, a later rather than incipient stage, for the welfare state has always been, in some measure, part of the historical experience of Tobago and Trinidad, beginning with the earliest attempt to transform them into plantations economies.

Ginsburg argues that in societies historically exploited by capitalism and imperialism a key aspect of the welfare state had always been the provision of legislation in the interest of workers, if only to redistribute some minimum level of goods and services.² Such legislative provisions were necessary to maintain the production process. Workers had to be fed, housed and clothed otherwise production ceased. Much the same would have resulted if the capitalist classes were themselves jeopardized. Hence, the state provided various welfare concessions to the capitalist classes.³

From a historical perspective, capitalism and imperialism institutionalized the welfare state conferring, in the process different degrees and levels of welfare on different social classes and racial groups. In the plantation colonies, where the state was for a long time synonymous with whichever metropolitan government was in power, all classes became increasingly dependent: the planter classes for various concessions against foreign competition, the labouring classes for ensuring the provision of a certain degree of welfare.

Historical evidence points to a pattern of increasing welfare statism that characterized the West Indian economy and society. This is reflected in Trinidad and Tobago's own experience.

The Cedula of 1783, issued by the Spanish crown, was the first welfare statist measure. Designed to transform Trinidad into a profit-making sugar-slave complex, it granted a wide range of welfare concessions, principally land, to both white and coloured would-be planters. Following this, Governor Chacon's Code Noir of 1787 obligated planters to provide commodious habitation, beds, blankets and other necessities for slaves".⁴ By 1787 the French government in Tobago had followed the Spanish in Trinidad holding out similar welfare concession to its planter and slave labour classes.⁵

British capture of Trinidad from the Spanish in 1787 transferred the responsibility for the welfare of all inhabitants to the former. Additional welfare provisions, this time for the slave population are to be found in the Amelioration Order of 1824.⁶ Slaves were provided for example with a protector of slaves, permitted to own and bequeath property, and masters were to provide a bond of £200 for slaves under six and over fifty who were manumitted.⁷

With British acquisition of Tobago by 1815, both colonies entered a new era of welfare statism after emancipation in 1834.⁸ It was based on a system of wage rather than slave labour and its significance lay in the newly acquired ability of free labour to force employers and the state to increase welfare provisions. The labour shortages and consequent increases in cost encouraged, for example, the immigration of East Indian indentured labourers into Trinidad. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, additional welfare concessions emerged in the form of health, education, penal and other facilities. Some East Indian labourers themselves received land in lieu of their return passage to India between 1869 and 1890.⁹

To be sure, the new concessions reflected attempts by the capitalist and imperialist classes to cope with the wage labour situation. Ginsburg has argued that in capitalist societies where wage labour becomes so entrenched that the majority of the masses (the workers and their dependent relatives) become dependent upon wages, it is inevitable that labour organisations, political parties and population pressure (the class struggle) would emerge to challenge the profit-maxim of the capitalist and the legitimacy of the state.¹⁰

All these elements were there by the beginning of the twentieth century; but the welfare state received another boost after 1917 when the traffic in East Indian immigrants was terminated. Capitalist and imperialist interests could now no longer restrain labour's collective power by merely augmenting the size of the labour force and thereby reducing its power to bargain.¹¹

Following the disturbances of 1919, and particularly those of 1937, the British government, guided by the findings and recommendations of the Moyne and Foster Commissions, moved hastily to augment the welfare state.

The report of the Moyne Commission, the more influential of the two, is instructive not only for its articulation of the existing social, economic and political problems, but for its clear indication that the British government viewed its responsibility in terms of a dire need for greater British paternalism.¹² Citing population growth, low wages and the general deteriorating economic conditions of the workers as the main causes of the disturbances the commissioners made, thus far, the most extensive recommendations to improve education, health and other social welfare programmes.¹³

In the area of education, the commissioners advised that it was a matter in which it was unwise to count the cost. In that of housing, a programme was to be embarked upon that would entail greater expenditure of a substantial amount of public funds.¹⁴

Following its recommendations a Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed in 1940.¹⁵ It provided for an annual grant of five million pounds to be utilized among the West Indian colonies. Trinidad received its share, but much of it ended up as business welfarism for revival of the cocoa industry. Since 1939 the commissioners had complained about "the prevailing absence of a spirit of ^{independence} and self-help and a tendency in all matters to appeal to the government".¹⁶ It had mentioned no particular group, class or race. The comment is ironical on two counts. Firstly, this had been the situation for centuries; secondly, the Colonial Office proceeded to intensify the dependency on account of the disturbances of 1937. Developmental efforts of the Colonial Office turned out to be a multitude of minor schemes without any major transformation of the colonial economy nor the psyche of the people.

What is to be made of these developments prior to the Williams era? The observation is that welfare statism preceded Williams by

a number of phases. The first existed during the era of slavery during which the role of the state was limited to the provision of legislation providing for redistribution of goods and services towards slaves. The second began with the abolition of slavery and ended in 1917 with the termination of East Indian Indentureship. A third phase ended with the arrival of the PNM in 1956. The high point of this phase was implementation of the recommendations of the Moyne and Foster Commissions. This phase coincided with the extension of Keynesian and Beveridgean programmes that saw an extended role for the state and attempted to respond to the issues of the growing social rights of citizens. This phase marked a watershed in the development of Trinidad and Tobago: it ushered in the modern welfare state. An important point however, is that the development of welfare state in Trinidad must be seen on its own terms for long before the events of 1937, there existed the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund introduced in 1929. It provided for an annual grant of £1,000,000 for economic and social development¹⁷. Lord Harris' programme to improve education for all its altruism, also constituted state welfarism.¹⁸

It is worth considering that before the arrival of Williams, there had already developed a number of institutions of political and social pressures, "forces of agency" which would have pushed the government towards the formation of policy along certain welfare lines.¹⁹ Among these would have included political parties and parliamentary party politics. Not only did the various political parties make campaign promises but they were very critical of political parties which did not deliver. Furthermore, political organisations usually responded to signals from pressure and interest groups. By the time of the arrival of Williams, there was no shortage of political parties and pressure groups. Many were Fabian, and concerned with welfare rights. In or out of office, to ignore signals coming from such groups would have been to court electoral defeat.

Also existing in the culture was the institution of welfare corporatism, a relationship between popular struggles and movements on the one hand, and political and trade union organisations on the other. Welfare corporatism encourages "a contract" between the citizen and the state to ensure that welfare and employment needs are adequately catered for in exchange for industrial peace.²⁰ This was precisely what the British had achieved in some measure in the settlement of the dispute of 1937.

This apart, there also existed the institutional capacity of the state itself in the civil service, public administration structures and its traditions. If the state was seen by the society as having the capacity to provide it was expected to provide.

The promises made by the victorious "party" of Albert Gomes in 1950 have already been mentioned. Nearly all political parties in the country made similar commitments. The actions of the Colonial Office and the campaign promises of the political parties must certainly have conduced to make normative an attitude of dependency on the state. This apart, they must have reinforced the perception that the state had the institutional capacity to provide.

In this regard the historical connection between oil and the welfare state is significant. In the nineteenth century Trinidad's cocoa and sugar accounted for the bulk of the colony's revenue and employed most of its labour force. Welfare statism, existed then at the level of both the property and propertyless classes.

As the twentieth century unfolded, oil increasingly began to dominate the economy. It was inevitable that the oil industry would influence the development of the welfare state.

By the 1930's the local oil industry had become very important to the British government. It constituted some forty-two

percent of her empire's production. In 1937 the major oil companies declared huge dividends but continued to pay low wage. This led directly to the riots of the period. Government's response was speedier than in 1919 for oil was now vitally important as fuel for the British ships and a second world war was on the horizon. Moderate as they were, the wage increases secured by oil workers were always the highest, triggering off demands for similar concessions by workers in other sectors.²¹

The construction of the United States military base at Chaguaramas during the Second World War had a tremendous socio-economic impact on the population. Thousands, including former oil workers, were employed at wages higher than any known before. Locals were captured by the American "aura of easy money".²² The appetite of the masses were whetted and in the aftermath of the departure of the Americans it was the state that was expected to provide.

The state had always been a source of employment and welfare. In 1937, expenditure on social services (health education) and poor relief amounted to 19.9% of total expenditure. Public works amounted to 24%.²³ Trinidad had the largest public workers programme in the British West Indies at the time. It was unlikely that with increased oil revenues the proportions spent on public works and social welfare would have been reduced.

CHAPTER 4

WILLIAMS: THE CONSERVATIVE : 1956-1970

In 1956 Eric Williams ascended to the throne of the local political elite as a result of the victory of the PNM in the election of that year.¹ His port-folio was that of Chief-Minister, a position that, consequent upon a constitutional change made during that year, allowed him to lead a cabinet which replaced an obnoxious quasi-ministerial system that existed before.² The new position enabled him to pursue a line of development policy more independent of the Colonial Office and to coordinate the work of various ministries.³

The legislative and executive system within which he had to work were the latest stages in the evolution of a political system en route to a reflection of the Westminster model. With the arrival of independence in 1962, the system developed into one of Prime Ministerial government, similar in many respects to that of Britain. It allowed the Prime Minister to dominate his cabinet and allowed the ruling party, depending upon the size of its majority in parliament, to dominate the legislature.⁴ It is therefore reasonable to assume that the nature of the executive and legislative system afforded Williams a considerable amount of power to put into practice many of his ideas. It is also reasonable to assume that economic and social policies pursued by the party and government reflected the will of Williams, for he is known to have had a forceful personality. This was strengthened by the fact that he was widely recognised for his academic achievements.⁵ Much has already been written about Williams' undoubtedly brilliant academic career.⁶ This section takes a brief look at the man and his ideas and points to a distinction between Williams as an academic and a politician.

Born in 1911, in a society dominated by metropolitan exploitation of sugar and cocoa, and a system of crown colony government, Williams, at the age of ten, won a scholarship to Queen's Royal College, the premier secondary school at the time. In 1931 he won a scholarship to Oxford, the cradle of imperial education. The completion of his undergraduate studies saw Williams as a brilliant student: he placed first among the first class of the history honours school.⁷

In 1938 he presented for his doctoral thesis a discourse entitled The Economic aspects of the West Indian Slave Trade and Slavery in which he began the process of debunking the notion that Britain abolished slavery on humanitarian grounds.⁸ He was to complete this task with his publication of Capitalism and Slavery.⁹ It remains, in the view of many, one of the most controversial historiographical works of the century. It is certainly the seminal work of a new orthodoxy in which he argued firstly, that the origin of slavery was economic rather than racial; secondly, that it was essentially through slavery that British capitalism developed and thirdly, that the abolition of slavery had very little to do with British altruism and philanthropy but came as a result of irreversible decline in the British West Indian sugar economy.¹⁰

Williams has since then been seen as a neo-Marxist, more particularly, as one who challenged in the strongest terms many presumptions by metropolitan scholarship about the inferiority of blacks and other non-white races and their ability to govern themselves. Williams was a prolific writer and, in the view of many, an excellent orator. His many writings and speeches continuously challenged the moral authority and legitimacy of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism. In academic discourses, he assumed the role of champion of the black cause: the blackest thing in slavery, he surmised was not the black man¹¹: the 'Negro in the Caribbean' he declared "would have full and unqualified

democracy, nothingless.... the Negro's right to decide his own affairs and his own life is not a question for argument".¹²

Based on what has been said so far of Williams' academic ideas, it is perhaps not so difficult to see why some have seen him as essentially pro-affirmative in action for Blacks, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. While these ideas are familiar leitmotifs in the academic writings of Williams they ran second place to political pragmatism while he was in office. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of many of Williams' critics lies in a persistent incapacity to separate "Williams the economic historian" from "Williams, the Prime Minister". Perhaps his attainment of both an illustrious academic as well as political career makes it difficult to perceive him in different dimensions. This does not negate the necessity for doing so for political necessities and constraints often condition scholarship with a pragmatism that it could otherwise ignore. Ken Boodhoo has argued, with justification, that Eric Williams the economic historian and later researcher of the Caribbean Commission was a brilliant and insightful analyst of the colonial economic relationship, while Eric Williams the Prime Minister, though often significantly scathing in his attack on foreign investors, was essentially conservative in his recommendations and policy for economic change. This was reflected in his early welfare statist policies.

As an historian, Williams argued that in the Caribbean¹² no progress could be made under sugar. As the Prime Minister he argued that no progress could be made in the Caribbean without sugar.¹³ As a consequence of the latter approach he proceeded to subsidize the sugar industry until his death in 1981. It was a pragmatic response: firstly it benefitted the East Indian workers in the sugar industry; secondly, it laid the basis for greater political stability in a country with the potential to ignite in racial conflagration.¹⁴

In 1961, Williams attacked a prominent local newspaper for perpetuating a "slave mentality". Reiterating his anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist stand, he declared "Massa day done".¹⁵ "Massa" was of course symbolic of the sugar planter who, according to Williams, took much from the country but hardly contributed.¹⁶ If the impression was to be had that he was unquestionably anti-capitalist, it should be noted that Williams was making these comments to beef up his own political support after having rid the PNM of CLR James, perhaps the country's foremost exponent of Marxist theory at the time.¹⁷

In 1964, Williams called for government to be partners with foreign enterprises.¹⁹ His position then was that government had found a middle ground between outright nationalism and old fashioned capitalism, and this was to involve active participation between government and the major foreign firms to achieve economic and social objectives.²⁰

The above example points to an element of conservatism in Williams' policies and gives the lie to the notion that Williams, as a politician, was overly anti-capitalist.

In 1956 when Williams came to power he opted for the continuation of the welfare statist policies of the colonial government and his immediate predecessor, Albert Gomes. The first definitive statement on economic, social, political and other policies provided by Williams and the PNM was the "People's Charter".²¹ According to Selwyn Ryan, "the creation of the welfare state was the basic promise of the charter".²² Ryan's statement is misguided since, apparently, the welfare state was already in existence. The Charter aimed to ensure the development of a well-fed, well-housed and healthy population. The provision of social services was seen as a right and not as a matter of grace and as a fundamental feature of the modern world.²³ Ryan describes it as a consumptionist policy and contends that the problem of how

to reconcile it with economic imperatives was temporarily postponed.²⁴ At any rate, some attempt was made to couch the programme against an economic framework.

The programme was to be financed by economic gains from developments in the area of manufacturing, agriculture and agro-based industries. The Charter underscored the new labour policy. This involved a commitment to democratic trade unions. Members were free to join trade unions of their choice. They had power to bargain on even terms with employers. Employers were expected to respect the legitimate and rational demands of the workers. Williams' policies, according to Ryan, were an exercise in moderation.⁵

The second set of welfare statist policies came within the context of the first Five Year Development Plan (1958 - 1962). It involved a total expenditure of \$191,388,39 of which \$63 million, some one third of overall expenditure, was to be spent on welfare.²⁶ Education, housing and amenities each received between \$12 to \$13 million.²⁷ Health received over \$8 million.²⁸ Ninety percent of the overall plan was to be financed by domestic capital.²⁹ Policies following this revealed Williams' encouragement of growing involvement of foreign capitalists.

In 1963 the Second Five Year Development Plan was announced.³⁰ Out of a total of \$302.6 million, \$21.8 million was allocated for education.³¹ It constituted, thus far, the largest allocation to any of the social services and marked the beginning of the Fifteen Year Education Plan, designed ultimately to facilitate universal, primary and secondary education, technical and vocational training as well as greater access to university programmes.³² Health received \$15.3 million, social and community development \$1.1 million.³³ The Special Works Programme (about which more will be said later) received \$5.0 million.³⁴ Some \$91 million dollars to

finance the programme were, however, to be secured from foreign loans and grants.

Welfare Statism in the Williams era has been too narrowly associated with anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism . In the first half of the period of Williams' administration much was done to woo foreign capital. Williams extended a virtual olive branch to foreign investors.

In 1963, he invited the foreign capitalists to come in and invest.³⁵ At the same time he warned the population that the capitalists had a right and that it was the policy of the government to give them the fullest guarantees against expropriation.³⁶ Williams had since 1958 adopted the Arthur Lewis model of "industrialization by invitation". This offered to foreigners huge tax concessions as well as the promise of high productivity and low wage payments. In 1967, with the second Development Plan near completion, Williams complained about the amount of revenue foregone through these tax breaks. He calculated the losses as outlined in table 4.

TABLE 4

Tax Concessions to Foreign Firms

Year	Revenue Lost
1961	3.2
1962	5.2
1963	6.7
1964	7.8
1965	12.8
1966	10.4
1967	14.0

Source: Budget Speech 1968, P O S: Government Printery 1969 p.37

It is inconceivable that the welfare state in the Williams era could be considered anti-capitalistic. At least up to 1970 such a description could hardly apply. Indeed, between 1956 and 1970, Williams and the PNM were following the liberal - collectivist model of welfare statism, against which Thatcherism in Britain later pitted itself.

The liberal aspect had to do with the policies of the British politicians Keynes and Beveridge who, during their time, strongly identified with the liberalism of the free-market: the collectivist aspect had to do with a commitment of the state to direct public provisions of welfare and services, universal access to these and national uniformity of the system.³⁸ According to Ginsburg, in such a system the precise extent of the state's welfare obligations and the welfare rights of the citizen was left to political pragmatism and social struggle.³⁹ Williams was so conservative that he retained the "cost of living" allowances, a relic of the wartime mobilization programme instituted by the

British Colonial administration. It was social protest and political pragmatism that would force a clear shift in policy by 1970.

CHAPTER 5

THE TRANSITION TO FABIAN SOCIALISM

Until the 1970's, Williams and the PNM had been essentially pro-capitalist. To be sure, as in Britain, liberal - collectivism intensified class divisions, failing in the process to satisfy the demands of the masses for a more equitable distribution of the national cake.¹ When as a result, working class struggles intensified, Williams responded as the colonial regime had done (to some extent) in the aftermath of the class struggles of 1919 and the 1940's. He applied strong-arm tactics to repress the labour movements and the revolutionary zeal of the proletariat. When this failed, Williams and the society forged a greater consensus in Fabianism. Even so, Williams proved the more reluctant partner. The transition from liberal - collectivism to Fabian Socialism is examined in this chapter.

It must not be construed that the antecedent roots of the socialism were absent in the society before the 1970's.² But certainly, as Susan Craig points out, all trade unions did not exhibit the same degree of leftism.³ And not everyone was leftist. Williams and the PNM were evidence enough of this.

The PNM had come to power as a black conservative middle-class nationalist party; black, in that, while it was the political party with the greatest multi-racial appeal, it was dominated by an Afro-Trinidadian element. It had neither the support of Tobagonians nor the large Indian Hindu community. It was middle class in that its founding members came from a high-powered cluster of professionals and teachers, belonging to the Teachers' Economic Union and the Political Education Group.⁴ Its nationalist thrust was reflective of a mode of decolonisation embraced by the native leaders of the Third World, the spirit of the Bandung Coalition, the common vision of Haile Selasie, Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah and the West Indian

Federationists and it stemmed from a common recognition that only the attainment of nationhood would bring greater welfare to the historically oppressed colonial masses.⁵

In office, this was the extent of the PNM radicalism. Its nationalist thrust was in the same vein: it was felt that through nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, a welfare system involving direct provisions of social services and amenities as well as universal access to such programmes could be achieved and sustained. Nationalisation, however, was not irreconcilable with a programme of liberal-collectivism nor did one have to be overly anti-capitalistic to be liberal-collectivist.

Apart from Williams' acclaimed academic brilliance and his capacity for fiery intellectual speeches which captured the imagination of the grassroots, one factor that had cleared the way for him to gain working class support in 1956 had been the British government's suppression of organisations that rejected "responsible trade unionism".⁶ The latter meant fidelity to the official procedure laid down for collective bargaining, an absence of military or political radicalism and willingness to separate industrial disputes from political agitation.⁷ Whenever political agitation was condoned by the British, it was in keeping with the Fabian Socialist ideology of the British Labour Party. The majority of labour leaders, among them Albert Gomes, Adrian Rienzi and Mc Donald Moses were at this ideological position by the 1940's.⁸ These were the labour leaders who were then more readily admitted by the Colonial Office into the mainstream of the British political system in the country. Uriah Butler and others who stood for militant political unionism were often arrested and jailed as in 1937 or interned as was done during World War II.¹¹

Williams was perhaps just as intolerant of labour leaders as the colonial administration. He tended to reject them whether they were Fabian or otherwise. He continuously warned the PNM

membership to stay away from them. He ridiculed Gomes and Butler and never, in his twenty-five years at the helm of government, installed a trade union activist or union leader as a member of his Cabinet.¹⁰

In spite of this, there is a tendency to see the entire period of Williams' administration as being one characterised by policies of Fabian Socialism. Such a description is applicable mainly to the post-1970 period. The main objective of Fabian Socialism is to overturn private monopoly, emancipating land and capital from class and individual ownership thereby vesting them in the community for the general benefit.¹¹ According to its main proponents, Tawney, Titmuss and Crossland, it promotes equality, freedom based on that equality and democracy.¹² In these respects, it is antithetical to capitalism which structures production in response to market demands rather than social needs and results mainly in inequality, absence of industrial peace and a pretence of democracy in which the law becomes a tool of the ruling class. Fabian Socialists occupies a muddy middle ground between liberal-collectivists who are reluctant to engage in wholesale collectivisation and hard-core Marxists who favour an overly centralised economy.¹³ While liberal-collectivists and Fabian Socialist pursue similar ends (equality, justice, freedom, democracy, a sense of community and individual self-realisation), a critical difference is that the former is more likely to pursue a more capitalist-oriented economy in order to attain full employment and economic growth.¹⁴

By the late 1960's large-scale nationalisation propagated by the Fabians in the society had not been achieved, nor was it being pursued relentlessly by Williams.¹⁵ He argued that trade unions urged that employment should be the first priority without recognizing the needs dictated by the wider issue of development.¹⁶ It was his view that it was impossible to nationalise an economy that depended so much on foreign trade, had a limited market of 900,000 people and could not absorb the total output of large-scale

production.¹⁷

But the society was more Fabian than Williams. The influence of the British Labour Party and its local counterparts had had their impact. What is more, much of the wealth of the society had not filtered down to the proletariat. Between 1958 and 1970, the national income share of the poorest twenty percent of the population (pensioners, retirees, the unemployed and casually employed) had fallen from 3.4 to 0.6 percent.¹⁸ This was the result of the pro-capitalist policies followed by Williams; those who could not compete in the labour market saw their incomes significantly reduced.

Capitalism, according to Ginsburg, maintains the status quo by reinforcing class and racial divisions.¹⁹ The PNM, formed as an organised attempt by Blacks to break the stranglehold of the colonial agro-commercial bourgeoisie seemed unable to do so.²⁰ The local bourgeoisie remained comprador while large concessions were spirited away as profits to head offices abroad.²¹ By foregoing certain taxes to woo foreign investors government had been forced to raise revenue through indirect taxes in 1968. These resulted in significant increases in the cost of living.²²

The development plans themselves had not been so successful. Rates of economic investment had begun to fall since the mid - 1960's.²³ The effect was felt at the level of the social services which were in disarray.²⁴ There was little by way of a centralised and coordinated approach which could provide impetus, direction and guidance to the development of social welfare. Government's intervention had been piecemeal and more in the nature of concessions to evolving expectations.²⁵ Social service programmes did not explore the possibilities of positively forestalling problems and building self-reliance in individuals and families.²⁶

CHAPTER 6

THE WILLIAMS EFFECT: Economic And Social Aspects

So far, the broad legacy bequeathed to independent Trinidad and Tobago by the colonial regime has been discussed. In addition, reference has been made to the existence of social forces that, by the 1970's, were able to push the national executive in the direction of Fabian Socialism. The interaction of these forces with Eric Williams constitute a complex dynamic that no words or models can adequately or completely describe. Any attempt to configure the precise contribution of Williams is beset by similar kinds of limitations. Notwithstanding this, it cannot be said that Williams and the PNM made no contribution to the nature and character of the welfare state. How this is to be delineated is debatable. But in the context of, for example, Williams' role as Prime Minister, these must be related to government's objectives, if not societal needs which entails a more subjective evaluation. This chapter attempts to delineate Williams' contribution.

The PNM had set itself well-defined goals from the inception. These involved firstly, widening the basis on which productive employment could be sustained, enlarging economic activities available to the population and reducing income inequalities. In addition, government aimed to provide a basic minimum of economic security, particularly in food and to satisfy the basic human need for clothing, housing, health care, education and utility services. Furthermore, the quality of life was to be improved through the provision of amenities and access to psychological incomes obtainable via the pursuit of the arts, sports, culture and religion.¹

From the point of view that all countries set similar goals for themselves, it might appear that there was nothing challenging about these objectives, but what is significant is the position

from which the country started to address these issues. It is true that Williams inherited a young and gifted population, but the foremost weakness was an overall dependency syndrome. There was an under-developed entrepreneurial class, substantially risk-averse; a framework of institutions which could respond only slowly to changing demands of the international market and an embryonic research capacity supportive of an economic structure which was essentially non-viable.²

Given this starting point, the economy made substantial progress. During the Williams era, the economy was transformed into one as vibrant as that of any developing economy. There exists very little evidence to tie the Williams era to negative growth and non-development. From 1962 to 1981 real output increased by 4.5 percent per year.³ The period 1975 - 1982 represents the heady period when per capita income reached U.S. \$4,000, the third highest in the world.⁴ For years after Williams' death, the legacy was one of the economic growth. It is a myth that Williams left a sterile economy, incapable of growth. Between 1981 and 1985, growth was 73% higher than during the 1970's (according to 1970 prices)⁵.

It is true that the phenomenal rate of growth in GDP was due to increases in the price of oil and that growth is different to development. But such growth as was experienced was accompanied by reduction in income equalities and the PNM was able to avoid the extremes of wealth and poverty which characterise so many developing countries.

TABLE 5

Distribution of Incomes by Deciles of Households

Deciles of Households	1957/58	1971/72	1975/76	1981/82
1st		0.6	0.5	0.4
2nd)) 3.4	1.7	1.9	2.0
3rd	3.8	3.0	3.7	4.1
4th	5.3	4.7	5.3	5.2
5th	6.7	6.1	6.8	6.9
6th	7.9	7.5	8.4	7.5
7th	11.1	9.4	10.3	10.8
8th	13.2	12.4	13.2	14.9
9th	15.3	17.3	18.0	18.5
10th	10.8	13.2	12.0	12.2
*10th	22.5	24.2	19.6	17.6

Source: Ralph Henry, "The state and Income Distribution" (ed) Selwyn Ryan, The Independence Experience, 1988

*Following Ahiram (1964) and Henry (1975), the 10th decile has been subdivided into two halves in all calculations.

Table 5 above represents data on the distribution of income by deciles for a budgetary survey undertaken in the years indicated. Such household budgetary surveys constitute the only hard data on incomes that are amenable to qualitative assesement on a longitudinal basis.

The data reflects growing increases in the income of most groups. Notice that the income of the richest 5% increased from 22.5% to 24.2% between 1957/58 and 1971/72 but decreased to 17.6% by 1981/82.⁶

Government was also able to check the sharp rate of decline of income among the poorest class which normally has the fastest such rate during periods of economic decline or transformation. This group depends entirely on government and has no way of increasing their incomes. On the whole the statistics point to a growing middle class.

The country developed as a result of government's increases in wages, salaries and consumption spending, a voracious appetite for imported or finished consumer goods and services. Between 1971 and 1975, demand for such goods reached nearly 14 percent of the average annual merchandise imports.⁷ Material needs were being met, notwithstanding the fact that supplies were coming from external rather than internal sources.

If the Williams administration is to be criticised it must be remembered that there were substantial increases in the quality of life. Over the period of his administration life expectancy increased by more than 4 years, standing at 67 for males and 72 for females.⁸ These statistics put Trinidad on the upper level on the world scale. At the same time, social services programmes reduced population growth by 1.5 percent per year.⁹ There were increases in the availability and consumption of water, electricity, telephones, public transportation and other goods and services. These were provided at subsidized rates by the public utilities.¹⁰ Large number of citizens enjoyed increases in welfare or increases in income through the purchase of equity in government owned and partly-owned enterprises. School children and old age pensioners enjoyed free meals and free public transportation. The improved standard of living was experienced by almost all workers for available data shows that in 1974 for example, 89 wages agreements were concluded.¹¹ In over 53 percent of these agreements, wage increases of between 31% to 60% were negotiated.¹² Some 21% of these negotiations involved increases in excess of 80%.¹³

Unemployment also fell. This was as a result of the growth that had been stimulated in manufacturing, construction, transportation, distribution and the services sectors which had themselves been propelled by the bouyant growth of the petroleum economy. It was also the result of significant government injections into the economy via increased wages and salaries as well as transfers and subsidies. Between 1973 and 1979 the unemployment rate averaged around 13.7 percent.¹⁴ By 1981, it had dropped to 10.4 percent. Table 6 below shows the effect of government's overall policy on GDP, income per capita, unemployment savings and investments.

TABLE 6

Selected Macro-Economic Indicators

Period	GDP	Per Capita GDP	Unemploy-ment	Nation Savings Ratio	Gross Investment Ratio
1779	5.2	3.8	13.7	34.0	26.5
1980	10.4	8.9	9.9	38.2	30.6
1981	6.4	4.5	10.4	34.0	27.6

Source: Quoted by Ramesh F Ramsaran, Social and Economic Studies 42: 1993, p.221 from an article titled: "Growth and Adjustment in a Petroleum-based Economy: some Aspects of Trinidad and Tobago Experience since the 1970's".

It is important to point out that the increases in growth, savings and investment were accompanied by structural deficiencies in the handling of the public debt. The Williams' administration tended to be bogged down by the high cost of servicing foreign debts which had been negotiated to finance the establishment of large state enterprises that remained unprofitable, largely because of excessive protectionism and falling prices of their products. But if Williams is to be criticised, it must be remembered that the private sector lacked the capital and initiative to embark on such large ventures and that on account of the state's participation

benefits were derived from the development of a local cadre of experts.

In spite of this, the Williams administration failed to break the dependency syndrome that had been institutionalised by the colonial system. Institutions and organisations which in the post-colonial period ought to have engendered a greater sense of self-reliance within the society proved ineffective. Nurtured by an extremely paternal government, dependency on the part of some in the society was to be encouraged by the PNM administration in order to maintain political support. This was to be one of the distinguishing features of Williams' administration. Williams, in fact, joined party politics and the welfare state to achieve political ends. How this was done will now be examined.

CHAPTER 7

THE WILLIAMS EFFECT: Political and Social Aspect

There can be no doubt in forming the PNM, Williams had in 1955, formed the country's most formidable political machine. This was evidenced by the party's rapid rise to success. After only nine months of existence, it had won the national elections and formed the government. Williams himself forged a messianic relationship between himself and the Blacks and though the party incorporated Indians, particularly Muslims, it was from the beginning tainted with being negritic.¹ Politically conservative Hindus, white settlers, the capitalist classes, the Catholic church, trade unions and political leaders feared the powerful hold the PNM had on the black masses and tried to undermine it. Williams and the PNM did their best to strengthen it. As a result, state welfarism was to become a part of the populism embarked on by the PNM administration. Particular aspects of state welfarism were used to forge a bond between black supporters and the PNM. Later these became a broad inclusive mechanism involving a number of popular measures which benefitted not only Blacks but the population on the whole.

Employment of welfare state measures formed a consistent part of the PNM's campaign to maintain popularity from the beginning. And indeed, like that conferred by the British capitalist and imperialist government that had preceded Williams, these were dispersed on different levels to different groups and classes. They were intensified in the aftermath of the 1970 "Black Power" uprising and reached a peak when oil prices rose in 1975.

Williams was often in the habit of outlining the important principles and practices of party politics to his supporters. Indeed, it was he who, together with the PNM, introduced a more organised, purposive and perhaps ^{more} pragmatic approach to the

effective operations of the political parties in Trinidad and Tobago. He sought at all times to ensure that supporters were pacified, received palliatives and were contented enough to stay loyal to the party. There were many mechanisms employed to do this. Among these were included the use of state enterprises and government departments to provide key jobs for party supporters. And, at the level of grassroots, he made attempts to pacify them through the use of what is usually referred to as Special Works and Community Development Projects.

The forerunners to the Special Works Projects were the Crash Programmes first introduced by the PNM between 1956 and 1957, to pacify the unemployed and to curb destructive and bloody gang warfare among members of the various steelbands. Williams himself intervened in the issue, introducing the Crash Programmes to supply the unemployed members of the gangs with jobs. These hitherto unemployed groups now felt that they had a certain power to make demands on the state, since they were able to call out the presence of the Prime Minister himself.⁴

Between 1965 and 1965, there were also many unemployed youths who had grown up outside the gangs. Many had gone through secondary schools without getting the required GCE certificate. Many had failed the Common Entrance Examinations. Many of them formed part of the 1970 protest groups. They were motivated by the working class struggles against the Industrial Stabilisation Act, by the attempts of oil and sugar workers to unite and by the experiences of poverty. Their strategy, unlike that of the gangs, was one of social movement. The wildfall that both groups got was the Special Works Programme.⁵

Those employed by it knew that the Special Works Programme was a windfall, a dole, a handout. To them however, it symbolized power in the hands of the working class. Soon they shifted the balance of power on their side and usurped control over the hours

and conditions of work. In a sense, they breached the fundamental principle of capitalism which suggested "a fair day's labour for a fair day's pay". These workers dismantled the correlation between productivity and wages and related the latter more to the power of the working class. The projects became a source of social wage, related more to needs than productivity so that eventually most workers on the projects were paid for doing nothing.

The projects were attacked by the bourgeois elements in the society and an "Unemployment Levy" set up to fund such projects was declared unconstitutional by the court. By 1974, workers on these projects were demanding that they be given full rebate on their income tax payments as well as national insurance benefits and opportunities for promotion and paid leave.⁸

Trade unions' attempts to negotiate on behalf of the workers were rejected by the workers themselves. The unions were seen as limited and confined to specific channels that emasculated labour organisations in a capitalist environment. Workers preferred to negotiate directly with the government rather than through a third party.⁹

In retrospect, the Special Works Programme reflected the further development of state capitalism and the increasing control and direction of the economy by the state. This in itself brought the self-organisation of the working class into direct conflict with the state. It also brought the realisation that issues in production could be settled politically and tended to push the worker beyond the realm of negotiating within the wage system. Government's control over industry or production told the worker that he had a stake in the process of production. State capitalism forced the workers to pose the solution to problems in terms of direct democracy, mass participation and involvement in order to meet the rigid centralization of the state. The formerly unemployed masses were now involved in the politics of control. By

their emphasis on community, social wages, and direct negotiations with the state, workers were hinting of the new socialist society.¹⁰ The PNM, as was to be expected of any political party, was thinking of staying in political power. Hence, the Special Works Programmes largely left out the East Indian Community, the majority of which tended to support opposition parties. The East Indians were also left out of what came to be called the Community Development Programmes.¹¹

Community Development is here defined as the process by which the efforts of the people, as residents of an area, are united with those of government to improve their community. The process involves two aspects: firstly, the community's reliance on self-help as far as possible and secondly, government's provision of technical skills and services which promote the use of initiative and develop self-reliance. The Williams administration was to turn the programmes into a system of political patronage that could secure support for the party. This patronage involved the exercise of power vested in persons and officials to appoint particular persons into office and to control and dispose of emoluments.¹²

Williams himself assumed responsibility for "community development" when he made it part of his port-folio in 1963. Special government departments called Community Development Divisions were established in certain districts. Persons appointed to serve in these divisions were PNM supporters. Through the use of voluntary community organisations known as village councils, the PNM was able to infiltrate local and municipal authorities and determine in which districts and communities projects would be undertaken and who would get jobs. The Special Works Projects themselves came to be placed under the Community Development Division. Invariably, the programmes catered for certain districts inhabited by Blacks. Rural districts inhabited by East Indians were largely neglected.¹⁴

The PNM under Williams, linked the leaders of the village councils, Community Development Divisions and Special Works Projects into a virtual watchdog group that sought the interest of the party and ensured that those who benefitted from political patronage retained a sense of obligation to the party. Much was designed to ensure that recipients of patronage developed a feeling of gratitude to the Prime Minister.¹⁵

On the basis of this system roads, bridges, street lighting, play grounds, community centres and other amenities were constructed in selected areas, providing, in the process, increased incomes and employment to beneficiaries. Initially designed so that government would provide part of the cost, with the community meting remaining cost and providing labour, the projects ended up solely as the responsibility of the government. In the end the standard of living of the community was improved but its members lost or failed to acquire a great deal of self-reliance. Needless to say, this increased the cost of government social welfare provisions.¹⁶

From the point of view of the retention of political power, this aspect of the welfare state proved very useful to Williams. Since the whole programme was under the Prime Minister, he was able to enhance his image. Williams was seen as the source from which action to provide amenities would flow. In so far as the major participants in this programme of community development were members of the PNM and recipients of its patronage, the whole business of community development was an extension of the PNM. It forged a bond between the Prime Minister, the PNM and its supporters. Because the Community Development and Special Works Programmes came to be funded entirely by the state, it increased the dependency syndrome. The extent of this dependency was reflected in the words of a popular calypso of the time:

Annabelle stocking want patching
She want de doctor help with dat
Johnson trousers falling
He want the doctor help with dat
Some want a Zephyr motor car
Others want a piece of land
Dorothy want she man
She want to complain to Doctor Williams.¹⁷

It must be pointed out that the words of the calypso perhaps underscore something other than dependency: it is also a reflection of the fact that Eric Williams became central to the hopes and desire of the masses. It is for this reason that he is remembered by some as "the father of the nation" Whether or not it could be seen as a reflection of his close identification with the needs of both the East Indians and the Blacks is debatable, for welfare states are known to discriminate along racial lines. This aspect of the development of the welfare state will now be examined further.

CHAPTER 8

RACE AND INCOME EQUALITY

It cannot be gainsaid that under Williams the welfare state of the country discriminated against the East Indian community. The discrimination occurred not merely at the level of 'community development' and the special work projects. It formed the basis behind the patterns of recruitment to key positions in various enterprises, public utilities, and government departments. There is the thesis that the Williams administration used the state as an agent of redistribution for the benefit of Blacks whom he considered the most dispossessed group of the society. Redistribution, it argues, was not restricted to outright transfer of income through welfare payments but also the creation of artificial employment and the provision of social and physical infrastructure such as housing and educational facilities: it also favoured the blacks in facilities offered for the expression and development of culture and intellect.¹

Williams own comments in his historical writings may have been interpreted by the East Indian community as evidence of his disfavour of them. In one of his books he noted that although planters tried to prevent the purchase of land by slaves they granted land to the East Indians.² He also contended that East Indians were brought to Trinidad in the interest of the planter class without any consideration for the possibility of social explosion between Blacks and Indians.³

To be sure, there were Blacks who saw Indians as largely economically self-reliant and felt that the African community needed to control the political economy. On that basis, some may have seen the exclusion of the East Indian from the redistribution benefits of the state as ideologically justified.

The whole issue of discrimination in the redistribution of income must be examined against a historical background. There can be no doubt that the experience of slavery and indentureship intensified racial cleavages in the society. Indentureship strengthened already deep racial feelings and increased resentment between Indians and Blacks.

Williams himself often made the mistake of misinterpreting the protest of sections of the Indian community as being obstructionist and unjustified.⁴ Many Blacks had never understood the unique, cultural needs of the East Indian⁵. The black community had, to a certain extent, been earlier socialised into an accomodation of the dominant European culture.⁶ It was assumed by Blacks that the East Indian aspired towards assimilation of such a culture. But many East Indians looked inwards and remained essentially unaccomodating: these constitute the epitome in cultural persistence. Thus, while some Blacks saw it necessary to acquire a community centre, they failed to appreciate the East Indians' desire for a mandir or mosque. Some East Indian themselves remained unwilling to use the community centre.⁷

Some discrimination might have been inevitable because Indians themselves had not, from the inception, sought to exploit the educational facilities available to qualify them for certain white collar jobs, preferring to seek employment with private and family businesses.⁸ It was not until the 1960's that Indians increasingly began to explore the educational opportunities available. Consequently, by the time Indians entered many areas of public sector employment, they were faced with the problem of lack of seniority when it came to the issue of promotion.

Two factors would have contributed immensely to discrimination where it existed. The first is that since the PNM was an African-dominated, in a situation where it was considered politically pragmatic to divide the spoils among its supporters, it was the

Blacks that benefited⁹. The second is that in a political system in which the ruling party dominated both the legislature and the executive, it was possible to effect discrimination.¹⁰

What were apparently missing were enough mechanisms to prevent discrimination both in the public and private sectors. It must be pointed out that discrimination against both Indians and Blacks existed in the private sector¹¹. In the manipulation of the redistribution of state resources what the PNM had done, to some extent, was to latch on to institutional racism already in existence.

It was not that no welfarism was conferred on the East Indian community. They benefitted, according to Selwyn Ryan, from a considerable amount of business welfarism, some of it apparently tied to political support for the PNM.¹² This apart, East Indians in agriculture (which they largely dominated) received considerable amounts of subsidies in the aftermath of the increases in oil prices.¹³ The government policy with respect to the sugar industry and cane farmers has already been mentioned.

The redeeming factor is that there was growing openness of the redistributive system over the period: more and more East Indians came into the teaching, public service and nursing professions.¹⁴ Others were employed in the public utilities. With the passage of time, there was growing equality of incomes and certainly the East Indian community benefitted, as did most groups, from the increase in welfarism that came after the 1970s.¹⁵

A study conducted by Ralph Henry in 1971 provided the following information. Blacks and Indians together made up 84.70% of the sample tested but 88.30% of the total poor.¹⁶ There was greater poverty among the Indians who then comprised 34.04% and the sample size but 42.13% of the total poor.¹⁷ Blacks on the other hand made up 50.66% of the sample but 46.17% of the total poor.¹⁸

Winston Dookeran who conducted a survey of income in both 1960 and 1970 also conducted that in both years the incomes of the East Indian were lower than the Blacks.¹⁹

A later study conducted by Henry and Harewood revealed significant changes in the situation. The pattern had been reversed: the monthly income of East Indian now averaged \$454, that of the Black was \$412. Incidentally, that of the European, Chinese, Syrian and others remained high at \$630.²⁰

To what extent the new income status of the Indian was the result of government's new redistribution policy or increasing openness of the redistribution system, as compared to the Indian's own initiative remains debatable. But a survey conducted by Henry for the period 1981/82 suggested that the geographic spread of expenditure, easy physical mobility across the country, continued reduction of unemployment and direct disbursements from the government in respect of its anti-poverty measures, had a positive effect on equity. All sections of the national community benefitted. There was significant reduction in the disparity that had existed between Indians and other income groups. It dropped from 1.89 in 1971 to 1.21 in 1981/82. What is more the disparity ratio of both Blacks and Indians in relations to other income groups settled at 1.21: both Indians and Blacks were in the same income position relative to other groups in the society.²¹

The situation is shown below:

TABLE 7
Income Disparity Ratios

Year	Black/Indians	Black/Other	Other/Indian
1971	0.16	1.58	1.84
1975/76	0.91	1.55	1.39
1981/82	1.00	1.21	1.21

Source: Ralph Henry, "The State and Income Distribution" in
(ed) Selwyn Ryan, The Independence Experience p. 487

The boom years were characterised by increased incomes for all but not always at the expense of others for the government was prepared to spend heavily on employment creation and a range of social services. This should put pause to the notion that Williams and the PNM continuously preoccupied themselves with affirmative action for Blacks and injury to others.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion attempted to trace the development of the welfare state in the era of the administration of Eric Williams. The welfare state was seen as those aspects of government's policy related to the promotion of the welfare of members of the society and was synonymous with social policy. It also established that since all societies design policies to protect and promote the interest of its members, they are welfare states of one kind or another.

The focus of this paper was on aspects of the welfare state examined by an emerging perspective called Jobism. The perspective joined macro-economic and cultural considerations and declared the welfare state a legacy Williams, resulting from his socialist ideas and deeds and precipitating economic decline on the country as well as discrimination against the East Indian community.

A discussion of the development of the welfare state in Williams' era necessitated an examination of events prior to that era. Historical developments in any one epoch are as much a matter of continuity as well as change and are often related to antecedent factors. The attempt to precisely locate developments in Williams' era within the historical records required a search for their roots. Although the welfare state has been formally defined in conventional academia as related to events beginning in the 1940's, this paper located the beginning of welfare statist social policy in the era of slavery. The welfare state was seen to have originated in the merging of the interests of planter capitalism and metropolitan imperialism. A crucial factor in the resolution of such a thesis lies in the willingness to depart from the safety of orthodox western paradigms and to examine the development of the welfare state in the British West Indian colonial empire on its own

terms. Such an approach provides very early evidence of welfare state measures and growing dependence of all classes, propertied and propertyless, on the state. Though it is often difficult to delineate where one epoch begins and ends, it is often necessary, for heuristic purposes, to re-define them. Through such a revision, this paper has established that developments in Williams' era followed earlier phases of state welfarism, each having its own characteristics and dimensions.

The last such phase bequeathed to Trinidad and Tobago a legacy of institutions, ideas, practices and expectations that conspired to encourage further development of state welfarism. These included trade unions, political parties, pressure groups, welfare corporatism and a Fabian psyche among the population and its leaders.¹ Furthermore, in the implementation of the reports of the Moyne and Forster commissions, the continuation of extensive public works programmes, housing projects and the establishment of social welfare schemes, the institutional capacity of the state to provide was established.² Meanwhile class and racial considerations continued to characterize the distribution of welfare.³

Into this scenario stepped Eric Williams and the PNM in 1956. Williams academic achievements and fame as orator had been based on a penchant for anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, both in speeches and writings. An expectant society saw Williams as a literal food basket. Williams himself encouraged expectation through the promise underscored by the People's Charter. It was as Fabian and, as the policies espoused by Albert Gomes, it was essentially consumptionist.

At an early point in his stewardship Williams, in his capacity as Prime Minister, came to recognise the economic limitations of the country, its weak entrepreneurial class, undiversified nature, limited research capacity and technical knowledge and the

inevitability of dependence upon foreign capitalists. His policy between 1958 to 1970 was an attempt to deal with these problems. However it constituted a volte face: except for his attempts to regain control of Chaguaramas, Williams had largely abandoned his anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist stand. He now courted the capitalist and stuck close to policies that were liberal-collectivist. Such policies were designed to enhance greater competitiveness and resilience in response to the dictates of the free-market. Welfare state policies were put on the back burner. The first of the two Five Year Development plans were essentially a list of priorities concerned with the transformation of the economy. It was not that the government was not committed to the welfare of the citizens. It was simply that the government opted for the pro-capitalist means to achieve most ends.

By the mid-1960's government's policies were landing it into trouble with the populace. The development plans were not successful and the economy was experiencing a slump. Williams must have been in a very ironic position: the great neo-Marxist had pursued capitalist policies which were failing. The lowest income groups in the country were receiving an even smaller share of the national pie. The stage was being set for mass protest, but Williams proceeded to defy the Fabians in the society. Since Williams had a forceful personality and dominated his cabinet, it is reasonable to assume that the pro-capitalist policies pursued were a reflection of both Williams' will and influence.

Williams had begun to shift from his pro-capitalist stand in 1969 with his Third Five Year Development Plan but by 1970 the social, economic and political situation had deteriorated enough to trigger of a mutiny in the defence force. Williams was capitalist up to the moment of the resolution of the impasse. He sought and obtained the assistance of the American government and soon the American gunboats were stationed outside the Gulf of Paria to protect American business interests in the country.⁴

Notwithstanding this, the disturbances caused a drastic shift in government's policy. The shift was decidedly towards state ownership, increased welfare provisions, the creation of artificial employment and greater equity in the distribution of income. It is beyond doubt that Williams was the reluctant partner in this new accommodation between state and citizenry. He had literally been pushed into this situation. One would have expected that as a neo-Marxist (in terms of academic inclination), Williams would have welcomed the change. But Williams was merely being pragmatic: in as much as it came to a choice between Fabian welfare Statism or social and political catastrophe, Williams gave way to the former. Even so the new shift was to state capitalism. Williams was always a reluctant socialist. This was to be brought out clearly in relation to the new situation as regards labour.

After the disturbances of 1970, a new labour code and a number of conventions were quickly ratified by the government. But by 1975 in an incident henceforth known as Bloody Tuesday, oil and sugar workers pursuing a peaceful protest march were beaten, arrested and jailed, at a point in time when it might have been easier to accede to labour's demand since oil prices had skyrocketed⁵. Why Williams is so closely associated with Fabian socialism defies logic.

The same must be said of attempts to qualify Williams' policies as precipitating economic decline. As has been pointed out, Williams left a legacy of economic growth. It is true that such growth was associated with increases in oil prices. But growth in the local economy continued after oil prices had fallen in 1982. And Williams was gone by then.

The view has been expressed, again by those with Jobist perspectives, that were it not for increases in oil prices Williams' welfare statist policies would have led to negative economic growth⁶. The view is based on an assessment of Williams' policies

as constituting a kind of modern day "Robin Hood" agenda that stole from the rich to give to the poor, served as a disincentive to private investment, and prevented individuals from earning through hard work.

In the first place it amounts to speculation and prognostication to contend that were it not for increased oil prices there would have been negative growth. Such a view ought not to be credited with being extrapolative. It is probably not designed to give Williams any credit for being pragmatic. Notwithstanding this, tremendous augmentation in welfare statism really came only in the context of increased oil revenue. Williams was no Robin Hood: the increases in oil revenues enabled the state to provide increased welfarism for all groups and classes, but not at the expense of any one. Nearly all groups enjoyed a larger income because of the existence of a larger national pie. For this reason the question of disincentive to private investment did not arise then. In the case of large private enterprises that controlled key resource sectors of the economy, government paid handsomely for their purchase. For smaller and medium private enterprises the government largely played a paternal role. The windfall from oil turned a parsimonious government into a spendrift godfather.

It is against this background that the Jobist perspective is correct in arguing that the Williams administration perpetuated a dependency syndrome. If, however, before the energy crisis this was perpetuated among the poor black classes dependent upon doles and handouts of the Special Works and Community Development projects, then Williams later enveloped the whole nation in a relationship of dependency after the increase in oil prices. Government began, henceforth, to dish out subsidies to state enterprises, public utilities, agriculture and pioneer industries and effected transfers to all and sundry. It was a period in which the high prices of oil proved intoxicating. Developmental planning was

temporarily shelved between 1974 and 1981 and replaced by uncoordinated sectoral planning in which various sectors of the economy were provided with financial aid.⁷ This increased the dependence on government even though new and formerly inconceivable areas of economic activities were entered into.

The early PNM discriminated against the East Indian community. What is not clear is how much of this was based on pure racism as opposed to political pragmatism. The same question arises concerning affirmative action for Blacks. There is now emerging evidence that Williams and the PNM discriminated against Tobago, which constituted an essentially African community. If the welfare state programmes constituted affirmative action for Blacks, then what is to be made of the allegations of discrimination against the Blacks of Tobago? This is certainly an area that requires further investigation, for Tobago received very small allocations for special works and community development and in some years, none at all.⁸

What is emerging about the relationship between Williams and the welfare state in Trinidad and Tobago points to the conclusion that it was guided by political pragmatism. It was political pragmatism and a need for a certain degree of conservatism that informed the tendency to opt for liberal-collectivism in the first fourteen years of administration. It was also political pragmatism that informed the shift to Fabian socialism. The same political pragmatism informed the decision to create special works and community development projects, to subsidise the sugar cane factories and the cane farmers.

Williams appears to have been a very pragmatic politician. Whether this pragmatism was influenced more by a desire to stay in power or to maintain a necessary degree of stability in the political, economic and social affairs of the country is debatable. It will appear, however, that both aspects were seen by Williams as

indispensable. Both these concerns seemed to have informed the pragmatism he applied to the development of the welfare state. In essence, he followed what he himself called a "third line of development" - ⁹one that was neither hard-line capitalist, socialist nor communist.

Once Williams is seen as a pragmatist it becomes clear that there were other forces that were of influence, not the least of which were those institutions bequeathed by historical circumstances. On the whole, the development of the welfare state has been too narrowly associated with Eric Williams and he has been too narrowly associated with the promotion of socialism. To a large extent the welfare state evolved from the interaction of the pragmatism of Eric Williams with a society that had been Fabian long before he came into power.

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5. Ibid, 52-65
6. Ibid, 67-86
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. Ibid, p.19
10. Ginsburg, pp.1-9
11. Williams, pp.41-97, See also Braithwaite, L. "Introduction" to Trinidad Labour Riots of 1937: Perspectives 50 years Later (St Augustine: Extra-Mural, 1987) pp.3-4, Braithwaite contends that "as long as the labour supply could be increased by new supplies of immigrants, be it from India, or the neighbouring islands of the Caribbean, it could be kept depressed at low levels and the potential for profits commensurately increased".
12. The intention is not to suggest that government made drastic changes in social policy after 1937 but rather, become increasingly disposed towards improving them. By 1937 both governor Murchison Fletcher and acting colonial secretary, H Nankivell had acknowledged that the state had to take some of the blame for the disturbances on account of its failure to improve social services. The idea of British paternalism is underscored by Braithwaite, Ibid, p.12. He writes "Perhaps coming to grips with social reality and the local situation had been defeated by the colonial assumption that 'Development and Welfare' were an imperial rather than local responsibility".
13. Moyne Commission Report (1939) pp. 1-34
14. Ibid, p.133
15. Ibid, pp.174-189

16. Ibid, p.35 On account of the crucial significance of the point of view of the commission it is quoted here in greater detail:

This leads us to one final point of vital importance. One of the strongest and most discouraging impression carried away by the investigators in the West Indies is that of a prevailing absence of a spirit of independence and self-help. The lack of a tradition of craftsmanship and pride in good work and a tendency in all matters to appeal to the government for assistance with little or no attempt to explore what could be done by individual self-help. Isolated individuals may rise above this ...but the spirit is lacking except in some of the very small island communities. Without some tradition no amount of external and government help will create a sound and self-regulating social tradition. It is true that the history of the West Indies explain and account for the pauperisation and we feel that it is incumbent upon the people of Britain to do what they can to help but in the last resort, the success or failure of any programme of social reform will depend upon definite and prolonged efforts on the part of the West Indians to help themselves, even while accepting help.

17. Moyne Commission Report (Cmd 6602) p.335. Trinidad received the second largest grant of the fund, an amount totalling £106,518.
18. Williams, pp.197-215
19. See Ginsburg, pp.1-9 for analysis of the forces on agency that influence the development of welfare states.
20. Ginsburg, p.9
21. See Brereton History of Modern Trinidad Great Britain: Heinemann, 1981) pp.178-223
22. Ibid
23. Moyne Commission Report, (Cmd. 6602, written 1929, pub. 1945) p.72

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1. Brereton, Bridget: History of Modern Trinidad (Great Britain: Heinemann, 1981), pp.231 - 235
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ghany, Hamid A. : "Parliament in Trinidad and Tobago" in The Independence Experience (ed), Ryan, Selwyn (St Augustine : ISER, 1988) pp.175-192
5. Sutton, Paul (ed) Forged From the Love of Liberty (Trinidad: Longman Caribbean Ltd., 1981), pp xvii-xxxvi
6. Ibid
7. Williams, Eric: Capitalism and Slavery (Great Britain: Andre Deutsch, 1966)
8. Ibid
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10. Williams, Eric "The Blackest Thing in Slavery was not the Black Man" Revisita Interamericana Review, Vol. 3, 1973. The very name of the article indicates William's perspective.
11. Sutton, p.xx
12. Ibid, p.xix
13. Boodhoo, Ken I (ed), Eric Williams, The Man and the Leader (USA:University of America Press, 1986), p.33
14. Ibid
15. See Rudder, Ruthven, W. "Agriculture and Development in Trinidad and Tobago 1952-1987" in The Independence Experience (ed) Ryan, Selwyn : St Augustine, ISER 1988), pp.313-327
16. Sutton, pp.210 - 217
17. Ibid
18. Boodhoo, p.54
19. Sutton, p.366 See also "Trinidad and Tobago: International Perspective" Freedom Ways Vol. 4, No.3 p.333
20. Sutton, p.10
21. Ryan, Selwyn: Race and Nationalism : A Study of Decolonisation

in a Multi-racial Society (Canada: Toronto University Press, 1972).

22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. Sutton, pp.16-37
26. Ibid
27. Ibid
28. Ibid
29. Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Second Five Year Development Plan, 1962-1967 (Draft), pp.88-100
30. Ibid, pp.1-9
31. Ibid, pp.123-138
32. Ibid
33. Ibid
34. Ibid, pp.88-100
35. Craig, Susan: Community Development in Trinidad and Tobago, 1943 - 1972 (Mona: ISER, 1974)p.31
36. Ibid
37. Ginsburg, pp.39-191
38. Ibid
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3. Craig, p.388
4. Ibid, p.391
5. Sutton, Forged from the Love of Liberty: Selected Speeches of Eric Williams, (Trinidad: Longman, 1981) pp.402 - 412
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7. Ibid
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12. See George Vic and Wilding, Paul Ideology and Social Welfare (London: Routledge, 1985) p. 69-82
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15. Craig, pp.390-391
16. Sutton, pp.1 - 100
17. Ibid
18. Henry, Ralph "The State and Income Distribution in an Independence Trinidad and Tobago" in The Independence Experience (ed) Ryan, Selwyn (St Augustine: I^SER, 1988) p.475
19. Ginsburg, p.5
20. Craig, pp.390 -398
21. Ibid

22. Ibid
24. St Cyr, J. The Social Services of Trinidad and Tobago: A Preliminary Evaluation (Draft) (Port of Spain: Government Printery, 1971) pp.iv-v
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Ibid, pp.1-57
28. Ibid, p.3
29. Ibid, p.25
30. Craig, p.8
31. Ibid, pp.394 - 395
32. Ibid
33. Ibid, p.393

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1. Rampersad, Frank: "The Development Experiences - Reflection" in The Independence Experience, pp.3-17
2. Ibid
3. Ibid, p.8
4. Ibid
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6. Henry, Ralph "The State and Income Distribution in Independent Trinidad and Tobago", in The Independence Experience p.475
7. Rampersad, p.10
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
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11. Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Review of the Economy (Port of Spain: Government Printery, Dec. 1975), p.15
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
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3. *ibid*
4. Howe, Darius and Rennie Bukka "The Unemployed and the Special Works" in Contemporary Caribbean : Sociological Reader (ed) Craig, Susan (Trinidad: Paria, 1982), pp.217-240
5. *Ibid*, See also Craig Community Development 1943-1973 From Welfare to Patronage (Mona: ISER, 1974)p.34
6. Howe and Rennie,
7. *Ibid*
8. *Ibid*, p.8 There were other demands
9. This is underscored by both Craig, Howe and Rennie
10. Howe and Rennie
11. Craig, p.52
12. *Ibid*, p.7
13. *ibid*, p.36
14. *Ibid*, pp.118-120
15. *Ibid*, pp.53-116
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17. Quoted in Cudjoe, Selwyn Eric Williams Speaks: Essays in Colonialism and Independence (USA: Calaloux Publication, 1993)p.102

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2. Williams, Eric: History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain: PNM Publishing Co. 1962), p.121
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4. Ryan, Selwyn - Race and Rationalisation: A Study of Decolonisation in a Multi-racial Society (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1172)pp.362 - 382
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7. Craig, Susan - Community Development in Trinidad and Tobago, 1943-1973 From Welfrae to Patronage (Mona ISER, 1974))pp.68-79
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12. Ryan, Selwyn - "Dr Eric Williams, the People's National Movement and the Independence: A Retrospective" in Ryan, Selwyn Independence Experience (ISER, 1988) pp.313 - 335
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2. See Report of the Moyne Commission, p74
3. See Ryan, Selwyn Race and Nationalism Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1972
4. Robinson, ANR Caribbean Man - Speeches from a Political Leader, 1976) pp155-160
5. Baptiste, O., Crisis Trinidad Inprint Caribbean Ltd., 1976
6. Job, Morgan "A Dread Legacy" Daily Express (Port of Spain: Tuesday 28th June, 1994)
7. Rampersad, F. "The Development Experience - Reflection in Independence Experience (ed) Ryan, Selwyn (St Augustine, ISER, 1988)pp3-18
8. The Principal issue in the charges of discrimination against Tobago lies in their suggestion that development programmes for Tobago tended to be dutated by Tobago had no depressed areas. Tobago suffered tremendously from neglect under the colonial regime. It had to have had depressed areas. Tobago was in fact neglected during the early period of the Williams' administration. Notice that Tobago received small budgetary allocations similar to that received by Victoria, a predominantly East Indian area.

Year	Country	Total Expenditure	No. of Persons Employed
1969	St George	3,055,708	7,608
	St Patrick	391,174	61,158
	Victoria	9,543	145
	Tobago	96,731	581

Source: Graig Ibid, p.118

Such statistics are typical of the pattern of expenditure vis-a-vis Tobago and other places. St George, a PNM Stronghold consistantly received the most.

The Central Government located in Trinidad. Such perspectives emerge in a number of paper forword on forging Sebastien Raphael, Forging a New Democracy (Port of Spain, 1989) With respect to Projects undertaken in Tobago. The following data shows early discrimination.

Expenditure on Depressed Areas

Year	Amount Spent	Where Spent
1958	359,969	St George
1959	342,116	St George
	40,875	Victoria
1960	653,259	St George

Source: Craig, S. Community Development Mona, ISER, 1974), p.34

Perhaps data is suggesting that Tobago had no depressed areas. This is inconcievable. Tobago was neglected for years during under the colonial regime.

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