

grenade-throwers); but they fall well short of the build-up that would be needed for the have-it-out-with-Syria option. Because they fall short of that option, they will have to be reinforced by an attempt to strike a political deal with Syria. More sandbags for the marines; but also an aeroplane to take a senior American negotiator to Damascus to sit with President Assad, for as many Levantine nights as it takes, to talk about an accommodation both America and Syria can live with.

Such a deal is not impossible, given the ambiguities in the cautious Mr Assad's position. On the American side, it would consist of an understanding that Lebanon will to some extent live under Syria's wing, and that the Americans will use their influence with the Maronites to get them to accept that. On the Syrian side, it would consist of an understanding that the question of Israel is to be settled by negotiation, not war. There are mists aplenty around this, but some of the possible building blocks are visible. President Assad knows that a policy of permanent confrontation with Israel involves huge

military risks, and he does not seem a man to relish risks. He is building up a Palestinian political movement under Syria's control, in rivalry to Mr Yasser Arafat's PLO, which may be a hint that he is readying himself for the negotiation about the West Bank that Mr Arafat has never yet nerved himself to. There is talk of compromise about the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Winks and nods only, maybe: but a hope Mr Reagan needs to reach out for.

It has been a tumultuous week for Americans, and for other people who share most of America's interests but do not share its responsibility for having to take most of the difficult decisions. The tumult has been loudest about Grenada, and is exaggerated: see the next article. The responsibility is greater in Lebanon, because the interests of so many of America's friends depend upon America getting things right in the Middle East. If President Reagan decides to stay in Lebanon, he must have a clearer idea of what he is trying to achieve than has yet been apparent.

## Ask the Grenadians

If the people of Grenada at last get democracy, are they likely to object to losing the Cubans?

One voice was silent amid the worldwide clamour that followed the landing of American troops in Grenada on Tuesday. It was the voice of the Grenadians. It might have seemed sensible to find out what the people of the island itself thought about it. Hardly anybody felt a need to do so. Positions were adopted and attitudes struck, both for and against the invasion, without any trace of concern about the Grenadians' views.

The action in Grenada has rattled nerves. Ever since Mr Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency, after presenting himself as a man who would assert American power around the world, those actions in which he has seemed to be trying to do just that have been watched, by some people appreciatively; by others nervously; and by a third group schizophrenically.

Even the British government has felt obliged to dissociate itself from the invasion. The French government and others have condemned it. Further strain has been placed on the whole North Atlantic alliance, at a time when its unity is tested by the need to match Russia's new missiles aimed at western Europe. Mr Reagan's sympathetic critics ask whether his Grenada action can be worth its cost in damage to America's international image. The unsympathetic ones ask how much farther he is likely to go: intervention in Grenada having followed intervention in Lebanon, where will the United States marines be sent next?

It would indeed be alarming if Mr Reagan appeared set on a course of generalised adventurism. The Grenada action, however, does not support that conclusion. It arose from a particular context, of which most of the first hasty commentaries showed little knowledge. Their chief theme was the simple one that the Reagan

administration had seized a chance to squelch what looked like becoming a Cuban (and, at a second remove, Russian) strongpoint in the eastern Caribbean. It would be silly to imagine that no such thought had entered any heads in Washington. Nevertheless, the Grenada issue was never as simple as that.

### Look at the facts in Grenada

Grenada, after two centuries of British colonial rule, chose full independence in 1974. As in other British islands in the West Indies, free elections had been introduced long before independence. The party which came to the top in those elections a generation ago, led by Mr Eric Gairy, was gradually tempted to stay on top by a combination of election-rigging and intimidation. But Mr Gairy never abandoned elections, or swept his opponents from the scene. His Caribbean neighbours—and many of the Grenadians—hoped that his finagling was only a limitable aberration from the basic pattern of parliamentary democracy.

When the 1979 coup led by Mr Maurice Bishop ended the Gairy regime, the neighbour states did not sever their close links with Grenada. In 1981 Grenada joined with Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St Kitts, St Lucia and St Vincent to form the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The aim of the OECS treaty was to enable the little member states to pool their slender resources, with specific reference to defence and security. Despite Mr Bishop's attachment to Cuba, he did not pull Grenada out of the OECS during his four years in power. The West Indian neighbour states urged him to return to the democratic fold by holding the free election he had originally



promised. A return to democracy seemed possible.

The recent signs that Mr Bishop might at last yield to these urgings may explain why his more rigidly Marxist colleagues locked him up on October 13th and had him and three other ministers shot six days later. After his death, with no recognised government left in Grenada, and power held there by a military junta with a murderous bent, all the OECS governments agreed that their treaty obligations called for an international effort to restore democracy to the Grenadians. Barbados and Jamaica, and then the United States, agreed to help. Contingents from six West Indian states joined the Americans in the invasion.

Yet, after taking all this into account, it was still an invasion. Unlike the peacekeeping troops in Lebanon, it is still not clear whether the seven-nation force now in Grenada got any formal invitation. Yet the facts that Grenada's new rulers had not been recognised by anybody, even by Cuba, and that so many of these opposed to them were dead or had disappeared, strengthened the case for action to help the islanders regain a constitutional system of government. The OECS states cite article 8 of their treaty to justify their

own actions and their recourse to non-members' help. Article 8 seems to require evidence of a foreign threat to their region's security. Some evidence of that may have been provided when, on Tuesday, the Cuban "construction workers" in Grenada turned out to be an armed force. The new airport points in the same suspicious direction. But more evidence is still needed.

In many people's eyes, an invasion cannot be justified in any circumstances, anywhere, at any time. In some other eyes, this one was justified to curb the encroachment of communist power in the Caribbean. However, neither of those lines of argument takes account of the still, small voice which is yet to be heard: the voice of the Grenadians. It is a long time since they have been permitted to express their views, under a government which held no elections and sent its thugs to beat up opponents.

If, as the Americans have promised, the invasion enables the Grenadians to restore their democratic institutions and freely choose who shall govern them, that will provide a stronger justification than is likely to be found in any other quarter. It may also make some of this week's shouting sound far too shrill.

## The normalising of Germany



### Despite those demos

The loudest sound during West Germany's week of anti-nuclear protest was Mr Helmut Kohl's government holding its breath. The government's whoop of relief rang even clearer as the demo-organisers' threat to make West Germany "ungovernable" dissolved on October 22nd into sunshine and smiles. True, the 1m or so West Germans who during the week had demonstrated peacefully against new American nuclear missiles (see page 45) are only part of Mr Kohl's problem. For the first time since the 1950s a great many West Germans, not just anti-nuclear people, are in a mood to ask where their country stands in the world, and why. That will dismay those of West Germany's allies which have got used to expecting it to be a strong and silent place. Do not dismay too much.


Strong and silent old Germany is admittedly not quite what it was. There is growing doubt in the mind of many West Germans whether more Nato missiles necessarily mean more security. Living on Nato's front line with the Warsaw pact, and with so many nuclear weapons already on their territory, the West Germans know they will be the battlefield if war ever does come in Europe. The deterioration of east-west relations over the past three years worries them even more than it worries other Europeans. Since the Germans are unique in Nato in having solemnly sworn never to possess nuclear weapons of their own, they know they depend on their allies for their safety. The danger comes when, as has already happened in a small segment of the anti-nuclear movement, they begin to

see themselves at greater risk from staying inside the western alliance than from pulling out of it.

Most West Germans are far from reaching that conclusion. But West Germany's main opposition party, the Social Democrats, is being tugged in the neutralist direction. A mid-life crisis, brought on by the sudden release a year ago from the responsibilities of 13 years in power, has encouraged the Social Democratic rank and file to vote an emphatic no to the new Nato missiles, and so end 25 years of bipartisan defence policy. The party's wilder fringe has joined the Greens in calling for a withdrawal from Nato. Even some wary members of the leadership are suggesting a revision of West Germany's role in the alliance. Somewhere in this haze the dreamers have begun to dream again of two Germanies brought together in a nuclear-free paradise somewhere beyond the power blocks of Europe.

### Warning for the Social Democrats

So why does Mr Kohl seem so calmly confident that he can steer the argument back to the sensible middle? Because that curiously sturdy phenomenon called public opinion is pointing that way. One reason why last week's anti-missile protests passed off so peacefully was that the organisers kept their supporters firmly in line for fear of frightening off support from the great watching majority of Germans. Although recent public opinion polls show that 70% of West Germans would prefer not to see the missiles deployed by the end-of-1983 deadline, opposition to Pershing-2 and cruise does



## A not-so-special relationship

There is nothing the British parliament likes less than to be made to seem foolish. No sooner had it reassembled for the new session this week than it was plunged into an orgy of impotent complaint over the government's handling of the Grenada invasion. Unable to vent its rage directly on President Reagan, the house selected as its victim the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe.

Once again, the foreign office was found wanting in elementary parliamentary footwork. A statement on Tuesday, and an emergency debate on Wednesday saw Sir Geoffrey's most unconvincing performance since taking office. Asked again and again for the government's view of the American invasion, he could only incant that it was "still possible to take two views of the matter"—unlike less cautious European governments, which were quicker to condemn.

It became clear as the week progressed that only one of these views had enjoyed any currency in Whitehall since the British government first learned of the possibility of military action against Grenada on October 21st. The British government

first asked the Reagan administration for its ideas. It was told that the United States had received a request from east Caribbean countries for assistance and that it was counselling caution. Two days later, Whitehall learned that, although the east Caribbeans wanted an invasion of Grenada, the Caribbean Commonwealth countries collectively were against military action but in favour of economic and political measures.

On October 23rd, the United States told the British, disingenuously, that it would consult if it changed its mind. That day, Sunday, the east Caribbean countries told the British high commission in Barbados to stand by for a formal invitation to assist in military action. According to Sir Geoffrey, such a formal request never came—a point flatly denied by Mr Tom Adams, the prime minister of Barbados. On October 24th, Sir Geoffrey told the commons, while the American task force was already off Grenada, that "no invasion" of the island was planned, that the Americans' concern was with their citizens and that he was in "close touch" with Washington. Given what the

foreign office must have known at the time, the statement was at best a hostage to political fortune. At the same time, a plea from Grenada's foreign ministry to Britain to intercede with the Americans, in view of the threatened invasion, was received at a Scandinavian plastic-bag company in London, the proud possessor of an out-of-date foreign office telex number.

That (Monday) night, the eastern Caribbean states formally asked the United States and Britain for military assistance. Mrs Thatcher called Mr Reagan and was told he was "giving serious consideration" to the request. She then conveyed her "grave doubts" about an invasion. These are believed to have included the rather Alice-in-Wonderland argument that it would be directed at an independent Commonwealth country still subject to the Queen. Sir Geoffrey had earlier told MPs that it was doubtful whether foreigners on the island were in danger, justifying military action; indeed, such action might be more dangerous.

How strongly Britain expressed this view remains to be revealed. Both Sir Geoffrey and Mrs Thatcher left none of their listeners in any doubt of their opposition to the invasion. But in public Sir Geoffrey merely remarked that "the extent of consultation with us was regrettably less than we wished".

These comments did little to reflect the boiling frustration within the foreign office and the prime minister's office at their joint humiliation at the hands of the Americans. With both Sir Geoffrey and Mrs Thatcher tongue-tied, the emergency debate on Wednesday was handed on a plate to Labour. "Megaphone diplomacy has been replaced by doormat diplomacy", shouted the opposition foreign affairs spokesman, Mr Denis Healey, in the course of an excoriating speech which overshadowed the party's new leader, Mr Neil Kinnock, sitting mute beside him. The opposition was unanimous in condemning the Americans; the Tories were divided, although most felt Mrs Thatcher had been embarrassed.

The Thatcher government will now find it hard to recover its equilibrium on the Grenada affair. Should the Americans withdraw swiftly, having established a democratic government under the governor-general, and with the Grenadian people holding their east Caribbean neighbours and the Americans as lifesav-

ers, Britain will have seemed churlish—particularly after the essential military supplies it received during the Falklands war—in refusing its support to an ally. It will have to welcome the end, having protested at the means. It will also be embarrassed if the claim that Grenada's governor-general, Sir Paul Scoon, sought military intervention proves true. Should bloodshed and further chaos ensue—as the foreign office appears to have feared—then the government's stark failure to convince President Reagan to change his mind will seem the more glaring. Not a happy return to work for Mrs Thatcher.

## Public opinion

### Missiles are fine, if they are British



More than 250,000 Britons responded to the call from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to come to London last weekend to demonstrate against nuclear weapons. But the other 56m Britons stayed at home. In the short term the government has no need to worry about public opinion on defence, even though Britain's first batch of cruise missiles is due to arrive in the next few weeks. But the rather erratic swings in the public's defence attitudes should give Mrs Thatcher pause for thought. And opponents of cruise missiles this week rushed to exploit the failure of Anglo-American consultations over Grenada.

Opinion surveys indicate that the British today are among the most defence-minded people in the west. That was one reason why Labour was humiliated last June. The Louis Harris organisation,

shortly before the election, asked voters in France, West Germany, Italy, the United States and Britain whether they would favour higher defence spending in their country even if it meant higher taxes. The British divided almost equally, 46% saying yes, 45% no, the rest offering no opinion. But the proportions of nay-sayers on increased defence spending in the other countries were far higher: 57% in the United States, 62% in France, 66% in Italy and a thumping 79% in West Germany.

As the chart shows, large majorities of the British electorate favour the traditional components of Britain's defence. Nine out of 10 want the country to stay in Nato. Almost as many (83%) favour the retention of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. A clear majority (60%) want America's nuclear bases in Britain to stay. Mr Michael Heseltine and other defence-niks will rejoice that the pro-Nato, pro-deterrent majorities are tending to increase. According to a Marplan survey in *The Guardian*, support for the independent deterrent has gone up by 15 percentage points just in the past year.

The proportions of voters favouring Trident and the introduction of cruise missiles are significantly smaller than those in favour of Nato, the independent deterrent and American bases. But widespread doubts about Trident and cruise—based partly, it would seem, on anxiety among women—do not amount to deep-seated hostility. The number of "don't knows" on the two issues is unusually high.

More significant, minor changes in question-wording make a big difference, indicating that many voters have no real views either way. Hint in your question that the cruise missile is a British or Nato weapon, and the public is ready to give it a cautious welcome. Mention that it is American or American-controlled and

Defence spending would be a better issue for Kinnock



### The sliding scale



the number in favour drops precipitously. State in your Trident question, as Marplan did, that the new system will cost £5 billion and a small pro-Trident majority dissolves into a larger anti-Trident majority. "Opinion" in these cases hardly counts as such.

All the same, the effect of mentioning Trident's price tag is significant, because popular enthusiasm for lavish—let alone increased—defence spending is waning fast. Three years ago, Mori asked a sample of voters in which three fields they thought public spending should be increased, if the government decided to increase it, and in which three fields it ought to be cut, if the government decided to cut it. At that time, 25% of Mori's respondents put increased defence spending high among their priorities, while 30% were keen to see defence cut. Earlier this year, Mori repeated the question on behalf of London Weekend Television and found that supporters of higher defence-spending had shrunk from 25% to 10%, while defence-cutters had grown from 30% to 45%. Those favouring defence cuts now outnumber those favouring increased defence spending by four to one. Gallun also finds that 60% (excluding the don't-knows) reject the idea that it is "worth £424m a year to keep the Falklands British".

A government thought to be hacking away at the health service and education while boosting spending on defence could find itself in difficulties. Mrs Thatcher herself is inclined to end the present programme, which increases real defence spending by 3% a year, after 1986 when the present annual 3% promise to Nato expires.

## Regional policy

### Tebbit's dilemma

The new trade and industry secretary, Mr Norman Tebbit, has one particularly delicate task ahead of him: steering through changes in regional policy. He has to find a way to cut ineffective capital-invest-



largely on the ground of the Caricom countries' lack of unanimity on the question of military action. However, according to Miss Eugenia Charles, prime minister of Dominica, a specific request for military action had been made by Sir Paul Scoon, Grenada's governor general. Apparently, no such request reached either Mrs Thatcher or Queen Elizabeth, Grenada's head of state.

On October 24th soldiers and armed policemen from Antigua, Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent—the four OECS members contributing to the joint force—went to Barbados, where American marines also began to arrive. In the early morning of Tuesday, October 25th, the invasion was launched, with a force of 2,900 Americans and 300 men from Barbados, Jamaica and the OECS states.

The strongest resistance they met appeared to come from the 600 Cubans who had been sent to Grenada to build the big new airfield at Point Salinas in the south-western corner of the island, scheduled for opening next spring. These "construction workers" were revealed to be an armed force. At a press conference in Havana, Mr Castro announced that they had been ordered to make as much of a fight as they could. On Wednesday evening, however, it was announced in Havana that the Cuban force had ceased to fight. The United States said that at least 30 Cubans and six Americans soldiers had been killed.

By then Nicaragua had demanded an emergency meeting of the United Nations security council, and Guyana was canvassing a draft resolution condemning the invasion. The first international reactions to it, and particularly to the role played by the United States, had been hostile. The end of the fighting, and the emerging reactions of the Grenadians themselves, may change that.

## Gulf war

### No oil on troubled waters

Thumbing their noses at the Iraqi threat to use Super Etendards against their oil installations, the Iranians have again attacked their neighbours. The latest incursion is variously described as a total failure (by the Iraqis) and a complete success (by the Iranians). But it is at least clear that the Iranians intend to threaten the Iraqis' economic lifeline, their oil revenues.

The Iranians appear to have succeeded in pushing their troops 25 miles over Iraq's border in the north and, they say, are occupying 270 square miles of land



north and east of the town of Penjwin. Part of the point of the attack seems to have been to knock out Iranian Kurds, operating from Iraq against the Iranian regime. (Iraqi Kurds, similarly, operate from inside Iran against the Iraqi regime.) The more alarming aspect of the attack is that it points towards Iraq's main oilfields, which lie near the town of Kirkuk, 75 miles west of Penjwin. The Iraqis' only present outlet for their oil, a pipeline through Turkey, runs northwards to the Mediterranean from Kirkuk. Iraq has countered by bombing the Iranian towns of Dezful and Masjed Soleyman. It also claims to have mined the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini and has threatened to bomb the nearby (unfinished) Japanese-Iranian petrochemical plant. Although the port is not an oil outlet, it is worryingly near the Iranians' oilfield at Kharg island.

What still concerns the other Gulf states most, however, is the Iranians' threat to close the Strait of Hormuz if the Iraqis use Super Etendards against Iran. Further Iranian successes would make such action by the Iraqis more likely. Most Gulf oil goes through the strait (see map). The only other outlets in use are Saudi Arabia's pipeline to the Red Sea and Iraq's pipeline through Turkey. Both countries also have pipelines through Syria, but they are not in use. The small Gulf states have no such pipelines, so the closure of the strait would hit them.

Western oil companies are not much worried by the Iranian threat. They calculate that the gap in supplies could easily be filled in the short run, and that the Americans would not allow the strait to be closed for more than a few weeks.

## Hongkong


### Of course we can run it

If confidence is the key to Hongkong's continued prosperity, then China has more than enough to go round. So far, however, such optimism is not shared by Hongkong's businessmen. The latest

round of talks between Britain and China ended in Peking on October 20th on an upbeat note. Both sides agreed they had been "useful and constructive". But there is still no sign of a breakthrough to the sort of agreement on Hongkong's future that Hongkongers are hoping for.

Nobody doubts that China will take back sovereignty over Hongkong by 1997 when Britain's lease on most of the territory runs out. Hongkong's hope that its prosperity can survive the takeover is based on two calculations. First that, because China's leaders seek the reunification of prickly Taiwan with the mainland, they will handle Hongkong gently enough not to frighten off the Taiwanese. Second, that since China earns large amounts of foreign currency from Hongkong—\$6.7 billion in 1982, 25-30% of China's foreign exchange earnings—it is unlikely that a pragmatist like Mr Deng Xiaoping will kill off the golden goose. So, anyway, runs the Hongkong view of China's view.

China's pride makes it reluctant to discuss the problem in public. And Chinese minds are notoriously hard to read, even face to face at the negotiation table. But it is possible even for a westerner to perceive that there is a view from Peking that is different from Hongkong's. Unlike Taiwan, which China cannot take back easily, Hongkong is a thorn in China's national pride that it can do something about. The clause in China's 1982 constitution permitting the creation of special administrative zones was meant to apply



All that glitters is not British

# AMERICAN SURVEY

## Why the sledgehammer hit the nutmeg

It would have been remarkable if President Reagan had sunk a putt last weekend. While playing golf at Augusta, Georgia, with Mr George Shultz, his secretary of state, the president was cooking up a Caribbean invasion. He kept playing so that nobody would get an inkling of his intent. His stroke was then deflected by a curious hostage-taking incident back at the clubhouse. Before he could start a second round, his concentration was well and truly diverted by the horror that befell the American marines in Beirut.

The invasion of the midget Caribbean state of Grenada, when it came on October 25th (see page 21), marked the Reagan administration's first use of American troops for undisguisedly military purposes. The invasion offered the administration an ideal opportunity to show the Russians and Cubans that passivity is not its true bent. It enabled Mr Reagan to start arranging things the way he wants them in America's "front yard", where central America remains a frustrating problem. And it provided some evidence, to be dangled before the president's right-wing critics, that Mr Reagan is not the ultra-pragmatist they believe him to be. Such motives are diplomatically denied by Mr Shultz and all the president's men, but it would be hard to imagine that the temptation to put some real force into the administration's global onslaught of words against communism was not uppermost in his mind.


Grenada could hardly have turned out to be a costly or forbidding action, and it was not, though the fighting continued for longer than the optimists might have expected. Symbolic it was, doubly so because hundreds of Cubans were present on the island helping with the resistance. The invasion, intended to remove a small irritant, may have helped to calm Washington's deep foreign-policy frustrations elsewhere, in Lebanon and central America. It probably does not herald American readiness to take the military offensive in these more difficult areas.

Mr Reagan seems rejuvenated by the

current alarms. To have acted has served as a tonic. With some pride, his staff tells how, after his arrival in Augusta on Friday, October 21st, for a relaxing weekend of golf, he got up in the middle of the night to tackle an urgent request from six Caribbean nations to help restore order in Grenada. He was clearly well disposed in advance to meet the request, since he had been preoccupied for some months not only by the left-wing policies of Grenada's rulers but by the construction of an impressive airport runway there, which he regarded as a budding strategic staging-post for Russia and Cuba. Presumably this will now be built, for other purposes, with American money.

Rather than return to Washington and scrap the golf, he played with Mr Shultz, the secretary of state has confided, to avoid arousing suspicions about his determination to resolve the Grenada problem. On the 16th hole, the game was interrupted by an armed intruder who took half a dozen hostages, including a Reagan aide, in the pro's shop, demanding a conversation with the president.

Shultz and McFarlane hear about the birdie on the 16th



The incident ended quietly, but Mr Reagan was whisked away from the course by security agents brandishing submachine guns.

The following morning, still in Augusta, he was woken still earlier, at 2.27am, with the news of the explosion at the marine headquarters in Beirut. By dawn he was flying back to the White House. He dealt with the Beirut disaster while secretly still planning the Grenada invasion. And so it has gone. The president, a man known to like comfortable working hours, has frequently been shown to the public directing the nation's affairs in his pyjamas.

Plenty of reasons were officially advanced for the Grenada invasion, which was carried out by 1,900 American troops (rather more than the marine force in Beirut) and by 300 troops from the Caribbean islands which requested American intervention. These landed well after the Americans had got things going. Apart from the request itself, the most pressing reason cited was the security of 1,000 or so Americans, mainly students, living in Grenada. This is where the invasion finds its psychological link with the bloody events in Beirut. Supposing, thought the president, the American residents were hurt or taken hostage in the violent climate prevailing in Grenada as a result of the recent overthrow of its prime minister, Mr Maurice Bishop.

In the event, it seems there was no

clear threat to the Americans, but the massacre of the marines in Beirut stiffened the administration's will to show the American public it was not neglectful about security. The White House subsequently acknowledged that Mr Reagan received eleventh-hour assurances from the dead leader's Marxist successors that all Americans would be safe, but he rejected their promises as untrustworthy.

Another reason cited was the desire to restore order in Grenada and give it the sort of government its people choose (one which, it can be presumed, will not be anti-American). This amounts to a stop-the-rot rationale, the urge to halt the spread of Cuban influence on America's southern flank. Nicaragua, please note.

To many in Washington, it was surprising that the act of war came so soon after Mr Robert McFarlane, known as an efficient but unadventurous staff man, had taken over from Mr William Clark as the president's national security adviser. Of the two, Mr McFarlane might have been seen as the less belligerent. Mr Clark closely shares Mr Reagan's ideological desire to confront the Russians. Mr McFarlane, however, is a professional military man (indeed, an ex-marine) who has evidently not become too much of a bureaucrat to feel uncomfortable about the use of force for political ends. He is said to have been the leading advocate of American military action against the Druzes in Lebanon.

Sudden military sorties to lay down the Pax Americana have been a traditional part of American policy in the Caribbean and central America for at least a century. The last one of note—apart from Mr Reagan's own show of force around Nicaragua this year—was directed by Lyndon Johnson, who sent a large marine force to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to make sure its government remained acceptable to Washington. The Dominican adventure did not arouse any implacable opposition in congress. Nor has the invasion of Grenada, though a lot of Democrats seemed shocked and apprehensive. The president's top advisers are of one mind, which makes a change.

Relations with Russia will worsen, the administration recognises, but they could hardly be blacker anyway. The disadvantages of the Caribbean operation may be felt most keenly in western Europe. That is not merely because Mr Reagan invaded Grenada, once a British colony, against the advice of Britain's Mrs Thatcher (see page 57). His move could sharpen the tensions surrounding the imminent deployment of new American missiles in Europe. Europe's left can be expected to argue that a leader who takes sudden potshots in the Caribbean might do so with nuclear weapons in Europe.

## AT&amp;T


## Hell is a local call

What goes down must go up. But will the promised drop in America's long-distance telephone rates compensate for the rise in the price of local calls which will inevitably accompany them?

All autumn, American consumers and their representatives in congress have been panicking about the possible size of coming rises in bills for local calls. Some say they may have to give up their telephones. America's boast of near-universal telephone service may have to be abandoned. The new split-level rates were to begin on January 1st, the day when American Telephone and Telegraph formally spins off its 22 operating companies:

What had been one majestic (or monopolistic) whole will then be divided irreversibly. AT&T will provide long-distance service, as will many competitors; the operating companies will provide local service. The rates of each service, according to the new philosophy, will reflect the cost of providing it. And there can be few people left in America who do not know that, until now, AT&T's long-distance service has provided a subsidy of about 50% for local calls.

Now the Federal Communications Commission has at last caught some of the public's anxiety. The FCC has ordered a delay, from January until April, of the "access charges" that it had ruled all users would have to pay to the local telephone companies once AT&T was broken up. These are, in effect,



... and \$2 more for gravitational pull

payments to replace the subsidy on local calls about to be lost by the withdrawal of AT&T's long-distance revenues. The FCC has also delayed the rate rises.

The access charges have so alarmed congress that a number of bills have been hurriedly introduced to delay or kill them. Most conspicuous and most unpopular has been the \$2 access charge to be levied on each household's monthly telephone bill, supposedly for the privilege of connection from the local to the trunk network. This charge has been a sore point with many people who never use their telephone to call anyone more remote than their doctor. Business subscribers have been scheduled to pay \$6 a month for this same privilege, both charges to rise over the next few years.

But the FCC has designed a second form of access charge, also unwelcome to congress. That is a fee to be paid by all the long-distance telephone companies—including AT&T itself—to the local companies for local connections, another cushion against the loss of the existing subsidy. The prospect of this charge has been welcomed by AT&T, because it will probably force up the prices of its rivals, such as MCI and GTE's Sprint, which now have a cheap ride into AT&T's local networks and can offer lower prices than AT&T's own long-distance service.

The FCC insists that it intends its access charges to go ahead, as designed. Its staff merely needs more time to wade through the details of the new rates filed by all the companies involved. But outsiders, doing their sums more quickly, reckon that AT&T may not have cut its long-distance rates enough. Customers, at least at the beginning, will lose more than they save from the break-up of the world's biggest telephone company: not a happy result.

The FCC's delay has only added to the confusion surrounding the future telephone service. AT&T is not even certain whether it can legally continue to subsidise the local exchanges after they become separate companies in 1984. If so, under what formula? It will have to go back to Judge Harold Greene, the federal judge who presided over the antitrust case which led to the break-up, to ask for permission. And the FCC has delivered AT&T a second blow: it has freed all long-distance communications carriers, except AT&T, from seeking the FCC's permission for changes in price or service.

For AT&T there are only two rays of hope. Perhaps the complexity of its current problems may prevent congress from once again passing a new telecommunications law. And perhaps the FCC, as it has faintly promised, will some day free AT&T too from regulation of its rates.

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Grenada Investor

# Licensed to kill?


While Frenchmen and Americans were being blown up in Beirut, all members of the western alliance, Americans included, questioned America's purpose and resolve. When Americans resolutely took over Grenada, Europeans and others condemned them. As America responded to a European request, originally made by the Social Democratic Mr Helmut Schmidt, to place missiles in Europe to counter Russia's new SS-20s, Europeans demonstrated by the million against their arrival.

For these and most Atlantic misconceptions America and its European allies have both been responsible. There is fundamental confusion on each side of the Atlantic about the true nature of deterrence, and about the use and purpose of American power.

## Grenada is the opposite of Vietnam

It is symptomatic of European muddle that most European opinion faintly praises the present lost cause of peacekeeping in Lebanon for its ineffectual nobility, while condemning the invasion of Grenada for being a ruthless success. "Under Reagan", wrote one respected European newspaper after the invasion of Grenada, "the United States has returned to the same use of armed force which betrayed it in Vietnam". That is exactly what it has not done.

The significance of Grenada is that it is close, convenient and small—whereas Vietnam was far, inconvenient, jungly and large. The maximum lesson of local deterrence—that even democratically shackled America can act unpredictably and with effect—has therefore been achieved in Grenada with the minimum of risk. The interesting points about President Reagan's shooting from the hip in the Caribbean are that he chose to do it months after he first thought of it and when he was confronting not Russia itself but Russian surrogates suddenly caught unawares with gangsters as their clients; and in a place where no superpower conflict was likely, where few casualties would occur, where no danger of a wider regional or broader conflict existed, where supply lines were short, and where support both from the American people and from small black surrounding democracies was known to be great. In short, this was, like Britain's more distant affair in the Falklands, a pocket war whose military damage was pocket-sized while its effect on home-town morale and



its message of resolve in the eyes of the rest of the world were reasonably large.

Three sorts of price have been paid so far by America for taking this overdue and freedom-enhancing little opportunity. None of the prices would count for much if Mr Reagan's administration were to notice the harm and take quite simple steps to offset it. Unfortunately—given the incompetence of so many American administrations, particularly this one and its Carter predecessor—this notice and correction are improbable.

The first piece of damage is more cosmetic than real. In Latin America, Mr Reagan has joined Mrs Thatcher in the doghouse: but, just as the Falklands effect was never as severe in Latin America as it was predicted to be (indeed Argentina's democrats this week have a lot, see next article, to thank Mrs Thatcher for), neither will the Grenada effect be very severe. It is more likely to leave a net gain, even in Latin America. Cuba has throughout the affair acted with, by its standards, abashed restraint—signalling to Nicaragua on the morrow of America's landing that it could not be relied on for direct help if Nicaragua were invaded next. The Nicaraguans, still fresh to the charms of totalitarianism, have shouted scandal at the tops of their voices—but will discover in due course that the Panamanians, Costa Ricans, Hondurans and El Salvadoreans who all fear them have been going to bed each night since Grenada feeling a bit safer than before.

Next, in the wider dock of third-world opinion, Mr Reagan has joined not only Mrs Thatcher but Mr Andropov—a fairly magic achievement. How many more people will henceforth take the view that President Reagan was applying in Grenada his version of the Brezhnev doctrine, that great powers always act just as they please, finding whatever specious excuses they can, and that there is no difference between Russia and America? The answer, one must hope, is a good number, especially among tomorrow's potential Comrades Bernard Coard who import 700 Cuban armed construction workers into an island with plenty of local labour, so that they can murder their prime minister and impose a Leninist government which 99% of their people do not want.

To say this will seem very shocking to those who do not understand the nature of deterrence. To deter, a deterrent must be plausible enough to cause quiet-

cence, or at least hesitation, on the other side. The best sort of deterrence—whether against nuclear war, against direct Russian expansion or against local suppression of democracy—is one which no democracy can provide: an absolute certainty on the part of all its potential adversaries that the United States will act to prevent what it does not want. Since the mayhem of American democracy and the glue of international law rule out such certainty of harsh response, the next best American deterrent is uncertainty. If they cannot fear the certainty of brutal retaliation, then the adversaries of the west should live in a state of uncertainty, even anxiety, as to whether and where America and its allies are going to topple undemocratic dictators (of left or right), or resist communist—or merely illegal—expansion. This sense of uncertainty needs to be periodically nourished by unpredictable actions such as that in Grenada last week.

Only one form of deterrence does not work, and that is the one that Europe's intellectual demi-monde and America's decent liberal tradition constantly wish on the United States: the absolute, destructive certainty that America will do either nothing or the decent thing—clothed, it goes without saying, in resolutions of the United Nations or whatever other cloak for inaction is to hand.

#### **Only America loves James Bond**

The fact that many Europeans do not see that inaction is more dangerous than American activism constitutes the third harm from the Grenadian affair, and the United States bears some blame for it. More damage has now been done to the picture which Americans and Europeans hold of each other—Americans seeing Europeans as spineless and (Mrs Thatcher particularly) ungrateful allies, Europeans seeing Mr Reagan as trigger-happy, unreliable, an alarming president to have control over nuclear weapons. Little matter that reality suggests that Mr Reagan, having restrained himself for three years wherever real danger existed, acted where there was not much—and about as far from nuclear confrontation as any local conflict could conceivably be. Little matter that, had the governments of Mrs Thatcher, Mr Helmut Kohl and in other European countries given Mr Reagan moral support, they would now be much better placed to persuade him to hand Grenada over quickly to Commonwealth or other international policemen. It is the mind, and what is in it, that matters.

Mr Reagan's hold over the mind is his greatest strength and his main weakness. The simpleness of his view has conveyed itself more strongly to his allies in Europe and Japan than has the evident pragmatism of the actions taken over the three years of his presidency. And not just to his allies: Russia fears and, in an odd way, even respects President Reagan as it did Richard Nixon—but the Russians are also now dangerously near to believing that, unlike Mr Nixon, President Reagan is too simple and too emotional for any sensible superpower business to be done with him. The Grenadian affair could entrench all these attitudes in Europe east and west.

America therefore has to ask itself why, over an action that was contained, efficient and even—despite the bogus pretexts that management of American democracy seems to require—honourable, its European allies indulged in their usual have-it-both-ways moralising about any use of American power. For sure, part of the reason is the familiar cravenness of European intellectual opinion. Anything goes so long as it does not involve matching or pre-empting somebody else's use of guns. For sure, also, Mr Maurice Bishop's government in Grenada was helped into crisis by Mr Reagan's coldness to its belated overtures. But a larger reason is that Mr Reagan's conduct of the presidency had in so many larger and previous ways disappointed his allies; so that Grenada fitted not, as it should and could have done, into a Reagan mosaic of calm, steely and determined action, but into a Reagan crazy-paving of unconnected and confusing bluster.

#### **Three sources of distrust**

The central disaffection, of course, has been over Mr Reagan's conduct of the nuclear debate. The first 18 months of Mr Reagan's, Mr Caspar Weinberger's and Mr Al Haig's speeches about nuclear war and weaponry successfully re-invented Europe's (and America's) mass anti-nuclear movement: and, with it, stimulated growing anti-Americanism and anti-Reaganism.

Slow to start negotiating nuclear deals with Russia, the Reagan administration now finds itself on the worst sort of escalator: making, in Russian eyes, insufficient concession after insufficient concession in order to dampen the "peace" movement that Mr Reagan's own brand of rhetoric helped to ignite. The entirely correct impression of a Reagan Washington in six-monthly disarray—two secretaries of state and three national security advisers in under three years—has confirmed the impression of a jumpy hard-liner succeeding a jumpy soft-liner in the White House; while a succession of other battles with Europe—over the Russian gas pipeline, unitary taxation, the extraterritoriality of American law—have made every government bureaucracy in the alliance impatient with America.

Two other American foreign policies have added to this central distrust. The first, Mr Reagan's policy in central America, is one on which European opinion is grossly misinformed. The picture of central America given by the liberal European papers and television is of an area longing to elect guerrilla leaders and Comrade Coards. It is more likely, see pages 21-28, that free electorates there would elect people who murder liberals. The United States deserves criticism for having, over a long period, created such nasty alternatives in its backyard, but not now for trying to create a path between them.

The second criticisable policy, in the Middle East, has been a chapter of more recent American incompetence and ill luck. Much blame for that lies at the door of the secretary of state, Mr George Shultz. Israel was first encouraged by one secretary of state to take on the Syrians in Lebanon, only to be restrained from hammering them by his successor. The excellent "Reagan plan" was presented last year at a moment when a long-

awaited Arab plan was still to emerge—thereby challenging the Arabs instead of waiting and using their plan as an invitation. A winter of vacillation over Mr Reagan's policy towards Israel helped leave King Hussein of Jordan high and dry. Syria's implacable opposition was ensured by the agreement America virtually forced the Lebanese government to sign with Israel. And America's peacekeepers were left in a vacuum that any peacekeeping force would live to regret: disregarded by many of the local militiamen, opposed by one regional superpower (Syria) and abandoned by the other (Israel).

### The real charge is ineffectiveness

America's controlled action in Grenada has been discredited, in short, by the lack of control in so much else of its foreign policy. It has suggested a president acting without licence, whereas in reality he was acting with calculation. That European newspaper charge of acting as in Vietnam might have stood if American forces had marched into the Chouf or over the borders of Syria. Instead America's forces in the Lebanon, at about one quarter of one per cent of the manpower levels deployed in Vietnam, are even more woefully inadequate to carry out a desirable end there than they were in Vietnam—and so they continue to sit in the terrorists' sights like ducks at dawn. The charge might just stand if America invaded Nicaragua (as it may one day do), but the present signs are instead that an

unpopular and interventionist clique there is slowly being brought to the bargaining table. Had America during 1980 or 1981 countered Russia's late 1979 invasion of Afghanistan a different accusation—of foolhardiness—might have been in order. The real charge in most areas should be of ineffectiveness.

Much will rest, therefore, in an election year, on whether America leaves Grenada in good shape, and on whether Mr Reagan can save much from the Lebanon, and make headway in central America, and give an impression of more control and less posturing over the superpower relationship with Russia. When opinion divides so deeply over such a tiny American venture, that says more about opinion on America than on the venture.

Nearly 40 years of peace, and an economic revolution, in Europe and the United States have done many things to the collective mind of Europeans and Americans. One thing they have done, of course, is to make that mind less collective, much less clearly made up than it was in the first war-shocked years after 1945. Such pluralism of view is an attractive fact; the west is lucky to enjoy it; indeed it is what Europe's last great civil war, in which America fortunately interfered, was fought for. But, brought to boiling point by a series of one-term American presidents who say more than they do, and too rarely say it wisely, such diversity also has a dangerous price. The price is confusion over even such an unconfusing event as Grenada.

## Peron is dead

Argentina's new President Alfonsín should be helped to bury him

The election of Mr Raul Alfonsín, the candidate of the centre-right Radical party, offers Argentina an escape from its dismal postwar cycle of inflationary Peronist populism and fearful army mismanagement. The size of Mr Alfonsín's victory—he won 52% of the vote against the Peronists' 40%, giving him an absolute majority in the electoral college—may at last have shaken loose the dead hand of Juan Peron, who locked his country's tiller on its futile, circular course.

Not even Argentina deserves its recent past. Peronism was an unsavoury mixture of borrowings from the European dictators—anti-semitism, posturing, parades and militarism, stiffened with a corrupt trade union base. Peron pandered to his mass support—Italian immigrants, a majority of the population—by exactions from the old landowners to provide cheap meat and bread. The result was that the farms stopped producing so much meat and bread, both for the domestic market and for export. Peron then threw up a protectionist stockade around new, and totally uneconomic manufacturing industries, making Argentina's foreign-exchange and inflationary crises even worse. So the generals stepped in unsuccessfully. Politically sensitive, they were scared of harsh measures to right the

economy. After a bit, they usually plundered the treasury for themselves. When the army lost popularity, it retreated—and the Peronists came back.

At the last turn of this wheel, which began in 1974, Peron died in office after a year. His movement disintegrated into rival factions fighting it out in the streets of Buenos Aires. The government headed by his second wife, Isabelita—who was advised by an astrologer, José Lopez Rega—stole what it could from the public purse until the army returned in 1976.

The old cycle repeated itself even under the ramrod-straight military president, General Jorge Videla. The army cracked down on left-wing guerrillas with a sledgehammer, but shrank from hard economic decisions. When General Leopoldo Galtieri seized power, he did try to impose a less inflationary and freer-market economic policy. Unfortunately, the disinflationary policy meant that real gdp fell by over 11% in 1980-82, while the freer-capital-market policy meant that rich Argentines borrowed from the banks to send their capital abroad. To distract his people from economic shambles, General Galtieri ordered a military shambles, the invasion of the Falklands. When that showed that a military government could not even win a war,



## A Radical switch to moderation in Argentina

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

After seven years of military misrule, preceded by three years of Peronist shambles, Argentines are pinching themselves and asking whether a bright new era in the country's tawdry politics can really have begun. What is certain is that a genuinely free election has been decisively won by a party with unquestionably democratic credentials. The president-elect, Mr Raul Alfonsin, who leads the not very radical Radical party, has a mandate which neither the generals nor the Peronists will rush to challenge.

The new government was due to take over from the present military junta on January 30th, but now that there is no need for vote-trading in the electoral college it may be inaugurated ahead of schedule in December. Its first, formidable task must be to come to grips with the country's foreign debt of \$40 billion (see page 93) and its inflation rate of more than 350% a year. During the campaign, Mr Alfonsin showed no readiness to swallow the deflationary medicine usually prescribed by the International Monetary Fund but his stump speeches are not necessarily an infallible guide to his conduct in office.

The scale of the Radical victory came as a surprise. Mr Alfonsin won an absolute majority of the presidential vote, easily defeating the Peronists' Mr Italo Luder who polled 40%. In the previous election in 1973, the Radical candidate won only 24% of the vote against 62% for General Peron's stand-in. Mr Alfonsin widened his party's middle class appeal this time and made big inroads into Peronist working class territory.

Mr Alfonsin's bandwagon was already rolling when he defeated the candidate of the party's right wing, Mr Fernando de la Rúa, for the presidential nomination. He toured the interior while General Peron's widow, Isabel, herself a former president, wondered whether to return from Madrid to pick up the party's banner. The Peronists' second choice, Mr Luder, a mild-mannered lawyer, made a dull candidate beside the younger and more eloquent Mr Alfonsin.

BUENOS AIRES



Winner (left) and loser embrace democracy

The Peronists also made a mistake with their candidate for governor of Buenos Aires province. Mr Herminio Iglesias, a machine politician, won 200,000 fewer votes in this Peronist heartland than Mr Luder and certainly cost the party support. In five other provinces, the Peronists split their tickets by backing their own candidates for the senate and governor while voting for Mr Alfonsin. The Peronists thus lead the Radicals in the 46-seat senate, but a heavy anti-Peronist vote in Buenos Aires province and in the populous capital city gave the Radicals a lead in the 255-seat chamber of deputies.

The election has already had its effects. When Radical youths, celebrating their victory in the city centre, saw bands of Peronists approaching, there was applause instead of the usual brandishing of fists. The day after the election, the defeated Peronist candidate, Mr Italo Luder, called on the victor and gave him a smiling embrace. General Bignone, who is presiding over the transition, commended the emergence of two mass parties instead of one. The Radicals were the one dominant party until 1930 and the Peronists have been the only mass party since 1946. The hope is that a healthier

rivalry will make Argentine politics less dangerously lopsided.

The president-elect promises to lead from the centre. His economic policy, however, sounds populist and implausible. In campaign speeches, he promised wage increases above the level of inflation. He claimed this would increase the demand for goods from factories which are working at 50% capacity and provide more jobs. Mr Bernardo Grinspun, who is tipped to get a top economic post in the new government, argues that the cost of wage increases to private companies will be offset by a sharp cut in interest rates. Preferential interest rates will be given to companies which promise to increase wages while keeping down prices. Despite holding out hopes for lower interest rates and new forms of government subsidies, Mr Grinspun also fervently argues that he is in favour of a tighter money policy and cuts in public spending.

One way of saving money would be to resolve Argentina's long-standing dispute with Chile over the Beagle channel. This can be done, Mr Alfonsin's advisers say, if Chile will give up any rights in the Atlantic in return for three disputed islands. Cuts in military spending may be made more tolerable to the generals if the Radicals decide not to conduct a witch-hunt for those responsible for the "dirty war" against "terrorists" in 1976-79.

Although Mr Alfonsin sometimes sounded like a hawk about the Falklands during the campaign, he apparently wants a peaceful settlement with Britain. He will agree to a formal end to hostilities only if Britain withdraws its troops, drops its exclusion zone of 240 kilometres around the islands and agrees to discuss sovereignty. The Radicals do not, however, rule out a "leaseback" solution whereby Britain would give up sovereignty to the Argentines and lease the islands for 50-100 years. Britain is waiting and listening.

### Grenada

## More light on it

The hostile international reaction to the American invasion of Grenada was crystallised in the United Nations' votes. On October 28th a draft security council resolution deploring the action got 11 votes and was blocked only by the soli-

tary American vote against it, which constituted a veto. On November 2nd the general assembly approved a similar resolution by an overwhelming majority. The same day American's defence secretary, Mr Weinberger, announced that hostilities on Grenada had ceased and that the marines and the naval task force had started to withdraw.

Most Grenadians had welcomed the overthrow of their self-appointed rulers. For the first time in many months, the Grenadians felt free to speak once General Hudson Austin and his junta had gone into hiding and the battalion of Cuban "construction workers" had given up the "fight to the last man" ordered by President Fidel Castro. Grenadians led the searchers to the hiding-places of the general himself and of Mr Bernard Coard, the hardline Leninist whose quarrel with the late prime minister, Maurice Bishop, set off the convulsions that led to the killing of Mr Bishop on October 19th and the coup by the military junta.

Once he, too, was free to speak, Sir Paul Scoon, the Grenadian governor-general, made it clear that he had asked for help and was "very grateful that those other countries came to our rescue. They came just in time". He explained that he had asked for help from fellow members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and had "asked the OECES to ask America for help". His reasoning was that the Americans could act "faster and more decisively" than the Caribbean states or the British.

In Britain, some of the criticism of the invasion seemed to stem from post-imperial nostalgia and ignorance about today's Commonwealth. Grenada, which has

## Twining twinges

Can the London borough of Islington now look forward to the restoration of democracy by a posse of doormen from the American embassy? The borough, once best known as the resting-place of Dick Whittington's cat and the Arsenal football club, is famed London-wide today for its left, all-but one-party council. And it is "twinned" with St George's, capital of Grenada.

The twinning sprang from the capture of the town hall in 1982 by the borough's private version of the Labour party, which won 51 out of 52 seats. Looking for a third-world twin, it lighted upon what was then Maurice Bishop's socialist island. Great was the wrath of Islington's "comprador and kulak classes", who felt no such emotion and feared (unjustly, so far) that their local proper-

ty taxes might be diverted into Caribbean fact-finding missions.

Anybody who knows about town twinning knows that the worst way to set about it is on a basis of political affinity. For one thing, many of the citizenry will automatically want no part of it. For another, political power can change hands. As it did in Grenada. And as it might yet in Islington, where the running dogs of Social Democracy last week captured two council seats in by-elections.

But the twinning may serve some purpose yet. Now that the Grenadians really could do with some fraternal aid, why not despatch a people's liberation mission? It should be led, the kulaks and compradors add hopefully, by Islington's Labour councillors—all of them.

been fully independent since 1974, was wrongly described as "British territory" and as having a "British" governor-general, who was barred from acting against advice given to the Queen by her British ministers. Curiously, it was on the left that imperial delusions seemed most persistent.


In fact, Sir Paul Scoon, who is a Grenadian-appointed Grenadian, has no duty towards or constitutional links with the British government. The Queen he represents is the Queen of Grenada, who happens also to be queen of a dozen other realms, and titular Head of the Commonwealth. Now Sir Paul is the only remaining link with constitutionality of a country that lost the rest of its constitu-

tional framework in 1979, and last month ceased even to have an internationally recognised government.

The moves he has been making seem to correspond to the wishes of most Grenadians. He has proposed to appoint a non-political caretaker ministry to carry on until an early general election can be held. The Commonwealth secretariat is sending to Grenada the British lawyer who drafted its 1974 constitution and a Grenadian expert in disaster relief. The secretariat has also been canvassing Commonwealth countries for contributions to a joint security force—of policemen rather than soldiers—which might take over the task of maintaining order from the 300 men from six Caribbean states who were hastily assembled to go in with the Americans last week.

Caribbean voices have been getting more of a hearing. The prime minister of St Lucia, Mr John Compton, has explained the fears of Grenada's neighbours that Cuba planned to make the island a base for further encroachments in the region. St Lucia, St Vincent, Jamaica and Barbados have joined Dominica in an attempt to get the UN to heed their arguments. Trinidad's prime minister, Mr George Chambers, has met sharp criticism in his own island for his failure to support the invasion, which, according to an opinion poll, had the backing of 61% of Trinidadians.

An eye-catching reaction came from Surinam, which, after the 1980 military coup there, was drawn into Cuba's orbit just as Grenada had been after its 1979 coup. Surinam's ruler, Colonel Desi Bouterse, had in recent months—like Mr Bishop in Grenada—shown some signs of losing his enthusiasm about Cuba. Two days after the American landings, the



Liberated and liberators

colonel ordered out the Cuban ambassador in Surinam and most of his staff. Three days later he expelled his 80 Cuban advisers.

The reactions of the Latin states of the Americas were very different. The invasion has shaken many Latin Americans who had come to believe that the United States would never again send troops into any other country in the hemisphere without being invited by a local government. The staunchly anti-communist governments of Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay were alone in supporting the intervention in Grenada.

Predictably, Nicaragua led the chorus of condemnation. The democratic and—until now—increasingly pro-American governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela all voiced strong objections. Brazil's military president, General Figueiredo, protested that the invasion violated the principle of non-intervention; and Mexico's government gave warning that it would damage American interests in the region.

## Lebanon

### Godfathers confer

FROM OUR LEVANT CORRESPONDENT

GENEVA

To compare this week's conference of Lebanese faction bosses in Geneva with a gathering of Mafia godfathers might be unfair to the Mafia, because it has never eliminated several hundred victims in a single day. There can seldom have been so many delegates around a table who were directly and personally responsible for killing the followers of fellow delegates. But sit around a table they did, and by midweek they were actually agreeing on a thing or two.

At the opening session on October 31st the atmosphere was icy. Only one person shook hands with everybody else. He was Mr Saeb Salam, the Sunni Moslem representative. President Amin Gemayel tried to greet everybody, but when he approached ex-President Suleiman Franjeh, who is still pursuing a blood feud with the Gemayel family, the former head of state turned his back and gazed out of the window at a sunset-flushed Mont Blanc. On Tuesday evening, delegates vented spleen but at least looked one another in the face. It was a thaw of sorts.

The Syrian foreign minister, who attended the conference as a highly active and interested observer, steered it into the first confrontation of the week on Tuesday when he and his three allies—Mr Walid Jumblatt, Mr Rashid Karamah

## Syria's men, perhaps

FROM OUR LEVANT CORRESPONDENT

Call them clients or allies, Syria has three Lebanese it is counting on at the table in Geneva. They all belong to the National Salvation Front and can be ranked in order of reliability.

The most dependent on Syria is the former president Mr Suleiman Franjeh, a Maronite. When he fled from Lebanon in 1957 because of his alleged involvement in a mass murder stemming from a Maronite family feud, he took refuge in Syria at Latakia. There he got to know the Assad brothers, who come from the area. It was Mr Franjeh, as president, who invited the Syrian army into Lebanon in 1976.

Mr Rashid Karamah, the Sunni leader and former premier, is less reliant on Syria because his family dominates the Moslem constituency in Tripoli, Lebanon's second city, which has always been emotionally pro-Syrian. Many of his followers in Tripoli have defected to the Baathists, the Communists, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Moslem fundamentalists. But because of his name the Syrians continue to give him some backing.

Mr Walid Jumblatt's alliance with the

Syrians is a marriage of convenience. He has the Druze community solidly behind him, so he talks to the Syrians from a secure popular base. At the moment, Syrian and Druze interests happen to coincide. A third of his Druze live in Syria, but the Syrians almost certainly killed his father. In his unbuttoned moods he rails against them.

Still more independent of Syria is Mr Nabih Berri of the Amal, the main Shia party. The Shias provide a popular base much larger than Mr Jumblatt's. In the Bekaa valley the Syrians who are far from smiling on Mr Berri, have sponsored radical Shia movements in competition with Amal, such as the Islamic Amal of Mr Hussein Musawi. The pro-Syrians scored a point at Geneva this week when Mr Berri agreed to sit alongside Mr Jumblatt, Mr Karamah and Mr Franjeh.

The main Lebanese Christian groups, including the Phalange, are not always as irreconcilable with the Syrians as their virulent rhetoric suggests. In the past Christian Lebanese presidents have reached an almost friendly co-existence with Syria.

and Mr Franjeh—demanded the formal abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal agreement. This potentially conference-killing issue was temporarily pushed aside by the equally sticky problem of defining Lebanon's "national identity"—a code-phrase for indicating whether the country should be pro-Arab or pro-western.

The last time a formal definition was worked out was in 1943 when Lebanon was described as "an Arab country with a western aspect". This no longer satisfies. On Wednesday the delegates produced a new, longer formulation:

Lebanon is an Arab country and a founding member of the Arab League; it stands by all the obligations it has undertaken consequent on that membership; the Lebanese government has been requested to give expression to this national identity in all aspects of state policy.

The drafting of this formula involved a startling concession by two Maronite leaders, Mr Pierre Gemayel, the president's father, and Mr Camille Chamoun. Their volte face in accepting a categorically Arab identity for Lebanon is a tribute either to the persuasive powers of Mr Saeb Salam, who presented the draft, or to the power of the old-boy network, which crosses battle lines.

Lebanon's agreement with Israel, signed on May 17th this year, stipulates that this pact should supersede any earli-

er international undertaking by Lebanon—including its membership in the Arab League. The new definition counters this provision. What happens then to the withdrawal agreement? The Gemayel government itself is prepared to accept almost any cover words: that the agreement has "lapsed", that it is "frozen", that it "needs revision", that it has been "breached by Israel". Anything but an outright announcement that it has been abrogated, which is what the Syrians demand. In Geneva Americans talked about tolerating revision; in Jerusalem a high-ranking American envoy appeared to endorse Israel's refusal to budge. A suitable circumlocution will be found only if the Syrians take a half-step back from "abrogation". On Wednesday night the solidarity of Syria's allies on this issue was cracking—a hopeful sign.

At the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, China's master diplomat Chou En-lai told the French that they should not expect to obtain at the conference table more than they had won on the field of battle. Ever since Mr Jumblatt's Druze forces flushed the Maronite militia out of the Chouf, he and his Syrian backers have been talking like victors. But the not-yet-beaten Maronites still have some bargaining counters. The big question is whether Mr Jumblatt can wriggle free enough of his Syria patrons to do a national deal.

## Grenada

### How long until polling day?

Four bodies, which had been burned and furtively buried, were found on November 8th near a former Cuban-run military camp in Grenada. Evidence indicated that they might be those of Mr Maurice Bishop and the three of his cabinet ministers who had been killed with him on October 19th, a week before the invasion by American and Caribbean forces. From the eye-witness accounts that have been given since the invasion restored the Grenadians' right to speak freely, it is clear that many other people were shot down on October 19th by General Hudson Austin's men; but even the number of the dead is not yet accu-

rately known. The number of American dead may also be much higher than officially stated, the BBC reported this week.


On November 9th Sir Paul Scoon, the governor-general, announced his appointment of a temporary non-political government. It is to be headed by Mr Alister McIntyre, as soon as he obtains leave of absence from his post in a United Nations agency. Mr McIntyre, a Grenadian, was previously secretary-general of the 13-nation Caribbean Community (Caricom). He is respected in neighbouring islands as well as in his own.

There has been a falling off in the originally shrill and rather strained attempts to prove that Sir Paul either had not appealed, or had no right to appeal, for outside intervention. In Britain, even Labour party leaders have by now found out that the governor-general is a Grenadian, not a British official subject to guidance from London. It is also coming to be understood that, as factual head of a state whose recognised government had been murdered, he had a right to try to save its people from arbitrary rule by the murderers. And it is clear that only he could legitimately install an interim government, which would hold an election.

How soon that election can be held will not be clear for some time yet. Within less than a year, Sir Paul still hopes. Two of Mr Bishop's former associates have voiced sharply contrasting views. Mr George Louison, one of the ministers who was locked up but not shot on October 19th, wants the election as soon as possible. Mr Lloyd Noel, a former attorney-general, thinks it would be a mistake to hold it in less than two years' time.

Mr Louison clearly hopes for the victory of a party trading on Mr Bishop's charismatic memory but glossing over the horrors in which his militarised regime eventually foundered. Mr Noel says he fears that an early election would produce a government with "half-baked ideas" that had "not been properly assessed by the people". He can claim to speak from experience. Before the invasion liberated him, he had been locked up, not just for a few days but for more than two years, and not by General Austin but by Mr Bishop.

# Menaced micro-states



Can the Commonwealth give the world a lead towards making the smallest countries less vulnerable to hijacking?

Hijacking a country can in some ways be easier than hijacking an airliner. You don't need to pass through those airport doorways that bleep if you are weighed down with guns. Once in control, you don't need to reach a friendly haven; you've already got where you wanted to go. You can take far more hostages than even a jumbo jet would provide, and the problem of feeding them ought not to arise immediately. Indeed, more airliners than countries have been successfully rescued from hijackers.

All this, of course, refers to small countries. But such countries are no longer far and few. Three decades of rapid decolonisation have created as many as 30 new sovereign states that have populations of less than 400,000. Several of them have even fewer people than Grenada. Nearly all of them are very poor. In a weakling micro-state of this kind, power can be seized overnight by a small gang of armed men. These armed men may be the little state's own discontented soldiers; or members of a political faction with foreign backing; or even a bunch of foreign mercenaries.

Surinam has been ruled, brutally, for three years by a group of soldiers whose main original motivation was

dissatisfaction with their pay. Once in power, they sought Cuban support—but a few weeks ago they managed to throw the Cubans out. The Seychelles regime that was installed by a mini-coup in 1977 has already faced three attempted counter-coups; one of these involved mercenaries recruited in, and flown in from, South Africa. In 1981 seven mercenaries were jailed in the United States after the detection of a plot, by a group linked with the Ku Klux Klan, to overthrow the elected government of Dominica. In Australia three men were recently arrested and charged with planning to send mercenaries to wrest the Comoro islands from the regime that was imposed there in 1978 by another gang of mercenaries.

The traditional way for a micro-state to stave off these dangers was for it to seek a bigger nation's protection. Belize, although fully independent since 1981, still relies on the presence of a British force to deter Guatemala's military rulers from pursuing their territorial claims on it. Djibouti, a sovereign state since 1977, still has a French garrison. In October, when the east Caribbean island governments were horrified by events in Grenada in which they saw an approaching

threat to their own democratic institutions, they turned to the United States for the military muscle they could not themselves provide.

There are obvious embarrassments in such traditional ways. Charges of neo-colonialism are likely to be made. Those charges often arouse suspicion throughout the whole community of newly independent countries, large or small—of which there are now 90, more than half of all the world's sovereign states. The sight of a micro-state turning to a great power for protection can even perturb other micro-states whose need for protection is as evident.

It would usually be preferable to arrange for protection by a regional grouping, the micro-state being shielded against any predatory neighbours by its other neighbours. For years, an arrangement of this kind has been sought for Belize; unfortunately, nothing firm enough to permit Britain to extricate its force there has yet emerged. Although Britain's original hopes that its West Indian dependencies could shape an enduring sovereign federation were dashed 20 years ago, the sight of seven of them now pursuing joint action in Grenada suggests that their family feeling may yet, some day, crystallise in a new federal form. The present Seychelles regime has obtained protective backing from Tanzania. Brunei, which is about to become independent (see page 42), is hoping that membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations will buttress its security. For many micro-states, however, there is no prospect of effective regional protection.

When the Commonwealth's prime ministers and presidents met in India in late November, with the events in Grenada a few weeks earlier still prominent in their minds, they achieved a consensus that was remarkable in view of the sharp division among them recorded in October. As to Grenada itself, they agreed "that the emphasis should now be on reconstruction, not recrimination", and they all promised sympathetic consideration of Grenadian requests for help. They endorsed Britain's protective action in Belize. More generally, they expressed particular concern at "the vulnerability of small states". They have asked their secretariat to produce a new study of small Commonwealth members' special needs, this time including "national security". If something workable comes of this, it could provide a model and a basis for a worldwide arrangement for reducing the danger of hijacking micro-states.

the law on confidence and copyright.

Until 1981, journalists had no statutory right to protect their sources, but courts would consider the balance of public interest in deciding whether they should be forced to reveal them. The 1981 contempt of court act introduced a new statutory right. Many journalists welcomed it. They were mistaken. To codify rights often means to limit them—and the exceptions that this law made to the general right of non-disclosure largely nullified it. Newspapers can be forced to reveal their sources to prevent not merely crime but disorder, and in the interest not merely of national security but of justice—a phrase capable of covering anything that can become the subject of legal action, ie, everything.

The appeal court last week required the Guardian to return its leaked photostat to the defence ministry—and thereby risk revealing its unknown source—because, having leaked one document harmless to national security, the mole might leak one that was harmful. Even had the court not feared this, the Guardian would have lost. Two of the three judges clearly felt "that the interests of justice" also demanded disclosure. As the Master of the Rolls put it:

The Crown is entitled to discovery as an aid in pursuing its rights against a dishonest servant. Refusal to order delivery would be contrary to the interests of justice.

That is where the narrow if important issue of disclosure joins the broad one of censorship. Almost every leak involves some breach of confidence by an employee. Discover it in time and you (the employer) cannot merely use that fact to demand the erring servant's name (as British Steel did against Granada Television in 1981) but even to prevent publication of the news that he has revealed (as Buckingham Palace did against the Sun newspaper in early 1982).

#### **A curious meaning for copyright**

The abuse of copyright law can go still further. Its proper aim is to protect authors and publishers from commercial exploitation by others of the labour they intend to exploit themselves. But lawyers have discovered a new use for the law. Let a ministry or a company discover that some of its documents have reached a newspaper, and it can slap in an injunction preventing publication of its contents and demanding the return of the originals and any photocopies. The newspaper can, ultimately, use the substance of what it has learned but not the documents in extenso.

This right of private censorship was not, in the event, used when the defence ministry first learned that the Guardian had its leaked documents, but it could have been. It has been used already by major companies. Indeed, if the plaintiff can find a sympathetic judge in chambers, the newspaper could, without forewarning, be raided at 7am by the plaintiff's lawyers armed with an Anton Piller injunction, entitling them to root around for all copies of their copyright material wherever they chose. Happily, that is still fiction in newspaper cases—video pirates are the typical targets of an Anton Piller. But nothing prevents this kind of weapon being turned against the press. Sounds like Russia, doesn't it? Should it be possible in Britain?

## Grenada

### Departures

Of the 5,000-odd Americans who were sent into Grenada in the last days of October, half had been withdrawn by early November. Most of the other half was pulled out this week. Only about 300 American soldiers, mainly military police and technicians, will remain in Grenada, alongside the 400 soldiers and policemen who have been provided by other Caribbean islands.

The joint Caribbean force, which assumed responsibility for policing the capital, St George's, four weeks ago, is now to maintain security throughout the island until the Grenadian police force can be rebuilt to an adequate strength. A Barbadian has been appointed to head the police. Rural police stations are already being reopened. They had been abandoned during the four years of the Bishop regime, when policing was virtually taken over by the "people's revolutionary army".

That army's arbitrary ways extended to finance as well as to political arrests and executions. Its custom was simply to take

a large sum from the treasury each month, purportedly for soldiers' pay, without saying how the money was being distributed or even how many soldiers there were on the payroll. This was revealed on December 9th, when the governor-general, Sir Paul Scoon, explained to the Grenadians how the island's treasury had also been emptied by unexplained "advances" taken by the Bishop regime's leaders. Sir Paul commented, rather mildly, that these arrangements seemed "open to corruption". More bluntly, the leader of an American aid mission said that the Bishop government had "looted" Grenada's financial system. American emergency aid is seeing Grenada through these hard times.

A first, modest, allocation of British aid has also been announced. However, one of the first British contributions to reviving Grenada was not a great success. It took the shape of a constitutional lawyer, Mr Anthony Rushford, who went to the island as an adviser on November 1st at the request of the Commonwealth secretariat. He huffed out last week and headed for Antigua, without telling Sir Paul or his Grenadian colleagues in the interim government. Apparently he had quarrelled with most of them.

## The case of the peccable source

"Are you through?" said Don Sebastian, quietly.

"I am, Don."

"Then I entreat you, tell me if to the best of your own convictions, this your story is, in substance, really true? It is so passing wonderful! Did you get it from an unquestionable source?"

"Moby Dick", by Herman Melville

Some British newspapers and the BBC, on November 9-11, had a passing wonderful story of their own, if not an unquestionable source: that American military leaders had lied in saying that only 18 American servicemen were killed in taking Grenada. The correct figure was "at least 42", according to the Daily Telegraph's "impeccable sources"; "as many as 42", according to the Guardian's "senior" source; or, simply, "42", according to a "highly placed" source cited by The Times. The BBC announced that "it has been learnt" that the death toll was twice that previously stated. The American defence department strongly denied the story, and after three days the British editors seemed willing to abandon it. Nothing has been heard since.

The story was the result of a briefing given to British reporters in Grenada's capital, St George's, by an official, not

American, of the Caribbean security force, who spoke on condition that he not be identified. For that reason none of the participants is now willing to say who he was. They stand by their accounts, pointing out—rightly, if lamely—that they merely passed on what was told to them, noting denials and making no claim to final truth. Scepticism was appropriate, they maintain, in view of

the Reagan administration's attempt to manipulate coverage of the invasion by keeping reporters away when it began.

Seemingly unasked in the rush to write, however, was a basic question. Could this be? In America, the most open of democracies, the truth about things like this is impossible to contain. Dead soldiers do not come home to silence. Families and communities mourn. Soldiers who survive eventually come home and talk. It could hardly have been; and, it seems, it wasn't.



America's dead cannot go unnoticed

# BRITAIN'S GRENADA SHUT-OUT

## Say something, if only goodbye

Last week, we examined the impact on America's special relationship with Britain of Mr Caspar Weinberger's, and the American navy's, aid to Britain during the Falklands war. This week, we examine the events leading up to the Grenada invasion, and ask why Britain did not return the compliment.

America's invasion of Grenada last October differed from Britain's recapture of the Falklands in one important respect. The United States had no need of military aid. It required and obtained a diplomatic smokescreen from a number of small states in the region. It would have been glad of Britain's moral support. But whereas Mrs Thatcher's failure to consult America before the Falklands operation was in retrospect a gamble, President Reagan's neglect of Britain before Grenada seemed little more—other than to Mrs Thatcher—than bad manners.

To Washington, the roots of the Grenada intervention lay in Britain's own neglect of Soviet expansionism in the region. Nowhere was the handwashing of post-imperial responsibility more complete. Tiny British possessions were left vulnerable to attack and subversion. At least since Anguilla, London had seemed not to care. While America had always viewed the regime of Maurice Bishop in Grenada with alarm, his toppling last October by General Hudson Austin, who was even farther to the left, was the last straw.

Here was one area in which Washington's notoriously divided foreign policy-makers could present a united front. They were appalled at the prospect of a Soviet-backed red triangle from Nicaragua to Cuba to Grenada. At the state department, a hard-line team was in place. The inter-American affairs secretary was Mr Langhorn Motley, a Reaganite businessman turned ambassador to Brazil. Alongside him was Dr Constantine Menges, conservative Central America adviser at the National Security Council. Mr Nestor Sanchez filled this role at the Pentagon. Together they argued to the NSC that Grenada's new airport could be used by Russia to precipitate another Cuban missile crisis and saw the new Grenadian regime as part of a steady communist build-up in America's backyard.

The CIA had long contemplated the overthrow of Maurice Bishop but drew back after plans were leaked to congress. American marines even staged a mock invasion of "Amber and the Amberdines" near Puerto Rico in 1981. Bishop's


fall on October 14th and the character of his successors naturally revived this enthusiasm. American officials in neighbouring Barbados immediately discussed the question of "rescuing" Bishop with the conservative Barbadian prime minister, Mr Tom Adams. The initiative for this seems to have come from the American ambassador to Barbados, Mr Milan Bish. It is known that two prime ministers, Mr Edward Seaga of Jamaica and Mr John Compton of St Lucia, were also discussing military action.

On Wednesday, October 19th, matters came to a head with the murder of Bishop and the apparent collapse of law and order on Grenada. This led to a formal plea for help from Mr Adams to Mr Bish, which was passed on to Washington. The legal basis of this plea was not clear. Barbados was not under any apparent threat from Grenada. Britain appears to have played no part in those discussions, despite having some 200 nationals on Grenada and a distinguished high commissioner in Barbados, Mr Giles Bullard. Britain also shared Commonwealth status with both Grenada and Barbados and had

a warship, *HMS Antrim*, at Cartagena in Colombia.

Mr Adams's plea was considered the next day, Thursday, October 20th, at an urgent meeting in the White House situation room. The vice-president, Mr George Bush, was in the chair, with Mr Motley and the secretary of state, Mr George Shultz, arriving half-way through. The meeting assessed intelligence reports on the new rulers in Grenada and formally ordered the joint chiefs of staff to prepare a contingency plan for the evacuation of some 1,000 American citizens on the island. A 10-ship marine amphibious force, already on its way from Norfolk, Virginia, to relieve the marines in Beirut, was diverted to the Caribbean and reinforced by a special commando group. This drastic decision was confirmed by President Reagan "on the recommendation" of Mr Bush's group. It would appear that the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was as yet in no way involved, nor do any sources mention any request for help from within Grenada itself.

Three pressures now converged on the



Sending for the marines, not the diplomats

## GRENADA

White House: its concern for the Americans on Grenada; the NSC's concern over Cuban penetration; and the desire of certain Caribbean states to end lawlessness on the island. Only the first of these, however, might justify the violation of foreign territory. Ideally, America needed an invitation from some plausible regional body. The OECS treaty provided a sort of legal cover, but Barbados was not an OECS member. However, Dominica was, and its prime minister, the redoubtable Mrs Eugenia Charles, was in Washington that Thursday. She returned to the Caribbean on the Friday and with Mr Adams obtained "unanimous" OECS support for military intervention. Unable to act alone, they decided to request "friendly states" (including America, Britain and, it is believed, France and Venezuela) for assistance. This news was communicated orally to Mr Bish, with the hope that the support of the main Caribbean grouping, Caricom, might be gained the following day in Trinidad. This support was not obtained (except from Mr Seaga).

The OECS plea for help was received informally by Mr Bullard on Friday night and confirmed the next day, with an indication that a formal request would follow. It reached London on Saturday morning. Mrs Thatcher was at Chequers, Sir Geoffrey Howe was in Athens, the relevant junior minister, Lady Young, was in Cyprus and the problem landed on another junior, Mr Richard Luce—occupant of a similar hot seat during the Falklands crisis. Mr Luce and his officials agreed that Britain was most unlikely to join any military action and briefed Washington and Barbados accordingly. However, it was decided to await the formal request as well as Caricom's almost certain refusal of support. The subject would be put on the cabinet's overseas and defence committee agenda for Monday.

Not surprisingly, the Americans reacted differently. They now had an informal request from states in the region. Meetings had been held during Friday, at which orders were given to proceed with preparations for a "non-permissive evacuation" of American citizens from Grenada. When Mr Bish's message arrived at the National Security Council late on Friday night, Rear-admiral John Poin-dexter was in no doubt of its urgency. He promptly awakened Mr Shultz at 2.45am in Augusta, Georgia, where he had gone for a golf weekend with the president.

What Britain treated as an informal notification was, to Mr Shultz, an "urgent request for help". He roused the national security adviser, Mr Bud McFarlane, also in Augusta for the golf. Mr Bush was called from his bed to the White House,

as was the defence secretary, Mr Caspar Weinberger. They conferred with Augusta on a secure conference line, still in the middle of the night. Mindful of past criticism, they decided eventually to wake the president.

Mr Bush's group reconvened at 9am that (Saturday) morning, with President Reagan and Messrs Shultz and McFarlane on the line from Augusta. To their dismay, the redirection of the marine force had leaked to the press. Immediately, the possibility of the Americans on the island being taken hostage dominated discussion—the spectre of Iran still haunts the White House situation room. The group had little intelligence of conditions on the island. Nor as yet was there any certainty of military support from the OECS beyond the Adams-Charles plea. Washington was determined to do something, but not to be seen as acting alone.

The first need therefore was for any military planning to be fast and absolutely secret. On Saturday, the joint chiefs were ordered to proceed with invasion planning on the basis of a "go order". The invasion countdown was started. To avoid raising alarm, Mr Shultz and President Reagan decided to continue with their golf weekend and not return to Washington. None of these decisions was communicated to anybody who did not need to know. Their aides denied that any invasion was planned, and a Pentagon spokesman even scolded reporters for jumping to conclusions.

The second need was to assess the position on the island and clarify OECS co-operation—bluntly, to get it in writing. Two diplomats were accordingly despatched to Grenada from Barbados (they went in the company of the British deputy high commissioner, Mr David Montgomery). Two more followed. In addition, an American special envoy, Ambassador Francis McNeil, was sent to Barbados with Major-general George Crist to "probe" the OECS invitation and to liaise over support troops for an invasion. As Mr Motley later said, unilateral action was to become multilateral. But multilateral did not mean Britain. Inquirers from the British embassy were assured that American deployments were confined to providing for the security of American citizens; that America was proceeding with "extreme caution"; and that London would be notified of any change in plan. The British had to do with that.

Mr McNeil duly got his letter: Mrs Charles "has the honour to transmit herewith a request for assistance under article 8 of the (OECS) treaty". She did not mention any external threat required by that article, nor did she mention any request for help from the Queen's governor-general of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon.

Her letter was not sent to the British. This was despite the fact that Britain's concern for the safety of its citizens was no different from America's; indeed, *HMS Antrim* was on Sunday directed to proceed to Grenadian waters. When asked later about this omission, Mrs Charles said it was because Britain was known to be averse to military action. Subsequent visitors to Barbados have indeed been told that Britain was "planned out of the operation" from the start.

On Sunday, the whole tenor of the NSC debate changed. Early that morning, news reached Augusta of the massacre of American marines in Beirut. The president was once again roused from his sleep—after a day on the golf-course which included some of his party's being held hostage by a gunman in the golf pro's shop. (He later remarked that if you want a really unrelaxing weekend "accept an invitation to go play golf with George Shultz".)

The presidential group left at once for Washington and remained in closed session throughout the day. It was one of the climactic moments of Mr Reagan's presidency. The morning was spent discussing Lebanon, with reports of American casualties mounting hourly. Only in the afternoon did attention turn seriously to Grenada. When it did, the president's overriding concern was over possible hostages. Depressed and exhausted, he was haunted by his predecessor's predicament in 1980, bewailing at one point, "I'm no better off than Jimmy Carter". With his Lebanon policy crumbling, another Iranian debacle loomed ahead.

It was fertile soil for the insistent prompting of those demanding action. America, they said, had to move fast to forestall the creation of a hard-line Soviet satellite in the Caribbean. As one of those involved recalled:

The overriding principle was not to allow something to happen worse than what we were proposing to do. The purpose was to deny the Russians/Cubans a feeling of potency in grabbing small vulnerable states in the region. It had to be nipped in the bud before it developed into another Cuba.

It also had to be nipped fast. Washington, to the NSC, was still a "city of doves and leaks". Hostages, communists, pleas for help all rolled towards an overwhelming conclusion: invasion.

In this context, shortly before 7 o'clock on Sunday evening, the president made what Mr Shultz euphemistically termed his "tentative decision that we should respond to this urgent request". It was, in effect, a confirmation of the decision that had been 75% made on Saturday. It became steadily more final as Monday progressed. Throughout the weekend, no more than a dozen senior officials outside



Shultz never reached Thatcher . . .

the operational commanders were privy to the invasion plan. The government information machine, including even Mr Larry Speakes of the White House, was disinformed, the more convincingly to disinform the media. When the marines landed shortly after 5 o'clock on the Tuesday morning the world was taken by surprise: a fact which NSC staffers still regard as a triumph of crisis management.

Less triumphant was the outcome of another discussion which took place at the Sunday meeting: should America's allies be consulted, in particular Britain? The answer was no, for two reasons. First, apart from the OECS, there was no need to involve any other state in the operation; consultation would risk argument and jeopardise secrecy. The problem, it is said in Washington, was not so much the reliability of British security as the fact that telling Britain would mean telling more people in Washington, and a bigger danger of a leak there. Second, the meeting was advised, apparently by Mr Lawrence Eagleburger, formerly head of the state department's European bureau, that Britain was anyway likely to support the action. It was pointed out that it was the sort of decisive anti-communist operation which should appeal to Mrs Thatcher. Britain was known to be concerned about its citizens. Besides, Washington was owed a debt of support for the Falklands. Participants do not recall discussing Grenada's Commonwealth status or that of Sir Paul Scoon as representative of the Queen.

Britain was certainly concerned over the fate of its citizens. But its embassy in Washington was persistently told by the

state department that America's concern was no different. The one British diplomat on the island, Mr John Kelly, was in daily touch with Sir Paul Scoon. The deputy high commissioner in Barbados, Mr David Montgomery, was also in touch and travelled to the island with the two American diplomats on the Sunday (after the initial "go order" had been given in Washington).

Mr Montgomery returned to Barbados on Sunday and reported to London that the island was tense but neither the governor nor any British citizens were in immediate danger. He had no reason to disbelieve Grenadian officials who assured him that those who wanted to leave could do so the following week. He spoke with Sir Paul privately in his garden, asking him specifically if he wanted any help and was told no. The American diplomats reported back in similar terms (though after the invasion their reports were given a more alarmist gloss). As far as the safety of foreign nationals was concerned, nobody on the ground over the weekend felt urgent rescue was warranted.

These views formed the basis of discussions between Britain's Washington embassy and the state department over the weekend. The Americans reiterated that their concern, like Britain's, was solely with their nationals, again promising both caution and consultation. Although such exchanges would normally be with the state department's European bureau under Mr Richard Burt, who was not privy to the NSC debate, British diplomats were also briefed by Mr Shultz's colleagues, Mr Eagleburger and Rear-admiral Jonathan Howe, who were.

If British and American officials were as one, both groups were now cut off from the course of discussion in the NSC (and from the governments of Barbados and Dominica). A foreign-office paper to Monday's cabinet committee in London conveyed no sense of urgency. Ministers considered carefully the implications of military action—which had not yet formally been requested and which had been rejected by Caricom. A long list of arguments against was formulated for sending to Washington—legal, constitutional and practical. Sir Geoffrey Howe duly went before the house of commons and declared:

The United States government have explained that their own naval forces in the area are in that position solely because of the requirement that may arise to rescue their own very sizeable community.

Asked directly about invasion rumours, he said emphatically, "I know of no such intention".

On any showing, this reply was remarkable. Since Sunday, C-130 and heavy-lift helicopters had been roaring into and

round Bridgetown airport. American reconnaissance teams were testing the approaches to Grenada. The Caribbean was alive with naval and air activity. In Washington over the weekend, every Central America policy adviser who mattered was at his desk. Journalists in both Washington and the Caribbean were convinced invasion was afoot, and predictions were both written and broadcast that weekend.

Washington observers are frankly amazed that Whitehall's Joint Intelligence Committee, supposedly revamped after the Falklands affair, can have left ministers ignorant of this activity and exposed them at very least to acute embarrassment. The high commission in Bridgetown must have seen with its own eyes what was happening. British intelligence seems to have been trusting America to keep it informed. This trust was clearly misplaced. A Pentagon official, asked whether normal intelligence exchanges had taken place with Britain prior to the invasion, replied breezily: "You don't collaborate with allies in spying on yourself."

At midday on Monday, Washington time, with the invasion all but under way and Sir Geoffrey's statement already delivered, Rear-admiral Howe on behalf of Mr Shultz received the cabinet's reservations from the British ambassador, Sir Oliver Wright. He notified Mr Eagleburger, and alarm bells started to ring. Mr Eagleburger called Sir Oliver to tell him a message was on its way to Downing Street intimating that "very serious consideration" was now being given to armed intervention. He indicated disappointment at Britain's apparent opposition—understandable disappointment in view of the guidance given to the NSC the previous day. He asked at least that Mrs



. . . nor did Scoon

## GRENADA

Thatcher not attempt to dissuade the OECS states from any joint action.

Mr Eagleburger's message reached Downing Street at 7.15pm London time. Mrs Thatcher was at a cocktail party but urgently gathered a group which included Sir Geoffrey Howe, his permanent secretary, Sir Antony Acland, and the defence secretary, Mr Michael Heseltine. Still and throughout the day, ministers appeared to have been left in ignorance of any imminent invasion. It was a ghostly echo of the JIC's performance before the Falklands.

Ministers at Downing Street merely prepared a stronger message than previously, reiterating Britain's objections to armed intervention. They dispersed for dinner. Mrs Thatcher was dining, ironically, with the American ambassador, Mr John Louis. Sir Geoffrey drove to the City, where he met Mr Louis's deputy, Mr Edward Streater. The American diplomats were not privy to the invasion plan, but were subsequently surprised at the British lack of knowledge.

At approximately 11 o'clock that night, the White House came on the line to tell London that President Reagan had "reached a conclusion" that military action was necessary. The final order to attack had in fact been signed in Washington. Tory backbenchers who afterwards accused a doveish foreign office of rail-roading Mrs Thatcher into opposing the invasion could not have been more wrong.

Those present at Downing Street that night had seldom seen her more furious. Mrs Thatcher's call to the president was answered in the early hours of the morning. Another lecture from the British prime minister was the last thing Mr Reagan needed just then. Anyway, it was too late. The conversation lasted less than five minutes. American commandos were already ashore on Commonwealth soil. Mrs Thatcher swore that Anglo-American relations could never be the same again.

Washington remains puzzled at why Mrs Thatcher took such strong exception to the American action: exception which increased rather than abated as days passed. Most Americans are sure it was largely her pique at not being involved. This may or may not explain the vehemence of the case she threw, and continues to throw, at any who question her on the subject: America's offence against the rule of law; the insult to the Queen; the danger the American action clearly posed to British citizens; the precedent set for similar impetuous action elsewhere in the world. Above all, she claimed that President Reagan was letting the Russians off the Afghanistan hook.

Washington is correct in one major

respect. Nothing hurt Mrs Thatcher more than the humiliation of not being taken into President Reagan's confidence. Washington's arguments for non-consultation—the extra leak danger in Washington apart—were extraordinary. If, as the NSC apparently believed, Mrs Thatcher was likely to support an intervention, all the more reason for telling her privately on Sunday night. NSC officials argue that the American leaders were all under intense pressure that day—yet the readiness to guard every flank under pressure is the essence of crisis management. Mr Shultz and Mr Eagleburger were aware of the cruise-missile controversy, with the issue of joint consultation then erupting in every capital in Europe.

Officials at the state department and the American embassy in London—not to mention many Tory backbenchers—are still convinced Mrs Thatcher would have supported President Reagan had she been properly handled. Certainly a major public row could have been averted. As it was, her opposition gave the lead to unanimous European condemnation of the invasion.

However, the strangest and to London most aggravating incident of all was the affair of the Scoon request. Why did Washington fail to pass to London on Monday the one bit of evidence which might have changed Mrs Thatcher's mind: the alleged weekend plea for help from Sir Paul Scoon, Grenada's head of state and personal representative of the Queen? Such a plea would have weighed heavily in London.

Explanations have fallen like confetti from Washington ever since. At one moment, the Scoon request was too sensitive to mention. Any leak might have endangered his life. At another moment it was too unimportant—it was the OECS request which mattered. Or perhaps President Reagan simply forgot to mention it to Mrs Thatcher, given the lateness of the hour? Yet the request was not raised by either Mr Eagleburger or Rear-admiral Howe to Sir Oliver Wright. It appeared in no telex message sent to Downing Street. It was never so much as whispered by Sir Paul to Mr Montgomery in Grenada on the Sunday or by Mr Adams to Mr Bullard in Bridgetown. Some spokesmen have suggested Washington did not know of the plea until told by Mrs Charles after the invasion. Yet the NSC says Mr Bish knew of it on the Monday.

Confronted on the issue, Sir Paul later told the BBC's Mr Richard Lindley that he did not consider intervention was necessary until "late Sunday evening". Even then, "what I did ask for was not an invasion but help from outside". In which case it came after, not before, the president's decision to invade, and, even then,

why did nobody think to tell Mrs Thatcher?

The Scoon request was almost certainly a fabrication concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy. Together with the stream of deception directed at Britain that weekend, it exacerbated Downing Street's sense of grievance at America's conduct of the affair.

In return, America's bitterness over Britain's opposition was and remains deep. Subsequent revelations of Cuban and Russian involvement seemed to make no difference to Britain's stance. To the White House this was precisely the sort of confrontation with communism on which it expected Mrs Thatcher's support. As in the Falklands, democracy was intervening to counter lawlessness. America made great efforts to put itself legally in the right with the OECS. President Reagan had supported Britain, unconsulted, in the South Atlantic. Why could Mrs Thatcher not give him the benefit of the doubt in Grenada?

However, the more bitter question left by the Grenada affair on Anglo-American relations is: what does it matter anyway? American casualness towards Britain was a function of overwhelming American power. There is little new in this. From Suez through Skybolt to Mr Edward Heath's anti-American fury during the 1973 Middle East nuclear alert, the story has been the same. As Mr Henry Kissinger commented of 1973:

Imminent danger did not brook an exchange of views and to be frank we could not have accepted a judgment different from our own. . . Emergencies are sure to arise again and it will not be in anyone's interest if the chief protector of free world security is hamstrung by bureaucratic procedures in the face of imminent Soviet intervention.

Last year this view was reiterated by the American vice-president, Mr George Bush, after a series of European complaints at non-consultation over east-west issues: "I'm sorry. The United States is leader of the free world, and under this administration we are beginning once again to act like it."

To cynics this was another way of saying that superpowers do not need allies, only cheerleaders.

The problem for Britain is that medium-sized allies need superpowers. Britain treated Washington, during both the Falklands and Grenada crises, with a spirited independence. It was largely bravado. America's foreign policy-makers are increasingly gazing south and east, away from Europe. When they can no longer be bothered to consult their friends, it is the friends who need to worry.

# INTERNATIONAL

## Grenada votes yes, thanks

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT IN ST GEORGE'S

The Grenada election on December 3rd was a notable success for President Reagan. His favourite contender, the New National party, led by the middle-of-the-road Mr Herbert Blaize, scored an overwhelming victory, winning 14 of the little assembly's 15 seats in a high turnout. The surge of support for the erratic Sir Eric Gairy that the Americans had feared did not materialise, though this once-but-not-future right-wing prime minister's Grenada United Labour party (known as the Gulp) did get 36% of the votes. The rump of the revolutionary pro-Cuban party that had ruled Grenada from 1979 until a year ago got only about 5%. Mr Blaize and the winners romped home with 59%.

All Grenada knew that Mr Blaize was the Americans' man. His campaign had been flush with money. The streets of Grenada's ramshackle capital, St George's, were bright with stickers and noisy with loudspeaker-vans blaring the New National message, which amounted to "down with the communists" and "down with the Mongoose gang" (the Gulp thugs).

The Gairy men had claimed they had Mr Reagan's approval, although they were publicly rebuffed by Washington. Thus 95% of the votes went to parties that approved of last year's American invasion—or "rescue mission", as most Grenadians call it. The Grenadians voted in praise of America.

The left tried to distance itself from the harsher memories of revolutionary government. It had renamed its party, formerly the New Jewel Movement, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement. Its new leader, Mr Kenrick Radix, argued that its late leader had been essentially a moderate left-wing nationalist. All the MBPM candidates denounced the hardline faction led by Mr Bernard Coard, who is now in prison awaiting trial for the murder of Maurice Bishop

and a number of other people. They also denounced, to be sure, the "Yankee occupation" (now down to 300 paramilitary policemen and back-up troops, plus 435 Caribbean, mainly Jamaican and Barbadian, soldiers and policemen). And they portrayed Mr Blaize as America's surrogate slavedriver.

In vain this time. The MBPM was stuck with its record. The most telling graffiti of the campaign was "Jewel kill we children"—a reference to the killing of at least 30 demonstrators, many of them youngsters, in the course of last year's bloody Bishop-Coard struggle.

The late Maurice Bishop is still generally regarded by Grenadians as preferable to Mr Coard; but the documents that the Americans captured last year, and subsequently published, show that he was a standard Marxist whose differences from Mr Coard were largely tactical. The election has knocked on the head the lingering image of Bishop as a moderate leader



Blaize, who wouldn't be there otherwise

hounded to his end by American destabilisation.

The Commonwealth and the United Nations snubbed Grenada by refusing to send observers to the election. Now, however, a number of conclusions are being re-drawn, both in the Caribbean and farther afield. The critics still say that the invasion was illegal, immoral, unnecessary for Grenada and bad for international security. Most of those charges no longer seem to hold any water.

It is true that the coating of legality hastily painted over the invasion was a thin one. The terms of the treaty signed by the eight-member Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States did not give the action a clear legal basis. The governor-general's invitation appears to have been transmitted after the main fact: Some of the Americans' arguments for the invasion were also fairly dubious. Their prime motive was not to save American lives; nor had Grenada already become a Cuban military stronghold. The big new airfield then under construction (and now completed by the Americans) was a justifiable commercial project, though the Cubans probably did have other purposes in mind for it too.

But was the invasion necessary for Grenada? The Grenadians clearly think so. Mr Coard had the army, nearly all the guns—far too many of them for a small country—and most of the ruling party's hard core behind him. He could probably have consolidated his rule. True, Cuba's President Fidel Castro had deplored the killing of Maurice Bishop; but if Mr Coard had survived for a few weeks, he might well have come to terms with Cuba. At best, he might have been defeated in a civil war costing many Grenadian lives.

Bad for international security? The invasion opened rifts between those small Caribbean countries, such as Guyana, that seek to keep America at arm's length and those, such as Jamaica and Barbados, that are prepared to accept American help to stave off possible Cuban interference. The invasion was also bad for American-British relations, and for relations between Britain and the Caribbe-

## INTERNATIONAL

## Carry on, Carriacou

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT IN HILLSBOROUGH, CARRIACOUCO

Nobody knows how many people live on the tiny island of Carriacou, 20 miles north of Grenada. Maybe 6,000, down from about 10,000 five years ago. For decades this island's main export—even more than nutmeg and cocoa—has been people, mostly to the Yorkshire town of Huddersfield, the rest to New York's Brooklyn, which is said to hold 60,000 Grenadians all told. (Grenada itself has shrunk to 90,000 souls.)

Under Maurice Bishop's rule, the Carriacou emigration rate rose. Some islanders say they feared that if they did not go quickly they would not be let out. One of the earlier leavers was Mr Nicholas Brathwaite; he came back to Grenada last year to lead the interim administration set up after the American invasion. Another distinguished Carriacouan, who stayed put, is Mr Herbert Blaize, the shy, severely arthritic, notably honest 66-year-old solicitor who has now become Grenada's prime minister.

When the Americans landed on Grenada last year they forgot Carriacou. It "fell" to them without bloodshed a week

later. Since then the Americans have improved the little airstrip but the jetty that serves the island "capital", Hillsborough, looks as if it is falling into the sea. The local island-hopping airline often ignores the official timetable and gives Carriacou a miss.

Carriacou's economy has been in decline for many years. But Sir Eric Gairy made things worse while he was in power by nationalising a lime-squeezing factory, frightening off entrepreneurs and neglecting the ordinary islanders' needs. The 1979-83 Bishop regime was not much more interested.

As in Grenada itself most of the islanders reckon that Sir Eric was bad and Bishop worse. Sir Eric, they say, roughed up his opponents but grudgingly permitted rough-and-ready elections; Maurice Bishop closed down the press, abolished the ballot, and jailed his enemies without trial.

Of the thousand-odd people who passed through the Bishop regime's jails during its four-year life, only three were Carriacou-born. But Carriacouans be-

came increasingly cautious. "Silence was golden", says the island's weatherbeaten Irish priest. The churches were viewed as hostile. "They would all have been closed down in the long run", said the priest. Dreadlocked Rastafarians also got short shrift from Maurice Bishop.

About 30 Carriacouans were armed and called "the people's militia". With Cuban help, the people's revolutionary army set up a training camp, run until just before the American invasion by the officer who later allegedly commanded the firing squad that shot Bishop in October last year.

On December 3rd Mr Blaize swept up 84% of the Carriacouan votes. A retired pharmacist, Mr Hyacinth Clyne, was the Gairy party's candidate in Carriacou, but declined to inform your correspondent what his policies were ("I don't know about that one"); he got 6%, just behind Mr Lyle Bullen, a lobster exporter, standing for the remains of Maurice Bishop's party, who played down Marxism and confessed that his elder brother was Mr Blaize's campaign manager. Bringing up the rear, with 3%, was Mr Winston Fleary, who argued for autonomy for Carriacou, and carried a red hibiscus flower "for love".



The middle way in Grenada

## Grenada

### The Gulp factor

A general election is to be held in Grenada on December 3rd. Sir Paul Scoon, the governor-general, is inviting observers from the Commonwealth, the Organisation of American States and the United Nations.

In the last election, in 1976, the Grenada United Labour party (Gulp), which had been ruling the island before it became fully independent in 1974, retained office, winning nine of the 15 seats. In 1979 it was ousted in the armed coup staged by Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (which promised to hold a fresh election, but never did). The Gulp leader, Sir Eric Gairy, returned from exile nine months ago and, although he said he would not be a candidate himself, he has been working hard to revive his party and prepare it for the coming election.

In spite of its record of corruption and strong-arm tactics, the Gulp still enjoys a good deal of support, especially among the rural poor. But Sir Eric's posturing as a dependable bulwark against communism has not impressed the Americans. They, like many Grenadians, fear that his return to power would soon produce another revolutionary upsurge.

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On the political left, two former ministers in the Bishop government, Mr George Louison and Mr Kendrik Radix, have formed the Patriotic Movement, which seeks to exploit the murdered prime minister's popular appeal. But, despite their group's efforts to distance itself from the far-left hardliners who killed Maurice Bishop and many other Grenadians last October, many former New Jewel supporters may hesitate to vote for it in December, recoiling from the prospect of a fresh cycle of repression, armed coups and perhaps invasions.

Until a few weeks ago, however, none of the small (and mostly new-born) centre parties looked like a potential winner; so the voters faced an unattractive choice between the Gairy men and the Bishop men. Then an electoral coalition was formed among four groups: Mr Herbert Blaize's Grenada National party, Mr George Brizan's National Democratic party, Mr Francis Alexis's Grenada Democratic Movement and Mr Winston Whyte's Christian Democratic Labour party. Mr Blaize, who had headed a right-of-centre government in the 1960s, was accepted as leader.

The coalition was formed with American encouragement, and after the personal intervention of the prime ministers of Barbados, St Lucia and St Vincent (Mr Tom Adams, Mr John Compton and Mr James Mitchell), who got the four party leaders together and witnessed the signing of their pact. The fact that such strong outside pressures were required to get the coalition launched—after months of squabbling—has left many doubts about its chances of holding together.

Whatever government emerges from the election will face two delicate decisions. Until Grenada can be equipped

with an adequate police force of its own, internal security depends on the continuing presence of 400 soldiers and policemen from other Caribbean islands and 250 from the United States; but, although these forces were welcomed as liberators a year ago, there are now some signs of impatience for their early withdrawal. The second problem concerns the trial of the 19 people accused of murdering Maurice Bishop and other Grenadians last October.

After long preliminary hearings, a magistrate ruled in August that they should stand trial before the high court this month. With emotions still running high in the island, trouble could erupt during the trial, in particular when the verdicts are given. The interim administration that has been managing Grenada for nearly a year would clearly prefer to be able to hand over to an elected government before the trial ends.