

NOW GAIRY TO THE 'RESCUE'?

THE remote possibility that the self-destruction of the Grenadian revolution followed by the US invasion and occupation of the island would be followed by a gradual return to peaceful obscurity away from the international limelight has been removed by the recent return to the Spice Island of Sir ERIC MATTHEW GAIRY, former deposed Prime Minister of the island.

The homecoming on January 21 last after five years of exile in the United States ironically coincided with the tenth anniversary of the death of the father of MAURICE BISHOP, RUPERT BISHOP, who was killed in St. George's by forces loyal to the regime of the then Prime Minister Gairy.

While the US troops stationed in Grenada whom Sir Eric expected to be at the airport to escort him into St. George's did not turn up, he was given an enthusiastic welcome, described as his "hour of glory" by scores of his supporters whom he led in hymns of thanksgiving and prayers for President RONALD REAGAN and the others who had intervened in Grenada.

While expressing total confidence that the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) he founded 33 years ago would be swept into power, he reversed earlier statements and declared that he would not offer himself as a candidate so as to remove any excuses for not holding prompt elections by those opposed to his return to power.

Earlier, rejecting allegations of repression or links with the "Mongoose Gang" which terrorised his opponents during his years in office Sir Eric said one of his few regrets was that he had been "too lenient, too soft with communists and subversives" and that he should have dealt with dissidents and subversives in a different way.

The real possibility that Grenada could quickly revert to a state similar to that under the previous Gairy regime makes even more urgent reflection into what went wrong with the Grenada revolution and what are Grenada's other alternatives to fratricidal leftist regime or the order imposed by the Mongoose Gang.

Alongside the positive achievements of the Bishop regime in its four years in power such as the programmes in health, education, cooperative agriculture and the genuine advancement of the poor of Grenada, the failure to hold promised general elections, detention without trial and the stifling of the privately owned media in Grenada were serious abuses undermining the regime. The militarisation of the society based on the conviction that the US would intervene militarily in Grenada and the "greed for power" among some of Bishop's associates were additional factors contributing to the crisis.

An even more fundamental flaw, however, was the glaring contradiction between claims that the regime was practising "grass root" peoples participation in government when crucial national issues were being decided by a dozen central committee members, the names of many of whom, even party members were unaware.

The recent conference statement of leading Caribbean intellectual workers (*see report on page 10*) describes this fatal flaw as one which led to "a divorce from the sensibilities and struggles of the people and that this distortion inevitably resulted in the paramountcy of the Central Committee over the party and the people".

The conference in condemning the execution of Maurice Bishop and his colleagues and use of armed force in settling internal disputes, also called for a careful study of these events from the perspective of Caribbean humanism.

We fully endorse this call.

However, lack of popular accountability by a "paramount party group" is not confined to "leftist" regimes and at present faces even the interim administration in Grenada. In the final resort, the administration is accountable not to the Grenadians but to the US Government and US armed forces that put and maintain it where it is.

Sir Eric has already called for a permanent US presence in the island: a proposition fraught with negative implications not only for the people of Grenada but the whole region. In effect, the stage may be set for a remarkable political trade-off: the prospective offer of a military and naval base in Grenada in return for deepened US support of a renewed Gairyite bid for power.

Grenadians have not been given their freedom. There is still a long and difficult road ahead to win and create that freedom for themselves.

CARIBBEAN MEDIA AND THE GRENADA AFFAIR

CARIBBEAN CONTACT's former Editor, Mr. Rickey Singh, feels that there are many lessons to be learnt from the Grenadian tragedy. One of these is that "had there been in Grenada a media system capable of permitting dissent, however restrained, given the siege mentality prevailing in St. George's, then Maurice Bishop himself may have had a vehicle to transmit to the Grenadian masses some of the problems his once loyal comrades insisted on concealing from the people . . .".

Singh, who, until last December, has been Editor of *Contact* for some nine-and-a-half years, made his observation on lessons to be learnt from the destruction of the revolutionary process in Grenada under the rule of the New Jewel Movement, while addressing a seminar in Kingston on December 2, organised by the Press Association of Jamaica (PAJ) to mark the 40th anniversary of the PAJ.

The theme of the seminar was *Professionalism and Professional Standards in the Media*. Singh, whose contract as Editor of *Contact* has been frustrated by the sudden revocation of his work permit last November by the Barbados Government, spoke on the topic: *The Caribbean Media and the Grenada Experience*.

Following is the text of his presentation:

"LET me first express my deep appreciation to my colleagues of the Press Association of Jamaica for inviting me to participate in this Seminar. This event, as you are aware, is taking place at a time of some very significant and dramatic developments, both in Jamaica and in the region as a whole, not the least of these being that frightening phenomenon of military intervention against a member state of our Caribbean Community, better known as CARICOM.

As a consequence of these developments our media systems and the professional practitioners associated with them, will come under increasing pressures to demonstrate their social responsibility to the PEOPLES of our Caribbean.

by

RICKEY SINGH



Rickey Singh

We will more and more be challenged to preserve our cultural and political sovereignty; to arrest those negative tendencies that lead to economic and political fragmentation; to oppose a narrow nationalism and, more importantly, to resist with all our resources, the attempts by extra-regional forces to dictate our development priorities and to give us an image of ourselves that so often bears no relationship to our own Caribbean reality. In far too many instances, this reality means, as **George Lamming** reminds us, still having to exist as 'tenants on our own property', after some four centuries of colonialism in this region of the Third World.

I have had cause to observe elsewhere that ownership and functions of the communications media vary according to the social system. Our own experience in the Caribbean inform us that while the private media are, generally, oriented towards the pursuit of profit and the exercising of power, the state-owned and controlled media often have their own functions regulated to reflect the thinking of the ruling elite and their allies who are not averse to deliberately confusing dissent with subversion and, worse, treason.

To share with you today my understanding of the Caribbean Media and the Grenada Experience, within my own chosen framework of the need to preserve our cultural and political sovereignty, I recall, to begin with, a most important statement attributed to no less a political figure than **Theodore Roosevelt**. Speaking as United States president way back in 1904, Roosevelt, in his wisdom declared:

Sooner or later the United States will inevitably protect and regulate the lives of the Caribbean Republics...

That was 79 years ago and 75 years before **Maurice Bishop** and his comrades of the New Jewel Movement chose to remove the corrupt and repressive **Eric Gairy** government in Grenada! The NJM's People's Revolutionary Government opted for a socialist transformation of their island society but also committing Grenada to a path of friendship with all of its neighbours; to mutually satisfactory relations with the super-powers and to a policy of non-alignment.

The then Administration of President **Jimmy Carter** was not very sympathetic to the initiatives of the PRG and distanced Washington from St. George's on the basis of the PRG's failure to hold general elections and to either release or place before the courts its political detainees. Then came President **Ronald Reagan**, whose verbal blasts and policies threatened not only little Grenada—an island

of 133 square miles and some 100,000 people—but also Nicaragua, and peace and stability in this hemisphere as a whole because of the ex-Hollywood actor's preoccupation with a Soviet-Cuba threat to US national security.

By March 1983, Reagan, heading one of the most hawkish regimes in modern US political history, was thundering, against the background of his previously-influenced 'Santa Fe Document' on hemispheric politics, that 'Soviet and Cuban military and naval bases were being constructed in Grenada', and that this constituted a threat to United States national security interest.

Reagan chose to ignore all the assurances of Bishop's PRG. He kept the Grenadian pot boiling. The PRG's construction of a new and modern airport at Point Salines, largely with Cuban assistance, was to become Reagan's central focus in a widening US campaign against Grenada, a campaign that succeeded in the promotion of a virtual siege mentality in St. George's.

The PRG had already closed down *The Torchlight* newspaper, a privately owned undertaking that, within the first few months of the NJM's 'revolution', was running stories of a Soviet military build-up in Grenada and providing unusual coverage of outrage within the Rastafarian community. The closure of the newspaper was an overkill. As Editor of *Caribbean Contact*, I editorially criticised this action and warned Bishop that his government might be playing into the hands of its enemies.

The state-owned radio and *West Indian* newspaper, were transformed into *Radio Free Grenada* and *Free West Indian*, respectively. However, it was not long before even the comparatively insignificant, so-called 'balanced coverage' that Bishop's own NJM had received from the *Torchlight* under Gairy's rule, had disappeared from state-owned radio and newspaper in an atmosphere of growing fear of internal sabotage, including bombings, and mercenary invasions.

Whenever the PRG's critics made observations about the absence of any functioning, and independent base of dissent, or the lack of a balanced flow of information, via state-owned and controlled media, the Government's answer was to point to the numerous regional and sub-regional committees; to youth and women groups and the general social and economic progress taking place.

But Reagan and some of his Caribbean allies were not impressed. They maintained the pressures against Bishop's PRG and Grenada's revolutionary experiment without being able to provide any convincing evidence of this small island state being a threat to any country's national security.

As the US president intensified his campaign against Grenada's airport project as a 'security threat' to United States and Caribbean countries, a US Congressman from California, **Ronald Dellums**, made public his findings,

based on personal investigations in Grenada and briefings with top officials of the US Air Defence Command, and NATO units in the Atlantic and the Caribbean area, that Grenada's airport project posed no threat to US national security.

"Fully briefed by high level officials,' declared Dellums, 'I was again assured that the airport under construction in Grenada is one of no consequence to the United States. Further, it has not now or ever presented a threat to the security of the USA...'

Dellums' findings made no difference to the Reagan Administration which was still claiming to be in possession of 'evidence' of a naval base being built by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Calivigny inlet on Grenada's south coast. For Reagan, Grenada under the PRG was nothing less than a Soviet-Cuban proxy in the US backyard; that the Point Salines airport was a 'military airfield' with a runway of some 10,000 feet. In fact, the runway was no bigger than runways of most of the modern airports in the Eastern Caribbean.

Needless to say that some leading media houses of our Caribbean greatly helped Reagan in perpetuating his Administration's image of Grenada under Bishop's rule, irrespective of even independent viewpoints within the US itself and from top representatives of the European Economic Community.

Some of the leading newspapers associated with the Caribbean Publishing and Broadcasting Association (CPBA) fell far short of any attempt to give the PRG the benefit of the 'doubts'.

One of these CPBA officials, a Trinidadian, prided himself on waging a relentless campaign against the PRG because of his own views that coincided with the politics of Reaganism in this region but which had nothing to do with the Grenadian reality.

During that period, we witnessed the unprecedented initiatives by sections of the Caribbean media publishing or broadcasting identical editorials, statements or advertisements condemning the PRG. Alas, it was left largely to the US, British and Canadian media and, I daresay *Caribbean Contact*, to nail some of the lies against Grenada.

It is perhaps appropriate to point out at this stage that until now, more than five weeks after the United States, supported by some CARICOM countries, invaded Grenada, Reagan's fantastic intelligence network, that had more than doubled the Cuban presence in Grenada, only to later apologise for its 'errors', is still to produce for our viewing that Soviet-Cuban naval base in Grenada!

This is the same little island, against which Reagan launched his war on October 25, with bombers, to put out of existence a 'communist' regime, as he had threatened to do more than two years ago, since he was not going to have what he kept projecting as a 'Soviet colony' along US oil tanker routes in the Caribbean.

For all the tons of weapons discovered in this 'highly militarised' Caribbean island, according to the US and its invading forces, *there was not a single Grenadian naval vessel or a single fighter aircraft to respond to US military power!*

Again, it was left largely to sections of the media of North America and Europe to inform interested Caribbean citizens about some of the more significant developments in Grenada, *before and after the invasion*. We could not learn about these through our own regional media. *Time* magazine's William McWhirter, for example, having visited the warehouses where 'stockpiles of weapons' were discovered, found the supplies 'more of a hodgepodge of wholesale weaponry than a sophisticated armoury...'

Reagan's *Operation Urgent Fury* was launched against Grenada in October, supposedly at the request of those Caribbean states that could not even wait to implement their own decisions at either the OECS or CARICOM Summit level, to ostracise General Hudson Austin's 16-member Revolutionary Military Council. The RMC, we know, bears the guilt for the murder of Maurice Bishop and, as a consequence, provided the US with the excuse to execute its well-worked out plan to smash the PRG's revolutionary process.

With few exceptions the *NATION* in Barbados being one), the Caribbean media projected the Reagan line of a 'rescue operation', or a 'liberation process' in Grenada which, incidentally, involved at one stage some 15,000

American troops. On the other hand, the media of Europe and North America were reporting on the 'US war' against Grenada and presenting critical analyses.

The *New York Times*, for instance, published on November 5, an analysis by its correspondent, Stuart Taylor, exposing what it headlined as 'American Lies on Grenada War'. The *Times* was not singular in deploring the fact that for the first few days of Reagan's war against Grenada, even American journalists had to be grounded in Barbados—one of the CARICOM countries that played a key role in the invasion—along with other journalists who wanted to fly into Grenada for on-the-spot coverage. The US Senate had to intervene to make this possible.

One of the 'lies' exposed by the *New York Times* is that although the Reagan Administration has claimed to have discovered 'a treasure trove' of documents captured by the invaders, 'there is no evidence that a terrorist training base exist, or that Cubans had planned to take over Grenada either in the documents released or in any other materials made public by the Administration...'

The *Times*' article also points out that the 'Administration has made public no evidence that supports its suggestions of a Soviet or Cuban role in the killings which were forcefully denounced by the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro, often described as a close ally of the late Bishop...'

With this quality of journalism, that contrasted so sharply with what we have had to put up with in sections of the regional media, it is not difficult to appreciate why, for instance, Napoleon Duarte, as President of El Salvador, was complaining last year:

I am losing the war not in the battlefield, but in the pages of *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*.

Is it fear or incompetence that has prevented so many sections of our Caribbean media from demonstrating a capacity to also challenge the accuracy of official statements or to cover the other side of America's war in Grenada?

Where fear exists in society, then, as one Caribbean writer points out, you do not need to regulate censorship; you do not have to put on the statute books legislation that curbs not only freedom of the press, but the wider and more fundamental concept of freedom of expression. There are far too many experiences in the Caribbean where either out of fear, or a weakness to win the favours of the powers that be, the standard of journalism has suffered. 'There are journalists who are afraid to be identified with a minority or a radical viewpoint even when justice demands such a statement'.

Caribbean journalists should not be worried about our politicians' fear or opposition to what they often describe as 'adversary or advocacy' journalism. What is really important is the social relevance and validity of this quality of journalism and the opportunities it can possibly create for our profession and Caribbean society as a whole.

The Director General of *Radio All-India* is on record as holding the view that 'in the final analysis, one has to interpret freedom of expression not only as the absence of censorship, but as the creation of opportunities'.

As a Caribbean journalist, who has had difficulties with his own and other CARICOM governments, I stand before you not as a paragon of virtue but as another victim for the profession. My latest 'sin' has to do with my own humble attempts to create opportunities for dissent by personally challenging the assumptions and conclusions of some CARICOM Governments in their involvement with the US invasion of Grenada.



Bewildered Grenadians pondering the events of October–November 1983.

Not only the United States, but not a single government of the Caribbean that has joined the Reagan Administration in the invasion of Grenada, has, to this day, provided *any concrete evidence of a threat to its own national security as a result of the PRG's politics or by the tragic events that followed.*

Compared, for example, with the attitude of some Caribbean newspapers screaming, 'An eye for an eye', and advocating the invasion of Grenada, *Newsweek* magazine of November 21, featured an interview with Cuba's First Deputy Foreign Minister, José Raul Viera, quoting him as stating:

The American medical students were not in danger in Grenada: 72 hours before the invasion, the Cuban Foreign Ministry in Havana called the US Charge there to tell him Cuba was ready to co-operate with the US government to preserve the lives of all citizens, including Americans . . .

Viera further stated:

Let me say that if those construction workers had indeed been Cuban soldiers with adequate weapons and instructions the invading forces would still be fighting in Grenada today. . .

On what basis then, should we accept the contention of *any* of the CARICOM governments participating in the invasion, that it was 'a rescue operation'? Are we, as journalists, asking Caribbean people to believe that while the United States cannot be bothered about the bloodbaths in racist South Africa, where black mothers and their children are being murdered by an inhuman apartheid machine, that this same United States was so eager to respond to this call for 'rescue' or 'liberation' from a handful of CARICOM governments—even at the risk of so seriously upsetting some of its most dependable NATO allies?

There are many lessons to be learnt from the Grenadian tragedy, the Grenadian nightmare. From the perspective of a journalist who believes in having some mechanism for legitimate dissent, who believes in the freedom of expression, one lesson is that had there been in Grenada a media system capable of permitting dissent, however restrained, given the siege mentality in St. George's, then Bishop himself may have had a vehicle to transmit to the Grenadian masses some of the problems his once loyal comrades insisted on concealing.

Another lesson for us is to be wary of the dangerous logic of politicians who say they do not believe in a 'democracy' introduced at the point of a gun, and then end up

doing the same thing in Grenada!

For the US and her allies in this region, there is nothing 'free' about *Radio Free Grenada*. So they bombed it out of existence. In its place, we have today something called *Spice Island Radio*, broadcasting for five hours a day now with rock and country and western music. A news report out of St. George's on November 24 described the situation:

Spice Island Radio fills the airwaves from its one-room studio mounted on the back of a dark green US Navy truck . . . The Grenadian announcer's voice gives the flavour, but the station is, for all practical purposes, owned and operated by the United States Navy . . .

So much for a 'free', spice radio! So much for cultural sovereignty and the independence of a Caribbean country after a much trumpeted 'rescue operation'! So much for what even the conservative Foreign Minister of the Bahamas, Paul Adderley, perceives as the 'legal aberrations' being invoked in Grenada today to give 'credibility to a government that has no constitutional legitimacy'.

Grenada's tragedy is today a Caribbean tragedy, a Third World tragedy. It has exposed so many of the weaknesses of our political leaders; our cultural, religious and trade union leaders. It has certainly exposed the shortcomings, the deficiencies of too many sections of the Caribbean media.

In seeing the invasion through the eyes of Reagan's Administration or those of its collaborators, the region's media, anxious to have the Grenadian revolutionary process out of the way, are allowing too many vital questions, of both a moral and legal nature, to fall by the way side. They are allowing the baby to be thrown out with the bath water.

Already, we have one Barbados-based businessman from Texas telling us, according to *Newsweek* of November 14: 'The invasion is the greatest thing we have done in years'.

Does the Caribbean media share this view?

Let us hope that the nightmare that has resulted in the insult that is *Spice Island Radio*—a creation of the US Marines Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)—reaches no other Caribbean territory!"

THE ASSASSINATION OF HOPE

JEAN Girard is a member of the Maurice Bishop Memorial Committee in Guadeloupe. The following is an edited version of his address to the Pirogue Conference, Guadeloupe, earlier this year.

AFTER some months the entire Caribbean has just begun to recover from the state of shock created by the tragic events that have taken place in Grenada. But today, a few months later, we should not forget; indeed, we must draw lessons from these events. We must understand as much as possible the factors responsible for the tragedy Grenada has suffered. We must also draw lessons from experiments made in Grenada during the time of MAURICE BISHOP.

Unfortunately, colonialism has divided us so much, here in the Caribbean, that we, in Marie-Galante, in Guadeloupe, know very little of what is happening in the neighbouring countries. In Maurice Bishop's own words:

"These people who do not understand anything about our history and our past, these people who came down to the Caribbean... and took our region and chopped it up like a loaf of bread... These people now want to turn around and tell us, who are basically one people that we must begin to hate each other, that we must begin to fight each other so that they can better exploit us."

Bishop was right. We do not know Grenada well, we do not understand Grenada well, but Grenada is close to us. It is close to us because as Guadeloupe, as Martinique, it is in the Caribbean. We have a common history. For more than a century, from 1650-1763, Grenada was a French colony. Up to today, especially in the small island of Carriacou a fair number of Grenadians still speak the same creole language as we do. Like us, Grenada has known slavery. Like us Grenada has known resistance and humiliation, struggle and colonial exploitation.

A NEW EXPERIMENT


March 13, 1979, will remain, despite the terrible events of last October, as one of the major dates in Caribbean history. It will remain because it marked the beginning of a new and encouraging experiment, carried out by men and women committed to fighting the roots of poverty, oppression and dependence.

By JEAN GIRARD

It would be impossible to review here all the achievements made between 1979 and 1983 by the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) under the leadership of Maurice Bishop. Yet such studies and analyses are needed to allow us to draw lessons from these experiments. I would like, however, to note a few aspects of the work of Grenada's revolutionary government.

In the economic field the Grenada Revolution had doubtlessly brought substantial improvements. According to a World Bank Report, the Grenadian economy had become the most viable and the best managed in the English-speaking Caribbean; it had even been able to generate a 5% growth rate in 1982. Thanks to the elimination of corruption, and to a very strict management of the economy, the Revolutionary Government in Grenada had been able to put an end to the waste that often characterises Caribbean countries.

The Revolutionary Government had also initiated an extremely ambitious programme of development and infrastructural betterment. Without doubt, the symbol of this effort was the international airport project at Point Salines which was to put an end to the country's isolation and to allow for a development of Grenada's tourist industry. As for tourism itself, the PRG had a very innovative plan to make it more in harmony with the country's interests. A new tourism in the hands of the Grenadian people and fully contributing to their social and economic development was the goal of the PRG.



In former days: Ex-Minister of National Mobilisation Selwyn Strachan addresses the St. George's Workers' Parish Council.



A meeting of the National Women's Organisation (NWO).

In the field of Education, there had been the setting up of a number of exemplary programmes and structures. The Centre for Popular Education (CPE) had been created to carry out a literacy campaign which has no equal in this part of the Caribbean. School curricula had been revised to suit, at last, the Grenadian social and economic reality. Thanks to the CPE, education was not a privilege anymore, but a right for all workers, a tool for socio-economic development, with intense programmes of technical training and linkages with the various sectors of production. Dozens of scholarships had also been given to young Grenadians to pursue University education overseas.

All this was but part of a larger framework for social and cultural development. We can think, for example, of the Health Programme, the construction of numerous Health Centres *et cetera*. In Grenada, women's rights were also recognised and defended with new laws designed to put an end to discrimination against women and with a new regulation for maternity leave that was by far the most advanced in the English-speaking Caribbean.

But what I would like to stress particularly in this experiment is the process of direct democracy and popular participation which had been generated, from the time of the foundation of the NJM, but which had of course been amplified after 1979. In a country of 110,000 people, it was possible to set up structures of participation and direct democracy. This participation took place principally through the mass organisations, such as the National Youth Organisation (NYO), or the National Women's Organisation (NWO).

This participation was also reinforced in many other sectors since all government programmes were discussed in the villages and the communities. A particularly good example is the preparation of the National Budget, in 1982, which had been made on the basis of the suggestions expressed at dozens of public meetings, in the villages, the communities and the mass organisations.

REAL DANGERS

But the work of the PRG

was not perceived favourably in the US and in many Caribbean capitals. It would be too tedious to detail here a list of the many manoeuvres and attacks launched by the American government, with the complicity of several Caribbean governments and some Grenadian elements, against Maurice Bishop's government.

It is sufficient to recall all the propaganda about Grenada or the terrorist acts such as that of 19 June 1980. We should also mention all the attempts orchestrated by the US to economically isolate Grenada. The White House, for example, at one time requested that Grenada not benefit from certain assistance programmes of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB); and instead of helping the international organisations of which Grenada is a member, the Reagan Government had in several instances preferred bilateral agreements which allowed for Grenada's exclusion. All efforts had also been deployed, through disinformation in the North American media, to ruin the Grenadian tourist industry.

For Maurice Bishop, the danger was real. According to him, the strategy of imperialism comprised several stages. First the intention was to create doubt among the population and to generate social unrest and economic difficulties. When these attempts failed, the second stage was through terrorism, to create violence. This also failed. Resort therefore was had to the third stage: Military Invasion.

We know that this military invasion took place, on 25 October 1983, and we know the damage it has caused. Hope has been assassinated. The economic, social and cultural programmes of the Revolution have been interrupted. Gairy the dictator is back in Grenada.

But the consequences of these tragedies go beyond Grenada's boundaries. In the entire Caribbean, reactionary forces have been strengthened. In its struggle for progress, dignity and political and economic emancipation, the Caribbean has made a tremendous step backward.

CONFLICTING MODELS

Why then all that? Why these slaughters and these betrayals?

The international press has talked a lot about power struggles within the Grenadian leadership. It has talked about personal ambition and personality conflicts. It is possible that such factors played in favour of division. But they cannot suffice to explain everything. I do not think that it is in this direction that we can find the explanation for what occurred.

We know that the criticisms expressed against Maurice Bishop had been largely discussed within the NJM's Central Committee, and that the decision to set up a so-called 'Joint Leadership' had been approved at a General Meeting of the Party. For certain people, this would be sufficient to justify a decision which of course tacitly implied the Prime Minister's removal, and which was evidently totally unpopular.

Where then was the source of conflict? Were there profound divisions, or simply diverging views?

For my part, I believe that the crisis that faced the NJM was real and profound, and that it has revealed the conflict between two often diverging models. The policy pursued by Maurice Bishop, and which was precisely denounced by the NJM's Central Committee in September 1983, had already been expounded in several texts and documents, including the NJM's 1973 Manifesto. At the political level, this model was based on two fundamental concepts: Direct Democracy and Mass Participation.

The Grenadian Revolution attempted to put these concepts into practice, notably through the mass organisations and the trade unions. But much remained to be done to formalise this democracy and to set up the structures which could prevent bureaucratic deviations.

The basis of this system had already been set up, on the principle of an effective decentralisation of power. Numerous ideas had been expressed, which included the formation of Village Councils and Parish Councils. These Councils would then have elected their representatives to a National Assembly. Also present in the National Assembly would have been the delegates of the mass organisations and the trade unions. The Government would therefore have been the Assembly's Executive Council.

These guidelines had been submitted to a Constitutional Commission appointed by the PRG. At the time of the crisis, the Commission was working on a Draft Constitution which would have given Grenada, and indeed the entire Caribbean, an alternative to the imported

models experimented with up to now in this part of the world.

In such a system, the Political Party could well have disappeared; with all these structures of participation, with the decentralisation of power, the Party as such could have well become redundant.

But on the other side, some of the NJM leaders were still clinging to the transformation of their movement into a 'classical' Marxist-Leninist party, whose action would be based on the principle of 'Democratic Centralism'.

There was thus cleavage arising out of these two different conceptions of democracy.

CATALYST OF DIVISION

In the field of the economy, we find similar differences of opinion, centered principally around the issue of the role of the State. On many occasions, the PRG had expressed the need to rest the economy on three different sectors, which would complement each other: The Private Sector, the Nationalised Sector and the Co-operatives. But it seems that some differences had progressively emerged within the PRG on the question of the role of the State and the importance that should be given to the Nationalised Sector.

When reading some of the official documents published by the Ministry of Finance in Grenada for the preparation of the two most recent national budgets, we are forced to note the difficulties with which the Nationalised Sector, established along the lines of a classic socialist model, was faced (Grenada Fishing Company, Grenada Farms Corporation, etc.).

Hypothetically we can say that the leadership could have been divided over the interpretation of these relative failures. On the one hand, the Finance Minister, Bernard Coard, and numerous members of the Party would have explained these difficulties by the weakness of this sector. To them the solution would have been found in speeding up the process of nationalisation and reinforcing State control over the means of production. On the other hand, even if it was still imprecise, it seems that the Prime Minister and many colleagues were beginning to seriously question the model and its adaptation to the Grenadian reality. If there was a failure of the classical models, it was probably necessary to reflect and to attempt, here again, something new and original.

There is finally a third question which may have been a catalyst to these divisions—that of Non-Alignment. Maurice Bishop

ASSASSINATION OF HOPE


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had expressed his determination to fight for a meaningful non-alignment and solidarity among peoples in the Third World, and he was sincere. This justified the effort displayed by the Grenadian government to keep its place within the regional organisations (CARICOM, OECS, OAS, UWI) and to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of such structures. This policy was not necessarily accepted by the entire Grenadian leadership.

If these differences are real, it seems to me it is indispensable to analyse them and to draw useful lessons from them. Indeed, these questions appear to be at the centre of the issues that we are debating, here, in Marie-Galante, in Guadeloupe, and in the entire Caribbean.

SAME OLD CONTEMPT

But I feel that there is al-



A billboard of the Center for Popular Education (CPE).

ready a fundamental lesson we should draw from these tragedies. I am frightened to read the Minutes of the NJM's Central Meeting of 25 September 1983 and to find in the mouth of one of Bishop's critics these worrying words:

"The masses have their

own conception and their own perception that may not be necessarily like ours who study the science."

In the same document, I find the blindness of dogmatism which transforms reality in the name of the "scientific approach". I find the intolerance which eliminates commonsense in the

name of so-called "ideological level". I find, under a new disguise the same old contempt of the people, their knowledge and emotions, their talents and profound aspirations.

The spirit of Maurice Bishop, the spirit that was to be murdered on October 19, is that of respect for the people; it is the idea of a real democracy where the people are actors and decision-makers. It is the conviction that it is here, with the people and by the people, and not in any imported models, that we can find a way to progress, dignity, freedom and democracy.

It is this flame that we must continue to hold high, to put an end to useless and ravaging divisions, to make this Caribbean, through solidarity and mutual understanding, a Zone of Peace, and to allow the genius of our people to help them determine by themselves the shape of their future and the way to reach there.

SUPERPOWER RIVALRY AND CARIBBEAN FREEDOM



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Departing from the adage that "politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum", Dr. ANTHONY GONZALES ponders here the Grenada question in the light of "the vacuum problem" in the Caribbean. He further proposes some recommendations for new foreign policy initiatives in the region.

This piece was written by Dr. Gonzales early in December 1983: a mere month or so after these tragic events.

Dr. Gonzales is a Lecturer in International Economic Relations at the UWI's Institute of International Relations in Trinidad.

ON attaining independence, the major concern of all nationalist and patriotic leaders of the region (and especially those with a sense of Caribbean history) was how to avoid being cornered in the 'American backyard' and being relegated to a 'banana Republic' or a Northern Caribbean State like Haiti historically, or the Dominican Republic. There it once was a virtual custom for the US to intervene militarily to control the affairs of these nations.

The Grenada invasion, by bringing the full weight of the US into the Eastern Caribbean, has now clearly established this part of the region as part of the "American backyard", thereby frustrating the dreams of Caribbean nationalists. US 'gunship diplomacy' and Monroe Doctrine control now mean less independence and manoeuvrability for all states in this area.

Many perhaps would argue that this was the logical sequel to the collapse of the West Indian Federation and the political arithmetical calculation that one-minus-ten-leaves-nought. This view of cause and effect, however, is too elastic insofar as it assumes that between the collapse of the Federation and the Grenada crisis, all events were just working passionately towards that end and that the only way to escape US domination (or for that matter any foreign domination) was through the creation of a Federation.

While a bigger unit could possibly afford a slightly larger degree of independent action, of more relevance are the policies that have to be pursued within the broader diplomatic community to guarantee some meaningful degree of independence and sovereignty for the states of the region. Viewed within this perspective, the issue would thus revolve around the failure of policy action to secure this result.

GEOPOLITICAL PAWNS

It is clear from the Grenada crisis that the 'power vacuum' in the region that was created following British colonial withdrawal was not adequately tackled by the leaders of the wider Caribbean region. This failure, in some way, stems from a lack of perception of the reality of the region. Basically, the islands of the Caribbean are not viable in any meaningful sense. With few exceptions, they have been reduced to recipients of abnormally high levels of metropolitan subsidisation in order to stay afloat.

Present USSR assistance to Cuba is over 5 billion annually; that of the US to Puerto Rico and Jamaica is currently running to about US\$4 billion and US\$1 billion respectively. Further, there is the massive assistance by the French and Dutch to their dependencies. What makes the situation in the smaller islands, such as those of the Eastern Caribbean, even less tenable is that they are unable to provide their minimum security requirements.

Unable to pay their way and, in some cases, even to defend themselves against a Ku Klux gang, the majority of the nation states in the region have been relegated to geopolitical pawns and havens for all types of adventurers either in the form of states such as South Africa, etc. or private transnational agents who perceive the weakness of these islands and move in to secure some advantage. In a very real sense, the islands of the archipelago are up for grabs by external forces.

One of the unfortunate consequences of this situation is that Caribbean leaders, especially those with meagre resources, tend to think that their interests are best served by playing all their international cards to secure some additional economic advantage with little awareness of the negative repercussions of some of this kind of action.

THE 'VACUUM PROBLEM'

In the post-Federation era, the story of the Grenada crisis could be said to have started with the refusal of the UK to effectively put the OECS islands on a relatively more secure footing for Independence. The UK very early in the post-war period, realised that its colonial habit of acquiring islands for strategic and economic reasons was no longer a rewarding exercise in a nuclear age. The costs of supporting these islands were prohibitive.

Furthermore, independence was an opportunity not to provide 'compensation' for centuries of colonial neglect in the form of a substantial package of assistance, especially since the UK no longer had any security interests and could be considered as paying security costs for other countries of the Caribbean Basin, including the US.

Under these circumstances, the fundamental question that was raised was who should bear these economic and security costs. The Williams Government, even though it gave a noteworthy amount of assistance, seemed to hold the view that Trinidad and Tobago, with or without an oil boom, could not be expected to bear these costs. That, as a matter of fact, was the very basis of the one-minus-ten-leaves-nought calculation.

The Venezuelans also came into the act. They developed a Caribbean programme to deal with the 'vacuum problem'. They immediately ran into charges of 'imperialism', however. Whether these charges affected their policies or not, is not clear. What is more evident is that they never moved into the area with sufficient clout to establish some discernible amount of geopolitical order and stability and thus ward off adventurism.

Another actor in this tragic episode is, of course, CARICOM. Conceived in the aftermath of the Federation's failure as a second-best solution, but capable of providing some measure of assistance to the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs), it was gradually reduced to a bystander with the economic collapse of two of its More Developed Countries (MDCs) under severe international economic strain.

US policy during this period could probably be best described as an 'indirect' one, insofar as its role was one of sponsorship of regional and national actors in their efforts to fill this vacuum. That was particularly so during the Carter Administration where this type of approach fitted with the new US foreign policy orientations. This overall approach to the problem, it can also be argued, represented a small security cost to the US for whom the recurring question regarding the area has been how to obtain the maximum security at the least cost.

THE LEAST-COST SOLUTION

The Caribbean islands have always been a set of headaches for the US. When in World War II the UK made an offer of some of these islands to the US in return for warships, the Roosevelt Administration turned it down in return for military bases, which was a more cost-effective option from the point of view of the US national interests. How to avoid paying the huge sums the French do in their overseas departments is always being evaluated in terms of combinations of military and economic aid (guns versus butter).

The Grenada invasion now represents a least-cost approach insofar as the required security is now obtainable through military and political control without the needed disproportionate amount of economic assistance. The security threat has been removed and a long-term system of political and military control of the area is being established. The present conjuncture is rather similar to that after 1968 when the threat of Cuban-style revolutions fizzled out with the Bolivian fiasco of CHE GUEVARA and the Alliance for Progress expired. The Caribbean Basin Initiative faces a similar death as US control in Central America is gradually being re-established.

But there are some interesting lessons to be learnt from the Grenada crisis which would be useful for any Caribbean strategy that attempts to restore some functional independence. The first is that *the crisis revealed the ineffectiveness of the Commonwealth as a means of protection against US domination.*

On becoming independent, most Caribbean countries regarded membership in the Commonwealth and later, by extension, in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Group as a way of escaping the full lash of the American 'big stick'. Recognition of Cuba in 1972 partly justified this position as it was possible to argue that we were not historically part of the inter-American system. (Most Caribbean countries had not signed the Rio Treaty and were not members of the OAS when the embargo on Cuba was imposed.) This resulted in a margin of foreign policy action envied by many in this geographical zone. Grenada's ability to secure EEC assistance for the construction of the airport in the face of US economic sanctions and hostility is another case in point here.

The decline of the influence of the Commonwealth really started with the decision of the UK Government to totally align its foreign policy on the Caribbean with that of the US. In reality, it meant the acceptance of US policy on Grenada and, consequently, the systematic isolation of Grenada. This conveniently opened up the way for a major US thrust into the region. Mrs. Thatcher's policy of distancing herself from the US invasion was merely to save face in the eyes of the Commonwealth.

CUBAN CALCULATIONS

A second major lesson from the crisis concerns the role of Cuba in the Caribbean. Recognition of Cuba in 1972 by the four MDCs of the Commonwealth Caribbean was based on solid foreign policy grounds. Cuba has a role to play in the region. As a 'plantation economy' with impressive military might, it can act as a useful counterweight for Commonwealth Caribbean countries faced with border problems with powerful Latin neighbours. In addition, Cuba can offer a significant amount of co-operation in areas of agriculture and infrastructure where its revolution has achieved major successes.

The problem with Cuba's role in the region has always been: how to undertake co-operation with Cuba without being dragged into super-power rivalry? Moreover, is it possible for Cuba to act independently of the Soviet Union in the interests of regional co-operation?

The Grenada issue demonstrated once again, as occurred in Jamaica under Manley, that Cuba in a desperate effort to escape isolation and forge regional links, is willing to pay a high price. The silent consensus on the substantial amount of assistance that Cuba offered Grenada is illustrative in this respect. *At one point, this assistance was almost the size of the national income of Grenada and substantially greater than what Grenada obtained over decades of colonial neglect.*

The issue, however, is whether this assistance was given without a *quid pro quo*. On this score, the suggested use of the airport as a stopover point for Cuban, Russian, and possibly Libyan planes seems quite plausible. This though would not have been enough to alter the balance of power. But in terms of superpower calculation, it represents some slight advantage which can never be conceded, especially during an intensification of the Cold War.

The essential point in this regard is that according to Cuba/Soviet strategic calculations, the establishment of such a facility was quite feasible. It certainly was not strategic enough in terms of US defence to warrant an outcry in the US and internationally that could justify a US intervention. Similar to previous USSR moves in Cuba, the US would have been confronted with a *fait accompli* to which it would have adjusted over time, reluctantly, after employing its normal destabilisation techniques which the Grenadian revolution at this point may have been capable of resisting.

This calculation under normal circumstances would appear to be reasonable and more viable than the use of Grenada as a base to export revolution and subvert neighbouring governments—events which would easily invite and justify US military intervention.

However, it represented a considerable gamble in the present context of intense Cold War politics and incalculable reactions on the part of the present US administration. In this sense it could be described as too risky. The present phase of East/West conflict required a more cautious policy by which Cuba would have given certain assurances to Grenada's neighbours. But similar to the high profile in Jamaica under Manley, Cuba's heavy military involvement in Grenada could hardly be considered a pragmatic way of building bridges to the Caribbean in the interests of long-term co-operation.

The Grenada crisis, as did the Jamaican situation under Manley, continues to demonstrate the limited potential of the use of these islands in an 'anti-imperialist' struggle.

BUILDING AN ANTI-DOMINATION STRATEGY

A third implication of the crisis relates to the fact that in eradicating the "vacuum problem" through military and political control, the prospects for "recolonisation" have been enhanced. In this context, it is important to note that the Caribbean is still the most balkanised and colonised region in the world. Effective decolonisation has never taken place in this area where from Puerto Rico to Cayenne, independent states are struggling to survive next to relatively prosperous US, Dutch and French colonies. Independence in these circumstances tends to mean very little to people who see many of their colonial neighbours driving Lincoln Continentals and BMWs.

The Grenada crisis has highlighted this situation in which, contrary to the myth spread by the nationalist political elite, the masses in the region do not have a clear perspective on the value of independence. It is well known that the vast majority of the micro-states of the Eastern Caribbean did not want independence. Had the UK offered an associated status similar in value to the departmental status of the French Overseas Territories, most, if not all, would have grabbed it. In this sense, Anguilla is not an exception. *At present, the impression is conveyed that given the support for the so-called "rescue operation" in Grenada, a referendum there on statehood would comfortably produce a positive result.*

But the problems and issues must be addressed. A strategy has to be developed to try and reduce US influence and con-

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Superpower rivalry

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troi to tolerable limits.

In this respect links with Latin American neighbours need to be reinforced. The belief that this involves "jumping from the US frying pan into the Latin American fire" places us in a dilemma which only leads to chronic inaction. The Grenada crisis reveals that our inability to work out with our neighbours a co-ordinated and improved response to the "vacuum problem" could be considered as contributing significantly to the present situation.

Moreover, the tendency to see the Latin American group as a monolithic bloc seeking to dominate the Commonwealth Caribbean and violate its territorial integrity, as in the case of Belize and Guyana, must be avoided. This is a serious misconception, since Latin America remains a heterogeneous body with each nation-state actively pursuing its own national interests. The border disputes referred to above are highly illustrative of this, since the main bulwarks of support for the territorial integrity of Guyana and Belize are some of the most powerful Latin American countries.

More permanent alliances need to be built in Latin America. The present isolation of CARICOM, without the wider diplomatic cover and muscle of some of the other broader regional organisations, to some extent has exposed the Commonwealth Caribbean to the Grenada attack. In this connection, institutions such as the Latin America Economic System (SELA) become critical for future action in terms of building an anti-domination strategy.

The strengthening of relations with the EEC, other Third World countries, as well as the reinforcing of regional integration in a more viable wider framework, are all additional elements that must be pursued.

These are some of the main elements of a strategy that for the moment is just indicative. It is urgent, however, in a context where the US has won a military victory and seems bent on achieving maximum security at minimal geopolitical costs and at the expense of Caribbean freedom and independence, not to mention growth and transformation.

CASA HONOURS BISHOP

SIX months after the execution of Maurice Bishop at the hands of once loyal NJM colleagues, Cubans had the opportunity in April to pay their tribute in a most unique manner to the slain Prime Minister of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) in Grenada.

The occasion was the 25th anniversary of the internationally-famous *Casa de las Americas*, the Havana-based publishing house, that announced the launching of a prestigious award every three years to commemorate the contributions of Maurice Bishop.

There in Havana to deliver the keynote address on Casa's 25th birthday on April 28, was the West Indian novelist, George Lamming (see his tribute on page 7).

His audience included the widowed mother of the murdered Prime Minister, Mrs. Alimenta Bishop, and one of her daughters, Ann; Cuba's Minister of Culture, Armando Hart; Nicaragua's Culture Minister and famous poet-priest, Ernesto Cardenal, and Mariano Rodriguez, head of Casa de las Americas.

Mrs. Bishop remained in Havana after the Casa ceremony for a few days and shared a platform at Jose Marti Square with President Fidel Castro on May 1, to mark Labour Day.

On her arrival at Jose Marti airport on April 27, Mrs. Bishop was met by a high-ranking Cuban delegation that also included Cuba's former Ambassador to Grenada Julian Rizzo.

Her presence in Havana and the Casa award served to underscore the Cuban Government's firm friendship with the slain Prime Minister and his PRG, which was overthrown in a shortlived military coup last October that provided the US with the

opportunity to launch an invasion of the Caribbean island.

The Bishop Award, the first of its kind to be offered by Casa, is "to pay permanent tribute to the spirit and contributions of Maurice Bishop as a man of the Caribbean and the American hemisphere".

The Award will be given to a distinguished personality, institute or organisation in the area of literature, the arts, politics or science. It is not competitive and will be decided by a competent jury for a body of work in any of these fields.

Casa will give the Award every three years on Bishop's birthday, May 29, starting next year on his 40th birthday. The Award carries a financial award of US\$5,000 (five thousand dollars).

Since it came into existence within months of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Casa de las Americas has been utilising its resources to promote a greater awareness of the peoples of the Caribbean and Latin America.

Between 1976 to 1984, Casa's publication of Caribbean literature included at least 14 works by writers of the region, among them: Ed-



Maurice Bishop

ward Kamau Brathwaite's *Black and Blue*; Andrew Salkey's *In The Hills Where Dreams Live*; Austin Clarke's *Growing Up Stupid Under the Union Jack*; Angus Richmond's *A Kind of Living*; John Agard's *Man to Pan*; Harry Narain's *Grass-Roots People* and David Lewis' *Reform and Revolution in Grenada-1950-1981*.

MEANWHILE, in St. George's itself, the "Maurice Bishop and other October 19 Martyrs Foundation" continues to draw wide support from within the society and across the region and beyond, according to two of the more well-known names of the PRG-ex-Cabinet ministers Kenrick Radix and George Louison—both of whom were in prison at the time of the US-led invasion of the island.

The foundation's headquarters has an entire wall decorated with photographs showing various development projects of the PRG as well as numerous meetings with Grenadians and international personalities by Maurice Bishop and other slain leaders of last October, among them former Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman; ex-Education Minister Jacqueline Creft; Norris and Fitzzy Bain and Vince Noel.

The lessons of Grenada for the Caribbean left

By GORDON K. LEWIS

THREE seminal events in the last twenty-five years have taken place that have been of transcendental importance for the Caribbean Left: the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, and the demise of the Grenada Revolution with the grim events of October 1983. All three of them, in, of course, different ways, contain within them important lessons for the Caribbean Left, in terms of socialist policy, tactics and strategy, ideological content, and, in general, the theory and *praxis* of revolution.

What are the lessons for the Caribbean Left?

First and foremost, surely, is that radical social change and armed force are a heady mix, with clear dangers . . .

It is worth remembering that the old European socialist tradition of which Marx and Engels were an integral part, was strongly anti-war, anti-militarist, seeing the armed state like Prussia or Czarist Russia as enemies of the revolution. The militarisation of the Third World today, including the militarisation of the new Grenada regime after 1979 (however justified in terms of the argument of self-defense), runs counter to that tradition.

The March 1979 *coup d'etat*, certainly, was justified. But the use of force and assassination to solve internal problems, as on October 19, can find no support from any right-minded radical person. As the noble Cuban declaration put it, "no doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position and no internal division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday . . ."

A socialist Left can never accept or condone that strategy of revolution, moral objection to which was summed up by Edmund Burke (with the French Revolution in mind) in his *Letters on a Regicide Peace* (1796). "The blood of man," he wrote, "should never be shed but to redeem the blood of man. It is well shed for our family, for our friends, for our God, for our country, for mankind. The rest is vanity; the rest is crime."

SERIOUS MISTAKES

Assuredly, a clear code of ethics must guide and control relationships between groups and persons in the life of every radical, progressive political party and organisation. But such a code clearly collapsed in the long internal power struggle that went on in the Central Committee of the PRG during the summer and fall of 1983.

Serious mistakes of strategy and tactics were committed. The deep bonds of affection that held Bishop and the Grenadian folk-people together were underestimated, so that after October 12 the Coard-Austin group could not perceive that they had lost irrevocably the mass support for the revolution: "No Bishop, no revo."

Furthermore, the mistake was made of using force, instead of containing argument, thus violating Mao Tse Tung's dictum that the party must be in control of the gun and not the gun in control of the party.

It is also a lesson of Grenada, if this line of analysis is correct, that the Left must abjure the temptation to indulge in revolutionary sloganeering. Too many of its elements have played with the idea of the use of armed violence as the proper road to socialism.

True, there will always be circumstances in which it is a justifiable strategy, notably where a repressive regime has made all other alternative strategies impossible. That was the case with Gairy's Grenada.

But where the other alternatives—and mainly the democratic-constitutional alternative—still remain, the resort to "revolutionary violence" becomes unjustified. It leads to what Marx himself called the game, essentially anarchist, of "playing with revolution."

It is unfortunate that, in the Caribbean of recent years, the criticism of the so-called "Westminster model", much of it surely justified, has been carried to the extreme of arguing that constitutionally-held elections, as such are dispensable.

As Dr. ERIC WILLIAMS once pointed out, there is more to the "Westminster model" than just elections: there are the rule of law, the multi-party system, the separation of church and state, the traditional civil liberties, and so on. To reject all of them, on the ground that the model is inapplicable to Third World conditions, is to throw out the

MILITARY SOCIALISM

A sort of revolutionary romanticism arises here—what one recent critic has called the concept of “holy violence” in the political thought of Frantz Fanon. It is tempted to think in terms of the “revolutionary moment”, of the quick overthrow of bourgeois governments, even indeed of the “revolutionary hero”, the strongman, who will lead the revolution. It thinks in terms of sabotage, underground activities, secret plotting, and all the rest, which almost becomes with certain movements (like the Puerto Rican FALN), leftwing terrorism. It becomes enamoured of schemes, plots, clandestine organisations even. It all leads, perhaps worst of all, to the appearance in the revolutionary struggle of the military chieftain.

Both Africa and the Caribbean have provided examples of this type in recent years. Men like Doe in Liberia, Rawlings in Ghana, Idi Amin in Uganda, Bouterse in Suriname, appear. They usually come into power as a result of a plot in the army camps; they promise an end to the corrupt politicians and inefficient civilian parties of the old regime; they move rapidly to the murder of opponents and critics; and all of this usually accompanied by a baggage of half-baked and ill-digested Marxism-Leninism, for the doctrines are used as slogans rather than as theories. It ends up in a new form of military socialism.

Such a process clearly took place in Grenada, with the emergence of military men like Austin, James, and Cornwall. The militarisation process of the revolution thus comes full circle.

We have to remember, ceaselessly, Cheddi Jagan's warning: 'Not every one who cries 'Comrade, Comrade', shall enter into the kingdom of socialism.'

It is immaterial to this line of argument, at least for the present moment, as to what particular figures personified what trait of mind and spirit in the Grenada Revolution. Whether Coard was the ‘hardliner’ and Bishop the ‘moderate’; whether Coard played Macbeth to his wife’s Lady Macbeth; whether Coard played Iago to Bishop’s Othello (the Shakespearean analogy has been used by Tim Hector); whether Coard was the ‘front man’ for Austin, or the other way around; or indeed whether Austin himself was being manipulated by fellow-officers like James and Cornwall; or whether the whole thing was engineered from the very beginning by the CIA: all this is fruitless and counter-productive speculation unless and until we have more detailed and reliable information than we now possess.

A DUAL STRUGGLE

It seems that there took place in Grenada at once a personal rivalry and an ideological struggle. The two can go together; they are not mutually exclusive. Everything we know about human nature in politics tells us that personal rivalries can be disguised in theoretical terms and that, conversely, internal debates about ideology can be rooted in and influenced by the same rivalries. Every historical process, bourgeois or proletarian, involves both of these components, the personal and the ideological.

First, there is the general problematic of personality. It is proper to point out the very special role that personality, and the *charisma* of individual leaders, plays in Caribbean society and politics. These, even including the larger islands like Cuba, are basically small-island societies. There is little of Durkheim’s urban *anomie* or Weber’s institutional personality. Family and kinship ties bind almost everybody together; everybody knows everybody else; private lives are public secrets.

This means two things: (a) the political struggle becomes intensely personified, resulting in an almost cannibalistic savagery, as can be seen, to take a single example, from Da Breo’s account of the power struggle in the St. Lucia Labour Party over the last few years, and (b) what Singham, in his study of pre-1979 Gairyite Grenada, has termed the ‘hero and the crowd’ syndrome. Hence the well-known Caribbean brand of political messianic leadership.

There are, possibly, two lessons that all this hold for the regional socialist movement. The first is that charismatic leadership is a given variable, not likely soon to disappear, because it is rooted in the Caribbean civic culture and the Caribbean human psychology. Both Coard and Bishop possessed it, in different ways, in Grenada, the first as a revolutionary theoretician, the second as a public orator,

and both easily drew disciples towards them.

The second lesson is that, precisely because charisma is so omnipresent in the region, and because, too, it is a heavy burden for any single person to carry—for it can lead to delusions of grandeur if the person does not have inner reserves of moral strength to resist it—it is vital that the party or movement construct institutional mechanisms to control it.

It is in that sense, of course, that (whatever might have been the motives behind it) the proponents in the Grenada debate of the joint-leadership idea had a point. In pushing for collective leadership and collective responsibility they were fighting against the habit of ‘one-manism’ that has been the bane of Caribbean politics. As CUD, OE succinctly puts it, ‘one-manism’ on the Right cannot be replaced by ‘one-manism’ on the Left. The regional socialist movement must seek to devise the appropriate institutional forms that will meet that point.

THE PROBLEM OF THEORY

After this, there is the problem of theory and ideology. What can be stated with some certitude is that there did take place within the Central Committee and party plenary meetings an intense and wide-ranging debate on the nature of the party, its relationships with state and government its relationship with the mass constituency, and its role for the future. It is here, beyond doubt, that the real issue was declared. It was stated, with remarkable candour, by the Central Committee majority in the important meeting of October 26, 1982, that “the Party stands at the cross-roads”; that the Party must be reorganised on “a Leninist footing”; that the great imperatives required were “the qualities of Leninist iron discipline, great depth in ideological clarity, brilliance in strategy and tactics, and Leninist supervision and guidance in all areas of Party work.”

Given that the ultra-Left group had taken over the Leninist structure of thought and analysis as a guide to the future of both the Party and the Revolution, any post-mortem must face up to the basic question: was the Leninist theoretical model appropriate, not only for Grenada, but for any leftwing revolutionary movement in the modern world?

That discussion, surely, must begin by questioning the assumption—implicit in the very term ‘Marxism-Leninism’—that Lenin’s political thought can be viewed as an integral part of what is commonly known as Marxism. For any thorough analysis of Lenin’s thought must recognise that it was based upon conditions—specifically, conditions in a Czarist Russia that were quite different from conditions in Western Europe—that unavoidably shaped and coloured its major presuppositions.

TSARISM UPSIDE DOWN

The Marxist groups of the 19th century (some of them Russians living in exile) in Paris and London and elsewhere, were living under comparatively liberal conditions. Those in Russia and Eastern European countries were living in basically anti-liberal, repressive societies. For the latter, that meant the evolution of revolutionary theories founded, necessarily, in conspiracy, intrigue, illegal underground activity, and the rest.

Lenin’s application of Marxism to those conditions led to his formulation of the Communist Party as an elite vanguard party; the dictatorship of the proletariat became transformed into something more akin to the Jacobin idea of a Committee of Public Safety than to any content that Marx or Engels had given to the term.

For there is hardly anything in the Marx-Engels literature which assumes that the Communist parties of which they wrote should become tightly-knit, iron-disciplined advanced groups, imposing ideological patterns upon the general working-class movement. In the Russian case, as Herzen put it, Communism became “Tsarism turned upside down”.

The Leninist theory, in sum, assumes that, of necessity, the revolution must be placed in the guiding hands of an experienced elite which, because its members possess the theoretical understanding denied to others, will then be able to guide the masses into the shaping of the new communist society.

This became, after all, the major bone of contention in the Russian-Polish situation between Lenin himself and

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Lessons for the Caribbean left

o From page 7

Rosa Luxembour, who espoused the alternative thesis of the 'spontaneous' rising of the masses.

Her position, of course, was in part based upon a traditional Polish nationalist fear of Russia, whether a Russia ruled by a Czar or a Lenin. But it was also based upon a philosophical fear of excessive centralisation in the institutional machinery of the revolutionary movement anywhere, not just Poland or Russia.

THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE WAY

"One the one hand," she wrote in 1904, "apart from the general principle of the struggle, there is no ready-made, pre-established, detailed set of tactics which a central committee can teach its Social Democratic membership as if they were army recruits. On the other hand, the process of the struggle, which creates the organisation, leads to a continual fluctuation of the sphere of influence of Social Democracy. It follows that the Social Democratic centralisation cannot be based on blind obedience, nor on the mechanical subordination of the party militants to a central power."

But for Rosa Luxembour there was even more to it than this. "Without general elections," she wrote later in 1918, "freedom of the press, freedom of the assembly, and freedom of speech, life in every public institution slows down, and becomes a caricature of itself, and bureaucracy emerges as the one deciding factor. . . . Public life gradually dies, and a few score party leaders, with inexhaustible energy and limitless idealism, direct and rule. Amongst them the leadership is, in reality, in the hands of a dozen men of first-class brains, even though, from time to time, an elite of the working class is called together in Congress to applaud the speeches of their leaders, and to vote unanimously for the resolutions they put forward."

This criticism, couched in both particular and general philosophical terms, helps to explain the general trajectory of the development of the world Communist movement after 1917. Because Lenin was the architect of a successful revolution and Rosa Luxembour the architect—and

indeed victim—of an unsuccessful revolution, it was Lenin's theories that dominated that movement until at least the period of the Second World War.

A Muscovite orthodoxy grew up in which all other national Communist parties were obliged to accept the party line established by the Comintern, or be denounced as traitors to the cause. Their ethical behaviour echoed that of Moscow: the passion for conspiracy, the need for deception, the centralised and automatic commands, the contempt for fair play, the ruthless discrediting of other socialist groups and persons, the ready identification of intellectual dissent with moral criminality, and the rest. The road to Moscow, like the road to Rome for the loyal Catholic, became the only permissible way; everything else was "social fascism" or "rightwing deviation" or "petty bourgeois opportunism".

THE SUPREME LESSON

This domination of Moscow was, indeed, only ended after 1945, as Euro-Communism began to develop, especially in France and Italy. But it is of interest to note that as it waned in Europe it received new life in many of the new Third World countries.

This is evident from the fact that it appeared ominously in the Grenada party. As one reads the inner party discussions the same temper of mind and spirit becomes evident.

The French Antillean socialist Jean Girard has commented on the PRG doctrinaire temper. "I find," he writes, speaking of his reading of the Central Committee debates, "the blindness of dogmatism which transforms reality in the name of the 'scientific approach'. I find the intolerance which eliminates commonsense in the name of so-called 'ideological level'. I find, under a new disguise, the same old contempt of the people, their knowledge and emotions, their talents and their profound aspirations."

It seems, all in all, that the supreme lesson of Grenada is that the Caribbean Left movement must rediscover its conviction that socialism must go hand in hand with democracy. The PRG regime was too much tempted to forget that lesson, so that it built up the paraphernalia of a left-wing

authoritarian state in the name of Leninism: the elimination of all rival parties, the suppression of a free press, the denial of civil liberties, especially to its political prisoners, and the organisation of a secret party organisation: all of which, let it be noted, lest we run the danger of uncritically developing a Bishop cult, was supported and propagated by Bishop himself.

It was in that sense that to some degree he was hoist by his own petard. It is therefore necessary that the Left go back to the more humane communism of Marx and Engels. For although both of them had their own share of the habit of fierce controversialism, they never pretended that they were entitled to some sort of infallibility so absolute that it is tempted to establish what is virtually an inquisition to enforce their dogmas.

There is one final point. No examination of the Grenada Revolution of 1979-83 should end on a pessimistic note. For there is much to be proud about. In leaders like Coard and Bishop, just to name the two prominent personalities that emerged out of the New Jewel Movement, a small Caribbean mini-society showed that it could give birth to a quality of leadership and ability comparable to anything anywhere else; for if Coard, with all his failings admitted, was a brilliant theoretician, Bishop, again with all his failings, was a radical populist leader who was able to create a rich and meaningful relationship between leader and rank and file, a *sine qua non* of all political movements.

But even more than that, the Revolution showed that a small island folk-people could put together a spirited mass movement of protest and resistance unmatched by any other people in the region. That movement culminated in the heroic episode of 'Bloody Wednesday', October 19 .

The release of Bishop and the march on Fort Rupert, without benefit of party leadership, was, more than anything else, an example of that concept of mass 'spontaneity' for which Rosa Luxembour argued. On that day, surely, and to use Marx's phrase, the Grenada people stormed the heights of heaven as surely as had done the Paris Communards of 1871. They thus added another glorious chapter to the history of Caribbean revolutionary resistance.

GRENADA NINE MONTHS AFTER...

By NORMAN FARIA

Barbadian journalist Norman Faria is a former Radio Free Grenada correspondent in Barbados. He has just returned from a visit to the Spice Isle.

"They say to be dead is as quiet as you can get".

With the persevering admiration and support among significant sectors of Grenadian society for the late Maurice Bishop and the policies of the People's Revolutionary Government, that observation by a character in Graham Greene's novel about Duvalier's Haiti, *The Comedians*, is undoubtedly being proven false in this Eastern Caribbean island—much to the consternation of the Washington-installed Interim Government of Nicholas Brathwaite.

For although the first thing that hits the visitor to post-invasion Grenada is the deep suspicion and resignation which permeates the social fabric, one quickly senses the persistent popularity of Bishop's ideas and those of the four-and-a-half year old PRG administration.

Or, as one button selling in the Market Square area in downtown St. George's boldly proclaims: "The Spirit of Maurice Bishop Lives."

"They can't rub out the PRG's example just like that. The people got too much

memories," ventured an unemployed civil servant who requested anonymity.

Up at the nearby 2nd floor Grenville Street headquarters of the "Maurice Bishop and October 19th, 1983 Martyrs Foundation", the sentiment is understandably more open and confident. Former PRG Agriculture Minister George Louison, and presently a leading Foundation spokesperson, sits in front of a wall photo display highlighting the achievements of the PRG. Speaking with the same enthusiasm and attention to detail which characterised an extensive interview he so kindly granted me in the hectic months in 1979 following the deposing of the Gairy regime, Louison reasoned with studied calm:

"The people have not forgotten. But one must also take into account the fact that the present official administration has not said a word about Maurice's death. They are playing down the developments and achievements of the Revolution. We are therefore working studiously to ensure that the programmes of the Revolution remain in the focus of the people."

Louison, who describes himself as "extremely lucky" at having escaped the fate of Bishop and others who he said were "massacred by the Coard clique", noted that the Foundation's work has been "extremely popular so far".

In the interview that I held with him, he argued that the Foundation's popularity was connected to the recent refusal by the West Indian Publishing Company (which also runs off the pro-government *Grenadian Voice*) to print any more copies of the Foundation's weekly 12-page newspaper, the widely distributed and read *Indies Times*. The Foundation nevertheless now has its own press, although the paper will come out in a smaller format, said Louison.

The former PRG Minister, interrupting himself occasionally to say a few words to the many passersby who came into the headquarters to view the photo display, also criticised the decision of the Interim Government to restrict his movements as well as those of his brother, Einstein, a former high-ranking officer in the People's Revolutionary Army who like his brother sided with the Bishop forces against Coard and his ultra-left faction.

"They have taken our passports and we may only travel after going through a lengthy, complicated application process for a special permit. We have had to turn down several invitations from overseas solidarity groups and interested institutions to come and address them. Is this effective trampling on our freedom of movement—is this the type of freedom and democracy that is in store



Louison

for the Grenadian people?" asked Louison, who also pointed to the recent dismissal of 10 media workers, including former broadcaster with Radio Free Grenada under the PRG, Harold Pysadee and Michael McMillan, from Radio Grenada as further evidence of the disregard for the principles of freedom of speech by the Brathwaite regime.

Down below in the market, the hawkers sell their fruits and spices and provisions as usual. However, a small farmer, there to sell his provisions lamented guardedly that the Grenada Development Bank only gives loans to those farmers with their own land. One week earlier, speaking with the Caribbean News Agency (CANA), the manager of the marketing agency for the island's spice industry, Robert Ferguson, bemoaned the loss of markets in Cuba and the eastern bloc

countries since the invasion.

At the supermarket next door, cans of popular "Spice Isle" brand fruit nectar drink, once the main product of a thriving PRG agro-industrial project to encourage the use of local fruits, stand forlornly in a rusting display at a reduced price—the Interim Government has closed the factory.

The slack has undoubtedly been taken up by the Cokes, the Fantas and other imported brands like the US-army-supplied Michelob beer, whose empty cans now litter the pill boxes around the barbed-wire-encircled US occupation forces headquarters at the Grenada Beach Hotel (formerly the Holiday Inn) at the famous Grande Anse Beach.

On the beach, we try to talk with some of the GIs about the invasion and other things. They are reluctant to talk with a journalist and only one, a conscript from Washington named Lawrence, speaks: "The big boys, the colonels and the like—they are the ones who get to go to Barbados for R&R [rest and recreation]. Not the lower ranks." But he didn't want to talk anymore.

"At night, along the Carenage where once we happily strolled, perhaps after attending a rally or pep talk at a village council meeting with PRG officials, to have something at the Nutmeg restaurant, one now is accosted by

prostitutes, beggars and Rastas."

"Unemployment is way up, something like 40 per cent and upwards," said Kenrick Radix, once the PRG's Justice Minister, adding that this was directly responsible for many young women, once gainfully employed under the PRG, hitting the streets at night.

The problems with the economy, despite an influx of aid money and a promise of opening of the new international airport at Point Salines, will undoubtedly be among the issues in the campaign before general elections slated, according to Brathwaite, to be held by year's end. However, as the myriad political parties start making their moves, some sceptics wonder how free they will be—or if indeed they will be held.

They point to last month's decision by the newly set up Carnival Development Committee that there will be no calypso competition during this year's carnival celebrations which traditionally come off August 13-14.

It is a further indication, the sceptics argue, that unlike the PRG's policy of inviting the region's popular singers such as St. Vincent's Beckett, Trinidad's Valentino and Barbados' Grynner, the new administration will tolerate no criticism of it or, more importantly, say praise for Maurice Bishop and the policies of the now defunct PRG.

GRENADIANS UNINFORMED ABOUT TRIAL OF 19

By DON BOHNING

DON BOHNING is Caribbean and Latin American correspondent for *Miami Herald*

FOR Grenadians, the trial of 19 persons charged with murdering the late Prime Minister Maurice Bishop which began October 16 is something more to be wondered about than witnessed.

So strigent were security measures and so limited the seating that unless they were members of the 60-member jury selection pool, attorneys, journalists or relatives of the accused, the general public was virtually excluded from the proceedings taking place at the former Lion's Club Community Center near the Richmond Hill Prison high above the city.

With no daily local newspapers and with the government-owned Radio Grenada still cautious in its reporting of politically sensitive news events, Grenadians found themselves relying heavily on the outside media and word of mouth to find out what's going on at Richmond Hill.

That's much the way it was at the opening session October 16 when High Court Chief Justice Archibald Nedd began the trial, then adjourned it until November 1 after the court was told that the defendants had been unable to raise the money to pay attorneys for their defense.

Nedd said he would seek to appoint the same Jamaican defense team which had represented the accused during the preliminary inquiry that ended August 8 and which found enough evidence to bring the 19 to trial. The retention of the defense team of lawyers at state expenses has not gone down well with some Grenadians one of whom, a businessman, complained:

"There are enough unemployed lawyers here in Grenada that we don't have to pay to bring them in



Coard—In plumper days.

from outside." The same businessman doubted the inability of the defendants to raise the money for their own defense.

The October 16 opening session was an unruly affair, more dramatic than informative, which did nothing to shed light upon the bloody events of October 19, 1983, in which Bishop and perhaps as many as 100 others died.

The 19 defendants, among whom are Coard, his wife Phyllis, ex-army commander Hudson Austin and onetime mobilisation Minister Selwyn Strachan, refused to enter pleas to the charges of Bishop's murder and ten other people.

All 19 defendants responded that they did not recognise the legality of the court and were not "prepared to be tried under foreign occupation".

The most dramatic moment—and for some the best performance—of the 90-minute opening session, came near its conclusion when Phyllis Coard appeared to collapse and fell from the dock bench on which she was sitting.

She claimed to have been on a hunger strike for six weeks, complaining loudly to the court that she had "been denied a doctor from outside" and "a lawyer of my choice".

Chief Justice Nedd was clearly skeptical, declaring that "if Mrs.

Coard doesn't keep quiet, she will be dealt with sick or not". He added, "I must say, her voice doesn't sound like an ill person to me."

There were also reliable reports that Mrs. Coard had unsuccessfully attempted to flee the women's section of the prison the night before by climbing over the wall.

The 19 defendants were ushered into the courtroom individually, their handcuffs removed as they entered the dock. All were well-dressed and appeared in good physical condition except Mrs. Coard. She needed assistance on entering the dock, then sat, with head bowed, as the others stood to hear the charges read against them.

They smiled, chatted among themselves and waved and talked to a score of relatives seated in the gallery behind the dock. Coard, somewhat untidy and overweight when he served as Deputy Prime Minister, has lost a substantial amount of weight and his beard is now well-trimmed. He was dressed in a matching grey shirt-jack.

The other defendants—in addition to the Coards, Austin and Strachan—are Major Leon Cornwall, former ambassador to Cuba; ex-junior Ministers Colville McBarnette and Dave Bartholomew, trade unionist John Ventour and soldiers Liam James, Ewart Layne, Andy Mitchell, Vincent Joseph, Cosmos Richardson, Lester Redhead, Callistus Bernard, Christopher Stroude, Fabian Gabriel, Cecil Prime and Raeburn Nelson.

The prosecution is headed by Karl Hudson-Phillips, former Trinidad and Tobago Attorney General who now heads the opposition Organisation for National Reconstruction (ONR) in the nearby state of Trinidad and Tobago. He estimates the trial will take two months to complete once it gets fully underway.

RICKEY SINGH'S VIEW

IT WAS WRONG FOR GRENADA TO BE INVADED

THE Point Salines airport has now been officially opened. No, it was not opened as *Maurice Bishop International*, as I am sure the great majority of Grenadians would have preferred. It will bear the name of its location—*Point Salines*. until, that is, another government in St. George's decides otherwise.

Predictably, Cuba, which made the airport project possible, was not among the invited governments and organisations at the opening.

For the ceremonial opening, the Interim Council of *Nicholas Brathwaite* and *Paul Scoon* was involved in arranging for special excursion flights into the island.

Guess which commercial aircraft had the 'honour' of the first landing. *American Airlines*, of course—with the compliments of the same country that first landed its C-130 Hercules on the Point

Salines runway when Mr. Reagan launched his invasion on October 25, 1983, with 'Operation Fury'.

On the day of that invasion, I declared in an article:

"Today is a dark day in the history of the Commonwealth Caribbean. This invasion of Grenada, an independent nation and member of the Caribbean Community, by the United States military, in collaboration with some CARICOM Governments, cannot be justified on any legal or moral ground. A dangerous precedent has been set that could have far-reaching implications for the future peace and security of the entire Caribbean ..."

A few days later, the Barbados Government thought it fit to revoke my work permit as Editor of *Caribbean Contact*. Later, as if to have some fun at my expense, I was to

learn of official allegations suggesting that the revocation had something to do with a Cuban intelligence connection.

Well, I hope that they have enjoyed their joke.

One year later, I have never been more convinced that it was wrong for Grenada to have been invaded, as I remain opposed to the clique that brought death to Maurice Bishop and his People's Revolutionary Government and shame to this entire region.

The Americans spent some US\$122 million to carry out the invasion of Grenada and Washington has already allocated US\$20 million in military assistance to Eastern Caribbean governments who, until last year, were receiving no more than one million dollars in such aid.

The emphasis is on military-security expenditures to

make 'democracy' safe in the region. It is a familiar story—to the poor and suffering masses whose interests cannot properly be served by governments which allow themselves to be misled into East-West conflicts.

Where do we go from here, when the US and Nicaraguan elections are over and with Grenada's new airport officially opened?

I almost said, "Ask the President of the United States". Not that he has all the answers. But you must agree that most of our leaders are very close to the guy. And our 'leaders' are supposed to know exactly where we are going! At least this is what they want the people to believe.

The people must ensure that they do not surrender the future by ignoring the past.

UWI Library

SITTING in a small office in his country's Mission to the United Nations in New York, Mr. Rashleigh Jackson, Guyana's Foreign Minister, turned to the question of Grenada, an issue which a year ago was dominating international headlines.

As he spoke, he showed little emotion. He said:

"My own personal belief which I held then and which I still hold now is that if the opportunities which had presented themselves then were allowed to operate, the invasion would have been avoided."

Spreading his hands across the top of the desk, Mr. Jackson went on to assess what had happened since the turbulent events of last October, activities which people speculated back then would ensure that the dream of regional unity in the Caribbean would remain just that, a dream.

"The invasion is now a thing of the past," the Guyana Minister added. "It seems to me the shrillness and the rhetoric which flowed across the Caribbean waters at that time have been attenuated and the proposals which were coming out loud and clear from several sectors for CARICOM II are now no longer heard. So, it would seem to me that there is an attempt to come to grips with what are the requirements of the present situation."

While the Foreign Ministers of the countries which took part in the military action of a year ago would obviously disagree with Mr. Jackson's contention that the 'invasion' could have been avoided, they would hardly find fault today with both his mood and the rest of what he had to say.

For in conversations with several Caribbean Cabinet Ministers and diplomats who were in New York for the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, it seemed clear that they all wanted to put the Grenada situation behind them.

"At the Commonwealth

Heads of Government Conference in New Delhi the stress was on reconstruction rather than on recrimination as far as the Grenada situation was concerned," Dr. Basil Ince, Trinidad and Tobago's Foreign Minister said in New York, "I think the Caribbean states have acted in that manner and they are all looking forward anxiously to the election of a stable government in Grenada. The stability of Grenada is important, not only for Trinidad and Tobago, but for the entire Caribbean."

It was interesting that the Foreign Ministers of both Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago took such a conciliatory position while obviously not forgetting what they saw as the lessons of Grenada. For it was those two countries which had formed the backbone of the opposition within CARICOM to the military action.

A year ago, for instance, Guyana was spearheading the condemnation of the United States, Jamaica, Barbados and the other countries which participated in the intervention or invasion. Indeed, Guyana played a key role in the efforts which successfully blocked all attempts by Barbados and Jamaica to explain their position to a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in New York.

At that time Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago were exchanging some sharp words as to who knew what and when, a strong disagreement which led to the recall of the Trinidad and Tobago High Commissioner to Barbados.

Dominica, too, entered the fray, calling for the removal of the CARICOM Secretariat from Georgetown, a move which Ms. Eugenia Charles, the Dominica Prime Minister, said would have allowed Guyana's President, Mr. Forbes Burnham, "to pursue his South American continental destiny".

But what has caused the present change in attitude?

Are the expressions of support for regional unity a year after Grenada a true reflection of the feelings of the countries in the

region or are they a mere papering over of the cracks in the regional structure?

One factor which has contributed to the current mood is a clear recognition that the business of CARICOM must continue. As Burnham himself said at a news conference in Nassau earlier this year no one could 'de-invade' Grenada.

Next was the reaction of Grenadians themselves to the military action. The overwhelming support given to the invasion by Grenadians has helped to defuse the opposition to the action.

The attitude of Grenadians was summed up in New York recently by the Head of the country's Mission to the United Nations, Mrs. Gloria Payne-Banfield, a diplomat who was first assigned to New York by the People's Revolutionary Government of the late Maurice Bishop.

"The solution had to come from outside," the Grenada diplomat said, "it certainly could not have been solved from within Grenada. People should remember that the entire situation was militarised. They should also remember that it was not a situation in which we had riots or people in the streets fighting. We had a situation in which the army had shot and fired against people who were not armed. As far as I am concerned, the military situation started there and it had to be a military solution ultimately and that solution had to come from outside. There was no other way to neutralise the position of the army."

A third factor in the CARICOM equation has been the regional economic picture in 1983 and 1984. In the twelve months since the troops landed on Grenadian soil, the countries in the region had been buffeted by declining export earnings, layoffs in the private and the public sectors and an overall poor economic performance.

Over and above that, the region has had to contend with the after-effects of Guyana's chronic foreign

CARIBBEAN Contact. Nov. 1984

A view from New York GRENADA A YEAR AFTER

exchange shortage; Trinidad and Tobago's protectionist trade policies and Jamaica's unstable monetary policy. These have combined to reinforce in the minds of most CARICOM leaders that the issues of bread and butter are more important than arguments about war and peace.

That's why, a year after Barbados and Dominica were snarling at Guyana, and the other way around as well, the three countries are now having bilateral discussions that could lead to joint economic ventures.

According to both Barbados' Prime Minister, Mr. Tom Adams, and Guyana's Foreign Minister, their two countries are talking about entering into timber and fishing projects. In addition, they are exploring ways in which Guyana could export more agricultural produce to Barbados.

Barbados' main purpose for these discussions is clear. It wants to get back some of the money which Guyana currently owes to the Caribbean Multilateral Clearing Facility, money which Barbados needs to put its balance sheet in order.

For its part, Guyana is seeking to get around the problems created by its shortage of foreign exchange by promoting what Mr. Jackson called counter-trade, an exchange of goods between countries. He said Guyana was already working with St. Vincent while it was talking with Barbados, Dominica and Trinidad and Tobago.

Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are trying to patch up their differences by agreeing to the reactivation of the lines of communication provided for in the 1978 Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries.

"I think it is imperative that the two countries talk and resolve these matters," said Barbados' Foreign Minister, Mr. Louis Tull, when asked what his government and the Chambers administration in Trinidad were doing to solve their problems of trade, air services agreements and so on. "It is important that in the future we be guided by

the good faith in each other."

In separate interviews in New York, both Mr. Tull and Dr. Ince sought to play up the positive side of the picture as far as relations between their countries are concerned. Both of them talked about the improved atmosphere in the Caribbean today and both repeated the claim that whatever difficulties existed today, their origins could be traced to events which took place before the Grenada action.

"I think that relations have improved in the Caribbean since the post Grenada days," was the way Dr. Ince put it. "The fact is that even before Grenada, there were some problems with respect to trade between the countries."

NO DOUBTS ABOUT GRENADA'S INVASION

THE following is an interview with Dr. Vaughan Lewis, Director General of the OECS. He was interviewed in St. Lucia by the Editor of *Caribbean Contact*, Dr. Colin Hope.

C.C.: We are on the eve of the anniversary, if you can use that term to apply to the tragic events which took place in Grenada on the 19th October 1983. Now a year later, Dr. Lewis, looking back at all that occurred, what are your thoughts and feelings at this time?

DR. LEWIS: Relative to the intervention and its aftermath, I think we can say that we have been able to arrive at a situation where the interim government which was established in Grenada has been able to maintain a certain degree of stability in the country. It has been able to begin the initiation of projects to allow government and the economy to continue. Thus in spite of the difficulties that we had when the interim government was initially established, with all the noise, it has been able to keep things on an even keel in Grenada.

C.C.: When you say 'we', are you speaking of the OECS or are you speaking of the Caribbean states and those others who were involved?

DR. LEWIS: The OECS.

C.C.: Actually, what I would like to know is what are your personal feelings, how do you feel now at this point in time, as an individual? Let us try to forget your role as Director General of the OECS, although I know you can't separate the two.

APPROPRIATE ACTION TO TAKE

DR. LEWIS: Not the two can't be separated and for those purposes I can only speak in fact as Director General of the OECS. What we can say is that one speaks for the countries; because this is the system that I represent. The countries were faced with an extremely difficult situation, unprecedented in the history of our part of the world. Those countries, their governments, felt the need to act very quickly if the situation was to be brought under some sort of control. The governments were very much aware that the regime that overthrew Maurice Bishop could only be a very, very difficult one, given the extent of the military capability it had at its disposal, and so our governments, some of them very close to the scene, geographically close, in addition to being culturally and politically close, decided that there was a threat or a great degree of urgency and we needed to seek the assistance of those who would be willing to grant assistance.

There is no doubt in my mind that this was the appropriate direction to take. I think the difficulties within the wider Caribbean, within the CARICOM area, arose from different perceptions of the urgency of the situation, and different perceptions of the threat that might have been posed to one or other of our countries. The differences in perceptions are partly a function of the differences in the strengths of the various countries. Our governments were very, very conscious of the fact that their capabilities were inhibiting to staving off any threats to their own security, their own well-being and the well-being of the peoples.

Our capabilities are extremely limited. That differentiates us from some other countries in the Caribbean who have, and who had at the time, greater forces at their disposal, and greater capacity to dispose of those forces in order to protect their own countries. We found ourselves in a situation of having to seek assistance from outside.

I think our governments were well aware that this kind of action was precedent-setting in a way, but that it was considered, and I am sure that they were right, that the situation itself was also unprecedented and precedent-setting, and extraordinary methods had to be taken.

The action of the governments was, as I am sure you know, supported by the great majority, and by the populations of the countries. There is no doubt about that. That sentiment of support was reflected in the Parliaments, when oppositions in all our countries, the majority of the oppositions in all our countries, supported the measures taken by the governments.

So I think that one would say that the action was justified by the circumstances, in spite of the fact that it was of an unprecedented nature, and that the action had the strong support of the people of our area, and the people of Grenada, which is more important, and that the government established since has been able to hold the reins as it were, while the system accommodated itself to the new circumstances and the people were able to gradually accustom themselves to the notion that they would be able to elect a new government within a year.

THOSE INVOLVED

C.C.: Now, you personally knew nearly every one of the individuals, the individual men and women, involved in the tragic circumstances. Knowing them as you did, could you have foreseen the tragedy which occurred and the manner in which it took place?

DR. LEWIS: No. I think it would be a bold man who could say that he could have foreseen what occurred in Grenada. We know that in political regimes of any kind there are difficulties that arise within the regime from time to time. What we did not, what I certainly did not, anticipate was the extent to which these difficulties would be, or at least the extent to which an attempt to resolve the difficulties would be made through the use of military instrumentalities. I don't think that many people, if any, could have foreseen the nature of the evolution of that crisis in Grenada.

C.C.: Do you think that the use of "military instrumentalities", as you call it, was the factor which shocked Caribbean people most?

DR. LEWIS: I have no doubts about that. It was the impetus to the intervention, the use of weaponry, the assassination of the political leadership and the use of weaponry again to cow the whole population—you recall the state of emergency and the particular nature of that state of emergency. I think it is that that shocked the people of our region, shocked the political leadership of the region, and led to the determination of the political leadership that such events could not be allowed to establish themselves and legitimize themselves and had to be dealt with in a different way.

A YEAR LATER: THE EFFECT

C.C.: Now that one year has gone by, what is the effect of what occurred on the relationships within the OECS firstly? Then perhaps you could tell me something of the effect it has had on the relationship within the wider Caribbean Community.

DR. LEWIS: Well I wouldn't say that there were many effects within the OECS itself. I think this was one occasion on which there was a very strong unanimity of view that something had to be done and about the measures which had to be taken. The Organisation was aware that it was going into an alliance, as it were, with governments much stronger than the governments of the Organisation. One of our main considerations was to establish it, in such a way that we could have some degree of control over the events as they evolved once the decision was taken that there should be an intervention with the assistance of the external forces—and external forces stronger than ourselves.

I think in general the OECS countries—and I think this surprised many people—the OECS were able to hold their unanimity, to hold their coherence in the face of the tremendous onslaught not only from sections within the region, but internationally, and in the international institutions. But I would say again, or reiterate what I was suggesting a while ago, that it is really the strength of the support of the populations of the countries which was very, very evident and very evident to all the political actors in the OECS. I think it was the strength of that support that allowed the coherence of the OECS to maintain itself during the difficult period.



NO PROSCRIPTION ON FORCE

As you know the events led to some degree of discord within the wider CARICOM circle. I myself, if I might put a semi-personal interpretation on it, I myself would think that to some extent the discord was due, as I was suggesting earlier, to the differences in the strengths in the countries of the region, the differences therefore in the perceptions as to the potential effects on the countries of what was occurring in Grenada.

There are substantial differences in, let us call them the countries' security capabilities, and there were such differences at the time between ourselves and all the other CARICOM countries, and I think that partly determined how different countries saw the events and how different countries judged the response that was needed to be made to the events. Our countries, I think, our governments were very, very well aware of the nature of the precedent of the potential

of inviting a third party, that is to say an extra CARICOM party to use military force to assist in the removal of the individuals who claimed to take command of the government of Grenada after October 19.

I think the governments considered it very carefully, and considered the nature of the precedent in international law, but they were aware too that these situations always pose problems of great moral and political dimensions. They pose problems of legality in the system of international law, i.e. legality or illegality. The governments were aware that they themselves were party to the charters of the international institution which proscribed the use of force except in very well defined circumstances. But the governments were also aware that the nature of self-defence, for example, was subject to different definitions depending on where you are sitting and what your strength is at any given time.

They're aware of the position of humanitarian intervention in international societies and in international law. And with that general awareness, and there

was a lot of discussion about the matter, they decided that the use of force, assisted by a third party was the only way in which the situation could be resolved with satisfaction for the security and well-being of our countries.

And it is really that rubric of humanitarian intervention that characterises the intervention for which there is precedent in international law and precedent in international relations.

CARIB DIFFICULTIES NOT FROM GRENADA

I think that in the wider world there was a certain amount of misunderstanding about the rights, the legal rights of the OECS to do what it did. That misunderstanding arose from the fact that not many people were aware of what the OECS treaty actually says. Many people were not, and people in institutions, people who should have known better, were not aware of the autonomous nature of the OECS itself, the OECS having an international personality, and a right to act autonomously.

Many countries were not aware of the nature of our decision-making process for example, and that led to a lot of dispute, needless dispute. We need to recognise of course, that some of the dispute was engineered deliberately in order to cause confusion and to de-legitimise our case. But we were never in any doubt as to the legitimacy of the Organisation's right to act and the manner in which the Organisation acted.

In the CARICOM area as a whole there were countries for which intervention, any intervention would have a precedent-setting nature and therefore intervention could not be acceptable to them. This is understandable and that is what I mean by saying that the different situations of countries, the different perceptions of the strength of their security capabilities, the different perceptions of the strength of their international diplomacy, and of the capacity of that international diplomacy to protect them, all of these things played a part in determining the response of CARICOM countries to the events. But our countries, as relatively newly independent countries, were quite clear that neither the strength of our diplomacy nor the strength of our security capabilities could inhibit the development of a dangerous situation if we did not resort to external help with great urgency.

C.C.: *You say that certain countries recognise that intervention would be a precedent as far as they are concerned, I want to question you on the countries, but could you just give me an idea of what you mean by this?*

shaking the stability of Do- posed ideas and interests.

GERRY HAREWOOD REPORTS ---

N.N.P. WILL WIN 10-12 SEATS IN GRENADA ELECTIONS—BRIZANE

WANTS US, CARIBBEAN PEACE KEEPING FORCES TO REMAIN

SOME 70 to 80 per cent of Grenada's approximately 50,000 registered voters, are expected to turn out for the December 3rd poll and to give the New National Party (NNP) between 10-12 of the elected seats. This is the view of Mr. George Brizane, one of the three leaders who merged their organisations to form the NNP.

Mr. Brizane, nearing his 42nd birthday, admits that the Spice Isle is still very much in trouble one year after the tragic events of October 1983. His assessment is largely economic and he claims that Grenada, with an income of EC\$81 million, is paying out some EC\$8 million annually in debt services alone.

One year after October 1983 he notes that unemployment stands at about 35 per cent of the work-force with some 11,500 persons out of work. The road systems need at least EC\$100 million in order to repair the 500 miles of roadways which have fallen into grave disrepair.

There is a need for upgrad-

ing the medical services, particularly preventative medicine, and a need to provide all Grenadians with primary health care and a system of universal health care. Mr. Brizane is by profession an educator, historian and economist and he would raise the quality of education in Grenada at all levels.

He would place emphasis on the continuing education of the country's young adults, especially in the basic areas of mathematics, English and science. He sees the need for the development of new institutions of learning and he estimates that the cost of upgrading the educational system would entail an outlay of about EC\$100 million.

Mr. Brizane pointed to the fact that the country's agricultural sector is in complete decay. The nutmeg industry is in a state of collapse, the cocoa industry virtually no longer exists and the banana industry is in trouble. As far as tourism is concerned, this is in limbo and requires strengthening.

Mr. Brizane's views the current situation in Grenada as simply a transitional and an atypical situation. But he thinks that some groups in the country are still willing to use the disenchanted elements in the population to stir up trouble for their own purposes. Because of this he welcomes the continued presence of the US and the Caribbean peace-keeping forces on the island until a stronger independent and well trained civil Grenadian police force has been built up.

AIRPORT OPENED

THE troubled, sagging economy of Grenada is expected to be given a significant forward boost with the opening of the Point Salines International Airport, on Monday, 29th October.

Opening of the airport with its 9,800 feet of runway affords Grenada access to all types of international air traf-

fic, both for passengers and cargo, providing a direct source of much needed dollars for the island.

The new six-tower terminal with its 103,000 square feet of space, is a replacement for Pears, some 20-odd miles out of the capital, St. George's.

The Point Salines airport has already made an impact on the Grenadian economy, providing some 400 jobs for locals, some of whom had already worked on it up to the time when construction ceased on October 25 last year as a result of the military intervention by US and Caribbean troops.

Construction at Point Salines was started by the Cubans in late 1979. After the interruption, it was restarted in June of this year and work on all buildings, landscaping, replacement of the temporary arrivals and departures hall, is expected to be completed by the summer of 1985.

The US, through its international AID Programme has pumped US\$14 million into the continuation of the con-

struction of the Point Salines Airport. The overall cost of the airport has been set at US\$60 million to US\$70 million or around EC\$200 million.

Grenada's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, declared the new airport open on the afternoon of October 29, at a ceremony attended by regional heads of government or their representatives, and a cross-section of the Grenadian community.

There was a rumour that U.S. President Ronald Reagan would himself attend the opening ceremony, but this rumour proved false. The President was represented instead by Mr. Peter McPherson, Director of USAID in Washington.

For Sunday's opening, part of the proceedings included a religious service conducted by the Council of Churches of Grenada, with the blessing of the terminal building and the runway performed by Msgr. Cyril Lamontagne, Vicar General of the local Roman Catholic Church.

Caribbean constitutional lawyers have begun legal arguments here over the right of the Grenada Supreme Court, established by the deposed People's Revolutionary Government, to try the 19 persons accused of the murders of former Grenada Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and 11 others in October 1983.

The petition before the high court in effect seeks a declaration from Chief Justice Archibald Nedd that the Court before which the 19 have been brought for trial, was unconstitutional and illegally established, and therefore has no power or jurisdiction to try them.

Should the court rule favourably on this contention, it could possibly mean that the 19 accused, including former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and his wife Phyllis and former strongman Hudson Austin, could be freed of the charges for which they are currently standing trial.

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