THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION FINANCE FOR SIDS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE AND PREDICTABLE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION FINANCING THAT IS NEW AND ADDITIONAL

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ABSTRACT

The Social Construction of Climate Change Adaptation Finance for SIDS: Epistemological, Methodological and Ontological Challenges to the Provision of Adequate and Predictable Climate Change Adaptation Financing that is New and Additional

Gary Anthony Rodwell Best

The objective of this research is to provide the small island developing states (SIDS) with an empirical understanding of key characteristics within the United Nations Climate Finance Mechanism and among its members that would enable more informed decisions and negotiating positions towards accessing climate change adaptation finance. Grounded in international relations theory, and the use of a multi method qualitative study with a sample of key informants triangulated with documentary information, the researcher explored the perception that actions of members contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable climate finance that is not new and additional, despite an obligation and commitment by developed country Parties to raise USD 100 bn from 2020, towards that goal. The data collection methods used were in depth semi-structured interviews, document review, supported by genealogy. Thirty-one findings emerged from an analysis of the coded data. Key findings included: (1) financialization of climate change solutions is detrimental to the SIDS; (2) there is no new and additional finance; (3) doubts surround the AOSIS as an effective negotiator; (4) more adaptation and mainstreaming are needed; and (5) adaptation is not seen as an investible product. The findings were analysed using a Foucauldian influenced discourse analysis and genealogy; a Ruggie inspired constructivism; and cross-case analysis, which confirmed that power was exercised, inter alia, through decision texts, influenced by the construction of dominant discourses that produced ruptures and disjunctures in the climate finance discourse. We concluded that market-based mechanisms, as a means of raising climate finance for the SIDS, are likely to fail and recommended instead, the provision of public and grant-based sources via direct transfers to programmatic activities within national budgets.

Keywords: Constructivism and international regimes; Dominant discourse and textual power; Financialization of climate finance; Justice and climate finance; Mainstreaming adaptation in developing states; New and additional climate finance; Post structuralism; and Uncertainties in climate finance.

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DEDICATION

For my daughter and son

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BINGOs	Business and Industry NGOs
BPOA	Barbados Declaration and Programme of Action
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CDERA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
COCHOG	Conference of Heads of Government
COFOR	Council for Foreign and Community Relations
COP	Conference of the Parties
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FiT	Feed-in Tariff
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEFSEC	GEF Secretariat
MARPOL	Convention on Marine Pollution
NAMAs	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NAPs	National Adaptation Plans
Oxfam	Oxford Committee of Famine Relief
REDD+	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SED	Structured Expert Dialogue
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
STAP	Scientific & Technical Advisory Panel
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNCCUR	United Nations Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources
UNCED	United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on the Human Environment

UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UWI	University of the West Indies

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Adaptation Committee
ADP	Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFB	Adaptation Fund Board
AFCs	Agreed Full Costs
AFICs	Agreed Full Incremental Costs
AIMS	African, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea
AML-CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
AR	Assessment Report
AWGKP	Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action
BA	Biennial Assessment
BCA	Border Carbon Adjustment
BCAM	Border Carbon Adjustment Mechanism
BCCL	Border Carbon Cost Levelling
bn	Billion(s)
CBD	Convention on Biodiversity
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CBIT	Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency
CBNRM	Community-based Natural Resources Management
CC	Carbon Reduction Contribution
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCAF	Climate Change Adaptation Finance
CCCCC	Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
CCF	Climate Change Finance
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CER	Certified Emissions Reductions
CFAs	Climate Finance Actors
CFE	Climate Finances Effectiveness

CGE	Computable General Equilibrium
CMP	Conference for the Parties Meeting as the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
CPEIR	Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review
CPI	Climate Principles Initiative
CRs	Coding References
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
DRs	Direct Responses
EBR	European Bank for Reconstruction
EU	European Union
G77	Group of 77
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF EO	GEF Evaluation Office
GHGs	Greenhouse Gasses
HR	Historical Responsibility
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IB	Interest-based
IC	Incremental Cost
ICAT	International Climate Financial Instruments
ICCR	International Climate Change Regime
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IEA	International Energy Agency
IET	International Emissions Trading
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
iNDCs	Indicative National Determined Contributions
IO	International Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
IRE	International Regime
ISM	Inter-Sessional Meeting
IUPN	International Union for the Protection of Nature
KCB	Knowledge and Constructivists-based
KIs	Key Informants

LDCEG	Least Developed Countries Expert Group
LDCF	Least Developing Countries Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIEs	Multilateral Implementing Entities
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NDA	National Designated Authority
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIEs	National Implementing Entities
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
PA	Paris Agreement
PB	Power-Based
PD	Prisoner's Dilemma
PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
PS	Private Sector
PSAG	Private Sector Advisory Group
PSC	Performance Score Comprise
QDAS	Qualitative Data Analysis Software
RBM	Results-Based Management
REIs	Regional Implementing Entities
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCC	Strong Cognitivist Constructivists
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SPA	Strategic Priority for Adaptation
SRI	Socially Responsible Investment
TNAs	Technology Needs Assessments
UN	United Nations

UNCFM	United Nations Climate Financial Mechanism
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USD	United States Dollar
WCC	Weak Cognitivist Constructivists
WIMLD	Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Due to the complexity of and enormous data surrounding climate change financing across key international climate actors, prudence led to a careful initial examination thereof, leading to the emergence of the purpose, problem statement, research objectives and the research questions, which were supported by previous studies and deficiencies thereto. To this end, the outcomes of relevant United Nations climate conferences, climate change decisions of CARICOM Heads of Government, and of the Alliance of Small Island States provided background and context for the study. The interaction of these factors led to an analysis and implications for the research which gave rise to the critical issues for the study, beginning in Chapter two. The research gap and contribution were fully developed as the research progressed.

1.1 Purpose

Since entering into force of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Conference of the Parties (COP) has not delivered, thus far, adequate and predictable financial resources, that are new and additional, to assist in meeting the costs of adaptation for small island developing states (SIDS). In this research, SIDS include "developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change" (UNFCCC 1992, Art 4:4); small island countries; countries with low-lying coastal areas; countries prone to natural disasters, drought, desertification and countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy intensive products (UNFCCC 1992, Art 4:8).

Grounded in international relations theory (IR) and a constructivist ontology, epistemology and methodology, the purpose of this multi-method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the United Nations climate finance mechanism (UNCFM)[1], particularly the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable climate change adaptation finance (CCAF) to the SIDS that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. It is anticipated that, through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. Although the SIDS are minor contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions - the major causes of climate change - and not seen as major investment vehicles for implementation of mitigation measures, they are nonetheless particularly vulnerable to climate change and would require adequate and predictable CCAF that is new and additional to respond to its negative impacts (IPCC 2016, AR 5; UNFCCC 1992).

The findings of the research may be of general application to the SIDS, as a whole, while the level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCC and the UNCFM.

1.2 Background and Context

The foundation for the SIDS receiving CCAF that is new, additional, adequate and predictable rests on Art 4:3 of the UNFCCC (1992), whereas the foundation for developed country Parties assisting SIDS in meeting the costs of adaptation, rests on Art 4:4 of the UNFCCC (1992). However, financial resources from developed country Parties may be channeled to the SIDS through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels (UNFCCC, Art 11:5), while the COP is charged with determining, in a predictable manner, the amount of funding necessary and available for the implementation of the UNFCCC (Art 11:3(d)). It is significant to note that developed country Parties committed to provide CCAF (Art 4:3 UNFCCC 1992) to meet the agreed full costs (AFCs), and agreed full

[1] In this research, the UNCFM includes the COP, AF, GEF, and the GCF.

incremental costs (AFICs) respectively, of all Parties (SIDS inclusive), in communicating information relating to implementation of the UNFCCC (1992, Art 12: Paragraph 1) and their mitigation and adaptation measures (UNFCCC 1992, Art 4: Paragraph 1). Consequently, these two articles seem to contemplate both mitigation and adaptation roles for the SIDS, whereas developed country Parties are seemingly only required to mitigate climate change (UNFCCC 1992).

Importantly, the language of Arts 4 (3) and 4 (4) is mandatory and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR) applies to all Parties' actions in addressing climate change (Art 3:1 UNFCCC 1992). Notably, the UNCFM includes several institutions: the GEF; AF; the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF); the Least Developing Countries Fund (LDCF); the Adaptation Committee (AC) and the GCF, all of which receive funding, private and public, including pledges and those from market-based mechanisms. Notwithstanding the above, the provision of CCAF to the SIDS remains inadequate, a situation which was confirmed at the recently concluded COP 22 (Decision 11/CP.22; Decision 8/CP.21; Decision 7/CP.22: 8; Decision 7/CP: 7 (d); Decision 4/CMP.8).

Further, the provision of inadequate CCAF to SIDS has resulted in several international debates surrounding climate finance. In this context, some writers point to limited amounts and ineffective distribution of climate finance (Morita and Matsumoto 2014, 1; Roberts et al. 2021, 180-182); ineffective distribution of climate finance at sub-national levels (Colenbrander et al., 2018, 902-915; Islam 2022); lack of internationally agreed definitions for terms, such as climate finance (Stadelmann et al. 2013, 718-37), private finance (Whitley 2013), AFICs (Olbrisch et al. 2011, 970-86; IPCC 2014), additionality (Lian-biao Cui et al., 2014, 266-99; Michaelowa et al., 2019, 1211-24; Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019, 386-400), and new and additional finance (Shrivastava and Upadhyaya 2014; Khan et al., 2020, 251-69). Other writers point to varied understandings of burden sharing (Bowen 2014); uncertainty surrounding determination of adaptation costs (Buchner and Wilkinson 2015); estimating adaptation costs (Haites 2014; Decision 8/CP.22) and differences in whether official development assistance (ODA) should be counted as adaptation finance (Scoville-Simonds 2016; Doshi and Garschagen 2020; Khan and Munira 2021). Additionally, some writers point to the absence of distributive justice (Shelton 2008, 640-62) and sloth in discharging financial responsibilities (Branger and Quirion 2014, 53-71), as critical factors. Interestingly, Jakob et al. (2015, 1-15) highlighted that direct financial transfers under non-market conditions would result in more finance available to developing countries. Further, the provision of limited CCAF may be due to the disproportionate spending on mitigation measures (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C: 27), which allows for private sector involvement at cost recovery within the context that mitigation is viewed as the best adaptation strategy.

On the other hand, it appears that only a limited number of studies was conducted on the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and the GCF, contributed to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS. Consequently, only a few studies close to this research area were found. One study in particular, "Financing Systems for Climate Change Adaptation" focused on international institutions (GEF and ODA), especially financing systems that are effective at promoting climate change adaptation activities in Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vietnam (Morita 2009; Morita 2102, 347-366). A second study identified the requirement for an institutional framework as a method for coordinating adaptation financing that enhances the strengths and minimizes the weaknesses of GEF and ODA (Kanako Morita and Ken'ichi Matsumoto 2014, 1). While a third study, "International Financing for Climate Change Adaptation in Small Island Developing States", used a mixed method approach with a focus on trends in international adaptation financing commitments by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to the SIDS across multiple regions between 2010 and 2014 (Robinson and Dornan 2016, 1103-111). However, none of these studies focused on the interactions of actors and institutions, leaving open the question whether actions of Parties within the UNCFM contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS.

1.3 Type of Study

This is a qualitative and multi method study. The methodology is post structuralist while the methods for analysis and interpretation of the research findings are genealogy, discourse analysis, constructivism and cross -case analysis. IR theory underpins the study's theoretical frame. Consequently, IR theories relating to power, regimes, institutions, agent and structure, norms and intersubjective understandings were examined, leading to selection of social constructivism as the study's theoretical approach. Additionally, post-colonial theory was interspersed across the research, not as an additional interpretative lens, but for its contributions to studies on the effects of colonization and decolonization on small states and its impact on their growth and development. A Foucauldian driven and inspired genealogy and discourse analysis, with emphasis on power-knowledge constructs and dominant discourse was applied to the coded discourse. A Ruggie inspired constructivism, emphasizing intersubjective understandings, identity formation, norm generation and regime formation underpinned the constructivist approach. It is anticipated that the knowledge generated from this study would afford new insights into decisions contributing to CCAF and, in that context, provide the SIDS with an empirical basis for collective negotiation of CCAF. The theoretical perspective for the research was interpretivism in keeping with a post-structuralist methodology, while the methods used for data capture were genealogy, document review and semi-structured interviews. However, the methods used for data analysis and findings were data summary tables and mental rigor. Importantly, the use of multiple methods in the research enabled triangulation of data and information which increased data analysis credibility, and reduced researcher bias. Concurrently, a synthesis of the findings was conducted using cross case analysis, situating the analysis of the findings within the literature, theory and the wider CCAF discussion.

The data collection for analyzing the COPs, ended in 2019 (Cop 25); for analyzing the AF (2020), GEF (2020), GCF (2020), AOSIS (2020), and the Key Informants, December (2020).

Now that the context for the research has been set, this chapter continues with a background to the research problem of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF for the SIDS, which frames the study within the body of the UNFCCC, particularly the UNCFM. This is followed by a historical chronology of events and decisions surrounding CCAF, the problem statement, the purpose statement, and the research questions. This chapter also includes a discussion around the research approach, previous studies addressing the problem, deficiencies in previous studies, and an analysis and implication for the research. It concludes with a summary.

1.4 Background to the Research Problem

A background to the problem under study and the context are critical pillars in determining the problem statement, the purpose statement and the research questions (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016; Marshall and Rossman 2016; Creswell 2014). More importantly, it allows for a better understanding of the core issues that led to the problem, and even though the CCAF journey officially began with the UNFCCC in 1992, financing for the protection of the environment began a few decades earlier.

The background has been divided it into three periods:

1. 1945 – 1972 - United Nations and the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in the Context of Environmental Finance

Recognition that humans have a responsibility to protect the environment was acknowledged as early as 1945 with the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and its specialised agencies and programmes. In October 1948, with the assistance of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN) was created to promote the preservation of the natural environment and wildlife. Subsequently, in 1949 the UN, through its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), established earlier in 1947 by a UN resolution, sponsored a UN Conference on the Conservation and Utilisation of Resources (UNCCUR). In this regard, Sands (2005) posited that "the resolution determined the competence of the UN over environmental matters and ultimately resulted in the 1972 Stockholm

Conference and the 1992 UNCED as well as other UN action on the environment (Sands 2005, 32).

Between the years 1945 and 1972, development actions in environmental preservation and conservation efforts continued, which included: (a) the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954); (b) the High Seas Fishing and Conservation Convention (1958); (c) the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf; (d) the 1958 Convention on the High Seas; and (e) the 1968 UNESCO Conference of the Biosphere. As pointed by Bodansky et al. (2008, 3), the response to environmental problems were at best ad hoc, episodic, without rules on procedure and without any significant emphasis on the earth's atmosphere. It is important to note also that none of the Conventions mentioned above contained any independent financial mechanism to manage provisions contained therein. However, in the case of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, indemnity for damages was settled between the private parties to the damage and not the State parties to the Convention (Article 29). Importantly, the regulatory regime in place to address a growing range of issues was limited, with no rules in place for activities such as environmental impact assessments (Sands 2005, 35). This vacuum, inter alia, subsequently contributed to the first global environmental conference in Sweden in June 1972 titled 'United Nations Conference on the Human Environment' (UNCHE).

The UNCHE produced, among others, three key outcomes: (a) the Declaration of twenty-six Principles for the Preservation and Enhancement of the Human Environment; (b) an Action Plan for Environmental Assessment, Environmental Management and Supporting Measures buttressed by 109 recommendations for action at the international level; and (c) a Resolution on Institutional and Financial Arrangements for international cooperation enabled via a voluntary Environment Fund. Of significance also, was the establishment of the UN Environmental Programme based in Nairobi, Kenya (UNCHE 1972). Specifically, the Environment Fund was tasked to finance new environment initiatives undertaken by the UN, including the Action Plan adopted by the UNCHE. Of particular importance in this Resolution was a commitment by the UN to ensure that the "development priorities of developing countries shall not be adversely affected, [and] adequate measures should be taken to provide additional financial resources to developing countries on terms compatible with their economic situation" (UNCHE 1972, 30).

Significantly also, is the fact that the report of the UN on the UNCHE (1972) contemplated the use of public funds, through pledges by Governments to finance UN environmental programmes. In any event, and according to UNCHE (1972), only two categories for country description were then contemplated: (1) developed; and (2) developing. Importantly also, was the absence of any reference to indicative costs associated with the management of the environment within the Action Plan of UNCHE. Notwithstanding, the UNCHE did set the bar at public finance, which was meant to be additional to the contributions of developed states towards developing states for environmental preservation and conservation. What is clear from the onset of the UNCHE, was a recognition that the environment was being harmed by developed countries and the UNCHE placed a responsibility on the developed countries to fund its preservation and conservation with public funds, and without any additional fiscal and other financial burdens to the economies of developing countries. As such, the UNCHE limited the rights of states that engaged in activities that are harmful to the environment. This also led to academic debates around the application of the 'polluter-pays' principle, developed by the OECD.

2. 1972-1992 – Key Environmental Conventions and Emerging Environmental Financial Mechanisms

Between the years 1972 and 1992 other important environmental developments, post UNEP, include: (a) the 1973 Convention on Marine Pollution[2] (MARPOL Convention) and its 1978 Protocol; (b) the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)[3]; (c) the 1980 World Conservation Strategy which gave effect to the term 'sustainable

[2] MARPOL (International Maritime Organization). 2011. Consolidated Edition http://www.idgca.org/doc/app5_290115.pdf.

[3] https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/disc/CITES-Convention-EN.pdf.

development'; (d) the 1982 World Charter for Nature [4] which concentrated on the protection of nature for the benefit of mankind; (e) the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); (f) the 1985 Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention 1985) and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol); (g) the 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (Basel Convention 1989); and (h) the 1999 Protocol which dealt with control of waste (Sands and Galizzi 2004; Gehring 2008, 467). However, in the context of finance for the environment, during the period 1972 to 1992, only UNCLOS (1992 Art 171) contained an established financial mechanism to manage activities contained therein, which is provided for through public and private contributions from State parties and private actors with special emphasis on providing funds to developing countries (UNCLOS 1982 Annex XI. 4). Interestingly, the MARPOL Convention (1982 Art X), the Vienna Convention (1985) and the Basel Convention (1989 Art 4) provided for financial and liability matters to be dealt with, separate and apart from their respective Conventions. Further, CITES (1973) provided no reference to financing in any form, while the World Charter for Nature (1982), though sponsored by the developing nations as a clarion call to action by the nation states, simply stated that "Funds, programmes and administrative structures necessary to achieve the objective of the conservation of nature shall be provided" (World Charter for Nature 1982, Principle 17). It was now up the UN environmental conference in Brazil to advance the cause of financing for adaptation and mitigation.

3. Post 1992 - Key Elements of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

The next major environmental conference was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, titled 'United Nations Conference on Environment and Development' (UNCED). Interestingly, it was the Brundtland Report of 1987, which had

[4] https://ejcj.orfaleacenter.ucsb.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/1982.-UN-World-Charter-for-Nature-1982.pdf.

expanded the role and definition of the term sustainable development that provided the catalyst which led to the UNCED (Sands and Galizzi 2004). The UNCED adopted four instruments, namely: (a) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), comprising twenty-seven principles; (b) Agenda 21; (c) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol; and (d) the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all types of Forests (Birnie and Boyle 2002).

According to Sands and Galizzi (2004, 17) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), while building on UNCHE, shifted to a more "… anthropocentric approach to environmental and development issues …." However, in the context of the needs of developing countries, two of its principles stand out: (1) Principle 16, which speaks to the internalization of environmental costs and the concept of the polluter bearing the costs of pollution; and (2) Principle 6, which provides that the "special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most vulnerable shall be given special priority" (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992).

The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC (1992) is to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system (UNFCCC 1992 Art 2). Importantly, the UNFCCC (the Convention) acknowledged that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) originated in the developed countries and that human activities contribute significantly to increases of GHGs. In addition, low-lying coastal and other small island countries, liable to floods and droughts, are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC 1992 Preamble). Of note, the significant principles of the UNFCCC, inclusive of those which relate to the SIDS and CCAF, include equity, CBDR, specific needs and special circumstances of vulnerable states, lowest possible cost, precaution[5], prevention, anticipation, adaptation, mitigation and cooperation (UNFCCC 1992 Art 3).

Together, these principles and commitments are at the heart of CCAF because they guide the actions of developed and developing states in negotiating funds for combating and adapting to climate change. While the Convention seemingly set the stage for provision of CCAF for the SIDS due their special circumstances, principles such as mitigating climate change in accordance with the CBDR of countries conflict with the special status provided to the SIDS by the same Convention. Unlike the UNCHE (1972), where public funds through pledges were the source and mechanism for raising climate finance, there is no mention of public funds in the Convention or the Rio Declaration. Thus, a significant shift in the politics of the sources of climate finance vis a vis the UNCHE, was recognized. As pointed out in Chapter 6, this Convention was always about mitigation with adaptation stuck into it as a concession to the SIDS.

In the context of a wider understanding of how CCAF was treated at the level of the COP against the backdrop of the provisions in the Convention, the researcher explored key actions and decisions from the Bali, Cancun, Durban, Doha, Warsaw, Lima and the Paris COP, and COPs 22, 23, 24, and 25. The Bali COP was the first to be examined.

1.4.1 Post 1992 - Bali Conference and the Early Years of Adaptation Finance

The Bali Road Map, which includes the Bali Action Plan, was adopted at COP 13, Bali, Indonesia on November 2007 (Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Road Map). The Bali Action Plan is divided into five main categories: a shared vision; mitigation; adaptation; technology; and financing. The shared vision refers to a long-term action on climate change, including a long-term goal for global emission reductions. To meet the objectives of the UNFCCC, the Bali Action Plan decided on a programme of enhanced mitigation and adaptation actions: (a) provision of

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[5] The precautionary principle is also Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992)

funds for financial needs assessments for LDCs and SIDS; (b) risk sharing; (c) loss and damage associated with climate change impacts of developing countries, particularly those that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change; (d) insurance; (e) adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources; (f) provision of new and additional resources, including official and concessional funding for developing country Parties; (g) innovative means of funding to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change in meeting the cost of adaptation; (h) mobilization of public and private-sector funding and investment, including facilitation of climate-friendly investment choices; (i) financial and technical support for capacity-building in the assessment of the costs of adaptation in developing countries, in particular the most vulnerable ones, to aid in determining their financial needs; (j) financing the development and transfer of technologies; and (k) financing technology needs assessment (Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Road Map).

However, it appears that the Bali Road Map (Decision 1/CP.13) facilitated a move away from the concept of public funds for adaptation to one that is primarily driven by multiple sources of private finance. Interestingly, although Art 11(5) UNFCCC (1992) provides for financial resources from bilateral, regional and multilateral channels, the provision did not go on to determine whether it would be public, private or a combination thereof. Further, Art 4 (4) (UNFCCC 1992) provides for the costs of adaptation for SIDS and LDCs to be met by developed country Parties and, it is in that context, the researcher posits that the Bali COP has interpreted that provision, and Art 11(5) (UNFCCC 1992) to include public and private finance through instruments including loans and concessional financing. However, this seems to be at odds with the principle of CBDR outlined in the Art 3:1 (UNFCCC 1992). Further, according to the report of the Bali COP, there was no apparent consideration given to the principle of direct financial transfers from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, particularly to the SIDS and LDCs. Importantly, the omission of making the sources of CCAF clearly public was deliberate in keeping with imposing onto the SIDS, the neoliberal market-based system underpinned by economic instruments.

1.4.2 Post 1992 - Cancun Conference

Another significant milestone in the CCAF agenda were the Cancun Agreements and the Cancun Framework adopted at COP 16 Cancun, Mexico, 2010 (Decision 1C/P.16). Key relevant highlights of the Cancun Agreements include: (a) a commitment to a maximum temperature rise of 2° C above pre-industrial levels with lowering that to a maximum to 1.5° in the near future; (b) establishing the GCF to provide financing to projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing countries via thematic funding windows (Decision 3/CP.17); (c) adopting the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which included setting up an Adaptation Committee (AC) to promote the implementation of a stronger, cohesive action on adaptation (Decision 1C/P.16); (d) agreement by developed country Parties to provide developing country Parties, particularly LDCs and SIDS with long-term, scaled-up, predictable, new and additional finance approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012; and (e) Parties' actions in mitigating and adapting to climate change are expected to be based on the best available science, traditional and indigenous knowledge, gender sensitivity, transparency, and the integration of adaption efforts into social, economic and environmental policies (Decision 1C/P.16). The thrust of the Cancun COP was not dissimilar to Bali. There was a lot of discourse about CCAF, but without any specifics. Cancun focused much more on a mitigation pathway for achieving the ultimate objective to the UNFCCC, with the likely influence thereto being the direction of climate finance flows more towards mitigation efforts. In that pursuit, there appeared not to be any clear decision that the SIDS, due to their special vulnerabilities and the principle of CBDR, would not be required to pursue a mitigation pathway.

1.4.3 Post 1992 - Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Conference

However, the pursuit for all to mitigate continued at the Durban COP. Importantly, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), which was launched at COP 17, South Africa, November/ December 2011, can be viewed as a breakthrough point on the international community's response to climate change by committing to a comprehensive plan that would come closer, over time, to stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropocentric interference with the climate system (Decision 1/CP.17). Country Parties at COP 17 also noted with great concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of GHGs by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. In particular, country Parties decided the following: (a) to launch a process, via the ADP, to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties, and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020; (b) that the ADP shall plan its work in the first half of 2012, focusing on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building; (c) that the process shall raise the level of ambition and shall be informed, inter alia, by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel (AR5) on Climate Change; and (d) the launch of a work plan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties (Decision 1/CP.17).

While Durban provided no specific focus on adaptation finance, except for a lot of discourse about CCAF, but without any specifics. What it did emphasize, however, was the importance of all Parties holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. This represented a clear shift towards the SIDS and LDCs adopting a mitigation pathway, in addition to its requirement to building climate resilience to adapt to climate change. The nature and meaning of 'adapting to climate change' were slowly changing, even as the SIDS themselves gave full support to the developed countries' 'all must mitigate' discourse in expectation of increased CCAF flows. That did not occur, and CCAF for the SIDS continued to be inadequate and unpredictable. This brings into sharp focus the negotiation strategies of the SIDS, led by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), particularly in the context of the G77 plus China - their negotiating group - and where most of the emerging polluting economies, such as China, India and Brazil, belong. This strategy exposed the SIDS to retaliation from the emerging economies, particularly at the level of the boards within the UNCFM. Further, the most important objective of the Durban COP was consensus on a new legal climate change agreement, and not the pursuit of CCAF for the SIDS.

1.4.4 Post 1992 - Doha Climate Gateway Conference

The Doha Gateway launched at COP 18 in Doha, Qatar, November/December 2012, served to further consolidate the emissions reduction pathway of COP 17 (Decision 2/CP.18). Specifically, country Parties agreed, inter alia, to: (a) speedily work toward a universal climate change agreement covering all countries from 2020, to be adopted by 2015; (b) establish mechanisms to scale up efforts beyond the existing pledges to curb emissions before 2020; and amend the Kyoto Protocol for another eight-year second commitment period that binds developed countries to cut GHGs (Decision 1/CMP.8). Parties also agreed to complete a new financial and technology infrastructure which included establishing the Republic of Korea as the host of the GCF, the SCF and the technology Mechanism. In addition, COP 18 provided for, a review of the AF (Decision 4/CMP.8, guidelines for the CDM, Decision 5/CMP.8) and guidance to the LDCF (Decision10/CP.18). In relation to the AF, the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) noted with concern issues related to the sustainability, adequacy and predictability of funding from the AF due to "the decline in market prices of certified emission reductions [CERs], and its expected impact on the availability of funding from the Adaptation Fund" (Decision 3/CMP.8, para1). Further, the decision to fund the AF from a 2% levy on the earnings from the clean development mechanism[6] (CDM) must be seen as part of the developed countries plan to financialize climate change solutions for mitigation and adaptation, particularly since adaptation by itself is not seen as an investible vehicle, but rather a public good.

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[6] This is an emissions reduction trading scheme set up under the Kyoto Protocol.

This market-based solution to the raising of CCAF for the SIDS, besides being contrary to expectation of public and grant based financing, created a direct relationship between mitigation performance and adaptation finance that was now subject to the volatility of international market systems without any upfront protection for the economies of the SIDS, whether through direct transfers, liability insurance or debt write offs. In the result, the CDM eventually failed and the AF and CCAF suffered. Reflectively, this was not about raising CCAF, but more about further integrating and controlling the economies of the SIDS. With the failure of the CDM, all eyes were then laid on the GCF to bridge the gap in CCAF, but the breaking of promises of public funding for the SIDS was still not resolved. Importantly, two decades on and the UNCFM was still unable to provide CCAF that is adequate and predictable through the GEF, or the AF.

1.4.5 Post 1992 - Warsaw Outcomes Conference

The important result emanating from COP 19, held in Warsaw, Poland, November/December 2013, was the critical decision by country Parties to stay on track towards securing a universal climate change agreement by 2015, through a global effort to rapidly reduce emissions while building adaptation capacity (Decision 1/CP.19). Additionally, decisions included modalities for submission by all Parties of indicative national determined contributions (iNDCs) and a commitment by developed country Parties to assist developing countries in preparing their iNDCs. Notably also, was the commitment by Parties to close the pre-2020 ambition gap by reducing the gap between what was pledged and what is required to keep global temperatures below 2°C, and the commitment by Parties to support country Parties through the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIMLD) (Decision 2/CMP.9). Parties also agreed to submit reports, on a biennial basis, relating to their efforts to mobilize USD 100 billion, from a wide variety of sources, annually by 2020 and to begin capitalization of the GCF from a wide variety of other sources (Decision 3/CP.19; Decision 4/CP.19). Decision 5/CP19 provides that “the GCF will indicate in its reports actions it has undertaken to balance the allocation of resources between adaptation and mitigation activities under the Fund." The Warsaw COP also supported a result-based payments mechanism (Warsaw Framework for REDD+) for the benefit of developing country Parties once they demonstrate their ability to protect their forests by cutting emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (Decision 9/CP.19).

The pressure for all Parties to mitigate continued with commitments to submit iNDCs. Even the natural resources of some SIDS and developing countries were not spared, rather, provision of CCAF was increasingly linked to mitigation performance by the SIDS:

> Reaffirming that, in the context of the provision of adequate and predictable support to developing country Parties, Parties should collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistent with the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in its Article 2 (Decision 9/CP.19).

There is no doubt that the SIDS, based on their high-indebted status, felt intimidated by these decisions, which lured them into support by promises of side payments, such as the USD100 bn climate finance pledge to developing countries, yearly from 2020. Commodification of natural resources assets and financialization of extra territorial land rights through Redd + agreements, became the order of the day. Additionally, the researcher is not convinced that pursuing loss and damage - an asset difficult to commodify- is tactful at this time, having regard to the uncertainty surrounding CCAF, and the fact that the loss and damage regime require further additional and separate funding. The COP has also pushed back by placing loss and damage in the same adaptation mode and its progress subject to the availability of funds. As a counter, the SIDS must solve the problem of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF before it mainstreams loss and damage into its negotiations. In the meantime, provision of CCAF to the SIDS remain inadequate and unpredictable.

1.4.6 Post 1992 - The Lima Call to Action Conference

The Lima Call to Action arose out of the 20th session of the COP and the 10th session of the CMP that took place from the 1st to 14th December 2014 in Lima, Peru. Specifically, the Lima Call to Action puts the world on track for a new 2015

Universal Climate Agreement, affirming, at the same time, "… [Country Parties'] determination to strengthen adaptation action through this new agreement" (Decision 1/CP.20, Preamble). Country Parties agreed to the ground rules on the submission of iNDCs, which will form the foundation for climate action post 2020 when the new agreement is expected to come into effect (Decision 1/CP.20). In particular, the COP 20 decided that the LDCs and SIDS may, based on their special circumstances, communicate information on strategies, plans and actions for low GHG emissions development and adaptation options within their submitted iNDCs. (Decision 1/CP.20).

Significantly, the COP 20 made progress in elevating adaptation onto the same level as actions to cut and curb emissions. Consequently, COP 20 identified NAPs, a resilience achieving mechanism, to be expanded through GCF funding and as the gateway towards adaptation actions, in addition to the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential and adaptation co-benefits. Parties also made pledges that took the capitalization of the new GCF past the initial USD100 bn target by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries, placing greater emphasis on transparency and predictability of financial flows. This target was set within an overall uncertain climate finance target, an uncertain CCAF target and uncertainty about what CCF flows are being made by Parties (Decision 1/CP.20).

Complimenting these adaptation actions at the COP 20 is the Lima Adaptation Knowledge Initiative which serves to capture the adaptive needs of developing states and the array of actions under the WIMLD process, aimed at enhancing the understanding of how loss and damage affects vulnerable developing countries and populations, inclusive of indigenous and minorities. Particular attention should be paid to the GEF decision of reaching a co-financing ratio of at least USD 6 to USD 1, with the expectation of greater co-financing in upper middle-income countries that are not SIDS, and the COP's urging for it to improve its policies and procedures associated with the length and efficiency of its project cycle timelines. Issues of inadequacy and unpredictability of CCAF were again highlighted. The COP 20 also reaffirmed that CCAF will be channeled through the

SCCF and the LDCF and its concern about the low performance of the AF due to an ineffective CDM (Decision 2/CP.20). As a result, the AF was urged consider diversifying its revenue streams (Decision 1/CMP.10; Decision 2/CMP.10). While I support the USD 100 bn climate finance call, I believe that the COP 20 should have agreed to a specific CCAF goal similar to goals set for mitigation. This, in my view, would have placed adaptation on a truer platform to call for increased ambition.

Further, every opportunity was seized by the COP 20 to situate CCAF and the SIDS within a mitigation and market-based construct. Co-financing ratios for the SIDS are not practical. High indebtedness has already stretched their economies to the limit with little fiscal space available from within. Governments will be hard pressed to muster co-financing ratios from its own purse, and if the private sector or an MDB is invited to participate, that would likely increase their indebtedness. Importantly, the pressure on the SIDS to describe its NAPs and NAPAs as resilience tools is meant to link them to the iNDCs which now caters for adaptation, resilience and low emissions pathways, and also an important pillar for accessing financing within the GCF. The obvious question would be why the developed countries are pressuring the SIDS to transition to market-based mechanisms? One view is that the developed countries are experiencing fiscal negatives due to a global economic downturn which has resulted in far less public funding sources available to them. Consequently, there is greater public scrutiny of their accounts and resistance to large transfers to developing states, SIDS included. Consequently, this has created a conundrum for the developed countries who are pressing the SIDS to mainstream adaptation actions into development, and at the same time delivering CCAF via projects. It seems clear to us that mainstreaming adaptation actions in development is better enabled through direct transfers of CCAF. As Paris approached, perhaps the only actors that were still speaking about CCAF, as a separate pillar within the UNCFM, were the SIDS themselves. The Paris Agreement would subsequently become the high-speed mitigation train that drags all other actors on board to play their part. However, the issue of CCAF was still inadequate and unsettled.

1.4.7 The Paris Agreement Conference

The Paris Agreement (PA) was the specific outcome of the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) and the eleventh session of the CMP from 30th November to 11th December 2015, Paris, France (Decision 1/CP.21). The objective of the Paris Agreement can be described as threefold: (a) holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels; (b) increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development; and (c) making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development (Art 2 PA). In the context of CCAF, the PA links financial flows to emission reductions. Quite significantly also, was the raising of adaptation actions to the level of a global response, where all country Parties agreed that:

> [A]daptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions … (Article 7:2 PA) and … that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs. (Article 7:3 PA)

The COP 21 also highlighted the limited resources in the AF given the current prices of CERs, which affect the Fund's ability to fulfill its mandate. In particular, as of 30 June 2015, a total of USD 1.8 million in pledged contributions to the AF was outstanding, while the AF Board was again urged to continue its efforts to simplify accreditation procedures for national implementing entities (NIEs). Moreover, ongoing discussion on linkages between the AF and the GCF continued (Decision 1/CMP.11). In addition, the COP 21 encouraged the Executive Board of the CDM to continue the simplification process of the CDM with the aim of further streamlining the project cycle, and to explore the opportunities for financing the CDM through international climate financing institutions, such as the GCF (Decision 6/CMP.11). Further, COP 21 acknowledged that the process to establish and implement NAPs is still in its early stages, noting concurrently the lack of funding in the LDCF and the SCCF to formulate and implement NAPs.

While welcoming relevant publications of the AC and the least developed countries expert group (LDCEG), which enabled the process of formulating and implementing NAPs, COP 21 also noted that gaps and needs remain in relation to the process to formulate and implement NAPs, including access to financial support, acknowledging at the same time that it was too early to assess how the process to formulate and implement NAPs has contributed towards reducing vulnerability to climate change (Decision 4/CP.21). Consistent with the view of COP 21 that the GCF should consider funding the CDM (Decision 6/CMP.11), in like manner, the GCF was invited to consider how to improve access to financial support towards formulating and implementing NAPs. The Technology Executive Committee (TEC), the CTCN, the LDCEG and AC were also encouraged to determine how best they can help country Parties align their technology needs assessments (TNAs) with the process to formulate and implement NAPs (Decision 4/CP.21).

With regard to long term financing, COP 21 urged for a greater balance between finance for mitigation and adaptation and decided that the second biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance will focus on the issues of adaptation finance, while appreciating the pledges and progress made by developed country Parties towards reaching the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion annually by 2020 (Decision 5/CP.21). This decision should be balanced with the SCF's requirement to provide the COP with biennial assessments of climate finance flows. The COP 21 also urged the GCF to simplify the funding proposal template and the concept note template in an expeditious manner while improving the approval process and timely disbursement of readiness resources to facilitate readiness programme implementation (Decision 7/CP.21). COP 21 also placed emphasis on methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties, included in Annex I to the Convention, by revising the common tabular format for the UNFCCC biennial reporting for developed country Parties. Of significance, in this revised format, are references to Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as climate change finance, and the absence of 'natural disaster' as a reporting sector (Decision 9/CP.21, Annex).

In many ways the PA has pushed out of the window many of the SIDS' arguments and positions. Firstly, ODA is used as the main source of climate finance and therefore attempts to separate ODA from CCAF appears futile at this point. Secondly, the PA institutionalized a link that has created an inverse relationship between adaptation and mitigation, deemphasizing public funding in the process. While the researcher agrees that the world cannot adapt itself out of the negatives effect of climate change, it is my view that SIDS need adaptation interventions at the same level of mitigation.

The critical issue for the SIDS is accessing adequate CCAF. However, that doesn't mean adaptation is not happening within developing and developed countries. In fact, it is believed that USD billions are spent on adaptation in these countries, but it is recorded as development and not adaptation. While the SIDS may argue that the PA provided more cuts in GHGs, adding to them staying alive; in terms of CCAF, nothing tangible was gained, except promises of reviewing access, increasing pledges and supporting NAPs and iNDCs. However, the more important decision affecting the SIDS is the return of a more expanded CDM type market-based mechanism as a source of climate finance. The collapse and failure of the CDM to provide CCAF to the SIDS has had zero impact on the climate finance decision trajectory of the UNCFM. Consequently, the PA may well be undermining Art 4 of the UNFCCC (1992), particularly Art 4(4), which provides that the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.

Clearly, the AOSIS' strategy to use its power of numbers in support of the developed countries pushing the emerging large emitters to agree to deep cuts in GHGs has not provided a quid pro quo in CCAF. Therefore, the SIDS, through the AOSIS and with assistance from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Common Market, must address their minds to future negotiation strategies and outcomes. Clearly the PA was not financially beneficial to the SIDS, to the contrary, it has placed a mitigation burden on them. Perhaps the COP 22 would be different.

1.4.8 The Conference of the Parties 22

The twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) and the twelfth session of the CMP took place in Bab Ighli, Marrakech, Morocco from 7 to 18 November 2016 (Decision 1/CP. 22). COP 22 was peculiarly important in the sense that the conference had to deal with the new focus of the COP, which is to keep global temperature below the 2°C target through global contributions without exceptions and, at the same time, maintain a balanced adaptation and mitigation focus. In particular, the COP 22 agreed that financing loss and damage, like CCAF, will come from multiple sources, including sources outside of the UNFCCC's Financial Mechanism (Decision 3/CP.22), noting at the same time that developing country Parties continue to face challenges in accessing funding from the GCF for the preparation and implementation of NAPs (Decision 6/CP.22). In terms of long term finance, COP 22, urged the following: recognition that assessment of adaptation needs in developing countries is fundamental for scaling up adaptation finance (Decision 7/CP.22, paragraph 7); nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and adaptation communications could constitute a good opportunity for supporting the scaling up of adaptation finance (Decision 7/CP.22, paragraph 7(b)); and the role of the private sector in providing finance for adaptation needed to be strengthened (Decision 7/CP.22, paragraph 7(c)).

The COP 22 also acknowledged challenges with the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows by the SCF, particularly uncertainties associated with data sources connected therein; uncertainties surrounding the lack of procedures and data to determine private climate finance; and uncertainties surrounding methods for estimating adaptation finance (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex B. 6). Accordingly, over the period 2013-2014, climate finance flows to developing country Parties totaled, on average annually, USD 41 bn as public finance and USD 40.8 bn as private finance, thus representing a balance between public and private sources. However, global flows, inclusive of flows to developing countries totaled USD 714 billion (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2, Fig 1). The characteristics of public finance flows to developing countries over the period 2013-2014 revealed that the UNFCCC funds (AF, GEF, SCCF, LDCF) totaled USD 0.7 billion which had a 50-50 per cent spread between adaptation and mitigation across developing country Parties on a 100 per cent grant basis. However, in the context of multilateral climate funds, a total of USD 2.2 bn was allocated with a (% ratio spread) of 27 to 70 to 03 between adaptation, mitigation and cross- cutting respectively, and across developing country Parties, with a (% ratio spread) of 53 to 47 between grants and concessionary loans.

Contrastingly, climate related bilateral funds averaged USD 25 billion with a (% ratio spread) of 27 to 53 to 20 between adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting respectively and, across developing country Parties, with a (% ratio spread) of 49 to 2 for grants and loans and a (% ratio spread) of 49 to 2 for concessionary loans and equity respectively. Moreover, funds from multilateral development banks (MDBs) totaled USD 15.8 bn which represented a (% ratio spread) of 8 to 82 between adaptation and mitigation respectively across developing country Parties with a (% ratio spread) of 09 to 83 to 2, for loans and equity respectively (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2, Fig 2). As a result of the above financial flows, mitigation-focused finance represented more than 70 per cent of the public finance in developing countries reported on up to 2013 and 2014, while CCAF provided to developing countries accounted for about 25 per cent of the total finance, which is not dissimilar to the period 2011–2012. However, grants represent 88 per cent of approved climate funds with 56 per cent of the bilateral finance reported to the OECD DAC reflecting adaptation as a principal objective. Some LDCs and SIDS in Africa and Asia have been among the largest recipients of adaptation finance (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2 (3)).

In the context of investments from MDBs, more than 80 per cent focused on mitigation and less than 20 per cent on adaptation. The COP 22 also noted that an average of 35 per cent of dedicated climate finance, climate related finance and finance through MDBs went to Asia for mostly mitigation projects, including REDD+, followed by 21 per cent to Africa for primarily adaptation and 18 per cent to Latin America and the Caribbean (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2 (3). The COP 22 also identified constraints associated with climate finance flows, which included, inter alia, administrative costs for fund management between 1 to 12 %; low levels of technical capacity to design and develop projects and programmes and to monitor and evaluate progress; difficulties in following the procedures to access finance; and engagement of key stakeholders across government, particularly ministries of finance and planning. In addition, beyond iNDCs, few efforts to assess national or global climate finance needs have been completed since the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows. This is a complex issue since most adaptation interventions seek to identify the specific number of people that are likely to benefit from the proposed interventions, either directly or indirectly in terms of increased resilience. Further, ensuring the accuracy of adaptation estimates can be challenging due to difficulties in identifying beneficiaries, establishing baselines and data collection, and defining and tracking resilience over time to what may be the slow onset of adaptation effects over hundreds of years (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2 (3)). Quite significantly, COP 22 also noted that public and private financial flows to developing country Parties which averaged USD 80 bn up to 2014, represent a mere 11% (per cent) of total global climate finance flows of USD 714 bn with close to 86 % (per cent) going to renewables and energy efficiency (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2, Fig 1). However, in the context of global available finance for investment, COP 22 highlighted that USD 75 trillion is under management within different portfolios along with USD 1.6 trillion invested in fossil fuel energy, which is in addition to the USD 714 billion total climate finance (Decision 8/CP.22, Annex C 2, Fig 3). This cumulative figure (USD 2.341trillion) represents a mere 3.2% of the total global finance directed towards climate finance.

The provision within the PA which advocates that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts conflicts with the GCF, whose instrument provides for balanced financing between adaptation and mitigation. The pursuit of greater levels of mitigation has undoubtedly led to an imbalance between adaptation and mitigation despite the impressive numbers provided by the SCF, above. At the same time, the inability of developed and emerging economies to increase GHG ambition sufficient to return to pre 1992 industrial levels suggests to us the need for increased adaptation to fill that gap, and not reduced adaptation as advocated. Impressive as the COP 22 climate figures appear, there was a further consolidation of private sector financing for adaptation with no information on how much CCF was actually needed for adaptation, and or mitigation. Pledges are therefore made under conditions of CCF uncertainties resulting in continued shortfalls in CCAF for the SIDS. Additionally, even though the percentages of financial flows (public and grants) appear higher within the UNCFM as opposed from bilateral and the MDBs, the quantity of CCF and CCAF made available is far greater from bilateral and MDB sources, with a significant portion from private sources. While it is accepted that among the SIDS there are low levels of technical capacity to design and develop projects and programmes and to monitor and evaluate progress, the researcher does not agree with the overall capacity constraints discourse that prevails within the UNCFM. What was found, was that within the SIDS generally, capacity is spread nationally across the public sectors to meet the service needs of citizens and not located in a specific location to deal specifically with project development to OECD standards. Recognizing that the investment trends are towards renewables, it is not believed that the SIDS can compete at scale and that renewable investments by them would necessarily reduce their need for adaptation. Unfortunately, the COP 22 did not produce any significant improvement in the provision of CCAF to the SIDS that is adequate and predictable. Great expectations are anticipated as the COP 23, 24 and 25 are examined.

1.4.9 Conference of the Parties 23, 24 and 25

The twenty-third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 23) held in Bonn, Germany from 6-18 November 2017 was particularly concerned with preparations for the implementation of the work programme under the PA, minimum progress since COP 22 on loss and damage, except for the establishment of a loss and damage secretariat, and that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources (Decision 5/CP.23). In terms of long-term finance, the COP, similar to COP 22, urged developed country Parties to channel public funds to adaptation activities and to achieve a greater balance between finance for mitigation and finance for adaptation, recognition of the importance of adaptation finance and the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation, and the scaling up of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation (Decision 6/CP.23). Similarly, the COP 23 directions to the SCF lacked any specifics in relation to CCAF. As it related to the GCF, the COP 23 noted with concern, once again, challenges in accessing financial resources from the GCF for CCAF and confirmed that the GCF will finance AFCs and AFICs, while at the same time the COP 23 noted a significant number of entities awaiting accreditation (Decision 9/CP.23). The GEF, on the other hand, was congratulated on yet another capacity building initiative to enhance transparency, while the COP invited the GEF to improve its access modalities to the SIDS (Decision 10/CP.23).

The twenty-fourth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 24) held in Katowice, Poland from 2-15 December 2018 focused on preparations for the implementation of the PA and the first session of the COP serving as meeting of the Parties to the PA. Under the PA work programme, the COP 24 emphasised the importance of predictability of climate finance flows to the GCF and LDCF through pledges to, and replenishment of the GCF, enabled through the High-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance and resulting in the SCF’s report of increased availability as more climate finance was flowing from developed countries to developing countries. Notably, the dialogue also called for scaling up of increased private finance for adaptation (Decision 1/CP.24). In terms of long-term finance, the COP 24 issued the same call as it did to COP 23. Interestingly, the COP 24 requested the SCF to prepare, every four years, a report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement for consideration by the COP (Decision 4/CP.24). It seems more than odd that after almost three decades the COP was still requesting a needs analysis for developing countries, much less the SIDS, which enjoys special category status. In relation to the previous SCF reporting period (2013-2014), climate finance had increased by 17% during the period 2015-2016 (Decision 4/CP.24, Annex III B). However, the SCF reported that the most significant source of uncertainty related to the geographic attribution of private finance data and recommended that Parties: (a) enhance their reporting of climate finance to developing countries; (b) harmonize their methodologies for tracking and reporting climate finance among IOs; and (c) integration of climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision making processes.

The COP 24 also invited Parties to strive for complementarity between climate finance and sustainable development by aligning climate finance with national climate change frameworks and priorities, as well as broader economic development policies and national budgetary planning. (Decision 4/CP.24, Annex IV). The last two recommendations at (b) and (c) above are a push by developed countries for SIDS to mainstream adaptation into development, which is a very sensitive matter for the SIDS. Even though climate finance flows have been reported as increased, the majority of CCF came from bilateral sources-the United States and the OECD (DAC), followed by MDBs, and lastly by multilateral climate funds, which include the AF, GCF, GEF, LCDF and SCCF.

Further, the majority of CCAF came from bilateral sources, followed by multilateral funds and then the MDBs- 29%, 25% and 21% respectively. Additionally, grants made up 51% of CCAF from multilateral funds, 47% of bilateral finance, and 9% of MDB finance (Decision 4/CP.24, Annex III C). The COP also reported that funding directed at the SIDS amounted to 2% of bilateral flows, half of which was for CCA, whereas for the LDCS, that amount was 24%, half of which was for CCA. Regarding the multilateral climate funds provided, the SIDS received 13 %, where more than half was focused on CCA. The MDBs did not have any disaggregated data for the SIDS for this reporting period (Decision 4/CP.24, Annex III C, para 42). However, the trend is still energy focused. Investment in renewable energy and subsidies stand at USD 295 bn and USD 150 bn respectively, whereas investment in fossil fuel and subsidies stand at USD 742 bn and USD 373 bn respectively (Decision 4/CP.24, Annex III C, Fig. 5).

The twenty-fifth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 25) held in Madrid, Spain from 2-15 December 2019 focused on modalities for increased global climate action and the extent to which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) continued to provide inputs that strengthen the global response to the climate change threat, noting at the same time, greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for adaptation efforts (Decision 1/CP.25). There was some movement in reducing the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of climate finance through an invitation for Parties to submit, via the submission portal by 30 April 2020, their views on the operational definitions of climate finance for consideration by the SCF (Decision 11/CP. 25). The COP 25 also commended the GCF for an increase in the number of project proposals approved, which brought the total amount approved by the Board to USD 5.6 bn to support the implementation of 124 adaptation and mitigation projects and programmes in 105 developing countries (Decision 12/CP. 25). The COP welcomed the pledges made by 28 contributors and the successful conclusion of the first formal replenishment process of the Green Climate Fund, resulting in a nominal pledge of USD 9.66 billion and a notional credit of USD 118.47 million that may be earned in the event all contributors make early encashment, along with the adoption of the Green Climate Fund’s policy on co-financing (Decision 12/CP. 25). Further, the COP 25 welcomed with appreciation the contributions made by developed country Parties to the LDCF during the reporting period, amounting to USD 184 million, and the contribution made by Switzerland to the SCCF during the reporting period, amounting to USD 3.3 million. The GEF was also urged to minimize the time between the development and approval of projects, and the disbursement of funds by its implementing/executing agencies to the recipient countries of those projects (Decision 13/CP.25).

Further, there was no appreciable change in the CCAF position of the SIDS, except to say that even with the increased in financial flows, CCAF remained inadequate and unpredictable as reported by the COP itself. Compounding this challenge is the absence of an agreed figure for CCF, and an agreed figure for CCAF. Additionally, a closer look at Decision 12/CP. 25, where the GCF projects approval stood at USD 5.6 bn, would reveal on a straight division a sum of USD 45.1 million per project or USD 53.3 million per country. Importantly, this figure does not disaggregate to reflect the SIDS. Countries like Guyana and Barbados would easily consume this amount in projects. Even the replenishment to the GCF falls short of any reasonable expectation of CCF and CCAF, since it amounts to USD 92 million per country. The LDCF fares worse with USD 4 million per country. Clearly these amounts are inadequate to meet the ordinary demands of developing countries including the SIDS, hence the push to financialize and commodify CCF, whether it affects the SIDS or not. Of course, it is not known exactly how these boards will allocate the funds, but it is not difficult anticipate grave difficulties in doing so, hence the numerous conditions that developed countries attach to accessing CCF. Ours is a straight division that reveals how inadequate CCF is, notwithstanding all the hype it gets in the UNFCCC and other media. Additionally, it may well be one set of funds being moved around by the developed countries to deal with climate change, natural disasters, famine and droughts, inter alia.

In the context of a wider understanding of issues surrounding CCF and CCAF from the perspective of the SIDS, the researcher examined how CCAF was dealt with within CARICOM and the AOSIS. Of note, CARICOM is an economic treaty organization comprising Caribbean SIDS. There is however no structured organization comprising Pacific SIDS and/or other Oceanic SIDS. Consideration is therefore given below to some key actions from CARICOM and the AOSIS. It is important to note also that the AOSIS negotiated on behalf of its membership, at the various COPs, which included the member states of CARICOM.

1.4.10 Communiqués and Statements from the Caribbean Community 1992-2018 Key Steps in The Climate Change Finance Context

This part begins from the year 1992 since it represents the beginning of a concerted effort on the part of the UN to elevate environmental matters of concern to the SIDS. The third inter-sessional meeting (ISM) of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government (ISM3-COCHOG), held on 19 February 1992, Kingston, Jamaica acknowledged the enormous practical importance of UNCED to CARICOM countries, individually and collectively.[7] At the COCHOG 13, held on 29 June-2 July, 1992, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Heads of Government (Heads) expressed satisfaction that the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)- later called CDEMA, became operational in September 1991 and expressed gratification that the UNCED took into consideration issues of particular concern to CARICOM states, including the sustainability of islands and alleviation of poverty; the sustainable development of all types of forests; and the environmentally sound management of solid wastes.[8]

Importantly, the COCHOG 15 held on 4-7 July 1994, Bridgetown, Barbados, represented a significant milestone in the context of sustainable development for the SIDS. Heads endorsed the outcomes of the United Nations Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of SIDS, which was held in Barbados on 25 April - 6 May 1994, and especially the Barbados Declaration and Programme of Action (BPOA).[9] The BPOA is driven by a 14-point programme with priority areas that include climate change and sea-level rise; natural and environmental disasters; and management of biodiversity resources. According to the BPOA, specific challenges and constraints that cause major set-backs to the socio-economic development of the SIDS included small size and geographic isolation that prevented economies of scale; overuse of resources and premature depletion; costly public administration; and limited institutional capacities.[10] In addition, cross-cutting areas to be addressed to support the

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[7] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-third-inter-sessional-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-19-february-1992-kingston-jamaica/

[8] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-thirteenth-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-29-june-2-july-1992-port-of-spain-trinidad-and-tobago/

[9] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-fifteenth-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-4-7-july-1994bridgetown-barbados/

[10] UN.org, "BPOA (1994)- Barbados Programme of Action" https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/conferences/bpoa1994

sustainable development of SIDS were identified as capacity building; institutional development at the national, regional and international levels; cooperation in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies; trade and economic diversification; and financial management.[11] Heads also agreed that collaboration with AOSIS should continue in the promotion of sustainable development and considered it imperative to utilise the resources of the GEF to develop and implement environmental programmes.

In 1996 at the COCHOG 17, held in Bridgetown, Barbados, from 3rd July to 6th July 1996, Heads endorsed the need for the Hemispheric Summit on Sustainable Development (Bolivia, December 1996) to examine those issues that had not been fully addressed at the UNCED, including modalities for the financing of environmental programmes.[12] Importantly, during COCHOG 16; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; and 23, nothing of significance relating to climate finance, sustainable development, adaptation or disaster risk management and reduction, emanated from the deliberations of the Heads as informed by the relevant Communiqués. However, at the fifth meeting of the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFOR) held during 6-7 May 2002, in Castries, Saint Lucia, Ministers affirmed their expectations that matters relating to the SIDS would receive full consideration at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002. [13]

At the tenth special meeting of the COCHOG held on 8-9 November 2004, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Heads, against the backdrop of the recent devastation of hurricane Ivan, focused on the region's response to disasters, highlighting that disasters served to re-emphasize the very vulnerable nature of the

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[11] UN.org, "BPOA (1994)- Barbados Programme of Action" https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/conferences/bpoa1994

[12] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/heads-of-government-at-their-fifth-special-meeting-held-in-barbados-on-16-december-1996-reviewed-the-issues-of-co-operation-between-the-united-states-and-governments-of-the-caribbean-community-in-the/

[13] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-fifth-meeting-of-the-council-for-foreign-and-community-relations-cofcor-6-7-may-2002-castries-saint-lucia/

SIDS and the urgent need to build resilience. In addition, Heads agreed to use the 10-14 January 2005 Mauritius meeting to review the BPOA for SIDS (and Low-Lying Developing States) and to highlight the Region's necessity for assistance to reduce economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities. Importantly also, Heads, at the ISM16-COCHOG held 16-17 February 2005 in Paramaribo, Suriname, agreed on the importance of sustainable development and the wide range of its implications, including disaster preparedness and mitigation.[14]

Further, the COCHOG 26, held on the 3rd -6th July 2005 at Gros Islet, Saint Lucia, noted the disturbing finding of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment for 2001-2005, which stated that human actions are putting such a strain on the environment that the ability of the planet's ecosystems to sustain future generations and the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being could no longer be taken for granted.[15]

Even though nothing related to climate change finance was expressed at COCHOG 24; 25; 26; and 27, COCHOG 28, held from the 1st - 4th July 2007 at Needham's Point, Barbados, saw a specific reference to climate change as a Communiqué heading. Heads expressed the following grave concerns:

(a) that climate change posed a threat to the sustainable development and future existence of the countries in the region;

(b) that recent findings of the IPCC demonstrated that human activity is the main cause of global warming;

(c) that dangerous climate change was already occurring; and

(d) that adaptation against current and future impacts was a high priority for SIDS.

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[14] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-tenth-special-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM-8-9-november-2004-port-of-spain-trinidad-and-tobago-2/

[15] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-sixth-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM-3-6-july-2005-gros-islet-saint-lucia-2/

Further, Heads called for urgent and ambitious action by the major emitters of GHGs in order to avoid a global climate disaster, highlighting that the region's priorities included: (a) the achievement of substantial and legally binding emission reductions in the shortest time frame possible; and (b) significant increases in the level of resources available to developing countries, particularly SIDS, to assist them in adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change. COCHOG 28 also pledged to work within the AOSIS and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) to achieve these objectives and enhance the region's negotiating capacity.[16] In support of its focus on emissions reductions and adaptation, at the COCHOG 29, held 1-4 July 2008 held at Bolans, Antigua and Barbuda, Heads approved a Task Force on Climate Change to give directions on the way forward.[17] However, at COCHOG 31, held on the 4 - 9 July 2010 at Montego Bay, Jamaica, Heads expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Copenhagen Accord from COP 15. Of particular importance to Heads, was the stabilisation of GHGs at 1.5^{o}C and efforts to achieve a legally binding agreement on issues related to mitigation, adaptation, research and finance.[18]

Quite significantly, at the ISM 21, COCHOG held 11-12 March 2010 at Roseau, Dominica, Heads agreed that the region's position on a series of actions including the enhanced action for adaptation, transfer of technology and the new financing window provided through the GCF and Technology Mechanism, shall be defined through a CARICOM Ministerial meeting. Quite surprisingly, ISM 21 COCHOG concluded that the recent severe droughts and water scarcity faced by many CARICOM states was not the result of climate change, but rather the effect

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[16] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-eighth-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM-1-4-july-2007-needhams-point-barbados/

[17] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-ninth-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM-1-4-july-2008-bolans-antigua-and-barbuda/

[18] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-thirty-first-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-4-7-july-2010-montego-bay-jamaica/

of the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENCO) compounded by the intense sub-tropical high pressure system over the North Atlantic.[19] Notably however, was the ISM 23, COCHOG held 8-9 March 2012 at Paramaribo, Suriname which became a watershed moment for CARICOM in the context of climate change actions. In particular, Heads approved the 'Implementation Plan for the Regional Framework for Achieving Development Resilient to Climate Change', which defined the Region's strategic approach for coping with climate change for the period 2011 – 2021, while pledging to support the further efforts of the CCCCC and the CARICOM Secretariat. In the context of the UNCED 20 (Rio +20) scheduled for Brazil, 20 - 22 June 2012, Heads agreed that the special development challenges faced by the small vulnerable developing states, like those in the Caribbean, should be fully acknowledged in the Rio + 20 outcome.[20] Contrastingly, the COCHOG 34 held 3-6 July 2013 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago focused on CARICOM'S perspectives relating to priorities on the UN Post 2015 Development Agenda. In that context, Heads acknowledged that the new international development approach embodied in the UN Post 2015 Development Agenda would be instrumental in fashioning the global financing agenda for developing countries. Consequently, Heads agreed to the establishment of a regional task force to co-ordinate the substantive engagement of the Community in the work to define the UN Post-2015 Development Agenda.[21]

Interestingly, ISM 25 COCHOG, held 10-11March 2014 at the Buccament Bay Resort, Buccament, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, emphasized a greater interest in financing for climate change. With specific reference to climate

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[19] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-first-inter-sessional-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM-11-12-march-2010-roseau-dominica/

[20] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-third-inter-sessional-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM-8-9-march-2012-paramaribo-suriname/

[21] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-thirty-fourth-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-3-6-july-2013-port-of-spain-trinidad-and-tobago/

financing, Heads lamented the fact that much of the promised resources had not been forthcoming but emphasized the need for the CCCCC to work with member States to have projects prepared to access financing when it did become available. In addition, Heads emphasized the need to enhance the Region's engagement in the climate change negotiation process and to increase the Region's access to available climate change financial resources. They also agreed on the establishment of a CARICOM Task Force on Sustainable Development to provide guidance to Caribbean negotiators and the Region's political leaders on Sustainable Development issues and, in particular, those related to the SIDS' negotiations on climate change. Notwithstanding, ISM 25 COCHOG focused quite a lot on disaster emergency and response management.[22] In like manner, COCHOG 35 held 1- 4 July 2014 at Dickenson Bay, Antigua and Barbuda saw Heads receiving the first report of the CARICOM Task Force on Sustainable Development. Emanating from that report, Heads accepted the need for effective CARICOM engagement in the on-going processes leading up to the Third International Meeting on SIDS, the UNFCCC Climate Change Conferences, and discussions on the Post 2015 Development Agenda. In addition, Heads recognised the need to highlight the issues confronting SIDS and to draw greater worldwide attention to the sustainable development challenges facing Caribbean SIDS. In that regard, they agreed to explore the appointment of a special envoy on climate financing to take optimum advantage of available resources and noted the need to ensure that the region's development priorities and concerns find ample expression in the final decisions and outcome documents of these conferences and meetings.[23]

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[22] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-fifth-inter-sessional-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-CARICOM/

[23] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-thirty-fifth-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community-1-4-july-2014-dickenson-bay-antigua-and-barbuda/

Importantly, the COCHOG 36 held from 2-4 July 2015 in Bridgetown, Barbados, against the backdrop of the intended Paris COP 21, represents the most comprehensive effort on the part of CARICOM in respect to climate change. Heads at COCHOG 36 gave effect to the CARICOM DECLARATION FOR CLIMATE ACTION. At the outset, Heads expressed concern about the inadequate response of the international community to the threats posed by the impacts of climate change, including the inadequacy of financial resources available to support actions required to reduce the impacts of climate change in the Caribbean. Such financial resources should be in the form of public, grant-based financial support to address climate change with prioritized access. In this context, they called for financial provisions to address the specific needs and special circumstances of SIDS, including developed country Parties enhanced provisions for supporting the adaptation needs of vulnerable developing countries. This included the provision of adequate, predictable, new and additional finance to support capacity building along with technology development and transfer to the SIDS. Heads also recognized, inter alia, that extreme weather, slow onset events and their adverse impacts, including sea-level rise, coastal erosion, coral bleaching, flooding, ocean acidification, sea temperature rise and mangrove degradation, posed fundamental threats to the sustainable development of low-lying Caribbean countries and island territories. As a result, they reiterated the urgent need to close the gap between the mitigation pledges and the level of effort required to hold the increase in global average temperature to below 1.5℃ above pre-industrial levels under a new internationally legal binding agreement.[24]

Surprisingly, the COCHOG 36 agreed on a common framework for member states to support the transformation of their energy systems, adopt ambitious national strategies and reduce GHG emissions. Further, Heads expressed the view that loss and damage was a central and distinct element of the agreement and should be treated separately from adaptation. They also urged that the WIMLD work with

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[24]CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-36th-regular-meeting-of-the-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community/

CARICOM risk insurance and other insurance mechanisms to assist in the design, development and implementation of innovative approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, but tailored to the needs of SIDS.[25] In the context of the GCF, COCHOG 36 expressed the view that the GCF should play a critical role in facilitating CARICOM countries' access to prioritized financing to promote the paradigm shift towards low-carbon and climate resilient development pathways and readiness support. This includes direct access mechanisms via regional and national implementing entities; developing initial pipelines of programmes and project proposals aligned with the objectives and investment criteria of the GCF and national priorities; facilitating the access to knowledge products; and distilling lessons and experience from readiness programmes.[26] Significantly, at ISM 27 COCHOG held from 16-17 February 2016, at Placencia, Belize, Heads noted the various opportunities for climate financing and agreed to elevate the importance of the readiness programming of the GCF to include the mainstreaming of climate change into National Development Plans as a means of facilitating access to climate financing.[27] It should also be noted that there were no significant climate change finance related decisions expressed at COCHOG 30; 32; 33; 37or 38.

Over this review period, CARICOM was more reactive rather than proactive. It was recognized that its decisions were not based on its own knowledge production and science, but more on that coming from the developed countries who were responsible for the climate crisis in the first place. Having said that, CARICOM - whose mandate is about promoting and supporting a unified, inclusive, resilient and competitive community, sharing in economic, social and cultural prosperity- found itself in a difficult position when it came to the issue of

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[25] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-36th-regular-meeting-of-the-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community/

[26] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-36th-regular-meeting-of-the-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community/

[27] CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-36th-regular-meeting-of-the-heads-of-government-of-the-caribbean-community/

CCAF for the SIDS. It is important to point out that CARICOM is an economic grouping and not a climate change organization, and to that extent one of the greatest historical and economic challenge to its members was constructed as natural disasters. What was missing within CARICOM, until the early 2000s, was that climate change, produced initially by the developed countries, was the cause of natural disasters. Consequently, it did not develop any advocacy that laid blame on them and any negotiation strategy for compensation for the harm done to CARICOM states. Natural disasters, particularly hurricanes, are devastating to CARICOM states. One disaster alone can wipe off an island's GDP and set it back multiple years, economically. Countries such as Dominica, Antigua and Grenada are recent examples. Because of its broad development thrust and late recognition of climate change as responsible for natural disasters, CARICOM developed a multi modal approach (akin to silos) to its mandate and not a single portal development model where the region's challenges are mainstreamed into its development thrust. In the absence of such a model, CARICOM appears to be following the dominant discourse of the UNFCCC and the UNCFM, including their energy solutions models to climate change. However, the researcher has not heard any push back from CARICOM to co-financing ratios imposed by the GCF- which is not an efficient model for highly indebted and vulnerable countries to mobilize finance, or against another CDM equivalent to provide CCAF to the SIDS - which failed under the Kyoto Protocol, or against the delivery of CCAF to the SIDS via projects instead of direct transfers, in keeping with the concept of mainstreaming.

The absence of any reference above to statements from Pacific SIDS, similar to that of CARICOM was due to the absence of a comparable organization existing within the Pacific SIDS arena. However, reference to statements by AOSIS in the below section, and throughout the thesis, covered the views of the Pacific and Caribbean SIDS.

1.4.11 Alliance of Small Island States and Conference of the Parties

The AOSIS represents a coalition of 44 member states who are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Members include islands and territories from CARICOM and the Pacific. Within the COP, AOSIS negotiates on behalf of the SIDS. Importantly, the AOSIS, in its submission to the ADP, urged that balanced treatment be given to mitigation; adaptation; finance; technology development and transfer; transparency of action and support; and capacity-building (AOSIS 2012). In particular, the AOSIS emphasized that "enhancing action on [climate] finance is necessary for developing countries to achieve the post-2020 mitigation obligations, as well as to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change." (AOSIS 2012:3 para. 17.) The AOSIS (2012) also urged that climate finance should be new and additional to ensure adequate and predictable flows to enable the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions.

Further, an international mechanism for loss and damage and a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of the delivery means were recommended to be part of the new protocol. Additionally, Post-2020 scenarios for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at levels consistent with what is required for having a likely chance of limiting the rise in average global temperatures to below 2°C, and well below 1.5°C, were critical submissions of AOSIS (2012).

In its opening statement to COP 18 in Doha, the AOSIS reminded the COP that it was only due to the developed country Parties' promise of a second commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, that developing countries agreed to negotiations under the ADP for a new legal agreement. Further, the AOSIS pointed out that any outcome at COP 18 that excludes a commitment to increase pre-2020 ambition would be unacceptable emphasizing, at the same time, that failure to close the pre-2020 mitigation ambition gap would have profound implications for the scale, scope, and necessary commitments under a new legal agreement.

The AOSIS also called for concrete commitments by developed country Parties towards mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to fund adaptation and mitigation in developing countries (AOSIS 2012a). However, the AOSIS in its closing statement to the COP 18, lamented that, similar to the Durban COP, the Doha COP was deficient in mitigation and finance actions. There was no new financing, "… only promises that something might materialize in the future" (AOSIS 2012b: para 5). In addition, the COP 18 did not result in any significant increase in commitments to achieve the global temperature goal of 1.5° C or the pre-2020 mitigation ambition. Consequently, inadequate mitigation ambition thus heightened the requirement for a separate regime of loss and damage (AOSIS 2012b).

On the issue of long-term finance, the AOSIS, in its submission to the UNFCCC, stated that though small emitters of GHGs, member states are committed to a renewable energy and energy efficiency future and, in that context, scaled up, adequate and predictable funding is its highest priority. However, the AOSIS expressed serious concern over uncertainty surrounding the end of the Fast Start Finance period, and the USD 100 billion per year by 2020 commitment, recommending, ad interim, a 2013 to 2015 finance period to ensure no reductions in financial flows towards developing county Parties (AOSIS 2013). However, this recommendation was not taken onboard by the COP.

Acknowledging that even though Decision 4/CP.18 refers to "…climate finance of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from public, private and alternative sources in the context of meaningful mitigation …, the definition of mitigation as a reduction tool for GHGs is a limited one". In that context, the AOSIS is of the view that an interpretation of the term mitigation also allows for it to mean 'mitigating the impacts of climate change', which also means 'building climate resilient action'. Such an interpretation, the AOSIS recommends, should be part of all future COP documents (AOSIS 2013). Further, despite promises for adaptation funding under the Fast Start Finance, only a few countries made an effort to provide specific, new finance for adaptation, while others renamed existing funding programmes as Fast-Start Finance. According to the AOSIS, "… ongoing finance for adaptation has been piecemeal and certainly does not match the needs of the most vulnerable countries" (AOSIS 2013:1).

Importantly, AOSIS in its report to the SBSTA at the COP 19 emphasized that loss and damage is different from mitigation, and different from adaptation, because it results from slow onset events. Consequently, financial flows from developed country Parties for loss and damage should be new and additional to financing for mitigation and adaptation (AOSIS 2013a; AOSIS 2014). Further, financial support is still required for preparing National Communications and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) (AOSIS 2013a). Similarly, AOSIS informed the SBI at the COP 19 that "[n]o progress can be made on adaptation in our countries without adequate, predictable and accessible funding" (AOSIS 2013b:2). Additionally, the implementation of the MRV system to take stock of mitigation efforts of all Parties is aimed at providing environmental integrity within the financial measures of the UNFCCC.

Further, at the COP 20 in Lima, Peru, the AOSIS emphasized that based on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), "… it is clear to us that an increase of 1.5°C in average global temperatures … in some cases will threaten the survival of SIDS" (AOSIS 2014a: 2). Consequently, this information will influence SIDS in:

(a) preparations of iNDCs and the level of ambition for the long-term goal of the new 2015 legal agreement;
(b) establishing linkages between the Technology Mechanism of the CTCN and the Financial Mechanism; and
(c) provision of long-term finance and guidance to the GCF in the context of predictability and clarity on how developed country Parties intend to fulfill their pledge of mobilizing USD $100 billion per year by 2020 (AOSIS 2014a).

Additionally, in its 2015 submission to the UNFCCC on finance, the AOSIS emphasized three critical areas. Firstly, the new legal agreement to the UNFCCC "… must include a commitment that finance from a variety of sources continues to be scaled up, post 2020, using the USD100 billion, as a floor, for developed countries' contributions" (AOSIS 2015:1). Secondly, delivery of climate finance under the new protocol to the UNFCCC "… must remain consistent with the founding principles of the Convention …" (AOSIS 2015:1). Thirdly, MRV of climate finance "… should also include a regular cycle of climate finance" (AOSIS 2015:2). Notwithstanding, the AOSIS in its closing statements to the SBSTA- Paris 2015 and the SBI- Paris 2015 respectively, pointed out than the recent findings of the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) report on the science behind a long-term goal clearly supports the 1.5℃ as a global goal. In fact, the SED clearly found that a goal of limiting average global temperatures to 2℃ offers inadequate protection to the SIDS and the growing scientific evidence indicates that the 2℃ goal is inadequate (AOSIS 2015a).

Moreover, the AOSIS expressed disappointment in the final steps of the 2013-2015 Review Process (AOSIS 2015b). This process was formally set up by the COP to determine the adequacy of the long-term global goal and overall process made towards achieving that goal. Consequently, in its opening statement to the COP 21 in Paris, the AOSIS requested the following specific inclusions in the 2015 Paris Agreement:

(a) a limitation of temperature increases consistent with a below 1.5℃ global temperature goal;
(b) internationally legally binding, quantified mitigation commitments and five yearly common opportunities for Parties to review performance;
(c) financial support to the SIDS towards contributing to increases consistent with a below 1.5℃ global temperature goal;
(d) explicit recognition of the special needs and circumstances of SIDS;
(e) recognition that an international mechanism on loss and damage must be a central and distinct element of the Paris Agreement;
(f) climate change and adapting to its impacts will require significantly scaled-up, new, additional and predictable financial resources, starting from the minimum of USD $100 billion per year by 2020; and
(g) special provisions to enhance access by the SIDS, especially to public, grant-based support for adaptation (AOSIS 2015c).

The post Paris COP created an opportunity for AOSIS to do some needed stock taking in the context of the PA and country Parties' obligations and performance thereunder. In its report to the SBI at the COP 22, Morocco, the AOSIS expressed concern in many areas including its dismay that 13 Annex I Parties reported GHG emission levels in 2014 that exceeded their 1990 commitment - despite agreement by all Parties to strengthen temperature limitations under Decision 10/CP.21, and disappointment at the slow pace of the CDM, SCF and WIMLD reviews (AOSIS 2016). Such reviews, initiated by the COP, determined the effectiveness and efficiency of the CDM, SCF and WIMLD mechanisms. Significantly, in its report to the SBSTA at the COP 22, the AOSIS posited that Art 6 of the PA (the market mechanism) should enable incentives for all Parties to move towards quantified economy-wide emission reductions and limitation targets, and hopefully the new mechanism would generate a share of proceeds for adaptation in the range of 5%, up from the 2% now in place under the Kyoto Protocol.

However, with reference to Art 6 (8) of the PA (the non-market mechanism), the AOSIS believes that this work programme could begin with consideration of the following: (a) fossil fuel subsidy reform; (b) phasing out of inefficient and polluting technology; and (c) policy reform to create the enabling environment for increased deployment of renewable energy (AOSIS 2016a).

Complementing its earlier submissions to SBSTA and SBI at COP 22, the AOSIS, in its opening statement to the COP 22, focused its attention, inter alia, on developing the transparency framework of the PA in order to finish the rulebook, which will form the foundation for tracking progress towards achieving the long-term goals of the PA. This is especially critical for the full implementation of the NDCs. However, even though the PA recognizes the special circumstances of SIDS, including capacity constraints when it comes to accessing financing, the AOSIS submitted that it still needs "… simplified procedures to help SIDS and LDCs access their fair share of much needed resources … [since] for us, adaptation is a must." It appears that the AOSIS seemed more diligently focused on dealing with mitigation rather than adaptation matters.

The AOSIS further declared its intention to initiate the discussions on how the AF can serve the PA (AOSIS 2016 b: 2). In the context of an adaptation communication as required by Article 7 (10) of the PA, the AOSIS was of the view that any adaptation communication designed to achieve the global adaptation goal consistent with the global temperature goal of well below 2°C (Art 7, PA) and limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Art 2:1(a) PA; AOSIS 2017b), should facilitate the ability of the SIDS to reflect their priorities, implementation and support needs, and their plans and actions, without creating any additional reporting burdens. The global goal of adaptation consists of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal. The AOSIS, however, noted the following deficiencies: (1) there are currently no existing guidelines for preparing an adaptation communication; (2) unlike mitigation, no guidelines exist for the inclusion of adaptation in NDCs for countries choosing to do so; (3) the lack of relevant guidelines created a level of uncertainty for developing countries in the process of developing NAPs in preparation of their next national communications; and (4) there is a lack of, or limited funding for enhancing the existing reporting of the SIDS under the UNFCCC (AOSIS 2017).

As a result, the AOSIS reaffirmed that, even though Art 7 of the PA allows for a non-exhaustive list of elements, it is of the view that an agreed common set of elements that can be reflected across all possible reporting vehicles should be encouraged which would also provide a good basis for developing the adaptation component of the global stocktake. Consequently, the AOSIS submitted that it was abundantly clear that the SIDS were already communicating a plethora of adaptation information, primarily through the National Communications process, which was the most rigorous of existing reporting processes. Importantly also, is the NAPs process, which was fairly new, but had the potential for being similarly robust (AOSIS 2017). Further, the AOSIS viewed the global stocktake as a tool to take stock of where all Parties were on meeting the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2℃, and preferably below 1.5℃, bearing in mind that "[i]f the target is not achieved the cost of adaptation will increase significantly, even beyond the reach of many developing countries, many of whom are already struggling to adapt at current levels of [global] warming" (AOSIS 2017:3). Further, in AOSIS' view, adaptation communication provided an opportunity of bridging the gap with other existing processes addressing climate change adaptation issues, such as the SDGs.

In its submission to SBSTA at COP 23, Bonn, AOSIS reiterated its position in relation to market approaches to Art 6 of the PA. Specifically, AOSIS' priorities included delivering a share of proceeds to support the adaptation needs of particularly vulnerable developing country Parties, inclusive of methodologies to account for financial information under Article 9 (7) of the PA (AOSIS 2017a). In addition, the AOSIS also noted the support of the GCF in the formulation of NAPs and looked forward to funding being provided (AOSIS 2017b). Further, at the invitation of the COP, AOSIS also provided its views on the review of the SCF. In OASIS' view, the SCF should target building up the overall effectiveness of the biennial assessments (BA) and overview of climate finance flows and improve the MRV process and support beyond the BA. In this regard, the AOSIS considered the work of the SCF as important references for the development of modalities for the accounting and reporting of climate finance under the PA, particularly with respect to Articles 2 (1) (c), 9 (5), 9 (7), 13 (6), 13 (9) and 14 (1) of the PA (AOSIS 2017c). Additionally, AOSIS exhorted the SCF to focus its efforts on how disaggregated data can be generated to better reflect in what way and where climate finance flows, particularly to vulnerable countries, including SIDS and LDCs (AOSIS 2017c).

It is quite puzzling that post PA, the AOSIS were able to identify numerous fundamental deficiencies. The immediate question that arises is: *"What were the strategies of our negotiators?"* Additionally, it is a contradiction for the AOSIS to agree to such imposing fiduciary standards without the specific qualifying CBDR principle attached to every fiduciary provision, knowing its current capabilities. Additionally, *"Did our negotiators drop the ball?* and *"Were they duped or misled?* The recognition by the AOSIS, to which it is agreed, that it cannot adapt its way out of the climate change problem, and that developed county Parties were not meeting their mitigation commitments, should have redounded to a call for more adaptation by the AOSIS for the SIDS to fill the gap created by deficient mitigation. It is also puzzling that the AOSIS would agree to another CDM type system as a provider of CCAF for the SIDS knowing fully well that the current CDM collapsed and failed. It is difficult to fathom a rationale for agreeing to another market-based mechanism. *Were the AOSIS negotiators, supported, and at times sponsored by international environmental NGOs, pressured into such agreement? Who benefitted from the 'friendly' NGOs supporting our negotiators, the SIDS, or the*

EU? Would international environmental NGOs truly represent the SIDS? These are important questions to be answered by our negotiators so that a clear picture on what took place can be discerned.

In the result, the non-market measures provision within the PA that include mitigation solutions should have been seen as closing the loop around mitigation and excluding adaptation as a primary option for the SIDS. Additionally, the sources and the amount of the USD 100 bn floor by 2020, so far mobilized, are still unknown, and the amount required for CCA is still an unknown. Though Khan et al. (2020, 259) posited that even though such estimates are very difficult to establish, the UNEP estimated that adaptation costs could range from USD140 bn to US$300 bn per year by 2030, and between USD280 bn and USD500 bn per year by 2050 (UNEP 2016). The mobilization of USD100 bn a year both for mitigation and adaptation by 2020 is clearly not in line with these cost estimates.

Depending on who is speaking, the USD 100 bn has already been, or is close to being, or very far from being realized. Additionally, there has not been any real progress in determining the methodologies used to capture these funds and to track financial flows (Roberts et al. 2021). According to Colenbrander et al., (2018, 902-15) allocation of CCAF at the sub-national level is even more problematic. With these uncertainties, it remains unclear to us the extent to which USD100 bn has been realised. However, it is more than apparent that developed countries are recycling ODA as climate finance (Khan and Munira 2021), particularly since most of them have failed to meet their 0.7% of GDP, as transfers to developing countries. The list of deficiencies in the PA, as identified by the AOSIS, read like a déjà vu list, and brings into question the efficiency of our negotiators, their strategy(ies) going in, their red lines, inter alia. *Where was the noise post Paris? What international dominant discourse was constructed by the AOSIS, including CARICOM, on the failing of the PA and even the negotiators? Why didn't or why couldn't the AOSIS negotiate an adaptation finance goal which would strengthen the vulnerability status of the SIDS, or at least be able to construct it as a dominant discourse outside of the UNFCCC, if that had failed?* Consequently, it is difficult not to conclude that the only purpose the AOSIS served, leading up to, and at the

PA, was to provide voting numbers from the AOSIS that ensured binding commitments from the emerging economies of developing countries- China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Nigeria, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and oil producing states in general. As for the SIDS, there is nothing financially worthwhile therein for them, except promises, and more promises.

Table 1. 1 provides a summary of the key CCAF agreements over the period 2007-2019.

Table 1. 1: Summary of Key Climate Change Agreements that Relate to Adaptation Finance

Climate Change Agreements – Adaptation Finance	
COP 13/2007: Bali Action Plan • Adequate, predictable, and sustainable financial resources for CCF. • New and additional CCF resources for developing country Parties. • Innovative means of funding • mobilization of public and private-sector funding and investment.	**COP 20/2014: Lima Call to Action** • iNDCs and NAPs to become the foundation for adaptation actions. • Pledges towards the GCF went past the initial USD100 bn target. • GEF a co-financing ratio of at least USD 6 to USD 1. • CCAF will also be channelled through the SCCF and the LDCF.

Table 1. 1 *(continued)*

Climate Change Agreements – Adaptation Finance	
COP 16/2010: Cancun Agreements • A maximum temperature rise of 2° C above pre-industrial levels with lowering that to a maximum to 1.5°. • Establishing the GCF to provide climate change financing. • Predictable, new and additional finance approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012 for SIDS/LDCs.	**COP 21/2015: The Paris Agreement** • Linking financial flows to emission reductions. • GCF to simplify its funding and concept note proposal and template. • A new market-based mechanism as a source of climate finance. • More mitigation may mean less adaptation.

COP 17/ 2011: Durban Platform

- A new legal climate change agreement applicable to all Parties.
- Ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties.

COP 18/2012: Doha Gateway

- Raising CCAF for the SIDS, via the market-based 2% levy on the CDM.
- Concerns related to the sustainability, adequacy, and predictability of funding from the AF.

COP 22/2016:

- Financing loss and damage, like CCAF, will come from multiple sources.
- NDCs and adaptation comms linked to scaling up of adaptation finance.
- Strengthening the private sector's role in providing adaptation finance.
- Pledges are made under conditions of CCF uncertainties.
- Low technical capacity to design, develop, monitor, and evaluate projects and programmes.

COPs 23/2017; 24/2018; & 25/2019:

- The need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.
- Scaling up of increased private finance for adaptation.
- Limited access to CCAF from GCF

Table 1. 1 *(continued*)

Climate Change Agreements – Adaptation Finance
COP 19/2013: Warsaw Outcomes • Submission by all Parties iNDCs. • Update on mobilizing methodology for USD 100 billion by 2020. • Balance GCF allocation of adaptation and mitigation activities finance

1.5 Problem Statement

Climate change and its consequences are perhaps the most serious challenge to the SIDS in the 21st century. Notwithstanding an established financial mechanism (UNCFM) under the UNFCCC, there is a perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to inadequate and unpredictable CCAF for SIDS that is not new and additional, despite contributions through pledges and other financial instruments both public and private to the UNCFM, and decisions to fund mitigation and adaptation in a balanced manner. There are also a number of uncertainties surrounding key concepts relating to CCAF, in addition to changes over time that influence the provision of climate finance. Further, there is insufficient information on why this phenomenon occurs.

1.6 Research Objective

The objective of the research is to provide SIDS with an empirical understanding of key characteristics within the UNCFM to enable more informed decisions and negotiations towards accessing CCAF.

1.7 Research Questions

Main research question:

What characteristics, if any, contribute to the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional?

Secondary research questions:

(a) What relationships may have emerged during interactions among Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, surrounding the provision of CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional?

(b) What changes may have occurred within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, in determining priorities for CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional?

(c) To what extent, if any, does organization behaviour influence the actions of the UNCFM, in particular, the AF, GEF and GCF in the provision of CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional?

(d) To what extent, if any, does uncertainty surrounding key CCAF concepts contribute to the provision of CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional?

1.7.1 Previous Studies Search

The search for previous studies of the research topic comprised basic and advanced searches and various combinations of key elements of the research topic. The various combinations of the research topic included: (a) “climate change adaptation financing and small developing states”; (b) “climate change adaptation financing and small island developing states”; (c) “climate change adaptation financing or small island developing states”; (d) “climate adaptation finance and small island developing states”; (e) “climate adaptation finance and small developing states”; (f) “adaptation financing and small island developing states”; (g) “adaptation finance and small developing states”; (h) “adaptation financing and developing countries”; and (i) “adaptation financing and developing states”.

The databases searched included EBSCO's Academic Search Complete; EBSCO's GreenFile; EBSCO's ERIC; EBSCO's Environment Complete; EBSCO's CAB Abstracts; EBSCO's Caribbean Search; EBSCO's Index to Legal Periodicals and Books; EBSCO's MasterFile Premier; ProQuest' Dissertations & Theses Global; ProQuest' Social Sciences; UWI *linc* which covered the St Augustine Campus Library Catalogue, Catalogue of The University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus and Affiliated Institutions, Mona Campus Catalogue, St Augustine Campus Theses Abstracts and Faculty Research and Publications; Google Scholar; UWI Collections, Articles by Subject Fields and UWI Theses. The searches were limited to full text scholarly peer reviewed articles published from 2011 to year 2018. Search techniques included SmartText Searching and search modes included "Boolean"; "Find all my search terms"; "find any of my search terms"; guided style search with style boxes limited to "subject terms"; and search "all Text". Expanders were used, which included "apply equivalent subjects"; "apply related words" and "also search within the full text of the articles".

The searches yielded no direct results for studies on the topic even in its varied forms. However, three research papers closely associated the topic were found. The search using UWI *linc* yielded the following complimentary results: (a) a research article on "International financing for climate change adaptation in small island developing states" by Robinson and Dornan (2016, 1103-111); (b) "Financing climate change adaptation in small island developing states" by Morita Kanako, a paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA's) 50th Annual Convention, "Exploring The Past, Anticipating The Future", New York Marriott Marquis, New York City, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009; and (c) "Financing Architecture for Adaptation to Climate Change" by Morita Kanako (2001), a paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference "Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition", Le Centre Sheraton Montreal Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 16, 2011. Notably, a thesis on "Financing Systems for Climate Change Adaptation" Lessons from Case Studies in Samoa, Tuvalu and Vietnam" by Morita Kanako was made available through direct contact between the researcher and Ms. Morita Kanako. The researcher found Ms Kanako's thesis via her LinkedIn profile.

In order for the researcher to gain a preliminary assessment of the potential size and scope of available research literature, the scoping review method[28] was used which yielded hundreds of related results, some of which, after determining their close relevance to the research, formed part of the literature review, and literature informing aspects of the research. Those that formed the bulk of the literature material include a number of papers/articles/reports relating to:

(a) adaptation finance (38); (b) climate change adaptation (18);
(c) vulnerability and negotiations (33); (d) climate finance (52);
(e) adaptation fund (39); GEF (30); GCF (31); (f) climate change (16);
(g) climate justice (23); (h) climate change politics (19);
(i) global climate finance (28); (j) environmental justice (18);
(k) climate change mitigation (24); (l) uncertainty and methodologies (46).

1.7.2 Previous Studies and Deficiencies in Addressing the Problem

As pointed out above, three studies closely related to the topic were identified after a search of various databases. One study in particular, "Financing Systems for Climate Change Adaptation" focused on international institutions Global Environment Facility and ODA, especially financing systems that are effective at promoting climate change adaptation activities in Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vietnam. This study sought to create a new analytical framework, indicators, and case studies, as methods to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of existing financing systems (Morita 2012). A second study focused on identifying the requirement for an institutional framework as a method for coordinating adaptation financing that enhances the strengths and minimizes the weaknesses of GEF and ODA (Morita and Matsumoto 2014, 1). The third study, "International financing for climate change adaptation in small island developing states", used a mixed

[28] This method provides policy makers with a preliminary assessment of the potential size and scope of available research literature, and the extent to which a full systematic review is needed.

method approach which focused on trends in international adaptation financing commitments by the OECD to SIDS across multiple regions between 2010 and 2014 (Robinson and Dorman 2016, 1103- 1115). An examination of these various methods produced mixed results. The first two studies found, inter alia, that CCAF contributions from GEF and ODA to the SIDS were inadequate. The third study, however, found that while CCAF flows were inadequate, SIDS were not disadvantaged in receiving finance from OECD over the period compared to other developing countries (Robinson and Dorman 2016, 1103 - 1115).

Significantly, the three studies were all consistent in examining modalities of the various financial organizations within the international climate change regime (ICCR) while focusing little or no attention to human interactions such as the interrelationship between intersubjective understanding among actors, the behaviour of regimes, the influence of structure and power that make up those financial institutions located within the UNCFM, and expressed through the COP. The fact that these studies did not focus on the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, may have contributed to the provision of inadequate CCAF to SIDS, leaves open the question as to what extent certain actions of Parties within the UNCFM contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS. It is this gap that the researcher hopes to minimise during the research.

1.7.3 Research Gap

Little or no information about qualitative studies, grounded in IR, that examine perceptions of actors and the provision of CCAF to the SIDS within the UNCFM, from a constructivist perspective.

1.7.4 Research Contribution

The research demonstrated that:

- Constructivism provides ontological, epistemological, and methodological lens through which IR can be studied.

- IR theory(ies) is a suitable approach to study perceptions surrounding actors' actions within an international issue area.
- IR phenomena can be studied using a post structuralist qualitative methodology of interpretivism, which dispels the construct that there is an objective reality and actors' identities, and interests are exogenously given, leading only to a positivist methodology.
- Power, absolute gains, and relative gains are not only material, but are also expressed ideationally and textually, which can be examined empirically though constructivist lens, dispelling the notion that objective measurement is a *'sine qua non'* for empirical studies, and establishing at the same time the suitability of thick description via narrative inquiry as a means of explaining IR phenomena.
- As an approach to IR, constructivism closes the blind spot that game theoretic approaches, based on economic modelling (PD, Suasion, Stag Hunt) create by not modelling/gaming for subjective realities.
- The constructivist approach allowed actors within the UNCFM to recognize discursive power that contributed to the provision inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional.
- The constructivist approach allowed for a recognition that intersubjective understandings were only used within the UNCFM to exert collective agreements from the SIDS in pursuits of a benefit of the more powerful.
- Despite the consensus-based principles within the UNCFM, exemplified by an equal country representation governance mechanism, rational choice models such as institutional bargaining, hegemonic orders, functional approaches, and knowledge-power practices were central to the conduct of the more powerful.

1.7.5 Research Overview

The problematic of the inadequate and unpredictable nature of CCAF for the SIDS, notwithstanding an established UNCFM, results in difficulties in climate change adaptation since adaptation depends on external funding. This is due to the historical, and present fact, that the responsibility for providing adequate CCAF for SIDS lies with developed country Parties. Many SIDS are concerned that climate change is seemingly poised to overwhelm their development efforts and thus anticipate increased vulnerabilities to their populations. It is perhaps, and indeed difficult, to be otherwise convinced that the SIDS are not at the mercy of dominant inter and intra power relations, dominant discourse, mutually constituted interests, and mutually constructed identities within the UNCFM. These are matters that are best examined qualitatively. Unless an empirical data driven understanding of the problematic can be generated, the SIDS may not be able to use their collective power to influence a more adequate and predictable delivery of CCAF, that is new and additional.

1.7.6 Analysis and Implications for the Research

The science behind climate change is clear and points to anthropogenic interventions over centuries beginning with the industrial revolution. The indiscriminate exploitation of the earth’s resources without any concern for sustainable use, leading to intra and inter-generational insecurity, has left us with more than the required GHGs in the atmosphere for our survival, as humans. Consequently, the world’s climate is warming too fast, affecting in the process that balance between its assimilative and regenerative capacities. As a result, the SIDS, in particular, are experiencing increased temperatures, sea level rise, slow onset events, coral bleaching, increased desertification, reduced water supplies, crops devastation, inter alia, creating economic and security hardships among populations centres. In the result, many conflicts arose across the African and Asian continents, creating climate migrants, climate refugees and climate terrorists with devastating consequences for economic growth, globally and locally. However, the countries that suffer the most from climate change are the SIDS and LDCs. With specific relation to the SIDS, this is due to negative factors such as, high exposure to hazards physical remoteness, and a distant problem that may be beyond their control (Thomas et al. 2020, 1-27); limited access to resources, smaller functioning economic markets, indivisibility of overhead costs, and limited industrial activity

(Briguglio 1995, 1615-32; Briguglio 2014; Thomas et al. 2020, 1-27; Moncada et al. 2021, 1-10); high exposure to external shocks due to high reliance on external trade and dependence on a narrow range of exports, (Briguglio 2014; Moncada et al. 2021, 1-10). Obviously, his grave situation required a response.

In 1992, the UN responded with the establishment of the UNFCCC, a regulatory framework buttressed by economic and financial instruments. The view held and implemented by the developed countries was that the market can be used to regulate human conduct and the use of economic instruments will internalize environmental costs which are treated as external by market forces. The market-based approach as the mechanism to finance climate change solutions presents difficulties in the context of raising CCAF for the SIDS. Firstly, the market operates by valuing environmental resources and not necessarily environmental solutions. Therefore, a value is easily attached to GHGs which leads to mitigation actions, as a solution. It is however difficult to attach a value to slow onset events, sea level rise, coral bleaching and coastal erosion, which require adaptation as a solution. In the result, the Convention adopted the economic instrument of tradeable permits under the Kyoto Protocol, locking out lesser developing countries and the SIDS from participation, but making the SIDS depend on it, via the AF for CCAF. Of course, the SIDS cannot partake because they do not produce emissions that would attract tradeable permits. However, there are other economic instruments that could benefit the SIDS, such as charges and taxes, deposit and refund systems, performance bonds, subsidies, and liability and compensation for damage that did not make into the Convention as options for raising climate finance, particularity for the SIDS.

It is obvious that the developed countries intended to limit and control the sources of CCF. Further, the collapse of the CDM which operated under the Kyoto Protocol is a reflection of the volatility of market-based systems that depend on human conduct. Therefore, the CDM failed because developed country Parties did not meet their emissions commitments. Importantly, for some developed country Parties, tradeable permits operated as an opportunity for them to avoid their Convention commitments and engage in emissions efforts in countries with no targets. Guyana and Brazil are two examples of countries that entered into bilateral Redd + agreements with Norway.

Secondly, the use of financial instruments to raise CCAF for the SIDS, such as loans, co-financing ratios, leveraging, equity and guarantees, has shifted by necessity, the focus from public financing towards private financing. This shift to the private domain for capital financing does not align well with the fiscal challenges of the SIDS, which are underpinned by high vulnerability and low resilience (Briguglio 2009, 229-47), exposing SIDS to high exogenous economic shocks (Briguglio 2009, 229-47; 2014). As a consequence of SIDS' high vulnerability, the UN designated them "as a special group" (Thomas et al., 2020, 1-27). However, vulnerability in this context is complex for the SIDS, particularly since the same factors that are responsible for their uniqueness (natural environment, pristine coastal beaches, fresh water) which are critical to their national economies, such as tourism, fisheries and agriculture, are also impacted due to high vulnerability (Thomas et al., 2020, 1-27). Additionally, as pointed out by Mycoo (2021, 259-83) vulnerabilities among Caribbean SIDS worsen due to inadequate implementation of spatial development policies. To this end, Briguglio (1995, 2009, 2014) instead called for a vulnerability and resilience index as a specific measurement of a country's economic progress, and a lens through which policy intervention to increase resilience can be made. Importantly, Briguglio (2014, 3), also posited that small states, despite their vulnerability can be economically successful if they "… adopt policies conducive to good economic, social, political and environmental governance." Though not a direct response, Khan and Munira (2021, 3-4) seemed to imply that once adaptation is seen as a global public good, the need for a vulnerability index may no longer be necessary, due to the possibility of financial transfers based on causal responsibility. Further, Doshi and Garschagen (2020) submitted that CCAF is not only made available based on vulnerability data, as other considerations such as physical exposure and pre-existing ODA are also taken into consideration. Admittedly, the scale required for leveraging private capital is not available among the SIDS, particularly due to limited access to resources and smaller functioning economic markets (Briguglio

1995, 1615-32; Briguglio 2014; Thomas et al. 2020, 1-27; Moncada et al. 2021, 1-10). However, the researcher believes that the SIDS have fiscal space for receiving public and grant financing, but not for raising private capital.

Importantly, a large private capital portfolio within the SIDS - and this may well have to be a joint effort - amounts to a small investment globally with little international attraction. Consequently, because of their small economies and high fiscal risks, the SIDS, as a whole, do not attract venture type capital within its fiscal borders, particularly since its product - adaptation- is not considered a global public good and not one that can be commodified. In the result, the decision by the UNCFM to use financial instruments to raise CCAF has resulted in private capital being raised **for** the SIDS, and not **by** the SIDS. The obvious consequence is that their external debt portfolio will continue to deteriorate.

Finally, there has not been any submissions to the COPs by the AF, GCF or GEF or the COP itself, indicating a certain financial figure for adaptation and mitigation, which is very puzzling, to say the least. However, what seems certain, is the uncertainty of not having such a figure, after over three decades since the Convention. Importantly, planning for, and the raising of CCF, inclusive of the USD 100bn, without a clear financial target approved by the COP allows for manipulation of financial numbers by the developed county Parties and a false sense of the quantity of funding required for mitigation and adaptation. In the end, the researcher believes that the market-based approach through economic and financial instruments operate to prevent the provision of CCAF to the SIDS that is adequate and predictable. Moreover, the UNCFM should return to, and the AOSIS should press the argument for, the principle of providing public, grant based financing to the SIDS, in addition to more equitable economic instruments, giving its special status as a vulnerable group and its inability to meet the onerous market-based measures of the UNCFM.

1.7.7 Critical Issues of the Research

The critical issues to be addressed in this research include: (a) uncertainties surrounding key definitions of CCF terms; (b) uncertainties surrounding methodologies for estimating CCF; (c) the amount of CCAF required for CCA; (d) the sufficiency of the CCAF currently available; (e) the factors preventing the flow of CCAF to the SIDS; (f) the efficiency, or lack thereof, of the UNCFM in providing CCAF to the SIDS that is new and additional; (g) issues surrounding the provision of the USD 100 bn, as a floor, by 2020 for CCF; (h) the effects of the market based approach to raising CCF and its effect on the SIDS; (i) the diminishing role of public finance and its effect on the SIDS; (j) whether climate justice prevails for the SIDS; (k) why Parties conduct themselves in a manner that prevent the flow of adequate and predictable CCAF to the SIDS; (l) the effects of negotiation positions of the SIDS; and (m) how do the SIDS pivot to new strategies that would enable the flow of adequate and predictable CCAF.

1.8 Summary

This chapter situates the study within a background and context, emphasizing in that regard, the roles played by the UN and other bodies, especially UNCHE, UNCED, COP, CARICOM and AOSIS in contributing to the shaping of the UNCFM and ultimately its role in the provision of CCAF to SIDS. This chapter also provided a synthesis of the actions by these various bodies, tracing, inter alia, key turning points in the CCAF history and the disadvantages to the SIDS of market-based systems. Attention was also paid to the problem statement, the objective, research gap, research contributions and previous studies relating to the problem. The chapter concludes with the critical issues to be determined in the research, an analysis and implications for the research and the importance of examining the views other writers hold in relation to the provision of CCF to meet the challenges of climate change.

Chapter 2 reviewed the literature surrounding adaptation justice, CCF, CCA, CCAF, culminating with a Literature Review Matrix, while Chapter 3 examined the literature surrounding IR and IREs theories, settling with constructivism as best suited for the research. Chapter 4 detailed the conceptual framework of the study and its influence on methodology, data analysis, and analysis and interpretation of findings, while Chapter 5 concentrated on the multi methods approach used in the research, concluding with a methodological framework. Chapter 6 revealed the research findings and Chapter 7 gave an analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of those findings, answering the research questions in the process. Chapter 8 closed off the research with a conclusion and actionable recommendations for the SIDS, UNCFM and the AOSIS. Chapter 8 also suggested areas for further research and the researcher's final reflections.

The researcher will address and explicate these critical issues chapter by chapter beginning with the literature review.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC, COP and the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF.

2.1 Overview

To carry out this study, it was necessary to complete a critical review of the current literature relating to CCAF. The researcher analysed and offered a critique of the literature reviewed by developing a clear understanding of the discussions already taking place and adding to it theoretically and methodologically (Ravitch and Riggan 2012). The categories for the review were informed by the analysis of the background and context along with an exploration of the interconnectedness of climate change characteristics and their relationship to CCAF. As a result, four broad categories of literature were critically reviewed: (a) uncertainties in the climate change finance regime, (b) financing CCA, (c) mitigation is now the business of SIDS, and (d) adaptation finance governance. The literature surrounding uncertainties and its relation to the climate change finance (CCF) regime was reviewed to identify and relate some theoretical and methodological approaches to uncertainty, provide context to uncertainty in some important environments and to explore an economic perspective to uncertainty. The review of the literature on financing CCA provided an understanding of the challenges associated with CCAF in the public and private finance arenas, financing models, theories, and methodologies; while the review of literature relating to mitigation now being the business of SIDS, provided an understanding of the influence of concepts such as more mitigation means less adaptation, linking adaptation finance to mitigation performance, and integrating adaptation and mitigation measures. Finally, the literature on adaptation finance governance was reviewed to understand the organization of the COP, AF, GEF and GCF as UNCFM institutions, some history of adaptation negotiations and an understanding of adaptation governance concepts.

Further, to conduct this review, it was necessary to apply literature review methods most suitable to examining the literature surrounding CCAF. In this context, Grant and Booth, (2009, 91-108) sought to classify/create a taxonomy of methods for conducting literature reviews, including 'literature review' as one of the methods. Fourteen literature methods[29] were examined by Grant and Booth, however, only those of relevance to this research will be in focus. In their view, "[a]n effective critical review presents, analyses and synthesizes material from diverse sources … [it] provides an opportunity to 'take stock' and evaluate what is of value from the previous body of work. It may also attempt to resolve competing schools of thought" (93). Additionally, with this method, a researcher may omit to examine literature that does not accord with his/her world views, particularly since it is not an end point (97). Whereas systematic review seeks to pull together all available knowledge on a particular topic by systematically searching, appraising, and synthesising research data. However, this method is limited to a specific or a few specific studies (Grant and Booth 2009, 91-108; Snyder 2019, 333-339). On the other hand, scoping reviews provides policy makers with a preliminary assessment of the potential size and scope of available research literature, and the extent to which a full systematic review is needed. They share several characteristics of the systematic review in attempting to be systematic, transparent

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[29] Critical review, literature review, systematic review, meta-analysis, mixed methods review, overview, qualitative systematic review, rapid review, scoping review, state of the art review, systematic review, systematic search and review, systematized review and umbrella review.

and replicable, however, similar to critical reviews, they are open to researcher bias (Grant and Booth, 2009, 91-108). Notwithstanding, as will pointed out in a later chapter, bias in qualitative research is no longer viewed as a negative characteristic.

Snyder (2019, 333-339), while citing Grant and Booth (2009, 91-108), expounded on three literature review methods[30], and acknowledged that "[b]uilding your research on and relating it to existing knowledge is the building block of all academic research activities, regardless of discipline … [and] [a] literature review can broadly be described as a … systematic way of collecting and synthesizing previous research" (333) Snyder (2019, 333-339), in contrast to Grant and Booth (2009, 91-108), does not distinguish between systematic and synthesizing research. Accordingly, in cases where a more creative collection of data is required, "… an integrative review approach can be useful when the purpose of the review is not to cover all articles ever published on the topic but rather to combine perspectives to create new theoretical models" (334). In Snyder's view, systematic review identifies " … all empirical evidence that fits the pre-specified inclusion criteria to answer a particular research question or hypothesis" (334), while the semi-systematic review approach was designed for topics that have been conceptualized differently and studied by various groups of researchers within diverse disciplines which hinder a full systematic review process, generating in the process " … themes, theoretical perspectives, or common issues within a specific research discipline or methodology or for identifying components of a theoretical concept" (335). The integrative review method, also referred to as the critical review approach, is closely related to the semi-systematic review. Its aim is to assess, critique, and synthesize the literature on a research topic in a way that enables new theoretical frameworks and perspectives to emerge through the application of "advanced skills, such as superior conceptual thinking" (336) in examining the relationships between ideas, factors, and issues. In Snyder's view, truly integrative review contributes to advancing knowledge and conceptual and theoretical frameworks.

[30] Systematic, semi-systematic and integrative.

In the result, the literature review method used by the researcher can best be described as integrative, since it combines elements of critical, scoping, and semi-systematic literature review methods, suitable for multi and interdisciplinary research, such as this one. Importantly, the researcher did not use literature review as *the* method to answer the research questions, but more importantly, they were answered through the integration of the literature review, conceptual, theoretical and methodological frameworks, supported by the analysis, synthesis and interpretation of research findings.

Theories that impact the research, in particular the literature review, but which do not from part of the theoretical framework, merit discussion in this section since they offer an interpretation of the literature under review. In this context, the researcher recognized and identified the importance and contribution of several theorists to the study of post-colonial theory/post-colonialism, and to IR generally, particularly its connection to critical theory in the form of subaltern, dependency, and decolonized studies. Similar to constructivism, in some respects[31], post-colonial studies are part of a wide and varied universe of scholarship, expanding across many disciplines[32] within a post structuralist research agenda, whose thought[s] are "embedded in a reflection on its relation to other theoretical paradigms and social theories, [such as] poststructuralism, world-system theory, Marxism" and constructivism (Wilkens 2017, 1). Equally important, is an understanding that studies surrounding former colonies, merit a reference, even if not direct, on the negative consequences of colonization. Situated within an IRE agenda, my research approach does not lend to post-colonial/colonialism, as the main theoretical and interpretative plank, and thus it is not central. Those theories will be discussed in the next chapter. However, as inescapable it is within the context of the research, various aspects of post-colonial theory/post-colonialism will be referred to and incorporated throughout this thesis, beginning with the literature review. In that manner, its presence gives expression to the numerous

[31] Particularly, in the context of it not being "a *single* nor substantive theory" (Wilkens 2017, 2).

[32] Vivek Chibber responding to Gayatri Spivak in "Making Sense of postcolonial theory", 2014.

contributions of post-colonial theorizing in the field of IR, and more specifically, a better understanding of its impact on the provision of CCAF to SIDS and other developing nations. To give effect, reference shall be made to the writings of scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Leon Sealey-Huggins, Sanjay Seth, Jan Wilkens, Lufti Hamadi, Guyatri Spivak, inter alia.

Citing Bhabha, Chakrabarty (2012, 1-18) postulated that "[p]ositive global relations depend on the protection and enhancement of … national "territorial" resources, becom[ing] part of the "global" political economy of resource redistribution and a transnational moral economy of redistributive justice" (6). However, the unevenness of post-colonial development, aggravated by climate change, now renders limited resources, even more limited, resulting in significant privations for the subaltern classes, global inequities, and the resulting negative impact of the provision of CCAF to SIDS. These subalterns, he argued, whether 'inside' (deprived citizens) or 'outside' (migrants, refugees and asylum seekers) exist in such conditions due to the absence of climate justice, which has triggered a somewhat new emphasis on post-colonial studies. Consequently, in the writings of Wilkens (2017) it is not difficult to conclude that hegemony and the subaltern should be viewed as coexistential, particularly since the "fabricated image" of the Orient (Elze 2018, 156-65) also resulted in leading to Orientals writing against themselves, due to cognitive subjugation. Importantly, Chakrabarty (2012, 1-18), is linking the human condition at the individual and national levels to the effects of colonization, globalization, global warming, climate change and the universalist view that humans are entitled to global justice and equal rights everywhere.

Further, "[t]he ascription of a geological agency to humans is a comparatively recent development in climate science" (Chakrabarty 2012, 10). Consequently, the theoretical proliferation of the term 'anthropocene', postulates the way human actions geologically produce lastingly effects on the shape of the planet, while at the same time, "… deploying a notion of a general humanity, which tends to disregard the unequal contributions various regions have made to this planetary age" (Elze 2018, 160). However, this development unsurprisingly translates into mitigation as a global response to climate change, led and dictated by the global powers who are particularly concerned with the human impact in their territories, or, as Mikulewicz (2020, 1807-30), citing Chandler and Reid (2016) puts it, adaptation "… has evolved [from] its original concern with transforming the external world to the transformation of the adaptive capacities of the subject" (6). It is not difficult to therefore recognize that this movement also lessens efforts in adaptation and reduces resources for the provision of CCAF to SIDS.

In support, Sealey- Huggins (2017, 2444-63) argues Caribbean indebtedness "… is traceable to relations of colonialism and imperialism" (2445). Paradoxically, the wealth generated from financed industrialization which led to climate change-inducing emissions now poses an existential threat to Caribbean societies, whose economies suffered forced restructuring along a neoliberal pathway, post-independence. The marketization and financialization, for profit, of climate change in favour of a small elite whose interests become the universal interests of all humans, referred to as "hegemonic control" by Wilkens (2017, 13), are continuations of the unequal relations established under imperialism and colonialization, hence the dominant climate financial models, underpinned by the logics of unlimited economic growth and unchecked global inequality, also pose a threat to climate justice (Sealey- Huggins 2017, 2444-63). Indeed, climate justice for the Caribbean is made even more difficult by processes which Sealey Huggins (2017, 2444-63) called carbon imperialism. These include activities such as carbon offsets and target-based diplomacy which rely on unequal global power relations to brand consumption in the global North as 'carbon-neutral', subscribing, in the process, to the powerful neoliberal subject-making concepts such as adaptation and resilience (Mikulewicz 2020, 1807-30).

Importantly, focussing on temperature targets, also known as technocratic universalism, or technocratic solutions as Mikulewicz (2020, 1807-30) calls it, obscures any emphasis on the resource-intensive models of capitalist development that are responsible for climate change, while concomitantly, the social relational structure which encourages excess emissions, is stymied. However, in response, climate justice movements argue that it would be impossible to solve climate change by using the same logics (unequal, colonial, economic and social power relations) that cause the problem in the first place. Therefore, the focus should be on societies being reorganized more equitably (Sealey- Huggins (2017, 2444-63).

On the other hand, Mikulewicz (2020, 1807-30), against the backdrop of his research on an adaptation project in São Tomé and Príncipe, jointly implemented by the UNDP and the national government, makes a compelling submission, when he posited "[t]he imaginative geography of the Global South's vulnerability and the associated discursive violence inflicted on its people run the risk of entrenching them in a position of political, financial, technical, and technological subordination relative to the Global North" (39). In his view, if discursive adaptation measures as prescribed by Western agents of development are not followed, the loss of lives and livelihoods becomes inevitable. A sort of gloom and doom situation, "… underpinned [by] the idea that only great powers matter" (Wilkens 2017, 9). Citing Evans and Reid (2013, 83-98), Mikulewicz (2020, 1807-30) noted that this powerful recourse to discursive violence operates to securitize climate change to the benefit of the Global North, by imaging adaptation as a form of Foucauldian biopolitics. However, in its attempt to protect the vulnerable subjects, the existing adaptation regime, described by Sealey-Huggins (2017, 2444-63) as asymmetrical and imperialist, ends up subjugating the subalterns and diminishing their autonomy in the process. In this context, one can readily relate the Global North's prevalence for delivering CCAF via projects – most of which fits into a 'one size fits all' template, with pre-conditional terms linked to ODA and, as Mikulewicz (2020, 5) advances, "… moulded to fit the business-as-usual, neoliberal articulations of local development in the Global South."

The use by the global North of imaginative geographies to create a necessity for mitigation as the solution to climate change is justified by imagining it as a survival contest between humanity, on the one side, and global climate change as the enemy, on the other. After all, it was Said (2003; 1978) who argued that "orientalism" was an arbitrarily constructed ontological and epistemological geographical difference expressed as the West and the Orient, asserting the former's political, economic, intellectual, and cultural superiority over the latter. In support, Wilkens (2017, 5) submits that this binary production of a distinction between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’, “… exemplifies how knowing turns into a mode of domination through the construction of the “other.” Notably, climate justice activists, in pursuit of financial reparations and equity, dispute the notion that all humanity are equally vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. By extension, and similar to the orientalizing of development in the Global South due to its vulnerability, adaptation to climate change, like mitigation, is similarly orentialized.

However, the epistemology surrounding adaptation projects can be considered as discursive violence, understood in Gramscian and Foucauldian terms as a clash of often contradictory discourses competing for ontological and epistemological hegemony (Mikulewicz 2020, 1807-30), even though it is best expressed by Spivak (1988) as epistemic violence which deprives the subaltern of agency through the undermining of non-Western knowledge and naturalization of Western superiority and dominance. Spivak (1988), in asserting that the subaltern cannot speak, argued that the subtext of narrative imperialism should be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge’, disqualified, and located low down on the knowledge hierarchy scale and beneath the required level of cognition. It was in this environment that the voice of the ‘other’ was given expression, and to that extent, “… certain varieties of the … elite are at best native informants for first-world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other” (78). Though Chibber (2014, 617-24), citing Ranajit Guha, castigates the Indian bourgeoisie for failing to integrate the subaltern domain with that of the elites, and achieve the same benefits of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe, following Spivak’s reasoning, one can readily recognize that discursive violence in this iteration is perpetrated against the Global South as a vulnerable group, and the SIDS as a special vulnerable group, requiring adaptation, and hence the West's tight grip on climate science and all that flows from it, including material violence which limits the provision of CCAF. In sum, many in the Global South, and SIDS in particular, “… are represented and approached by the development sector in a very particular mode that denies them their agency to meaningfully participate in adaptation planning, implementation and monitoring without external help” (Mikulewicz 2020,12), in similar fashion to the powerful colonizer who ignored their cultures, histories, values, and languages, while imposing a language and culture on them in their pursuit to dominate (Hamadi 2014).

In his post-colonial critique of mainstream IR, Seth (2011, 167-83) concludes that "… postcolonial theory has been especially sensitive and attentive to the many circumstances in which knowledges born in Europe are inadequate to their non-European object" (182). Or, put another way, a central aspect of postcolonial studies is "… to disrupt the hegemonic discourses that reproduce truths based on European experiences" (Wilkens, 2017, 4). In support of his conclusion, Seth challenged the centrality accorded to Europe as the historical source and origin of the international order, questioned whether the normative European construct, which reflects and reproduces power relations characteristic of the colonial encounter are universal in nature, and queries the epistemological privilege accorded to an understanding of knowledge. Thusly, Seth (2011, 167-83) argued that the 'international' contestations over epistemology, power, and resources reflect a desire to problematize and not simply naturalize historical and existing meanings. This desire, or a need for such a desire, to problematize and even destabilize current presumptions is central to the fight for SIDS to receive adequate and predictable CCAF. The researcher is of the view that Seth (2011, 167-83) impliedly rebuffed the Watson-Bull narrative that decolonization ended the undisputed dominance of European powers. Instead, he asserted the role that Europe's brutal imperialist colonial system played in ushering in the 'modernized' world, riddled with inequalities that benefit the Global North, due to naturalizing existing histories and meanings.

The effect of colonialism is still constitutive of what is now called the modern world, and a post-colonial examination can assist in identifying its defects and offer solutions for curing it. Citing Anderson in *Imagined Communities*, Seth (2011) submitted that nationality and nation were artefacts, particularly since culture, civilisation, language, and other features used to define 'a people' never, in fact, corresponded to the nations which constitute the international order. To be successful, the nation-state invention had to become a creative and coercive process. This process of reimagining led to Uyghurs becoming Chinese, Catalans into Spaniards, and Hindus, Muslims, Gujaratis and Bengalis, as Indians. He therefore makes the point that, though some success can be claimed, most of the modern nation states and the essential value system of its peoples had to be constructed, to the extent that "… the free, equal, rational and unitary individual presumed by the social sciences as an incontestable fact is no such thing; [and] like the nation and state, s/he is a product of processes and discourses" (180). Consequently, the mode of processes and discourses, as an output of creation/construction, finds itself dominated by the Global Northern nation-states, albeit artificial in nature. To that extent, adaptation finance when viewed through those lenses denies SIDS their "… agency to meaningfully participate in adaptation planning, implementation and monitoring without external help" (Mikulewicz 2020, 1807-30). However, note should be taken of Elze (2018, 158) who argued that because postcolonial theory wrongly expected "… socio-cultural and economic development to progress isomorphically towards the eventual instalments of identical values, subjectivities, and societies … - a focus on individualism - ample room was left for "… 'otherness' to assert itself in an asynchronicity of technology, capitalism, democracy, rule of law, and humanism", which in turn empathised with the doctrine of neoliberalism and its market based focus. The net result is a market-based climate change financial system that is dominated by the nations of the global North.

In the conduct of this review under the four broad areas, the researcher used professional journals, dissertations, books, and reports. These sources were accessed through the databases mentioned in Chapter 1. Throughout the review, the researcher attempted to point out theories, important gaps and methodologies. The researcher also examined debates, arguments and themes discerned from the review. In addition, relevant contested areas and issues were identified and discussed, including theoretical and methodological approaches that related to decision making under conditions of uncertainty, measuring perceptions of uncertainty, (in) applicability of probability theories, the economics of uncertainty, some key sources of and response to uncertainty, various approaches and schools of thought to uncertainty, and the management of uncertainty. Each section of the literature review closed with an analysis that focused on research implications. The interpretive summary that concluded the chapter illustrated how the literature informed the researcher's understanding of the material and how the material links to the theoretical frame of the study and contributed to the ongoing development of the study's conceptual framework.

2.2 Uncertainty in the Climate Change Finance Regime

2.2.1 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches and General Characteristics

In a classic study on characteristics of the environment and perceived environmental uncertainty, Duncan (1972, 313-327) conducted research among mid to lower-level organizational staff, comprising twenty-two decision groups in three manufacturing and three research and development organizations. The aim was to identify the characteristics of the environment that contribute to decision makers experiencing uncertainty. According to Duncan (1972, 313) the interpersonal relations of members and their interactions with each other make up the internal environment, whereas the interactions of other individuals, groups and organizations make up the external environment. Consequently, Duncan defined the environment as the totality of physical and social factors taken directly into consideration in the behaviour of decision makers in the organization (314).

The environment comprised two dimensions. The simple-complex dimension, defined as the number of factors taken into consideration in decision-making and the static-dynamic dimension, characterized by the degree to which these factors in the decision-unit's environment remain the same or change continually (Duncan 1972, 313). Duncan's research found that decision makers within dynamic complex environments experienced the greatest amount of uncertainty in decision making. Consequently, uncertainty is least when decision-making exists in a simple environment where factors are relatively unchanging and accessible. Finally, uncertainty is significant where decision makers have more difficulty in obtaining information because of the continued changing nature of the factors. Based on his research and, after examining various definitions of uncertainty by information theorists such as Attneave (1959), Gardner (1962), and decision theorists such as Knight (1921), Luce and Raiffa (1957), and Lawrence and Lorch (1967), Duncan, using his scale, identified three key components of uncertainty for measurement: (a) lack of information regarding the environmental factors; (b) not knowing the outcome of a specific decision in terms of how much the organization would lose if the decisions were incorrect; and (c) inability to assign probabilities with any degree of confidence. This is different from Milliken (1987, 136), who defined uncertainty as “an individual's perceived inability to predict something accurately”. However, Duncan believed the study of uncertainty should relate to the various decisions of the specific components of the internal and external environment.

According to Jauch and Kraft (1986, 777-790), Duncan’s study ignored the objective properties of the environment and, as a result, relied only on perceptions of the environment. The authors expressed the belief that that part of the environment, which is not observed and treated, may also influence decision making. In fact, Jauch and Kraft (1986) created a model of environmental uncertainty and argued, inter alia, that some managers make decisions that result in the creation of environmental uncertainty and that there is a relationship between objective environmental uncertainty and perceived environmental uncertainty. For example, their reference to “social and physical phenomena” (784) as elements of the objective environment form part of Duncan’s key components of his perception of uncertainty. However, Milliken (1987, 133) posited that there was a lack of any clear evidence of objective characteristics of the organizational environment and perceptions of environmental uncertainty.

Significantly, Downey et al. (1975, 613-629), found surprisingly disappointing results while using Duncan’s (1972) uncertainty scale among mid to lower-level organizational staff which formed his key research grouping. In his research, Downey et al. (1975, 613-629) found that perceived environmental complexity might be inversely related to perception of uncertainty, which is quite opposite to Duncan’s findings which stated that, the more complex factors considered by decision makers are, the higher the level of uncertainty. In the view of Downey et al. (1975, 613-629), uncertainty concepts as presently used in organization theory involve much ambiguity and they noted, contrary to Duncan (1972, 313-327), that the measurement of perception of uncertainty should be viewed as a psychological trait rather than an environmental one. On the other hand, Bourgeois (1985, 548-573) used a modified version of Duncan's uncertainty scale to measure for perceived uncertainty amongst workers at the strategic-executive level. Bourgeois (1985, 548-573) found, inter alia, that if uncertainty is in fact an accurate manifestation of the actual situation, reducing it might result in an undesired effect. Based on Bourgeois' research, firms should only reduce uncertainty under stable environmental conditions, since it is quite possible that uncertainty may be functional in an unstable environment, particularly at the strategy-making level of the organization.

Similarly, Andrews (2008, 25-50) in his research sought to examine for perceptions of uncertainty among managers from different local government departments across the public sector as opposed to private corporations. In this context, the author suggested that his results are generalizable to some extent. Drawing on the literature on environmental complexity and dynamism (Duncan 1972; Downey 1975; Bourgeois 1985) the author developed and tested a model of the organizational characteristics and outcomes associated with perceptions of environmental uncertainty and posited, thusly, that higher perceptions of uncertainty encourage public sector managers to pay significant attention to strategies, structures and policies that are likely to improve organizational performance. Consequently, the performance of local government departments is positively influenced by perceived external political uncertainty.

On the other hand, Milliken, (1987, 133-142) in contrastingly different terms, argued for a re-examination of perceived environmental uncertainty by way of a literature review, hypothesizing that it was the failure to differentiate between 'state', 'effect' and 'response uncertainty' of perceived environmental uncertainty that may have resulted in misunderstandings in past results. Accordingly, these three types of perceived environmental uncertainty are quite prevalent where there are perceived threats to the environment. In Milliken's view (1987, 133-142) the different types of perceived environmental uncertainty ought to be measured separately in order to provide more correlated results. The author did state, however, that Duncan (1972, 313-327) seemed to have measured for the three different types of perceived uncertainty. However, Milliken (1987, 133-142) in this research, did not validate his views by measuring any or all of his three types of perceived uncertainty.

Interestingly, Elenkov (1997, 287-302) agreeing with Milliken's definition of perceived environmental uncertainty went on to suggest that where a sector is of significant importance, that sector "… translates perceived environment uncertainty into strategic uncertainty" (288). Using an adapted version of the scale developed by Miles and Snow (1978) as a multidimensional measurement tool, Elenkov (1997), applying a personal interview method on a sample of 141 business companies operating in a highly constrained environment, found that the combination of perceived environmental uncertainty and sector importance generates an interest in decision makers scanning events to perceive external trends and events, in order to reduce strategic uncertainty. Importantly also, is that the scanning mode used by decision makers is influenced by the perception of strategic uncertainty across all sectors (Elenkov 1997; Daft 1986; Daft 1988). In Elenkov's view "[p]erceived environmental uncertainty is the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information which has already been obtained" (1997, 288). Therefore, where decision makers lack confidence that they understand what the major trends are or are unable to assign probabilities to the likelihood of an event occurring, perceived environmental uncertainty exists.

Saunders et al. (2014, 467-478), against the backdrop of a cross sectional qualitative exploratory study, based on the semi structured in-depth interview method of project management practitioners from several large-scale projects in civil nuclear and aerospace companies, developed what they called the "uncertainty kaleidoscope" as a means of identifying the sources of uncertainty in safety-critical projects and offered approaches that decision makers can use to attenuate the level of uncertainty.

In reviewing the literature, Saunders et al. (2014, 467- 478), identified the sources of uncertainty and categorized them into five perspectives: environmental; individual; complexity; information and temporal. Firstly, the sources of the environmental perspective include turbulence in the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Duncan 1972), competing and conflicting stakeholder demands (Ward and Chapman 2008; Jensen et al. 2006; Aaltonen 2011) and institutional norms and decision-making processes (Chapman and Ward 2002; Jensen et al. 2006). Secondly, the sources of the individual perspective include: internal state of knowledge or understanding (Kahneman and Tversky 1982); uncertain state of mind in response to triggers in the external environment (Milliken 1987); a state of uncertainty exists in the mind of the person who doubts (Head 1967); bounded rationality and the fallacy of rational decision making (March and Simon 1958; Kahneman and Tversky 1982); and a recognition that different psychological profiles perceive uncertainty in different ways (Madsen and Pries-Heje 2009).

Thirdly, the sources of the complexity perspective were identified as functional requirements of the product (Danilovic and Sandkull 2005; Madsen and Pries-Heje 2009); technology choice (Danilovic and Sandkull 2005); diversity of actors and stakeholders (Ward and Chapman 2003; Atkinson et al. 2006; Jensen et al. 2006; Reymen et al. 2008); and inherent project complexity including feedback loops, instability and emergent system properties (Cleden 2009; Osman 2010; Winch 2010). Fourthly, the sources of information perspective were identified as incomplete and imperfect information (March and Simon 1958; Harrison 1992); lack of knowledge or understanding (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Smithson 1989; Cleden 2009; Bedford 2009); incomplete understanding of cause-and-effect relationships (Milliken 1987); and inability to estimate accurately (Ward and Chapman 2003).

Finally, the sources of the temporal perspective include the stage of the project lifecycle (Atkinson et al. 2006; Kolltveit and Gronhaug 2004; Ward and Chapman 2003); project tempo and timescale (Cleden 2009); and project turbulence-rate of change on projects, timing of changes, and direction of changes (Weick 1995). Contrastingly, Samsami et al. (2015, 215-229) without any reference to Saunders et al. (2014, 467- 478) attempted in their study to classify the main issues and controversies surrounding environmental uncertainty from the point of view of strategic management. Accordingly, Samsami et al. (2015, 216) are of the view that "[i]t is clear that the ultimate goal of studying uncertainty in organization is to face it in the choice of appropriate strategies". They submit that the concept of environmental uncertainty emanates from various perspectives and is generally presented by psychologists and economists. Samsami et al. (2015) sought to distinguish between uncertainty and risk, where uncertainty is the gap between what we know and what we need to know in order to make correct decisions.

2.3 Uncertainty in the Climate Change Environment

Without any referencing to Duncan (1972, 313-327), Downey (1975) or Milliken (1987), Brugnach et al. (2008, 1-16), recognizing that uncertainty had become an increasingly important subject in natural resources management, argued for a recontextualization of uncertainty analysis relative to its role, meaning, and relationship with actors in the decision-making process. The authors used a relational approach, as opposed to the traditional probabilistic ones, since, in their view, multiple parties of diverse backgrounds reflecting "… a spectrum of opinions, expectations, experiences, values and forms of knowledge must be accommodated" (2) within the context of natural resources management. The relational approach to uncertainty operates where uncertainties are recontextualized in a broader manner relative to their role, meaning and relationship with actors in decision making. In Brugnach's view, the perception of uncertainty has therefore changed. Uncertainty is now an acceptable fact and decision makers need to find ways of adjusting their management techniques to adapt to unexpected conditions. Brugnach et al. (2008, 1-16) further argued that uncertainty might be reduced using concepts such as persuasive communication, dialogical learning, negotiation and opposition modes of action giving rise to a better description and understanding of the situation.

In this regard, Brugnach et al. (2008, 1-16) suggested that such concepts push understanding and solutions beyond the traditional single view approach to one that is multiple and relational. This is particularly relevant in the context of natural resources management where multiple perspectives compete for equal attention.

Notably also, Lempert et al. (2004, 1-9) posited that significant socioeconomic and scientific uncertainties affect climate change policy making within the UNFCCC and that some IPCC contributors have resorted to probability-based distributions to characterize uncertainties in the climate change arena. To avoid the limitations of probability-based methods, decision-making under conditions of uncertainty ought to avoid depending on expert consensus based on probabilities, which Lempert calls the 'predict-then-act' approach (Lempert 2004, 2). As an alternative, he suggests giving heightened attention to the 'assess-risk-of-policy' approaches, which may provide climate-change decision makers with a firmer foundation for action in this contentious and deeply uncertain policy realm. The assess-risk-of-policy approach envisions a procedure where uncertainties minimally affect policy options due to the application of a small probability factor to assess the risk of choosing such a policy (Lempert 2004, 5). Similarly, Dessai and Hulme (2004, 107-28), posited that climate change prediction is important because of the central role it plays in guiding adaptation policy (Dessai and Hulme 2004, 107-28). In this regard, any probability assessment of climate change is likely to be subjective, conditional and provisional due to reflexive human behaviour - which essentially means varied type of human actions explicitly influenced by information. To counter this apparent difficulty, Dessai and Hulme (2004, 107-28) suggested that a combination of scenario-based and probability-based methods would provide a more desirable outcome relevant to climate change decision making.

Meanwhile, Dessai and Sluijs (2007, 1-97), in their scoping study on 'Uncertainty and Climate Change Adaptation', identified two main decision making frameworks: (1) the predictive top-down approach which began by exploring the accumulation of uncertainty from emission scenarios - from carbon cycle response, to global climate response, to regional climate scenarios - that together produced a range of possible local impacts in order to quantify what needs to be anticipated; and (2) the resilience bottom-up approach that looked at the impacted system and how resilient or robust this system was to changes and variations in climate variables and how adaptation can make the system less prone to uncertain and largely unpredictable variations and trends in the climate.

Assessing these two frameworks against three levels of uncertainty: statistical, scenario and recognized ignorance, Dessai and Sluijs (2007, 1-97) concluded that predictive top- down approaches are more compatible with statistical uncertainty, whereas resilience bottom-up approaches are strong in coping with recognized ignorance. They recommended a combination of both top-down and bottom-up approaches so that a decision-making strategy would be generated based on a wide range of economic, political and cultural factors necessary for a more accurate analysis of a plausible climate change future in an uncertain environment. Further, Dessai et al. (2009, 64-78) in answering the question whether a lack of accurate climate prediction represents a limit to adaptation, suggested that an approach focused on a robust decision-making regime with multiple representations of the future is more likely to succeed, rather than basing decision making on a single set of probabilistic distributions that determine accuracy of climate models.

However, Kettle and Dow (2016, 579-606) conducted a quantitative study using a web-based questionnaire to examine how planners' perceptions of risk, uncertainty and trust, over a 10-15-year planning horizon, were related to support for CCA planning in the U.S. coastal communities of Alaska, Florida and Maryland, particularly the allocation of human and financial resources for local level adaptation strategies that address climatic impacts. Though the authors did not suggest their findings were of general application, several climatic similarities appear between the U.S. coastal communities and the SIDS that invite serious considerations of their findings. The authors found that social and psychological factors are relevant because coastal communities are at peril to first-order risks which include increases in temperature, extreme precipitation, intense hurricanes and coastal storms, and relative sea level rise, leading to second-order risks such as permanent and episodic flooding, loss of coastal habitat, saltwater intrusion, coastal erosion, public health impacts, economic loss, beach and dune loss, wetlands and ecological loss and damages to infrastructure and property.

Kettle and Dow (2016, 579- 606) also identified climate and non-climate uncertainties. Accordingly, climate uncertainties include projections of first-order impacts, which remain unknown, and non-climate uncertainties include knowing what actors and institutions will be involved in, such as coastal management, predictability of budgets, population growth and development, the political environment, cost and availability of insurance, stakeholder values and priorities, and changes in state and local coastal policies. The authors found, in the first instance, a higher level of perceived risk and trust in scientists both significantly increase the odds of a higher level of support for the development of, and allocation of resources for CCA strategies. Secondly, they found that uncertainties in the decision-making process were negative to the development of a plan. Thirdly, they observed that a higher level of climate-related uncertainties did not significantly decrease the odds of a higher level of support for CCA, however, disaggregation of planners across levels of management revealed that a higher level of uncertainty is correlated to a lower level of support for CCA, among local planners.

2.4 An Economic Perspective to Uncertainty

From an economic perspective, Ferrari-Filho and Conceição (2005, 579-594) identified two approaches to uncertainty: (a) a post Keynesian approach which demonstrates that, in an uncertain and unknown world, economic agents prefer to retain money rather than make investment decisions and (b) an institutionalist approach, where the belief is held that the economic environment has nothing to do with the notion of equilibrium and that money is a fundamental institution of the capitalist system because it disrupts the preferences and actions of economic agents. In both approaches, the underlying and common factor is the concept of uncertainty, which links them together. Ferrari-Filho and Conceição (2005, 579-594) argued that uncertainty is the fundamental element of Keynes' monetary theory and the institutionalists' view. From a Keynesian perspective, uncertainty is a phenomenon whose probability cannot be calculated leaving people ignorant about the future. The probability of an uncertain event does not exist, in contrast to the term 'risk', where the probability distribution of the event is known. Accordingly, Ferrari and Conceição (2005, 579-594) point out that our desire to hold money, as a store of wealth, is an expression of our distrust in future economic trends leading to the adoption of conventions as a partial solution to the problem of uncertainty, occasioning the volatility of investment and, consequently, the rationality of liquidity preference. This in turn causes fluctuations in effective demand and unemployment. Uncertainty is therefore the reason why people retain money. Similarly, institutionalists see uncertainty playing a crucial role in a capitalist economy because economies and economic agents operate in historical rather than logical timelines. Consequently, conventions and institutions are important because they shape the behaviour, habits, and preferences of economic agents concerning expectations and confidence (Ferrari and Conceição 2005, 579-594), all of which operate under conditions of uncertainty.

2.5 Analysis and Research Implications

The concept of uncertainty has evolved to mean different things to different researchers depending on their methods, units of analysis and sample populations. There is no one size fits all when it comes to making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Consequently, the general characteristics, particularly the predict-then-act approach associated with probabilistic theories and underpinned by measurement, are unsuited for the CCAF regime. In fact, probabilistic modelling excludes the human factors, the subjective factors and the actual evidence on the ground when it comes the SIDS. While agreement that probabilistic approaches may suit predicting climate change events that lead to adaptation interventions, they are unsuited to predict CCAF for the SIDS. In support, the nature of uncertainty behaviourally is cognitive and therefore approaches such as, the assess-of-risk policy, is more in keeping with the intersubjective nature of human interactions, supported by persuasive communication, negotiation and dialogical learning, as methods for understanding and reducing uncertainty.

The researcher does not support the ‘data and capacity scare’ that pervades the discourse in relation to the SIDS. Further, an assessment of the risk approach is linked to bottom-up methods which would provide, inter alia, information about the cause-and-effect relationships within the SIDS that are relevant to adaptation solutions. Consequently, a disservice is being done to the SIDS by not focusing on bottom-up approaches, which should include local knowledge, local data sets, community data partnerships, and data recording and extraction. Uncertainty about predicting science driven adaptation impacts and measures should not, *a fortiori*, result in uncertainties surrounding CCAF for the SIDS, once the data is assembled and processed. It is also important to remember that the Convention provided for Parties to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty by using the best available scientific knowledge, which was qualified by the PA to include, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems. Therefore, let the data from the SIDS drive the process of identifying and quantifying CCAF. This would mean national bottom-up data and knowledge capture, and regional integration and data assessment production. It also means that the data must drive the actions of the negotiators, negotiations, and influence the involvement of the private and community-based sectors in providing CCAF.

While admitting that, at the top of the bottom-up approach, there is no certainty that the management of the financial systems within the UNCFM will take on an assess-the-risk-approach, or a relational approach when dealing with allocating CCAF to the SIDS. The fact that uncertainty is so varied a concept, difficult to measure, difficult to define with precision and still necessary in the context of CCA, there is every likelihood that agents would use its fragility as a benefit to themselves, hence the absence of an international ‘agreed to’ figure for CCAF. Uncertainty is here to stay; however, the SIDS must use its knowledge and science to arrive at the financing required for CCAF. To this end, their efforts at reducing uncertainty at the local and national levels will more than likely attract the private sector into a less risky environment**,** reduce political risks at local and national levels, reduce uncertainty surrounding pledges of CCAF**,** while widening the fiscal space within the SIDS in the process. However, if the level of uncertainty remain as is, it will limit the capabilities of Parties within the UNCFM, along a full performance spectrum, in the provision to the SIDS of adequate and predictable CCAF that is new and additional.

2.6 Financing Climate Change Adaptation

2.6.1 Overview

Financing CCA for the SIDS with funds that are adequate and predictable and new and additional is interconnected to the interrelatedness of CCA and CCF. One of the anticipated outcomes of the interrelated and interconnected nature of CCA, in the context of the SIDS, is that it will result in CCAF that will be adequate, predictable and new and additional. However, there is recognition that CCF spans a wide and complex field of actions and uncertainties resulting in theoretical and methodological hurdles to the provision of CCAF to the SIDS. Further, perceptions surrounding actions of Parties relating to CCAF have not been extensively debated in the literature, except in a limited manner (Morita 2012; Kanako Morita and Ken'ichi Matsumoto 2014, 1; Robinson and Dorman, 2016, 1103-1115). Consequently, financing CCA for the SIDS has become a central variable in the discussion of CCF concepts including adequacy, predictability and new and additional (Buchner and Wilkinson 2015; Branger and Quirion, 2014; Haites, 2014; Lian-biao Cu et al., 2014; Shrivastava and Upadhyaya, 2014). In this context, Roberts et al. (2021) pointed out that new and additional finance for developing countries, agreed to at Copenhagen (2009), was quantified at USD100bn, as a floor, beginning 2020.

The review of literature under this topic will explore the effectiveness of climate funds and financing from an adaptation costs perspective, particularly modalities for estimating climate change costs and identifying sources of CCAF. The review will also explore the effectiveness of climate funds and financing from a climate related, non-climate related, and national government perspective. In this context, emphasis will be placed on generating finance from market based and non-market-based systems such as auctions of emissions quota, taxes on global ‘bads’, carbon taxes, and direct financial increases to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

The researcher will also review literature on private finance with a focus on the effects of an absence of agreed international definitions of financial terms that include full incremental costs. Finally, the literature review will examine theoretical framings and methodologies used in climate finance. In this regard, game theory, Nash equilibrium, bi-level optimization, integrated energy economy climate modelling and country-driven financial framework will be explored. The section ends with an analysis and implications for the research.

2.6.2 Effectiveness of Climate Funds and Financing: An Adaptation Costs Perspective

Determining the effectiveness of climate funds and financing rely to a large extent on estimating climate change costs and identifying sources of CCAF. According to Ayers and Huq (2009, 677), “estimating the costs of climate change impacts and adaptation is inherently problematic, as evidenced by the lack of quantified data on the topic ....” Further, estimates on adaptation costs tend to be based on assumptions and lack sufficient “… across-sector studies that look at the cumulative effects within countries or the wider macroeconomic consequences of impacts or adaptation” (Ayers and Huq 2009, 677). Nonetheless, the World Bank in 2006 estimated the cost of adaptation to be between USD 9 bn and USD 41 bn annually; Oxfam in 2007 estimated the cost of adaptation closer to USD 50 bn annually and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicated that adaptation costs may well increase to approximately USD 86 -109 bn annually by 2015. However, according to Ciplet and Roberts (2017b, 372-398), in 2013, the global community provided a mere USD 3.4 bn in adaptation finance for developing countries. This is way below the USD 150 bn needed yearly by 2025/2030 (UNEP 2014). This is separate from costs associated with climate impacts beyond adaptation (loss and damage) which are estimated as high as USD 2 trillion (Ciplet and Roberts 2017b, 372-398). Consequently, it is easy to envisage difficulties scaling up finance to address adaptation and loss and damage in a UNFCCC regime that is seemingly rooted in the principles of voluntariness and marketization (Durand et al. 2016, 1-42; Doelle and Seck, 2020, 669-680)

It is important to keep in mind that unless the international climate change community can halt, and then reduce GHG emissions, the costs of adaptation will continue to rise (Ayers and Huq 2009, 675-692). Consequently, climate finance will not be either fiscally adequate or accessible to developing countries (Ayers and Huq 2009, 675-692; Möhner and Klein, 2007, 15-22) as evidenced by the developed countries' pledges not meeting the already insufficient estimated costs and developed countries not meeting their actual pledges. Complicating matters is the fact that developing countries are also facing difficulties meeting their NDCs. India, for example, with low per capita emissions is asking for USD 2 trillion to pursue low carbon strategies as opposed to burning its coal to provide needed energy for its citizens, while the LDCs have costed their NDCs at USD 1 trillion (Ciplet and Roberts 2017b, 372-398). In the first instance, the LCDF, SCCF and the SPA are all under resourced. Secondly, developing countries have singled out as impediments, high transaction costs and delays in delivery of GEF funds due to disbursements by partner entities (World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP) for a fee, as additional unnecessary bureaucracy. Thirdly, the GEF, LCDF and SCCF require co-financing and tend to deal with additional adaptation needs resulting from climate change and not baseline development activities (Ayers and Huq 2009, 675-692).

Importantly, it is argued that developed countries should contribute between 65-85% of adaptation finance (USD 30 billion 2010-2012) due to historical responsibility (Denton 2010, 655-671). Further, some scholars argue that funding from the AF should not be channeled through agencies like the GEF, and adaptation projects should be mainstreamed and aligned with development needs of the AF (Fankhauser and Burton 2011). However, as pointed out by Denton (2010, 655-671), "the crux of the matter consists not in the mobilization of funds alone but in the continued vulnerability of those institutions necessary to underpin the effective management and use of funds intended for adaptation” (668).

As a result, issues surrounding equity, governance, adequacy of funds, and the absorptive capacity of institutions have been cited as the most difficult for advocates of the AF (Denton 2010, 655-671). Meanwhile, Barr et al. (2010, 843-858), while acknowledging that additional finance will be necessary for adaptation measures, proposed a framework on “… how adaptation funding may be allocated among developing countries in a transparent, efficient and equitable way” (844). According to Barr et al. (2010, 843-858), the analytical framework proposed will use quantitative indicators to assess a country's vulnerability to climate change and its capability to efficiently manage additional resources. The key elements of the framework comprised three criteria: (1) the climate change impacts experienced in a country; (2) a country’s adaptive capacity; and (3) a country’s implementation capacity. Importantly, the results though indicative, suggested that African countries were much more vulnerable and more in need of CCAF.

2.6.3 Effectiveness of Raising Climate Funds from a Climate Related, Non-Climate Related and National Government Perspective

Bowen (2011, 1020-1036) and Eisenack (2012, 491-504) identified international auctioning of emissions quotas, offset levies and marine and aviation bunker fuels levies as potential financial instruments available for raising climate related finance for developing countries. The non-climate finance revenue generation options included increasing financial resources to International Financial Institutions (IFIs) including the World Bank, MDBs, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction (EBR) and the IMF; taxes on global ‘bads’; and financial transactions taxes (Bowen 2011, 1024). At the national level, Bowen (2011, 1027) proposed national auctions of emissions quotas, carbon taxes, fossil fuel royalties and subsidies, and assessed or indicative contributions. However, in the context of carbon taxes, Costantini et al. (2013, 609-621), suggested that unless the cost of taxation of emissions allowances are considered, conclusions on their effectiveness may prove to be erroneous. In addition, (Glemarec (2010, 1-13) argued that carbon taxes are a vexed issue for consumers who generally resent tax increases and doubt their fiscal neutrality in most countries. Further, Den Elzen et al. (2010, 247-260), posited that, developing countries should be able to receive direct climate finance support, through the REDD+ mechanism, carbon market and other programmes, if they are able to reduce emissions by 15-30 % below baseline levels.

Even the emissions reductions schemes of the market-based approach are unlikely to generate the kind of funding required to abate climate change. Beltran et al. (2011, 7361-7371), using the FAIR model to analyse combinations of the proposed emission reduction ranges for Annex I and non-Annex I countries, to limit global warming to 2° C by 2020, concluded that the proposed ranges in emissions reductions would not result in meeting the agreed target by 2020. Consequently, there is a move towards "… direct financing of mitigation and adaptation actions as an alternative to emissions reductions schemes contemplated under current negotiations" (Beltran et al. 2011, 7362). However, such a move will see the continuation of IFIs and MDBs playing an intermediary role in financing the production of climate change activities (Gomez-Echeverri (2013, 632-648), and little scope for capacity building (Denton 2010, 655-671). This is viewed as a reflection of a classical principal-agent scenario where developing countries, as agents simply adopt the positions of the principals who advance their own interests (Abadie et al. 2013, 943-955; Schenker and Stephan 2014, 44-55; Shah 2015, 31-38). It is also interesting to note that according to the PA (UN 2015, the mechanism to promote mitigation of GHG emissions, while fostering sustainable development, should be "… voluntary and authorized by participating Parties" (Articles 6 (3), 6(4) PA). This does not appear to be legally binding, except being bound to volunteer. In this context, it could therefore be argued that the negotiation positions of the United States were well secured at COP 21, which becomes clearer in a later section.

The market-based approach to emissions reductions also draws support from public economic theory. Adopting a public economy policy approach and the view that developing countries have insufficient funds to adapt to climate change, Aakre and Rubellke (2010, 767-791; Oberlack and Neumärker 2011, 1-24; and Stern (2007, 1-37) argued that if the market fails to meet the objectives of the public economy policy approach (efficient allocation of resources, proper distribution of income and wealth and economic stabilization) then public economic theory justifies government intervention into the market. This as reflective of Keynesian economic theory and meant to encourage developing countries to adopt a market-based approaches. Konrad and Thum (2014, 56), based on the principles of subsidiarity and correspondence respectively, believed that a significant amount of adaptation can occur "… in the private sector, voluntarily, and in private markets, as a reaction to climate change and with little governmental involvement". The view expressed here promotes decision-making at the most decentralized level and payment through private sources, which is inconsistent with the capacities of the SIDS, LDCs and many developing countries.

Another area of support for market-based emissions reduction schemes comes from the view that mitigation provides direct and indirect global environmental benefits, whereas benefits from adaptation measures are largely local and not global (Aakre and Rubellke 2010, 767-791; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009, 381-400). Consequently, Aakre and Rubellke (2010, 767-791) argued that the absence of direct global benefits prohibits adaptation measures from being integrated into the existing funding scheme of the GEF, because the GEF requires a global benefits test. However, adaptation funding organized through the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol portals were not expected to meet this global environmental benefits test (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009, 381-400), suggesting easier access and less bureaucracy in the funding pipeline for developing countries, even though it is important to keep in mind the hegemonic role of IFIs (Beltran et al. 2011, 7361-7371; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, 127-155).

2.7 Private Finance

There is definitely a role for private sources, additional to public sources, in raising CCAF for developing countries through activities such as the CDM, CERs, auctions, carbon pricing and taxes, which will all contribute to equity and efficiency in financing (Bowen 2011, 1020-1036; Bowen 2014, 1-35; Miles 2011, 190-208; Stadelmann et al. 2013, 718-737). Importantly, emissions reductions also include those from developing countries, accounting eventually for more than half of GHGs in the future (Bowen 2011, 1020-1036; Den Elzen et al. 2013, 397-412; IPCC 2014). However, much needed international climate finance could be generated from charges on embedded carbon in commodities under a World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible border carbon cost levelling (BCCL) mechanism, levelling of carbon costs between production and consumption at the border, in regions that adopt carbon pricing or cap and trade policies (Grub 2011, 1050-57). A consequential benefit of this mechanism is the generation of revenues from emissions based on consumption models quite apart from production-based models and the opportunity to transfer such revenues to developing countries as CCF (Helm et al. 2012, 368-394; Liniger 2015).

A similar method to the BCCL mechanism is the border carbon adjustment mechanism (BCAM). The BCAM is a border carbon tariff, which adjusts the charges on imports in accordance with the level of GHGs emitted in the production of specific imported items (Persson et al. 2010; Liniger 2015). It is important to note also that both the BCCL and the BCAM aim to stop carbon leakages (Grub 2011; Helm et al. 2012, 368-394; Persson et al. 2010). Consequently, implementing carbon tariffs on energy intensive imports from developing (non-Annex 1) countries that have not agreed to 'binding emissions reductions' (Springmann 2013, 20-42) should be linked to "… connecting emissions transfers to international offset responsibilities" (Springmann 2014, 177). Accordingly, revenues from carbon tariffs should be used to fund clean development in the relevant exporting (non-Annex 1) developing countries (Springmann 2013, 20-42; Liniger, 2015). There are, however, implications surrounding mobilization of private climate finance. A documented impact is the role of, and the extent to which, regressive subsidies dwarf other private climate contributions, undermining climate compatible development in the process (Glemarec 2010, 1-13; McFarland and Whitley 2014; Whitley 2013). In this context, the negative effect of subsidies could be avoided by linking the discourse on private climate finance and subsidies, which will in turn unlock climate compatible investment and reduce barriers to private climate finance (Whitley 2013). Additionally, the absence of agreed international definitions of 'full incremental costs'[33] (Olbrisch et al. 2011, 970-986; Würtenberger et al. 2012; IPCC, 2014) and "costs of adaptation'[34] have led to inaccurate determination of the amount of CCAF (Fankhauser 2010, 23-30). In the result, new challenges in climate finance decisions are presented by the close links between adaptation, development, mitigation and uncertainty surrounding the sources of CCAF and how CCAF should be delivered (Buchner and Wilkinson 2015, 483; Haites 2014; Narain et al. 2011, 1001-1019; Smith et al. 2011, 987-1000). Further, an agreement on a common definition of full incremental costs will serve as a guide to developed countries in meeting their financial obligations to developing countries under the UNFCCC (Olbrisch et al. 2011, 970-986). Given these uncertain conditions, the amount of international funding suggested for mitigation measures in developing countries lie "… between the estimates of incremental cost and the incremental investment"[35] (Olbrisch et al. 2011, 970).

Importantly, the general climate finance performance and investment related impacts are difficult to assess because the climate finance discourse has been strategically framed around investment business models without much attention to socially responsible investment (SRI), equity, CBDR and ethics (Richardson 2009, 597-626). As a result, developing countries have always argued for CCF to be distinctly additional to the aid provided by donor countries, while developed countries argued for a more integrated approach to CCF and aid, because the two complement each other in many ways (Fankhauser and Burton 2011, 1037-

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[33] Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed country. Parties agreed to cover the 'agreed full incremental costs' of implementing mitigation measures (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 4.3).

[34] Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed country Parties agreed to assist in meeting the "costs of adaptation" of developing country Parties (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 4.4).

[35] Global, country and sectorial preparation of estimates of full incremental costs and incremental investments include UNFCCC, IEA, OECD, McKinsey & Company, World Bank, World Business Council on Sustainable Development and the IPCC.

1049; Pickering et al. 2013, 1-34). Even though "… the assessment of 'additionality' is methodological challenging" (Stadelmann et al. 2011, 176), developing countries generally agree that 'new and additional' funding starts after developed countries would have contributed their agreed 0.7% of GNI to ODA (Stadelmann et al. 2011, 175-192; Brown et al. 2010,1-11) in the form of grants and concessional financing (Lian-biao Cui et al. 2014). Additionality is also achieved through surplus spending over an ODA reference level year, limiting additional CCF to a percentage of rising ODA levels and increased CCF to developing countries without any connection to ODA (Brown et al. 2010, 1-11).

Greater opportunities for additionality are also presented through innovative financing from new sources such as auctioning under emissions trading schemes; export credits and insurance schemes (Brown et al. 2010, 1-11; Frank et al. 2013, 4-46; Pickering et al. 2013, 1-34)which will remove the need to rely on ODA as a major funding source of climate finance (Brown et al. 2010, 1-11). Further, additionality is more likely to be met through separate and dedicated institutions such the Adaptation Fund, rather than through bilateral sources where distinguishing between CCAF and funding for other development remains problematic. Such a system will allow for more efficient tracking of climate finance and removal of fears that ODA budgets will be assigned to climate change projects (Fankhauser and Burton 2011, 1037-1049; Haites 2014). Additionality is also affected when bilateral funds, such as ODA, are offered with mitigation and adaptation labels as conditionalities, which in essence amounts to re-labelling, recycling or renaming (Ciplet et al. 2013, 49-68; Shrivastava and Upadhyaya 2014, 78-89). However, additionality when viewed from mitigation lens means ensuring that no fictitious carbon units, i.e., unit that do not real emission reductions, compromise global carbon markets (Michaelowa et al. 2019, 1211-24; Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019, 386-400). Consequently, if real emissions reductions via the intended mechanism in the Paris Agreement is achieved, concomitantly, that will reduce the required amount of adaptation and new and additional CCAF. A correlated assumption would be, failure of international transfers not leading to 'the same or lower aggregate global emissions' would also lead to a greater demand to adapt and, consequently, greater requirement for climate finance that is new and additional. Additionality from a market-based perspective maintains the dependence of CCAF for SIDS on mitigation outcomes, while, adding pressure on the SIDS to up their NDCS.

2.8 Theoretical Framings and Methodologies used in Climate Finance

Game-theoretic analysis was used to study how the formation of a multilateral funding programme to finance global public goods, such as climate mitigation, influenced the recipient country's demand for side payments and how domestic political constraints in donor countries influenced equilibrium behaviour and outcomes (Bayer and Urpelainen 2013, 160-189; De Canio and Fremstad, 2013, 177-187; Depledge 2013). In particular, "… funding global public goods enhance recipients' ability to extract concessions from donors [side payments] …" (178), which created incentives for donor rejection. Likewise, "… donors with severe domestic political constraints on funding often free ride on other donors' contribution" (178). As such, donors are inclined to oppose multilateral funding programmes or impose funding constraints to reduce recipients' demand for side payments. Consequently, voluntary coordination between states is necessary for a Pareto optimal allocation. The possibilities of fairness - equated with equity and CBDR - influencing international climate negotiations were examined through the application of game theoretic-analysis (Pittel and Rübbelke 2013; Pittel et al. 2017) in the absence of a "… coercive international authority that can enforce efficiency generating measures" among states (2013, 2).

Applying a game theoretic model that was based on transfers from North to South to study multiple questions surrounding the interplay of development aid and official finance for adaptation and mitigation, Eyckmans et al. (2013, 1-37) found that except for the LDCs, the South reacted to the transfers by "… reallocating its own resources until it [had] established the mitigation, adaptation and consumption balance that optimize[d] its welfare …" (25). The net effect was that climate finance worked as an income transfer to the South and adaptation and mitigation effects were triggered by the softer budget constraints, ultimately suggesting that countries with financial income constraints are best suited for adaptation support. However, Urpelainen (2013, 107-125) suggested that using a dynamic climate governance model could provide finance within a North-South climate mitigation context. This model combines elements of treaty design (Frankel 2006, 31-56) and bottom-up climate policy (Biermann 2009, 351-69) where progress is achieved through what Urpelainen (2013, 107-135) calls "a series of politically feasible "small wins" guided by a unifying "big dream" of the elements that a comprehensive climate regime should comprise in the future" (2013, 108). The unifying big dream represents limiting the global temperature to 2°C and the small wins are political feasible steps towards the objective, such as North-South finance initiatives. As emphasized by Urpelainen (2013, 107-125), admissible small wins are defined by their transformation potential. In the context of international transfers, Nash equilibria exists resulting in smaller transfers than the anticipated amounts for international CCF such as the pledged USD100 billion. This meant that countries preferred to provide individual pledges making the goal of raising USD100 billion an uncertain activity (Constantini et al. 2011, 1-33; Schenker et al. 2015, 1-30). There is also a strong argument that "… the *absence* [emphasis original] of a carbon price effectively comprises an implicit subsidy to dirtier production in non-regulated markets" (370), and not a BCA, which acts as a market correction as opposed to a market distortion occasioned by the implicit subsidy (Helm et al. 2012).

Notably, Weitzel et al. (2012, 1-30) used a CGE model to carry out a sensitivity analysis of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) rates. The analysis showed that countries in a climate coalition region are more likely raise carbon-based border tax rates above the standard rate, as a strategic tool, rather than reducing carbon emissions, to achieve an equalization of carbon prices across a climate coalition and non-coalition region, in order to reduce carbon leakage. However, low-income countries would benefit from the trade diversion effect and therefore not oppose a higher BCA. In any event, incentives for 'free riding' are quite possible through higher BCAs (Weitzel et al. 2012, 198-207). BCAs also threaten development and climate agreements. In terms of development, BCAs restrict market access of developing and vulnerable countries who rely on exporting few goods. From a climate ethics perspective, BCAs are likely to undermine procedural justice by imposing adjustments on global burden sharing agreements and violating the polluter pays principle (Brandi 2013, 79-93; Branger and Quirion 2014a, 29-39). Additionally, the application of BCAs "… shift part of the abatement costs from abating to non-abating countries" (Branger and Quirion 2014, 56) possibly conflicting with the CBDR principle of the UNFCCC, which may then trigger a possible trade war by encouraging third countries to join the abating coalition (Branger and Quirion 2014, 29-39).

2.9 Methodologies Used for Climate Finance Research

According to Springmann (2013, 20-42), carbon tariffs could raise USD 3.5 to 24.5 bn (with a central value of USD 9.8 bn) for clean development financing. Similarly, Wei et al. (2014, 2228-2245) using a bilevel optimization method[36] found that generators with higher emission co-efficient attracted higher taxes while unit cost of carbon emissions decreased with increased permitted emissions in an experimental carbon tax scheme in China. Likewise, Millard-Ball and Ortolano (2010, 533-546) found that methodologies used in the transport sector were underrepresented for CDM offset projects because of the impact desk reviewers had on those methodologies and inconsistencies in decision approvals between sectors. However, Jakob et al. (2015, 15), using an integrated energy economy climate model to assess the potential magnitude of financial transfers to developing countries, under non-market transfer mechanisms and international emissions trading (IET), found that transfers to developing countries could reach up to 2.5% of their GDP and, under IET conditions, close to USD 400 bn per year by 2020. However, he cautioned about the possibility of a 'climate finance curse' resulting from windfall profits which may result in exposing their economies to economic volatility, appreciation of exchange rates, crowding out of manufacturing, and rent seeking behavior.

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[36] Bilevel optimization method is a fairly new application in the context of carbon credit schemes.

Additionally, Cui et al. (2014, 266-299) using a 'preference score compromises' (PSC)[37] model to determine how to raise funds for the GCF, found that the United States and the European Union would be the two largest contributors to the GCF, sponsoring more than 80%. In order to determine how to distribute allocated funds among non-Annex II Parties, the authors, using an 'adaptation needs' (AN) approach, which took account of economic strength and climate damages, found that African countries with high vulnerability would receive most of the funds, reaching close to 30%.

On the other hand, Caruso et al. (2015, 5-66) in collaboration with OECD[38] presented a methodological framework comprising four sequential, but interrelated decision stages[39] to estimate publicly mobilized private climate finance through donor countries' public finance (grants, loans, equity, de-risking) and policy (regulatory, fiscal, information and innovation) interventions. Some of the obstacles observed in the study included definitional, communication and data challenges, and the absence of fixed methodologies. However, Caruso et al. (2015, 10), recommended that selected methodologies should be guided by accuracy, incentives, standardization and practicality. Caruso et al. (2015,12) also suggested that the OECD's four-stage methodological framework can be used to measure progress towards the fulfilment of the commitment by developed countries to mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action. Importantly, Brown et al. (2015, 1-61), used the OECD's four-stage methodological framework to

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[37] Based on environmental responsibility and economic capacity, with historical emissions as an indicator for environmental responsibility and GDP as indicator for economic capacity.

[38] The Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance, an OECD-led network of research organisations, international finance institutions, and governments.

[39] (1) Definition of core concepts; (2) Identification of public interventions and instruments that can be credited for mobilising private climate finance; (3) Valuing public interventions and accounting for total private finance involved; and (4) Estimating mobilised private climate finance.

estimate publicly mobilised private adaptation finance and found that their results were consistent with the findings of Caruso et al. (2015, 5-66). Additionally, methods used for estimating climate finance would differ according to the type of financing instruments used and the peculiarities of the institutions, but care should be exercised to avoid double counting, because:

> it is difficult to identify a single point in the climate finance supply chain where tracking would ideally take place. This is because climate-related activities in developing countries can have several project stages (e.g., feasibility study, infrastructure development, project development) and involve multiple actors at each stage. (Caruso and Ellis 2013)

According to Chaum et al. (2011), the effectiveness of climate finance can improve through a common 'climate effectiveness' methodology and metric that allows some comparison between funding proposals, institutions and activities that provide a robust and credible ex-ante and ex-post estimation of climate intervention activities that are likely to impact climate financing in general, and not only those confined within a climate portfolio. This should lead to a balance between public and private funding that is predictable and coordinated in a setting where real time systems are available to measure progress using results-based methods.

Another useful tool in determining the effectiveness of climate finance is leveraging, which in simple terms means "… the debt which can be raised against a given equity contribution" (Brown et al. 2011, 1). Generally, high ratios are an indication that public finance was used to reduce risk to investments. Institutions that use leverage methodologies include the GEF, the Clean Technology Fund, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the World Bank Group Infrastructure Financing. Leveraging is also done through carbon finance and Feed-in Tariff (FiT). The methodologies used include quantitative ex-ante assessment, semi-structured interviews, quantitative ex-post assessment and quantitative assessment (Brown et al. 2011, 1-19; Tumushabe et al. 2013, 2-11).

Nakhooda (2013, 1-27) on the other hand, proposed a ten key interlinked dimensional framework (IDF)[40] to analyse climate finance effectiveness (CFE) through an analysis of multilateral funds. The analysis begins with consideration of the driving logic and objectives of a multilateral fund. This is followed by an analysis of five interlinked components of effective spending, followed by how the active portfolio fund shapes the other five interlinked components. The IDF modeling concludes with an analysis of the role of the fund in the global international climate finance architecture. Forstater et al. (2013, 3-38) applied the ten-key IDF to analyse the CFE of the Amazon Fund valued at USD1billion for a payment for services agreement (REDD+) between the Federal Republic of Brazil and the Kingdom of Norway. The analysis found that the payments were not linked to demonstrated emissions reductions and were not at a scale to create any significant shift in Brazil's large economy. The ten- key IDF was also applied to analyse the CFE of the Adaptation Fund. The analysis found a significant alignment of the ten- key IDF with the Adaptation Fund. Nonetheless, results also show that a coordinated approach among actors across sectors is required to meet national adaptation financial needs of developing states (Trujillo and Nakhooda 2013, 1-40). As a contribution to this effort, Stadelmann et al. (2013, 718-737), suggested that researchers should use methods such as advance statistical tools, randomized experiments and process tracing "to improve data quality and increase the understanding of the effectiveness of public climate finance" (733).

Additionally, a four-step country driven climate finance framework[41] that would scale up financial resources from various sources to meet low carbon transition costs was proposed by Glemarec (2010, 1-13). His framework would provide adequate international financial resources to fund a transition to low carbon

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[40] The ten interlinked components are mobilization; governance; allocation; disbursement and monitoring; evaluation and learning; scale; enabling environment; catalytic impacts; innovation; and national ownership.

[41] In Step1countries will be assisted in preparing low carbon climate resilient strategies, Step 2 will support the establishment of country financial and technical support platforms, Step 3 proposes the setting up of "NAMA-like" and "NAP-like instruments to access international climate finance and Step 4 addresses the need for a coordinated implementation and reporting mechanism.

economies once there is international cooperation and goodwill to phase out regressive fossil fuel subsidies thereby releasing substantial financial capital to fund low carbon transitions (Glemarec 2010, 1-13). Further, each developed country Party would be required to provide to the UNFCCC, summary information in a textual and tabular format on the financial support provided to developing country parties whether committed or pledged to the GEF, AF, GCF, the LDCF and the SCF. Developed country Parties would also be required to indicate whether the funding was for adaptation or mitigation, the source of funding, the financial instrument used, and an indication of what resources were to be considered new and additional financial resources. In the result, the extent to which developed countries were able to accurately reflect the commitments to developing countries hinged on the effectiveness of the theoretical and methodological approaches used.

2.10 Analysis and Research Implications

A close look at the literature on financing CCA will reveal that even though public finance is mentioned, it is done so in the context of unlocking private finance within a market-based structure, and as the driver in allocating, estimating, and measuring CCF. The value of public finance in the climate change solutions arena is not to increase grants and low/no interest loans to the SIDS, as a priority, rather, it is being used to de-risk private capital investments as the priority sources of CCAF and climate change mitigation finance. The shrinking use of public finance as direct CCAF transfers to the SIDS has resulted in multiple known and unknown methods of estimating adaptation costs by developed country Parties, resulting in significant differences in estimated costs for CCA, which is further compounded by uncertainties surrounding key financial terms. Additionally, nothing about the private finance push is intended for economies like the SIDS as participants, rather the SIDS are seen as downstream recipients.

It is also difficult to support the suggestion that unless GHGs are reduced, adaptation costs will rise and become fiscally impossible for the SIDS – almost like a fiscal cliff. Once CCAF is being deployed into a SIDS economy to address a common good, that extra expense can be fiscally accommodated through policy interventions by their governments. On the other hand, increased emissions will result in a need for increased adaptation. Consequently, the SIDS cannot sit back and wait until emissions are reduced by the developed and developing country Parties. That would be a risk to the survival of the SIDS due to their high vulnerability. Therefore, public funding, via pledges, is essential for the SIDS in its adaptation efforts to climate change. However, this is becoming more and more difficult as pledges are made, but are not being met due to possible political pressure in developed countries to use public finance to unlock private capital to give their citizens an opportunity to invest and profit from climate solutions. Hence, public finance is used to de-risk private capital, and governments also reduce political risks between themselves and their citizens in the process, all at the expense of the SIDS. This option by the developed states reflects their reluctance and unwillingness to internalize within their populations, discourses on their historical responsibility for climate change, and that the polluter pays principle is necessary to protect the world's climate and those states that suffered the most. Further, even when public funds do go into the GCF, for example, when those funds are ready to come out, they are far less public and more profit-based funds, with attachments such as guarantees and leveraging, thus making it difficult for the SIDS to qualify.

It is unfortunate that developed countries, notwithstanding the plethora of literature, have not supported climate and non-climate related finance initiatives to raise CCF, such as taxes on global bads and levies on fossil fuels. Instead, they continue to pursue market mechanisms based on carbon credits - the pollutant content in climate change- generated from fossil fuels transactions to raise CCF funds as opposed to removing the subsidies on fossil fuels altogether towards renewable sources. This action by the developed country Parties of providing subsidies on fossil fuels to balance out carbon credits for market applications amounts to the SIDS subsidizing the very source and cause of the deleterious effects of climate change on their economies and populations. Additionally, emissions trading systems are as efficient as emissions reduction discipline among participants. Therefore, if markets are weak then financial flows will be weak as experienced with the collapse of the CDM. The hotel industry, for example, located in the SIDS, are primarily owned by international corporations who do have a corporate and social responsibility to the human and physical environment. Consequently, the SIDS import much more embedded carbon than it exports, and in this context a set off and the difference as a payment to the SIDS is possible. Additionally, borders are no longer exclusively physical, they now include fiscal and environmental considerations, inter alia. The concept of BCCL and BCAM can be tweaked to suit the SIDS to raise CCAF within the ‘bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels’ provision of the UNFCCC. The suggestions to increase allocations to IMF and the World Bank as a source of increased CCF is unsuitable to the SIDS given their high debt ratios and high vulnerability. A single hurricane event could wipe the GDP of a SIDS and set it back decades. Many CARICOM SIDS such as Dominica, Grenada and even Antigua are struggling to return to economic normalcy and must now depend on loans to repair damages which they were not responsible for in the first place. Additionally, adaptation funding organized through the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol portals was not expected to meet the global environmental benefits test, as per GEF, which suggests to us that easier access and less bureaucracy surrounding CCAF was, and should be, the intention of the UNCFM.

What is also important to recognize is that most of the various OECD type methodologies used for estimating and accounting for CCF, not the raising of it, begin with the role public finance plays in mobilizing private finance and in estimating the USD100 bn pledge. The models look at how public finance unlocked private capital, with both sums being added to arrive at where the UNCFM is in meeting this pledge. It is not only the CCF, which is publicly raised that is counted, and given that the higher the ratios the more private capital that is raised, then the USD100 bn becomes an easy target for the developed country Parties. The net effect of this approach, however, has created even greater uncertainties surrounding the raising USD100 bn for CCF by 2020, and thereafter on a yearly basis. This approach also opens the door for double counting, remarking agreed ODA funds as climate funds, and suggestions that the USD100 bn target has already been met. However, for the SIDS, unless it is new and additional that pledge is still to be realized. It is quite possible that there is no new public money in the climate finance arena, and public funds are shrinking due to global economic contractions. The money available is private and it will not reach the SIDS unless it is de-risked and returnable with a profit. The nature of the neoliberal market-based economy of the major developed county Parties and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, in their own countries, compound the CCF challenges of the UNCFM. Therefore, if the SIDS want to maintain a separation of ODA from CCAF then they will have to point to additional sources of CCF, such as export credits, taxes on global bads, BCCL, BCAM, and insurance, making the argument that the AF, GCF and the LCDF are no guarantee of additionality and that the key remain the sources of the finance for which these additional measures would address. In order to press this argument further, the establishment a climate coalition among the SIDS would allow for them to use their power of numbers through the AOSIS to advance that cause during negotiations by increasing their scale of operations and forcing themselves into the climate finance discourse as contributors.

Importantly, the various game theoretic economic CCF modelling puts the LDCs as more vulnerable than the SIDS. We believe that those models do not contemplate ‘the single event’ GDP wipe out scenario. Even though we do accept that, the more financially constrained countries are, the more suitable they are for adaptation, using GDP (total income divided by population) as a measure of a country’s economic standing results in a fictious and illusionary outcome that the SIDS are doing well and not so vulnerable. Therefore, game theory results where Nash equilibrium produced smaller CCF transfers than expected in a GCF scenario should be reset within parameters that include, for example, developed countries obligations under UNFCCC, historical responsibility and vulnerabilities peculiar to SIDS that will go beyond Nash equilibrium towards Pareto optimality. Additionally, game theoretic modeling should include conflict between BCAs and CBDR, differences in full incremental costs; investment costs; and additionality. Further, due to the nature, contents and deficiencies of the methodologies used, the point of reference for analysis surrounds developed states with mitigation as the primary pathway. Many developing states, in particular SIDS, will not meet the content standards of these methodologies to qualify as full participants. Different methodological contents are required for developing countries and SIDS to better determine CCF for adaptation and mitigation. Methodologies and game theoretic modeling should also focus on the capacities of SIDS and developing countries to absorb and spend large tranches of finance; the extent to which ODA can be separated from climate financing and whether the financial structures set up in the North are consistent with those in the South. Finally, more research is required on the role of socially responsible climate finance investments; how climate finance investments can result in transparency, equity and justice for developing countries, including SIDS; and how to avoid potential obstacles to financial flows derived from investment due climate risks and their impact.

2.11 Mitigation as the Business of Small Island Developing States

2.11.1 Overview

There is no doubt that under the UNFCCC, country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially the SIDS (Art 4:8 (a) UNFCCC 1992; Preamble UNFCCC, 1992) were required to adapt to climate change (Art 4:4 UNFCCC, 1992). However, by the time of the PA, the SIDS were voluntarily agreeing to mitigate climate change (Art 2 PA, UN 2015; Art 7:2 PA, UN 2015; Art 7:3 PA, UN 2015;). The importance of adaptation by the SIDS has been extensively dealt with in the literature as a necessary response to the historical and current damage to the atmosphere by developed states. Liability and compensation for the adaptation response by the SIDS is about honouring the undertaking by developed countries to fund their adaptation costs (Art 4:4 UNFCCC, 1992). Shifting mitigation actions towards the SIDS may also shift the responsibility of developed countries paying this ecological debt. The review of literature under this topic will explore why there is a preference for mitigation finance over adaptation finance, the linking of CCAF to performance, and equating adaptation to mitigation, particularly the influence of the PA. The review will also examine the concept, emanating from the PA that more mitigation means less adaptation. The section ends with an analysis and implications for the research.

2.11.2 A Preference for Mitigation Finance over Adaptation Finance

Mitigation considerations undoubtedly influenced the posture of climate finance mechanisms (GCF, GEF and the AF). Further, the ascendancy of mitigation finance over adaptation is perhaps due to firms viewing mitigation as "… the better perspective for activating private funds … and governments interests in supporting projects abroad" (Abadie et al. 2013, 946), and the perception that adaptation presents local and not global benefits (Barrett 2008, 118-139; Buchner 2011). Of course, the preponderance of mitigation finance over adaptation is challenged by free riders once there are no global emissions systems binding all nations (Abadie et al. 2013, 943-955). However, Eyckmans et al. (2016, 429), suggested that "… if the North wishes to change the balance between mitigation, adaptation and consumption it should structure its transfers as "matching grants", which are tied to the South's own level of funding. Other perspectives shaping a mitigation bias include: the inability to commodify adaptation measures; the subsequent absence of a market to trade adaptation credits; lack of incentive to mitigate by developing countries due to weak developed countries' adaptation support; and a view that more mitigation today saves future adaptation costs (; Buchner et al. 2011; Lobell et al. 2008, 607-610; Markandya and Galarraga 2011; Persson 2010).

Additionally, the CDM, which also funds adaptation, has its own challenges. Most of its projects focus on India and China and on other gases, such as CHFC, and less on CO2. The CDM has also not deterred China from rapidly developing more coal-fired plants, nor has it met its sustainable goals, since most of the projects are located outside the poorest of countries (Hepburn and Stern 2008, 259-279). Notably, Hourcade et al. (2012, 165-186) pointed out that generating high cash flows through the CDM depends "… on demand of carbon offset by countries subject to emissions commitments, which is precisely today's main cause of uncertainty …" (169), and climate change. Further, the CDM contracted by 59% in 2009 (Hourcade 2012, 165-186). According to Li:

> [T]he current structure of the CDM, and the procedure - intensive nature of project-by-project crediting, simply cannot support the scale of reductions needed in developing countries to achieve the global climate stabilization targets by 2050. (Li 2011)

Additionally, Bhattacharyya (2013, 462-472) pointed out that mechanisms such as the CDM and other innovations are unfriendly to the energy access projects (usually small scale) necessary for the poorest nations of the world to improve their living standards. Consequently, Glemarec (2010, 1-13) argued that a few countries (China, India, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico) benefit from close to 80% of CDM credits (for sale to the industrialized countries) creating geographical and technological biases. Unlike the North-South dilemma, there is now see a South-South problematic emerging, with most of Africa and SIDS being left out. Further, Bakker and Huizenga (2010, 314-336) suggested that NAMAs represent a step beyond the current role of developing countries, which is to act as host nation of CDM projects in their countries under the Kyoto Protocol framework. Under NAMAs, emissions are reduced in developing countries and represent contributions to the concept of full incremental costs as provided for under the UNFCCC (1992). Interestingly also, Coetzee and Winker (2014, 4-11), recognized that NAMAs, play a significant role as a mechanism for raising finance for developing countries under the CBDR principle within the UNFCCC.

It is interesting to also note that Bowen (2011, 1020-1036) concluded that "… expanding the scale and scope of the CDM and (ii) expanding the use of international financial institutions' balance sheets (2011, 1020) are now useful financial mechanisms, "… [therefore] public finance may be necessary to leverage private finance" (1024; Glemarec 2010, 1-13; Juergens 2012, 1-48). The role of public funds is therefore quickly emerging as a catalyst for funding, rather than as the main source of funding (Gomez- Echeverri 2013, 623-648).

2.11.3 Linking Climate Change Adaptation Finance to Performance and Equating Adaptation to Mitigation

Clearly the PA links financial flows to emission reductions, while at the same time raising adaptation actions to the level of a global response. In that context, it is significant that all country Parties agreed that:

> [A]daptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions…" (Article 7:2 PA) and "… that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs. (Article 7:3 PA)

Support of the concept that more mitigation means less adaptation was further bolstered at COP 22 where all Parties agreed that nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and adaptation communications could constitute a good opportunity for supporting the scaling up of adaptation finance (Decision 7/CP.22, paragraph 7(b)).

Interestingly, though Ingham et al. (2013, 39-53), while confirming the view held by Parry et al. (2009), that an integrated approach is required for addressing adaptation and climate change, they nonetheless concluded that neither substitution nor complementarity is easily achieved. Using various economic models, the authors found that, "… only in the case where the effects of mitigation on marginal adaptation costs are strong, do we find that mitigation and adaptation are complements" (51). In other words, there is no even scale between adaptation and mitigation. However, the authors did not say at what point, and who, and or what determines the effects of mitigation on marginal adaptation costs. In relation to substitution, Ingham et al. (2003, 39-53), citing Tol (2003), agreed that adaptation costs are finite and not infinite as assumed by the IPCC 1996 Report, and consequently the two are substitutes to each other, as some adaptation will instead reduce mitigation costs as opposed to the concept that more mitigation means less adaptation, as expressed in the PA.

2.11.4 Analysis and Research Implications

The shift by actors within the COPs towards mitigation also becoming the business of SIDS, contrary to the adaptation norm established under the UNFCCC, is perhaps the key factor enabling the drive for private finance as the major CCAF vehicle through market mechanisms within the neoliberal ideological construct. Secondly, this shift disacknowledges the ecological debt owed by the developed world to the developing world, in particular the SIDS, whose first order is adapting to climate change. Though many (Markandya and Galarraga 2011, 66-74; Buchner et al. 2011; Persson 2011; Lobell et al. 2008, 607-610) hold the view that more mitigation today saves future adaptation costs, a concept that is now codified with the PA (UN, 2015), the consequence thereof is the moving away from public finance structures to private ones. Further, measuring and assessing adaptation finance possibilities using economic mitigation tools such as: (a) adaptation not being a global good; (b) difficulties in commodifying adaptation; and (c) absence of an adaptation market, were doomed to fail since adaptation is a slow onset activity spanning decades that produce results difficult to measure. In the end, a mitigation finance bias was willed by the more powerful.

Perhaps, the CCAF deck was stacked against SIDS from the beginning when one considers the (non) effect of the philosophical underpinning of the CDM which was to fund adaptation from mitigation projects. The SIDS' future in financing adaptation was already in the jaws of mitigation. The PA (UN 2015) simply completed this process. The CDM was unsuccessful as a vehicle to provide CCAF to SIDS since that carbon market had underperformed, not to mention a bias against CDM projects in the SIDS and African countries. Recognition of this failure was expressed by the OASIS grouping which called for an increase of revenue from 2% to 5% under the 'new' Paris carbon market mechanism. These results challenge the concept that more mitigation means less adaptation since the current experience is less mitigation. Linking CCAF to mitigation and equating adaptation to mitigation, as expressed in the PA, represents a betrayal to the SIDS by the developed country Parties to the UNFCCC. These new concepts have put private finance, which is a 'for profit' mechanism, as the key vehicle to unlocking CCAF, leaving in its wake inadequate and unpredictable CCAF for the SIDS that is not new and additional. Importantly, adaptation financing for the SIDS should remain separate from mitigation finance and should be from public sources and funded by the developed country Parties as contemplated by the UNFCCC. Equating adaptation to mitigation is a classical asymmetrical game that only the powerful states can win. Thus, by linking CCAF to mitigation performance by the SIDS, the COP has shifted the burden of adaptation costs onto the shoulders of the SIDS who have no capacity to perform creditably as mitigators of climate change. Ultimately, this shift towards mitigation performance actions by the SIDS act as a *casus belli* for the delay in the provision of adequate and predictable CCAF to SIDS that is new and additional.

2.12 Adaptation Finance Governance

2.12.1 Overview

If adaptation finance structures, as essential elements of adaptation finance governance, are not perceived as legitimate, fair and socially justified by developing countries, the global and coordinated response to climate change may be put at risk of failure (Scoville- Simonds 2016, 1-29). The review of literature under this topic will explore distributive justice and fairness in the context of adaptation policy and adaptation finance. Emphasis will also be placed on compensatory justice for the costs of climate policy, liability for climate impacts, climate debt owed to developing countries, neoliberal and market-based approaches to adaptation solutions advanced by the developed countries, and mainstreaming (against the wishes of developing countries, SIDS in particular) adaptation into development by marking ODA as adaptation related. The review will also examine activities of climate finance actors (CFAs) at community, cities, global levels and the interplay between state and non-state actors; climate finance negotiation positions of actors and institutions, highlighting those negotiations by CFAs at global and local levels, which were largely influenced by emissions reductions market-based systems, such as the CDM; and asymmetric power dynamics within the COP, AF, GEF and the GCF. There will also be an examination of the United

States and the European Union as the two most powerful global CFAs, along with countries like China, India, South Africa, and Brazil, all of whom generated sufficient influence to be noticed.

The absence of a definition for ‘adaptation’ and ‘additionality’ along with resistance by the LDCs and SIDS to mainstreaming adaptation into development will be looked at, particularly whether such absence enabled the European Union to negotiate for legally binding commitments and the United States for legal parity and a review process, notwithstanding the insistence by developing countries of a second commitment for Annex II countries, CBDR in every aspect of climate finance; fairness, equity, and justice in the lead up to Paris COP. The researcher will also review literature on the UNCFM, particularly the AF, the GEF and the GCF. The section ends with an analysis, implications for the research and a summary.

2.13 Distributive Justice and Fairness in the Context of Climate Change Adaptation Finance Policy

At the outset, Shue (1992, 373-397) argued that questions of justice are internal and not external to international climate negotiations. Interestingly, Grasso (2010) cited in Khan et al. (2020, 251-269) posited that both procedural and distributive justice[42] in adaptation financing can be ensured through:

> [A] fair process, that involves all relevant Parties, of raising adaptation funds according to the responsibility for climate impacts, and of allocating raised funds putting the most vulnerable first. (Khan et al. 2020, 256)

This formulation encapsulates the polluter pays principle, the historical responsibility principle, and the most vulnerable principle. Similarly, equity and fairness are key concepts of distributive justice, even though there is agreement by

[42] Distributive justice refers to a situation where all primary social goods, including opportunity, income, and wealth, are distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured, guaranteeing a fair deal for the most disadvantaged.

rational agents to pursue their own self-interest (Ciplet and Roberts 2017a, 148-156). Complimenting distributive justice are procedural justice and recognition. Procedural justice refers to the representation of all who have a stake in the outcomes of decision-making processes (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009, 88-108), and recognition provides visibility to historical wrongs and disrespect (Khan et al. 2020, 251-269). Distributive and procedural justice, and recognition are interdependent, and together they consider the resources that should be redistributed, to whom, and the norms, structures and power relations guiding decision-making processes (Khan et al. 2020, 251-269).

With specific reference to distributive justice in climate policy, Klinsky and Dowlatabadi (2009, 88-108) using a combined ethics framework[43] of underlying policies that impact distributive justice with the details of proposed policies[44] found that, because equitable burden sharing focusses on the technical (mitigation) and financial aspects of the climate problem, "… economically optimal global solutions …"[45] (103) become the expected outcome which create cost-effective mitigation rather than disparity reductions in resource distribution. Secondly, Klinsky and Dowlatabadi (2009, 88-108) examined climate change impacts and human development as two critical elements of fair distribution of costs and impacts and found a tendency to leverage existing development programmes to support human development to spend more on mitigation development. The results of the findings of Klinsky and Dowlatabadi are unsurprising, due to what Den Elze (2018) called the proliferation of the term 'anthropocene' and its resulting effect of disregarding the unequal effects various regions have made to climate change. Consequently, this kind of discursive and material violence pans out in mitigation actions as the primary solutions to climate change (Wilkens 2017). Even though the Klinsky and

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[43] Technology, substitution and danger, sovereignty, and public ethics.

[44] Equitable burden sharing, fair distribution of costs and impacts and justice for costs, impacts and liabilities.

[45] This refers to the neoliberal justice principle promoted by wealthy nations that avoids liability, as opposed to distributive justice promoted by developing nations, which demands compensation for harm caused (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi (2009, 88-108; Ciplet and Roberts (2017a, 148-156).

Dowlatabadi framework did not focus on the SIDS as the unit of analysis, their findings are applicable to the SIDS. Additionally, the Convention contains burden sharing provisions within Articles 4.3 and 4.4 (UNFCCC 1992) and Decision 10/CP7. Interestingly, Decision 5/CMP2 and Decision 1/CMP3 implied a commitment to distributive justice to the particularly vulnerable countries on a priority basis[46]. Notwithstanding these provisions and decisions, in the initial years, distributive justice was neglected by the COP and forms of compensation were relegated to provision of insurance (Art 4.8 UNFCCC 1992) due to the market-based solutions approach within the neoliberal framework (Khan et al. 2020, 255; Ciplet and Roberts 2017a, 148-156), and supported by the neoliberal justice principles that promote 'justice as mutual advantage' and 'justice as private property' (Ciplet and Roberts 2017a, 148-156). Thus "… the framing of climate adaptation finance provisions as goodwill or subject to market forces, rather than preconditions for establishing responsibility for creating the problem in the first place …" (Khan et al. (2020, 253). This is consistent with Spivak's (1988) view of the subaltern as a subjugated 'other' who cannot speak.

Notably, the rise of the climate justice movement resulted in a radical civic critique of neo-liberal capitalism and its commodification of nature and ecosystems, demanding in the process "… a complete transformation of modern capitalist society in order to enable equitable and sustainable climate futures" (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2019, 519-32). Importantly, it was Chakrabarty (2012) who pointed out that the unevenness of post-colonial development, worsened by climate change, served to hinder the political economy of resource distribution on equitable terms. Further, arguing from a constructivist critique of legalization literature, Hall and Persson (2018, 540-566) posited that, notwithstanding knowledge, the consequences of non-adaptation will go beyond borders and "many

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[46] Thus, after more than twenty years "… the political ambiguity about the meaning of 'particularly vulnerable' is as great as ever (Klein and Möhner 2011, 17).

developing states, particularly the most affected (AOSIS, SIDS, African States), have endorsed this view of adaptation as a global public good and called for strong binding commitments on adaptation" (558).

Notably, in Hall and Persson's analysis, the level of legalization and normalization for adaptation is low because it is seen as a contested global public good due to "… inherent ambiguity of adaptation as a concept; asymmetric preferences; and differing views on what sort of good (public/private; local/global) adaptation is ..." (559). Or, as Mikulewicz (2020, 1807-30) puts it, the effects of colonization via hegemonic discourses have resulted in the nations of Global South being denied agency to participate, without external help, in adaptation finance planning. It stands to reason that for adaptation to be accepted as a global public good, more substantive national and international binding commitments will be required for it not to be seen as a concept with low precision and low obligation and ultimately as a side payment to states in the negotiation process, but rather to be seen as a climate debt[47] owed to developing nations.

2.14 Distributive Justice Challenges

Arguing that adaptation driven distributive justice concerns arise not only between burden takers, but also benefits recipients, Jagers and Duus-Otterström (2008, 577), posited that many formulae for funds allocation tend to reflect donor interests underpinned by quota systems, variegated burden sharing rules and individuation of responsibility for climate cost burdens (Paavola and Adger 2006, 594-609; Page 2008, 556-575), which in turn raises the question of fairness in fund allocation (Ciplet et al. 2013, 59). This is akin to Said's (2003) 'Orientalism' constituted by an imagined geography of 'Orient' and the 'Occident', or the 'West' and the 'other', described by Sealey- Huggins (2017) as the interests of a small elite becoming the interests of all humans. Additionally, there is no system under the PA

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[47] According to Khan et al. (2020, 254), climate debt comprises two elements, an 'adaptation debt' owed to developing countries as compensation to enable adaptation to the impacts of climate change and, an 'emissions debt' owed by wealthy nations to developing countries for utilizing most of the atmosphere for carbon storage.

to predictably raise these funds, particularly since negotiations on burden sharing were side lined at the Paris COP (Ciplet and Roberts 2017b, 155; Klinsky et al. 2016, 93) Further, the shift to exclusive minilateralism, resulting from the adoption of a neoliberal framework, raises concerns for ensuring procedural justice and representation of those most impacted (Ciplet et al. [2015] cited in Khan et al. [2020] 251-269). Accordingly, the expectation is that in the post Paris discussion phase, "… mitigation decisions are more likely to be made unilaterally, bilaterally and in 'climate clubs', outside of the UNFCCC process" (Ciplet and Roberts 2017b, 156;). Of course, this raises serious questions about whether the most vulnerable (SIDS) will be excluded from negotiating for distributive justice.

Interestingly, Scoville-Simonds, relying on a combined analysis of both governance characteristics and donor support, highlighted that:

> [D]onor support tends to be concentrated in channels that offer the highest degree of control to donors…[and] the majority of public adaptation finance flowing from developed to developing countries does so in the form of development aid. (Scoville-Simonds 2016, 4)

This is a direct reference to ODA being marked as 'adaptation-related'. Scoville-Simonds (2016, 5) also submitted that donors, particularly from the OECD, under the Credit Reporting System (CSR) rules can fill out the CSR forms applying the Rio marking system to mark activities as adaptation specific without it being the primary objective. As Scoville-Simonds (2016) puts it, "[t]he 'Rio marking' process through which regular ODA becomes 'adaptation-ODA' relates directly to the concern for adaptation finance being 'new and additional' to existing development aid budgets …" (5), and there is no mechanism to prevent donors from systematically indicating adaptation in every field for every ODA activity. Consequently, Roberts et al. (2021, 180-182) pointed out that the OECD Rio Marker system was "especially problematic" (180), and the long-standing issue of whether funds are new and additional has not been solved.

2.15 Some Climate Finance Negotiation Positions (Actors)

Using the COP 17 as a backdrop, CFAs at the global level included delegates from nation states; corporations and industry associations; NGOs; and business and industry NGOs (BINGOs). According to Banerjee (2012, 1761-1786), key CFAs comprised the COP[48]; CMP[49]; AWGKP[50] and the AWG-LCA[51]. Interestingly, Bernauer (2013,) explained that approximately half of all accredited delegates in recent UNFCCC- COPs were from NGOs, and 70% of all national delegations included members from NGOs. Other key CFAs included the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)[52]; Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA[53]; Annex I countries,[54] Annex II countries,[55] Non Annex1 Parties (comprising developing Countries); the AOSIS consisting of 42 island states and low lying countries; the African Group comprising 53 member states, the LDCs comprising 48 member states; the G77 plus China comprising 132 member states with rotating chairmanship between Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean; and NGOs (Environmental NGOs, business and industry NGOs,

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[48] The decision-making group of the UNFCCC with 194 countries plus the EU.

[49] COP serving as meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision making group comprising 193 countries).

[50] Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol consisting of 37 industrialized Annex I countries.

[51] The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, comprising 195 countries.

[52] Expert group that provides advice to the negotiating groups as it relates to mitigation, adaptation, transparency, finance, technology and capacity building.

[53] Expert group that provides advice to the negotiating groups on scientific and technological matters as they relate to the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol, the IPCC and the Paris Agreement.

[54] Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States and the European Union representing 27 countries. Includes countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties) such as the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States (Banerjee 2012).

[55] Consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the Economies in Transition (EIT) Parties. Annex II countries are required to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change (Banerjee 2012).

local government and municipal authorities, indigenous people's organizations, and research-oriented and independent NGOs). With such a wide and diverse field of actors, negotiations surrounding CCAF for SIDS would no doubt be an arduous and complicated process. By the time of COP, the experience was shifting geopolitical constructs and players that saw the emergence of the South-South platform with China and India as key players (Gomez- Echeverri 2013, 623-648).

According to Banerjee (2012, 1761-1786), climate change negotiation positions advanced at the COP 17 comprised the following groupings and views. The G77 plus China, the Africa Group, the LDCs, OASIS, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and China, together called for the preservation and strengthening of the Kyoto Protocol and binding commitments from developed countries. The Africa Group, the LDCs, India, BASIC and China called for the protection of the principles of CBDR and equity. The EU, on one hand, offered to undertake unconditional emissions reductions and a single binding treaty for developed and developing countries. Contrastingly, the United States opposed any form of unilateral and unconditional emissions reductions; called for any agreement to have legal parity; rejected the principle of CBDR and recommended a ‘pledge and review’ scheme as opposed to enforceable mitigation commitments. The LDCs called for a legally binding instrument of compliance regime and international verification to monitor emissions from developed countries. India was opposed to any new legally binding treaty and binding emission targets for developing countries.

The BASIC group called for strengthening the unity of the G77 plus China and for it to represent a unified voice of developing countries in climate change negotiations (Banerjee 2012, 1761-1786). China was not averse to legally binding emissions reduction obligations post-2020, provided they were based on the principle of CBDR (COP17/CMP7). It is imperative to note that the LDCs were particularly concerned with the amount of funding needed to adapt now, and the acceptance that burden sharing was central to the LDCs’ claim that developed countries should be partially responsible for financing the world’s environmental problems (Denton 2010, 655-671). Further, the LDCs’ call for equity is a critical factor that adds a new layer of complexity to this increasingly charged issue (Paavola 2006, 594-609). However, it is interesting to note that new concepts and theories emerged over the years of climate negotiations. In particular, the G77 plus China, which also represents the interests of SIDS, were able to lead the charge for climate justice at the UNFCCC meetings in Delhi, Bali and Poznah, emphasizing the negative effects of ecologically unequal exchange on developing countries and the ecological debt owed to them (Parks and Roberts 2009, 385-409; Ciplet and Roberts 2017a, 372-398).

Further, Ciplet and Roberts (2017a, 372-398) in the context of climate change negotiations, while advocating against blaming only the North, pointed out that semi-peripheral states (comprising the more developed states within the G77 group), within the UNFCCC's political space, have undermined robust mitigation efforts, particularly measures that would place limits on their own development aspirations, by first dominating the G77 plus China's bloc - supporting SIDS and LDCS- , and then later building alliances outside of the G77 plus China coalition to shirk their own responsibility to mitigate their emissions (2017a, 389). Notwithstanding, as OXFAM (2015) cited in Ciplet and Roberts (2017a, 388) explained, semi-peripheral states agreed, as a group, to commit through their climate plans to more emissions reductions during the 2020-2030 period, than that of wealthy states. Further, in contemporary UNFCCC politics, Ciplet and Roberts (2017a, 389) observed that peripheral state coalitions such as AOSIS and the LDCs had called for proposals that challenge a North-South binary for mitigation responsibility, thereby resisting governance processes which intensify ecologically unequal exchanges due to fragmentation of defined interests between peripheral and semi-peripheral states. The salient point of the discussion above is the significantly diminished role and visibility of the SIDS among the CFAs within UNFCCC negotiations.

2.16 Climate Finance Negotiation Positions (Institutions)

Concepts also form a negotiation backdrop for climate finance negotiations. Within the adaptation setting, a contested negotiation position surrounded the definition of adaptation. Importantly, the UNFCCC defined adaptation in a narrow sense, which is adaptation to climate change *specifically,* as distinct from adaptation to climatic *variability*. Within climate finance negotiations, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between funding for building resilience to climate change which is additional to ODA contributions and funding for building resilience to climate variability more generally which could be included in ODA contributions (Ayers and Huq 2009, 680; Klein and Persson, 2008). However, Adenle et al. (2017,190-201), suggested that adaptation policies and programmes are too narrowly focused on explicit responses to climate change, as opposed to responses to climate variability. Consequently, adaptation finance is insufficient, and procedures for accessing it present challenges to governments' capacities.

Notwithstanding that there is a role for ODA in building resistance and reducing vulnerability to climate change, any clear separation of development from adaptation is less beneficial to developing countries (Ayers and Huq 2009, 675-692; Klein and Persson 2008). However, Ayers and Huq (2009) also suggest that "… supporting adaptation through development assistance makes sense"(6810.[56] Contrastingly, developing countries argued that adaptation funds "… should be separate, constitute a stream and not mimic the governance structure of [the ODA]" (Denton 2010, 656; Fankhauser and Burton 2011, 1037-1049; Eisenack 2012, 491-504). Importantly, Doshi and Garschagen (2020) and Khan and Munira (2021) make the disquieting point that a significant portion of climate and adaptation finance is recycled ODA, while "pre-existing ODA activity" is a predictor in bilateral adaptation finance (Doshi and Garschagen 2020, 7). This compounds accountability and climate justice issue because ODA is voluntary while adaptation finance is mandatory (Khan and Munira 2021, 4). This ODA-climate finance complexity is also compounded by the attitude of the World Bank which insists on using GDP per capita, (a misleading and simplified tool) for measuring development. It is particularly unsuitable in measuring for country vulnerability deficits (a characteristic which plague the SIDS), due to negative climate exposure and their lack of resilience to quickly bounce back.

[56] See also Dodman et al. (2009).

Similarly, mainstreaming adaptation into development, which involves the integration of information, policies, and measures to address climate change into ongoing development planning and decision-making (Ayers et al. 2014, 37-51), can be considered another form of supporting adaptation through ODA and, consequently, represent another negotiation position within the UNFCCC, though not one that necessarily results in additionality. Further, including climate risk insurance for catastrophic events into adaptation strategy and planning enables two activities; a negotiation position for the poorer nations, and an opportunity for the most vulnerable to benefit from post-disaster liquidity by adopting a preventive approach to climate related disasters (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009, 381-400). Note also, that insurance also functions as one of the international climate financial instruments (ICFIs).

Banerjee (2012, 1761-1786), while acknowledging that global negotiations at the level of the UNFCCC or the WTO have been traditionally examined through regime theory (Krasner 1982, 185-205) and considering climate change negotiations from the perspective of political economy, posited that the political economy of climate change is about the power dynamics between market, state and civil society actors. In his view, the politics of domination tend to prevail over the politics of legitimacy. Against this backdrop Banerjee (2012) also opined that if global regulation is the best way to address climate change, then it is difficult to see how the politics of domination will encourage global regulation at UNFCCC negotiations. Consequently, the market -state nexus favour climate change solutions such as carbon capture and storage as the means to address climate change; emissions trading as the way to reduce reductions; and private banks as the preferred financial structure (Banerjee 2012, 1768). In the result, power becomes the central unit of analysis when dealing with the political economy of climate change and negotiations take the form that ensures economic development is not affected by environmental actions (Banerjee 2012).

2.17 The United Nations Climate Finance Mechanism

2.17.1 Overview

This section will look at the GEF, GCF and the AF as key entities within the UNCFM. The other financial mechanisms, though important, will not be dealt with specifically in this paper. To that end, other financial instruments that influence the climate finance mechanisms, include: (a) ICFIs in the form of international transfers (Brunner and Enting 2014, 138-143; Abadie et al. 2013, 943-955; Aakre and Rubellke 2010, 767-791; (b) insurance (Bals et al. 2006, 381-400; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2009, 38-400; Leurig & Dlugolecki 2013; Cummins and Mahul 2008); (c) NAMAs (Bali Action Plan UNFCCC 2007; Li 2011; Bakker and Huizenga 2010, 314-336; Coetzee and Winker 2014, 4-11); (d) the clean technology fund (Bakker and Huizenga 2010, 314-336); and (e) the 'no-lose target' system. Together they undoubtedly influenced the UNCFM. Notably, the UNDP (2011) citing Dervis, Kharas and Unger (2011) also estimates that there are more than a thousand financing mechanisms for climate change, while the World Bank lists more than 230 multilateral development agencies that are involved in CCF. The machinery of the funds, particularly the concept of 'partner entity', 'co-financing' and 'national entities' will be examined.

2.17.2 The Adaptation Fund

There are four funds relevant to adaptation under the UNFCCC:

(1) The LDCF. This was established to help developing countries to prepare and implement their NAPAs;

(2) The SCCF. This was developed to support a number of climate change activities such as mitigation and technology transfer, but prioritizing adaptation;

(3) The GEF Trust Fund's Strategic Priority for Adaptation (SPA). This was established to pilot 'operational' approaches to adaptation;

(4) The AF, which comes under the Kyoto Protocol (Ayers and Huq 2009; Decisions 5/CP.7, 6/CP.7 and 10/CP.7).

The AF was adopted at COP 7, 2001 in Marrakesh through Decision 10/CP.7. Further, the operationalizing and governance structure of the AF came into being in Nairobi through decision (5/CMP.2) and finalization of procedures were made at the COP 12, 2007 in Bali through Decision 1/CMP.3. Notably, the AF is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB). However, credit must be given to the developing country Parties (SIDS included) for insisting that the GEF not be the operating entity of the AF, a power position argued for by the developed country Parties[57]. Consequently, the AFB became the operating entity for the AF (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011, 23-32).

The AF is administered by a sixteen-member board, with ten representatives from developing countries, and the remaining six from developed countries, while the World Bank serves as the Trustee (Kahn et al. 2020, 251-269). Further, the GEF provides secretariat service to the AF on an interim basis. Abbot and Gartner (2011, 1-15) refers to this system as state-centric and suggested that direct participation by civil society and stakeholders provides for better governance. In that context, the authors posit that the AF governance structure is really a backward step from earlier models of participation such as UNAIDS, The GAVI Alliance[58] and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

The guiding principles of the Fund include access by Parties in a balanced and equitable manner (Decision 5/CMP.2 para. 1(b)), and transparency and openness in the governance of the Fund (para. 1(c)). The governing body, constituted by Parties in the Kyoto Protocol, is based on the one country-one vote rule, where projects are country and needs driven (Khan et al. 2020, 251-269). The AF is capitalized from a 2% levy of the CERs issued from CDM project activities

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[57] This rejection was due, inter alia, to the exceptionally long GEF project cycles (Lattanzio 2012) of up to 22 months (Nyekwere 2017) for project delivery involving several different states of review by multiple GEF actors.

[58] A global health partnership, in collaboration with the WHO, of public and private sector organizations dedicated to “immunization for all.” https://www.who.int/workforcealliance/members_partners/member_list/gavi/en/

in developing countries (Denton 2010, 655-671; Grasso 2010, 74-81) and contributions from sovereign governments, foundations, non-governmental organizations, private corporations, and individuals (UNFCCC 2016). The CDM/CERs represent(s) the ICFI of the AF. Further, under the AF, all funding applicants must submit their project proposals through national implementing entities (NIEs), regional implementing entities (REIs) or multilateral implementing entities (MIEs). Proposals also require endorsement by the national designated authority (NDA) of the country in which the proposed activities would take place (UNFCCC 2016).

The NIE is directly related to the principle of direct access through which developing countries, (SIDS included), will exercise more ownership and responsibility. Further, the AF is the first multilateral climate fund that allowed direct access, thereby avoiding the need for intermediate implementing agencies. It is a 'government run' model where governments of developing countries "are able to nominate a national implementing entity (NIE) to the AFB [where] [t]he NIEs are responsible for organising the project level monitoring, reporting and evaluation, including the final evaluation."[59] As of June 2018, there were twenty-eight accredited NIEs for accessing resources directly from the AF with a cumulative project and programme approvals reaching USD 476.8 million with USD 225.7 million available for new funding approvals and USD 270 million available for projects and programmes in the active pipeline (Decision 2/CMP.14).

At the outset, developing countries argued that adaptation funds "… should be separate, constitute a stream and not mimic the governance structure of [the ODA]" (Denton 2010, 656; Fankhauser and Burton 2011, 1037-1049; Eisenack 2012, 491-504). Further, the differences between adaptation needs and development needs are blurred (Persson et al. 2009), while distrust between the richest and the poorest nations on an international regime to manage the global commons exacerbate this difference (Bapna and Mc Gray 2008). The AF was designed to finance concrete adaptation programmes and projects in developing

[59] Harmeling and Kaloga (2011, 27).

countries that are party to the Kyoto Protocol, and particularly vulnerable to climate change (Levaggi 2014, 121-123). However, according the Harmeling and Kaloga (2011, 23-32), the fact that the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)[60] received more than ten times the resources than that donated to the AF, reflects the "… preference of many donor countries towards mainstreaming adaptation, rather than funding concrete projects, and the World Bank as a managing body" (2011, 26).

Further, COP 24 also makes specific reference to strengthening adaptation by mainstreaming adaptation into planning (Decision 9/CP.24). Important also, is Klein's (2006) argument that the AF gives developing countries the greatest ownership amongst the various funds that finance adaptation activities. Specifically, however, Horstmann (2011, 1086-1096) points out that the AF is unique in three ways: (1) its independence from ODA; (2) its direct access to funds (Stadelmann et al. 2014); and (3) most developing countries operate in the Fund's governance mechanism. Additionally, Grasso (2010) also pointed out that the AF had met the procedural, distributive, and participative justice standard, which is in keeping with the demand of the justice theory. However, Ciplet and Roberts (2017, 372-398), Khan et al. (2020, 251-269), and Klinsky and Dowlatabadi (2008, 88-108) have all submitted that the AF had not met the standards required for procedural, distributive and participative justice.

In addition, funding channeled through the AF should be predictable, appropriate, equitable and adequate (Denton 2010, 655-671; Müller et al. 2009, 1-19; Eisenack 2012; Art 4.4 UNFCCC 1992; Art 3.1 UNFCCC 1992). This view is justified under the CBDR principle and the concept of 'burden sharing' flowing therefrom (Denton 2010, 655-671). Interestingly, Stadelmann et al. (2014) pointed out that "… prioritization among eligible countries and projects remains unclear" (102). Responding on behalf of the AF, Levaggi (2014, 121) criticized Stadelmann et al. (2014) for presenting methodological errors in their data units and submitted

[60] The PPCR was set up outside the UNFCCC process under the World Bank Climate Investment Funds portfolio. It receives funds from donor countries.

that funding decisions are not influenced by characteristics of the proponent country, but only by the technical qualities of the proposal. Interestingly, (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011, 23-32) suggested that the issue of unclear prioritization of projects lie with members of the AFB. In their view:

> [t]he decision-making power of some AFB members representing countries which do not belong to the group of 'particularly vulnerable countries' named in the Bali Action Plan … has hindered agreement on this prioritisation. (AFB 2011:29)

The countries referred to here are the LDCs, SIDS and countries in Africa prone to droughts, floods and desertification, and the view held is that the members not representing them belong to the developed and more developing countries. Additionally, with the AF now serving the PA, there is every likelihood that it will become richer but not particularly benefitting the most vulnerable (Ciplet et al. 2013). Importantly, the now established GCF may result in a challenge to the AF and a possible drying up of its own funds, if the AF is not successful at funding good adaptation projects and improving direct access (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011, 23-32). Interestingly, Scoville-Simonds (2016, 17) pointed out that traditional international development agencies have been approved faster, with fewer conditions, for higher-risk/impact projects for a wider range of activities, and are eligible to receive more substantial funding, as opposed to the new 'direct access' NIEs. Ultimately, this raises the question of fairness in the distribution of adequate and predictable CCAF to the SIDS that is new and additional.

Even with a renewed role under the PA, the potential of the AF is constrained by a continuous resource crunch after its primary revenue source - a 2% share of proceeds levy from mitigation projects registered under the CDM[61] - dried up (Warnecke et al. 2017). However, Fankhauser and Martin (2009) also posit that a 10% levy could raise up to USD10 billion once there are restrictions on credit demand. Additionally, Kok et al. (2008, 103-118) pointed out that the AF is

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[61] Many project gaps exist with the CDM due primarily to very few approved methodologies for the transport sector. Transport accounts for approximately 13% of global GHGs, under the CDM (Bakker and Huizenga 2010).

unlikely to generate capital flows to meet the financial needs of adaptation, and consequently development finance and private investments, both international and domestic, will be required (Sussman and Helme 2004; Miller, 2008). Subsequently, it was announced in 2018, that the AF would be capitalized to the tune of USD129 million with pledged donations.[62] Further, Warnecke et al. (2017) suggested that the AF should consider raising funds by closely engaging with actors in the voluntary carbon markets to explore additional options for raising CCAF.

Notably, the COP 24 reiterated its concern regarding the issues related to the sustainability, adequacy, and predictability of funding for the AF due to the current uncertainty about the prices of CERs (Decision 2/CMP.14, para 6). Additionally, COP 24 encouraged the scaling up of financial resources, notwithstanding cumulative receipts of USD 753.5 million into the Adaptation Trust Fund as of 30th June 2018, and pledges of USD 129 million from developed countries for 2018 (Decision 2/CMP.14). However, as pointed out earlier, funds required for adaptation far outweigh the AF's cumulative receipts and pledges for 2018 (UNEP 2014; Ciplet and Roberts 2017b). This brings into sharp focus questions about the predictability and distributive justice in funding CCAF for the SIDS (Trujillo et al. 2013).

2.18 The Global Environment Facility

First proposed in 1989 by the government of France in response to the 1987 publication of the World Commission on Environment and Development Report - "Our Common Future"- on the deterioration of the global commons, the GEF was subsequently established in 1991 by the World Bank with funding from the major economic powers (G7) to serve the needs of developing countries in confronting the difficulty of climate change mitigation and adaptation. According to Ervine (2007, 125), the GEF emerged out of a set of high-level negotiations "dominated by a handful of Northern nations which sought to pre-empt a potential Southern

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[62] From France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and others. Importantly, Germany pledged US$1.7 billion to the GCF, and the European Union may lead in filling the gap left by the USA's withdrawal from the GCF as well as the PA (Khan et al. 2020; Decision 2/CMP.14).

proposal for a global green fund at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development."

Specifically, the GEF was set up to provide financing to country-driven climate change mitigation and CCA projects avoiding the one-nation, one-vote UN General Assembly-type structure, with the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP as the GEF's three project implementing agencies in the Global South (Ervine 2007, 125-142). However, due to widespread criticism of a monopoly by the UNEP, World Bank and UNDP, the FAO, UNIDO, IDB, the Internal Fund for Agricultural Development, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development were all added as executing agencies of the GEF. The GEF comprises the GEF Council; the COP; the GEF Assembly; the GEF Secretariat (GEFSEC); the Scientific & Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) and the GEF Evaluation Office (GEF EO). The main decision-making body in the GEF is the GEF Council, which is responsible, under guidance of the COP, for developing, adopting, and evaluating the operational policies and programmes for GEF financed activities. The Council meets every six months and comprises thirty-two constituency representatives, representing 178 countries that are parties to the GEF, with sixteen representing developing countries, fourteen for developed countries and two for economies-in-transition respectively (Ervine 2007, 125-142). Abbot and Gartner (2011, 1-15), similar to their comment about the AF, called this the state-centric approach, which is counterproductive to civil society and stakeholder participation. Interestingly, the GEF Assembly comprises representatives of all the participant countries within the GEF, the World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, regional development banks, representatives of the different conventions as well as accredited major groups, who are all invited to the Assembly meetings. The GEFSEC ensures that the decisions taken by the Council and the Assembly are translated into effective action by liaising with the implementing agencies, while the STAP advises the GEF. The UNEP provides the secretariat, while the GEF EO assesses the work of the GEF.

Further, unlike the AF, which has a one-country one-vote system, voting in the GEF Council requires a double-weighted majority, through an affirmative vote representing both a 60% majority of the total number of participating countries and a representative providing 60% majority of the GEF funding. However, Ervine (2007, 125-142) posited that this system, which is based on the Bretton Woods model, was never tested, since GEF decisions are made by consensus, but the real decisions are made behind closed doors. This exclusionary process is compounded by the fact that donor governments -in essence, the G7- who contribute the funds to the GEF occupy a privileged position to demand that their interests are represented. The GEF also serves the financing mechanisms for the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), UNFCCC, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (Nyekwere 2017, 278-97). Interestingly also, the GEF's strategic focal areas are biodiversity; climate change mitigation; international waters; land degradation; chemicals framework; sustainable forest management; and cross cutting capacity development (GEF 2014). It should be noted that CCA is not a separate focal area listed for the GEF.

According to Khan et al. (2020) skepticism of the GEF remained because it is "… donor-controlled, based at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., and requires that all spending result in global public goods benefits, including … the case of adaptation projects" (255)); Ciplet et al. 2013). Subsequently, the GEF relaxed its policy and began accommodating a broader approach to adaptation funding (Khan et al. 2020, 251-269; Ciplet et al. 2013, 49-68) deciding, inter alia, to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures covered by Article 4.1 (UNFCCC 1992), and in accordance with Article 4.3 (UNFCCC 1992), facilitate provision and transparency of financial resources and pragmatic application of its concept of incremental costs on a case-by-case basis (Decision 11/CP.2). In the result, GEF became the operating entity of financial mechanism of the UNFCCC in accordance with Article 11.1 of the UNFCCC, except for the AF. Consequently, an MOU between the GEF and the COP was signed to govern their relationship.

The GEF is also required to report annually to the COP covering matters relating to guidance given to it by the COP and all GEF funded activities in implementing the Convention. The GEF also serves the PA (Decision 13/CP.25) and operates through a partnership with accredited entities that are responsible for proposing and managing its projects. Project proposals are first endorsed by recipient countries with assistance from agencies and NGOs. The GEF projects are one of three types - full-size projects (more than USD 2 million), medium-sized projects (less than USD 2 million), and enabling activities (EAs) - while the approval process differs by project type. EAs are projects that assist countries with reporting requirements of the UNFCCC. Preparation grants are also available to aid in the development of projects (Kotchen and Negi 2019, 41-62).

The GEF is funded through developed country contributions. Every four years, as part of a replenishment process, the GEF reviews and revises its funding and strategic priorities (Nyekwere 2017; Kotchen and Negi 2019, 41-62). For every USD 1 invested, the GEF expects at least USD 3 in co-financing, which varies based on the project themes and country of implementation (Nyekwere 2017). Defined as the joint or parallel financing of projects through loans or grants to developing countries in association with the World Bank, (IMF 2014, 226 cited in Kotchen and Negi 2019, 41-62), co-financing is designed to leverage more resources from public and private sources to accomplish project outcomes and development goals[63] (Kotchen and Negi 2019, 41-62). It is important to note also that funds managed by the GEF, particularly the LDCF, SPA and the SCCF, depend on voluntary contributions from donor countries (Horstmann 2011, 1086-1096), which inevitably reflect the demands of donors on how the GEF should function (Ervine 2007, 125-142).

Notably, co-financing may come from a variety of sources including public and private money in the recipient country, loans from the MDBs, foreign direct investment, or other ODA (Lattanzio 2012). Interestingly, the COP has endorsed

[63] The GEF, has since provided more than USD13.5 bn in grants for environmental projects while leveraging an additional USD 65 bn of co-financing for projects in 165 developing countries, seeking to reach a co- financing ratio of at least 6:1 for its overall portfolio, with expectations of greater co-financing from upper-middle income countries (Lattanzio 2012; Kotchen and Negi 2019, 41-62).

recent policy reforms of the GEF that seek to increase co-financing even further (Decision 6/CP.24). However, Kotchen and Negi (2019, 41-62) were quick to point out that the push towards co-financing will mostly favour projects supported by MDBs in countries with supposedly "government effectiveness" and "regulatory quality" (43), focusing on climate change projects where investments in renewable energy are common. Additionally, Cui et al. (2020, 95-108) found that the co-financing ratio of GEF grants increased from 3.95 to 7.69 during 1991-2018, with climate change (mitigation) projects showing the strongest leverage potential and co-financing being higher in emerging economies and lower in low-income countries.

Another key policy in GEF funding is the principle of incremental costs. Explained by Nyekwere (2017, 278-297) as the difference in costs between a project with global environmental benefits and an alternative project without such global benefits, the incremental costs must therefore be incorporated by the GEF Council for any GEF finance or grants (Lattanzio 2012). However, calculating estimated incremental costs proved problematic, to say the least, since it is difficult to "… separate global and national causes of environmental degradation and to determine a global or a national level of action…" or even distinguish global and national environmental benefits (Nyekwere 2017, 292). In the absence of a global definition of incremental costs, governments continue to accuse GEF's implementing agencies of unilaterally determining what those costs are through the application of technological metrics that are biased towards market-based solutions. In the result, projects using low-cost technology or indigenous knowledge or local stewardship and public education which create global environmental benefits cannot be funded by GEF because they do not fit into GEF's incremental costs formula (Nyekwere 2017, 278-297). With so many challenges surrounding incremental costs, it is difficult to accept the view that co-financing helps to ensure that aid finances only the incremental costs of projects and that co-financing indeed promotes recipient country ownership of projects and programmes (Kotchen and Negi 2019, 41-62).

Importantly, under the GEF, funds are only accessible indirectly through the GEF's designated partner entities (Horstmann, 2011, 1086-1096). Additionally, even though the GEF has spent billions over the past ten years (Kok et al. 2008, 103-118; Tirpak and Adams, 2008, 135–151), it still represents a fraction of the USD100-200 bn estimated as needed per year to invest in clean energy, improved access to energy and reduced vulnerability effects on development projects (World Bank, 2006; UNFCCC, 2007). Further, even though the GEF has provided more financial and project support to renewable energy than for energy efficiency (Hennicke et al. (2007, 13-25), Gomez-Echeverri and Müller (2009) pointed out that most country Parties believe that the scale of funding and the current financial operational arrangements of the GEF are inadequate.

Notably, the COP 24 (twenty-two years after COP2), and after receiving the GEF report and expressing concern with the decrease in allocation to the climate change focal area, acknowledged notwithstanding, the increased integration of climate change priorities into other focal areas. Additionally, COP 24 acknowledged the efforts by the GEF to reach an increased ratio of co-financing to its project financing and its Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT), which enhances predictability of funding for the CBIT. Further, the COP 24 requested that the GEF consider the participation of additional national and regional entities, as appropriate, as it builds capacity to fund other focal areas in diverse countries (Decision 6/CP.24).

2.19 The Green Climate Fund

The Cancun Agreement established the GCF at the COP 16, in 2010. The GCF is governed by the GCF Board. It functions under the guidance of the COP and is accountable to the COP in support of projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties using thematic funding windows (Decision 1/CP.16). It is an operating entity of the UNCFM (Art 11, UNFCCC 1992). Similarly, to the AF, the GCF was operationalized and administered by a twenty-four-member board, with equal representation from the developed and developing countries. However, some developed countries at COP 18, in Doha

2012, in an effort to weaken developing country decision-making over the GCF, were unsuccessful in their efforts to limit the GCF's accountability to the COP (Decision 3/CP.17; Khan et al. 2020), while Abbot and Gartner (2011, 1-15) argued that direct stakeholder participation in GCF governance, as opposed to the current state-centric model, can serve to reconcile differences in visioning that divide the North and South. In this context, the GCF Board agreed to a twenty-person Private Sector Advisory Group (PSAG) as part of its effort to have public and private involvement in the affairs of the GCF (Schalatek et al. 2012, 1-4).

Notably, the GCF received strong support from civil society organizations (CSOs) which endorsed its decision to adopt the principle of 'country ownership' (Chaudhury 2020; Schalatek et al. 2012, 1-4) as a central strategy to "… empower recipient countries to take 'effective leadership' over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions" (Bertilsson and Thörn 2020, 2), even though country ownership is understood as institutional capacity rather than anticipated bottom-up processes. Enabling its central strategy of country ownership are the GCF's core concepts of paradigm shift and transformational change. Paradigm shift is linked to building a low carbon society, specifically low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways (Schalatek et al. 2012, 1-4), while transformational change, focusses on fundamental adjustments as opposed to incremental changes, in managing climate change. Additionally, two CSOs and two private sector (PSO) representatives, equally representing donor and recipient countries, can participate at GCF Board meetings (Bertilsson and Thörn 2020, 1-19).

Applying a discourse analysis methodology of GCF documents[64] underpinned by searches for the concepts, 'transformational change' and 'paradigm shift', Bertilsson and Thörn (2020, 15) found that these concepts "have been mobilized as discursive resources in order to control the project proposal process, while still describing it as country ownership and responsiveness to the needs of

[64] Including eleven board meeting reports and affiliated documents totaling 2,774 pages and three interviews of key actors for confirmation.

recipient countries." Further, the authors found that the new financial instruments will more than likely unlock private sector investments by equating financialization of climate finance governance with country ownership, even though the approach is more top-down than bottom-up. In their view, climate finance governance is seen as an all-too-important issue to be left to recipient countries. Consequently, there is neglect of historical responsibility of developed countries for climate change and a requirement for developing countries to make themselves investable, notwithstanding pressures to the contrary from the climate justice movement (Bertilsson and Thörn 2020, 1-19).

Informed by Foucauldian governmentality studies, a discursive framework by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2016, 519-532) approached government as a performative practice that was actively involved in the constitution of objects, identities and interests at various political sites, such as the UNFCCC, the COP, the GEF, GCF and the AF, through discourses of green governmentality, ecological modernization and civic environmentalism, and the extent to which they still inform climate governance. In this context, the authors found that the discourse on green governmentality continued to advance the state as the principal agent of climate governance and the UN as the epicentre of global climate policy, while discourses on ecological modernization see climate change as a decentralized, multi-level and participatory governance challenge that is better achieved through polycentric governance structures from the local to domestic and transnational levels (Au et al. 2011). Whereas, in relation to civic environmentalism, the discourse is defined by the slogan 'system change, not climate change' (Bond 2012).

The GCF is devoted, in part, to funding low carbon development projects, capacity build up, and adaptation (Hourcade et al. 2012, 4). Notably, at COP 16, held in Cancun, developed country Parties undertook to mobilize USD 100 bn annually by 2020 in the form of private and public funds for mitigation and adaptation measures to be administered by the GCF (Decision 1/CP.16). Consequently, the GCF is expected to play an important role in leveraging private funding with the help of public finance to mobilize the USD 100 bn annually (Fridahl et al. 2014, 257-269). Importantly, accounting for USD 100 bn is particularly difficult due to the multiple accounting and methodological approaches used by developed countries (Roberts at al. 2021). However, there are doubts whether the entire USD 100 bn will be deposited into GCF coffers[65]. The GCF intends to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures, in the form of national, regional or GCF accredited entities and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties (Abadie et al. 2013, 943-955; Gomez Echeverri 2013, 632-648; UNFCCC, 2016), and is committed to offering balanced ownership over the functionality and funding decisions of the GCF (Chaudhury 2020, 4). Also expected, is equal funding distribution between adaptation and mitigation (Schalatek et al. 2012, 1-4), with at least 50% of funds going towards LDCs, SIDS and African countries.

However, notwithstanding GCF's commitments, difficulties arose that included demand for project funding outstripping availability, lower commitment of funds from pledged countries, including the non-payment of USD 2 bn by the United States of America consequent on its withdrawal from the PA. Additional difficulties included unequal allocation of funding between adaptation and mitigation activities, a stringent process for accreditation of national entities and their lower capacity to meet the extensive funding covenants, and skewed allocation of projects and funding to international entities. Much of this was occasioned from distrust between developing country Parties and developed country Parties over the latter's insistence on applying neoliberal constructs to GCF governance decisions (Chaudhury 2020, 1-17). Additionally, "[t]he GCF Funding is Heavily Skewed towards International Intermediaries, Reinforcing the Historical International Dominant Development Model (initial capitals original)" (Chaudhury 2020, 8)[66],

[65] Further, 60% of the initial capitalization of the pledged US$10.3 billion (Chaudhury 2020, 1-17) was deposited into the GCF coffers, diminishing any expectation by developing countries that they would even been handling the expected USD100 bn a year commitment (Chaudhury 2020, 1-17).

[66] Out of 132 projects in the GCF pipeline, only seventeen are managed by national accredited entities, as opposed to one hundred and three (103) managed by international accredited entities. With respect to financing for these projects, a mere 6% (USD 396 million) of all funding was channeled through national accredited entities, while 94% (USD 5.6 bn) went to regional and international entities.

with National Intermediaries slowing down due to weak ecosystem of national accredited entities to develop projects independently, despite GCF training (Chaudhury 2020, 10).

Importantly, with 93% of global climate finance flows in 2017/2018 directed towards low carbon energy transition and transportation projects, the GCF's financing projects portfolio stand at 42% in favour of mitigation, 34 % towards cross-cutting and 24% in favour of adaptation, and the fact that most adaptation funding is grant based, brings into question its sustainability particularly since reduced funds will encourage the GCF to focus on projects with greater impact output (Chaudhury 2020, 1-17). As Chaudhury (2020, 10) puts it, "[t]he Quantum of Climate Adaptation Funding Will Go Up, but the Gap between Adaptation and Mitigation Funding Will Widen in Favour of Mitigation because of Missing Key Intermediary Roles in Adaptation (initial capitals original)." Arguing that there is a scientific and political dimension to the term 'vulnerability', Klein and Möhner (2011, 15-22) suggested that the GCF adopts a 'no prioritization approach' and instead let the countries themselves determine their own vulnerability as practiced by the AF.

According to Bertilsson and Thörn (2020, 1-19), between 2015 and 2019 the GCF approved 114 'ordinary' projects and seven smaller-scale projects through the Simplified Approval Process Pilot Scheme, utilizing varied financial instruments, such as grants (44%), loans 44%, equity loans (8%), results-based payments 2% and guarantees 2%. Acknowledging that finance is a central part of climate finance governance, Bertilsson and Thörn (2020, 1-19) posited that "… climate finance became mainstreamed into development aid, partly because scientists argued for a more integrated perspective, and because it gave governments … an opportunity to reduce the need for new and additional resources in recipient countries" (6). Consequently, developed countries pushed for financialization of climate finance governance as a means of opening more financial instruments and profits, at the same time, deepening neoliberalization in the Global South. In this context, Zhang et al. (2017, 213-219) posited that climate change governance will remain central through a decentralized effort enabled by strengthening cooperation among cities, local governments, NGOs, universities and the academic community, while the withdrawal by the United States from the PA also opens up opportunities for interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism and engagement with non-Party stakeholders, particularly cities and the private sector, to enable the GCF to fulfil its role[67] in implementing the PA Bowman and Minas (2019, 342-353)[68].

Meanwhile, Keucheyan (2018), cited in Bertilsson and Thörn (2020, 1-19), suggested that financialization is a political dispossession beyond the control of democratic deliberation rather than any representation of a democratization of finance. In the result, the financialization of global climate finance governance brings into sharp focus issues concerning whether private finance can address adaptation which is difficult to measure; whether grants and concessional loans should be based on public funding; and should there be instruments such as green bonds and insurances to incentivize and catalyse private sector investments in climate projects, taking into consideration that "[s]uccess is measured by the amount of co-financing from the private sector for every invested dollar from the GCF" (Bertilsson and Thörn (2020, 12).

It is important to also note that the COP 24 urged for a review of the accreditation framework and the continuation of the GCF Board's deliberations to develop a mechanism for arriving at decisions where there is no consensus, along with implementation plans to speed up disbursement of funds to already approved projects as a key element of the Green Climate Fund's operations (Decision 5/CP.24). In summary, almost all the difficulties identified as plaguing GEF, and the AF, and by extension the SIDS, continue to be associated with the GCF.

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[67] Through more efficient leveraging of resources to increase private capital and resources concerning adaptation, the GCF is able to achieve a greater impact from the funds pledged to it by governments, expanding its base of climate finance while addressing at the same time criticisms of excessive state-centricity (Bowman and Minas 2019, 342-353).

[68] Additionally, the GCF Private Sector Facility aims to respond to a significant market gap and an unmet demand for innovative approaches and financial instruments that would enable the mobilization of the private sector, especially in developing countries.

2.20 Analysis and Research Implications

The UNFCCC is a mitigation Convention with only a sliver for CCAF, despite all the climate talk, climate pledges and climate decisions. The Convention and the UNCFM promote market-based mechanisms to raise CCF, including CCAF for the SIDS. The developed countries, led by the IPCC are laser focused and convinced that only the reduction of GHGs can save our planet, and all states must 'voluntary' subscribe to NDCs. Against that backdrop, climate finance and its governance present difficulties for the SIDS in the sense that scale prevents them from effectively participating in the market, and any forged participation by the SIDS is likely to increase their debt-to-income ratios, leading to possible default, IMF interventions, bailouts for a political price, population strangulation and political instability, in an already delicate political economy imbalance within the SIDS. Additionally, recognition by developed country Parties of 'historical responsibility' does not equal liability and compensation. In fact, that recognition has become fluid and includes other states that were not historically responsible.

The challenge, therefore, for the SIDS is how to survive politically and financially within this construct where power dynamics underlie the UNCFM's interest and motivations towards managing the global commons. However, the push back from the developed country Parties and their scientific and academic support, the SIDS should promote and keep the debate within the frame of a quantifiable 'adaptation debt' owed to them within the broader framework of a climate/ecological debt. This approach creates an opportunity for the SIDS/AOSIS to remove themselves from being seen and treated as peripheral states, and negotiate independently of the G77 plus China, on an exclusive adaptation platform, thereby avoiding the conundrum where China, a major polluter with multiple positions - some for China and others for the G77 plus China - is seen as hypocritical in leading the fight for the SIDS to receive CCAF. Consequently, the SIDS can consider applying qualitative and quantitative approaches such as the ecological unequal exchange theory of collective action as support for larger sums of CCAF to them than to others who suffered less climate change impacts. Such an approach also allows the SIDS to argue that adaptation was not meant to be subjected to the global benefits means test and therefore an unequal share, in their favour, of CCAF was justified within the context of distributive justice principles.

Additionally, the SIDS will have the opportunity to negotiate for a greater vote, and in keeping with the ecological unequal exchange theory, a greater weighting of their votes within the UNCFM to compensate and balance out power, unequal knowledge and financial advantages of the developed countries. Such a move can reduce the need for the SIDS to play nice to the powerful and be seen only as entities for side payments. The payment of an adaptation debt is best done through direct transfers to national budgets to specific programmes that the SIDS would have decided on prior, allowing for integrated budgets where possible, and stand-alone (s) where necessary. The key to this activity is its originality within the SIDS and its reflection of the needs of the SIDS. The CARICOM, because of its existing structure, can take the lead in this effort and replicate it within the Pacific and Oceanic SIDS. In this manner, the inapplicability and dangers that co-financing and leveraging pose to the SIDS can be avoided.

Importantly, the label for the CCAF that is transferred should be ‘public’ whether or not it was raised through private sources. Consequently, the source of the funds for repayment of the adaptation debt should be a burden and concern for the SIDS. The greater outcome is for the debt to be discharged via the provision of public finance, and since it is a reducing debt, the burdens, challenges and non-qualification that go with loans, guarantees, bonds, and equity can also be avoided, and the ‘historical debt’ millstone eventually discharged. Importantly, as a benefit, direct transfers of CCAF into the national budgets of the SIDS, mainstreams adaptation into development which reduces tension between ODA and adaptation finance; allows the SIDS to transition to low carbon and resilient development (LCRD); provides the best evidence of country ownership; releases opportunities for definitions of key finance terms at the national level; and an opportunity of monetising LCRD and using it as ICFIs and possibly as financial reserves. In this manner, adapting to climate change by the SIDs would become unblurred and dependent on ‘public’ transfers, while mitigation, as the prime response to climate change impacts, remain unbothered.

No abandonment of the AF, GEF and the GCF, is proposed, they need to continue functioning, but differently. They all have a role in raising CCF through their various mechanisms. The difference lies in the transfer mechanism. In the case of CCAF, these entities will make the direct transfer to the budgets of the SIDS, as opposed to current delivery of CCAF via projects. In the result, the bureaucracy and fund expertise surrounding CCAF will no longer be needed within the UNCFM, but will be needed within the SIDS, thereby broadening their resource pool. Consequently, the neoliberal market system of the UNCFM will continue to serve the mitigation interests of the UNFCCC, where optimal global economic solutions become the expected outcome which favours mitigation as opposed to adaptation projects. However, the accusation that the GEF, and to a lesser extent the GCF, have been transformed into a representational mechanism for the agents of global capital and a tool to promote neoliberal policies around the globe is likely to remain, undermining their credibility and ability to manage the global commons in a fair manner. In like manner, the protection of donor interests where the power and influence to negotiate outside the normative framework obtains, will likely continue, but hopefully guidance from the COP will also be influenced by the SIDS/AOSIS as a negotiation collective under the rubric of an adaptation coalition that speaks for 44 countries. In that sense, the SIDS should develop their own negotiation matrix. Table 2.1 presents the literature review matrix of key discourse concepts and, using the scoping method, the number of articles/papers/reports identified for the Literative Review.

Table 2. 1: Literature Review Matrix

Literature Review Categories	Discourse Concepts	Articles/papers/reports and categories identified for Lit review using the Scoping Method
Uncertainties in The Climate Change Finance Regime	adaptation finance; adaptation finance justice; adequate and predictable; new and additional; additionality; scaled up financial resources; particularly vulnerable; mainstreaming adaptation and development; estimating climate finance.	(a) adaptation finance (38); (b) climate change adaptation (18); (c) vulnerability and negotiations (33); (d) climate finance (52); (e) the adaptation fund (39), GEF (30), GCF (31); (f) climate change (16); (g) climate justice (23); (h) climate change politics (19); (i) global climate finance (28); (j) environmental justice (18); and (k) climate change mitigation (24); (l) uncertainty and methodologies (46) **TOTAL = 415**
Financing CCA	neoliberal market mechanisms; contested public good; minilateralism; distributive justice; more mitigation means less adaptation; coalitions of interests; direct international financial transfers; game theory; carbon credits; clean development mechanism; economic modelling; leveraging.	
Mitigation Is Now the Business of SIDS	voluntary emissions reductions; mitigation as opposed to adaptation; historical responsibility; shift from adaptation mitigation; balancing adaptation and mitigation; more mitigation means less adaptation; linking CCAF to mitigation performance; equating adaptation to mitigation.	
Adaptation Finance Governance	discursive dominance; structures and power relations; polluter pays; fairness; distributive justice; respective capability; governance; financialization; accredited entities; financial instruments; private capital; co-financing; leverage.	

2.21 Summary

This chapter provided a literature review under four broad areas (a) uncertainties in the climate change finance regime, (b) financing CCA, (c) mitigation is now the business of SIDS and (d) adaptation finance governance. Under uncertainties in the climate change finance regime, focus was placed on theoretical and methodological approaches, uncertainty in important environments, and an economic perspective to uncertainty, highlighting that uncertainty, wherever present, will affect the capabilities of parties within the UNCFM, along a full performance spectrum, in the provision to the SIDS of adequate and predictable CCAF that is new and additional. The chapter continued with a review of literature relating to financing CCA, emphasizing a review of the effectiveness of climate funds and financing from an adaptation costs perspective, the effectiveness of climate funds and financing from climate related, non-climate related and national government perspective, private finance and theoretical framings used in climate finance. The chapter also reviewed literature relating to a preference for mitigation finance over adaptation finance, the linking CCAF to performance, and equating adaptation to mitigation.

The chapter concludes with literature reviews of adaptation finance governance with special emphasis on distributive justice and fairness in the context of CCAF, climate finance actors, climate finance negotiation positions at the level of actors and institutions, reviews of the AF, GEF and the GCF and the analysis and implications for the research. The overall conclusion is that, in the absence of distributive justice and the dominance of the market-based approach even within the UNCFM governance mechanism, the SIDS are unlikely to be provided with CCAF that is adequate, predictable, and new and additional, unless they forge a different approach to the provision of CCAF. In that regard, the SIDs should consider calling for a quantifiable adaptation debt that is discharged through direct transfers into national budgets.

Chapter 3 will focus on IR theories that elucidate the context for the overall conclusions of the foregoing and subsequent chapters and provide the lenses through which the study is grounded and explained.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC, COP and the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF. Consequently, the COP, AF, GEF and GCF are part of the constituent elements of the UNCFM, each of which is treated as an international regime (IRE), an international organization (IO) and or an international institution (II), depending on context when measured against the understandings of IREs, IOs and or IIs (Krasner 1982, 185-205; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 753-776; Keohane 1989; Hasenclever et al. 2002; Viotti and Kauppi 2012).

International Relations is a field of inquiry that theorists use to construct and make the world and human interactions within it, more intelligible through an understanding of the complexities encompassing the intersubjective and subjective nature of global politics (Viotti and Kauppi 2012). However, IR is not a theory, rather it is a paradigm which is explained through the application of various theories, which for convenience, are called IR theories. The theoretical framework of this research provides the boundaries for situating it within the selected theories. As a result, it is broad enough to cover the ontological, epistemological and methodological issues within the IR literature on theories of IREs, with special emphasis on knowledge-based (social constructivism) theories. The extent to which a synthesis is possible between power based (PB), interest based (IB) and knowledge-based theories of IREs will be explored. Additionally, a synthesis between those theories and realist constructivism will also be explored.

At this juncture, the researcher agrees with Viotti and Kauppi (2012, 15) that constructivism is not a theory, nor an image, but rather a theoretically informed approach to interpretative understanding of IR. Therefore, constructivists can theorize within this interpretative understanding any of the images or perspectives of IR (Barkin 2010; Hasenclever et al. 2002). Constructivism is therefore a theoretically informed approach to IR which, like IR, is explained through various theories. Naturally, important questions that define the regime-analytical agenda emerge in the issue area of CCAF. What accounts for instances of rule-based cooperation in the COP/UNFCCC? How do IREs affect the behaviour of states and non-state actors in the issue areas for which they have been created, such as the AF, GEF, or the GCF? What factors contribute to the success and stability of IREs? These are all questions of relevance in the context of IREs for which require some answers.

To further a better understanding of these matters, in the context of regime analysis, working definitions of IREs, IOs, and constructivism will be constructed. Thenceforth, my focus on the IB approach to theories of IREs includes an examination of market failure, absolute gains, situation and problem structures, and institutional bargaining. With regards to the PB approach, the emphasis will be on a discussion of hegemony, distributional conflict, and relative gains, while for the knowledge and constructivist based (KCB) approach, the focus will be on ideas, interpretivism, arguments, mutual constitution, identities and intersubjective understandings.

An attempt will be made to show that the ‘realism’ most approximate to international regime under study is ‘classical realism’, rather than neorealism and, of the three approaches to theories of IREs, the best suited are KCB theories within which social constructivism is foundational (Hasenclever et al. 2002). Notably, a KCB approach to theories of IREs, presents opportunities to explore possibilities of a synthesis with a realist constructivist approach to IR and with the IB and PB theories. Of course, that there *are* various theories of IR, as opposed to *a* theory of

IR[69]. Within the research each theory or a set of theories, find (s) expression through the actions of actors pursuing power, interest, or intersubjective understandings. The researcher shall attempt to explain this preference given the learning in the area. Consequently, a KCB approach to the study of theories of IREs allows us to examine power, interests, and intersubjective understandings within the UNCFM without disabling any of their organizational tenets, while maximizing their applicability.

3.1 The Importance of Theory

"To think theoretically one has to avoid treating the task as that of formulating an appropriate definition of theory" (James Rosenau, 1980)

3.1.1 Definitions

The importance of theory in IR research cannot be understated. As Viotti and Kauppi (2012) point out, theory means different things to different people (Cox 1996). It is simply a way of making the world better understood, and for many people with a scientific or positivist bent, theory involves explanation. Consequently, Viotti and Kauppi explains theory thusly:

> [A] *theory* [emphasis original] in an intellectual construct composed of a set of interrelated propositions that help one to identify or select facts and interpret them, thus facilitating an explanation and prediction concerning … patterns of behaviour among diverse state and non-state actors acting internationally or globally. (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 7)

Explanation from the positivist perspective involves the development and testing of hypotheses (a quantitative approach) which is central to positivist (empirical) theory building. Resultant law like statements, emanating therefrom, permit IR

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[69] Theories of IR include: Realism and Liberalism (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002; Donnelly 2009); Regimes (Stephen Krasner; Constructivism (Ruggie 1986; Wendt 1999); Critical Theory (Cox 1981); Historical Sociology (Linklater 2009); Post Structuralism (Michael Foucault 1976, Devetak 2009); International Political Theory (Nardin and Wight 2009); Rationalism-The English School (Linklater 2009; Viotti and Kauppi 2012); Economic Structuralism (Viotti and Kauppi 2012); Feminism (True 2009) and Green Politics (Patterson 2009).

theorists to make tentative predictions about possible outcomes. Laws establish relations between variables, which are concepts that can take different values. Repetition of the results provides specified expected probabilities for a future prediction, hence the importance of theories (Waltz 1979). Importantly Waltz, in providing a narrative explanation of theory, observed that:

> A theory is born in conjecture and is viable if the conjecture in confirmed, … [r]ather than being mere collections of laws … and the associations recorded, theories are statements that explain them … [t]heories are qualitatively different from laws … [l]aws identify invariant or probable associations … [t]heories show why those associations obtain … and [their] usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive powers … that may be fashioned. (Waltz 1979, 2-9)

Similar to Viotti and Kauppi (2012), Waltz (1979) focused a lot on the predictive and explanatory nature of theory but stayed clear of suggesting any interpretative value explanation in theory. In his view, though theory explains some part of reality, it is distinct from the reality it explains. Waltz (1979, 11), within the context of developing a theory of international politics, argued that "[t]heory is fruitful because it goes beyond the necessary barren hypothetico-deductive approach". He does not believe that a theory can be arrived at inductively (a matter central to our methodological approach), since such a claim suggests that an understanding of phenomena before the means for their explanation. In his view, both induction and deduction are indispensable in the construction of theory. Importantly, Waltz (1979) ignored the roles of ideas, interest, and identity in theory formation, though a glimmer of 'construction', as a concept, seemingly emerged when Waltz (1979) stated "[w]hat we think of as reality is itself an elaborate conception constructed and reconstructed through the ages" (5).

Contrastingly, Cox (1981) against the backdrop of constructing a critical theory of world order, explains theory thusly:

> Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose [emphasis original]. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation and social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and

> expectations of the future …. There is, accordingly, no such thing as theory itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. (Cox 1981, 128)

At a glance, Cox's understanding of theory from a perspective of social and political time and space, suggests a recognition that theory construction should be dynamic and be viewed within a historical context. From that perspective, theory, like constructivism, is under construction, ever changing and ever evolving. Cox also presents a sense of morality and ethics as essential to effective theory building, and historical sociology as critical to unravelling dominance and power within national, social, and economic classes.

3.1.2 Types of Theories and Purposes

There are various species of theories. Worthy of mention for the research are problem solving theories, particularly neo-realism and neoliberalism which takes the world as it finds it, with its prevailing social and power relationships and institutions (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 201; Donelley 2009), and critical theory which opens up the possibility of choosing a different perspective of creating an alternative world (Cox 1981).Theories that use standards of proof associated with the physical sciences, such as developing hypotheses and developing general laws and explaining and predicting the conduct of states are classified as positivist or positivism, and are used extensively by neorealists and neoliberalists. Theories that construct images of IR based on methods of understanding the social and political implications of their knowledge claims are classified as post positivist also referred to as post-structuralist (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002; Donelly 2009; Viotti and Kauppi 2012). Theories that test hypotheses, propose causal relations, and identify patterns and trends are classified as explanatory in nature though, as some post-structuralists contend, since there is no objective knowledge about an external reality then the very process of separating subject from object or theory from practice is, in itself, problematic (Donelly 2009). Whereas theories that emerge through interactive processes of language, culture, religion, ethnicity, and gender that actors bring to the study of IR through their life experiences are classified as constitutive (Donelly 2009, 16-18; Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 5).

3.1.3 Overtheorizing and Matters about which IR Theories Differ

Donelly (2009, 21-24) pointed out that theories differ in four areas, the level of analysis and scope of enquiry; the purpose of social and political enquiry; the appropriate methodology to be used; and whether IR (in its traditional sense) should be studied as a distinct area of intellectual endeavour or be assisted by other areas of investigation such as historical sociology and world history. Firstly, in relation to theoretical differences about the level of analysis in the study of IR, Waltz (1959) referred to three levels/images that the literature explored: (a) human nature; (b) the structure of the political systems; and (c) the nature of the international system, with anarchy as its main component. However, Viotti and Kauppi (2012) distinguished between levels of analysis and unit of analysis. Levels of analysis, in their view, comprised the international system; the state; groups; and individuals. Whereas unit of analysis comprised states, organizations, individuals or groups, classes and other entities. Of note, as opposed to realists, that there is no international states system in their unit concept (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 9). After all, as Cox (1981, 127) puts it "… a state was a state was a state".

Secondly, neo-realists, influenced by Waltz (1979) maintained that the purpose of social and political enquiry was to understand the limits on political change in an anarchical world where the existence of a balance of power served as a deterrent to war (Donelly 2009). Contrastingly, liberalists believed the purpose of social and political enquiry was to promote economic and social interdependence between individuals across the world, while Cox (1992) suggested that a broader purpose of social and political enquiry, as seen by constructivists, feminists and critical theorists, was to reflect on how the world order came into being and how it has changed, and the normative task of exposing constraints on human action. Finally, in relation to appropriate methodology and distinct intellectual endeavour, positivists favouring quantitative methodologies believed IR should be distinct and separate from other areas of social sciences of intellectual endeavour, based on its anarchic nature. However, more recently there are efforts to embrace multidisciplinarity, as a way of escaping perceived insularity surrounding the study of IR. These include areas such as sociology, ethics, political theory, social theory, and post-colonial thinking (Donelly 2009).

Even though we believe that is important to discuss the importance of theory in IR, we are conscious of Barkin's warning (2010, 147), not to overtheorize. By overtheorizing he meant "… the inclusion of long discussions of theory, epistemology, and method in works in which they are not necessary". Instead, Barkin (2010) advocated that the tendency to overtheorize can be mitigated by scholars "… specifying precisely what they are doing … [which] will make it clear whether a particular piece of research fits into a narrower or broader definition …" (147) of the theory or perspective under consideration. In this regard, Barkin (2010) posits that big-tent or expansive definitions of approaches to the study of IR contribute to the tendency to overtheorize. In his view, expansive definitions dilute key terms whereas narrow definitions allow for more specificity of epistemological and ontological context of a given research. This the researcher remains conscious of Barkin's warning as a working definition of theory is proposed.

3.2 Working Definition of Theory

Having looked at the importance of theory in IR and some constituent elements therein, the researcher now provides a working definition which adopts, but widens that which was offered by Viotti and Kauppi (2012, 6). Theory thusly:

> Theory is an intellectual construct comprising of a set of interrelated propositions that help one to identify or select facts and interpret them, thus facilitating an explanation, interpretation and prediction concerning patterns of behaviour among diverse state and non-state actors, social institutions and regimes acting internationally or globally. (Working Definition)

This definition provides specificity by reflecting positivist and post positivist contents of theory which allows the researcher to select either one or adopt a combination of both to explain, interpret and or predict the outcome of patterns of behaviour, not only among states, but also within IREs, IOs and IIs. Against this backdrop, definitions of IREs are examined and a working definition relevant to this research is offered.

3.2.1 The International Regime

Ruggie (2000, 62) states that “the concept of IREs became a major focal point of institutional analysis from the late 1970s on. This was due initially to the first sustained use of it in an important book by Keohane and Nye….”

3.2.2 Consensus Definition

According to Hasenclever et al. (2002, 8) a consensus definition of the IRE was one of the outcomes of the 1982 special issue of *International Organization* on IREs where, according to Krasner, regimes are:

> [I]mplicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (Krasner 1982, 186)

Importantly, embedded in Art 3 UNFCCC (1992) are similarities with Krasner’s consensus definition. These included the following principles and norms: equity; CBDR; special circumstances of developing country parties; vulnerability of small states to the adverse effects of climate change; proportionate burden sharing, and global benefits at the lowest possible cost. As such, the UNFCCC and the UNCFM are regarded as IREs in this study. However, Krasner’s definition is not without criticism. The debate that ensued surrounding the consensus definition gave rise to three differing positions, behavioural, cognitive, and formal (Hasenclever 2002). Young (1986, 104-122) pointed out that Krasner’s definition comprised a set of ambiguous terms, was conceptually thin and seemingly operated independent of a larger system of ideas capable of resolving the ambiguities inherent in the definition. Consequently, Young (1989, 5) who favoured a more behavioural approach, defined social instituitions as “… identifiable practices of recognized roles linked by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles.” He later defined as IREs as “… social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue-areas" (Young and Zurn, 1995, 6). Interestingly, Zacher (1987, 174) posited that conformity to proscriptions and prescriptions is not always necessary. He, however, added that one must doubt the effectiveness of behavioural guidelines particularly if states are allowed to breach rules and norms for their own benefit. Interestingly also, Hasenclever et al. (2002), pointed out that Krasner's definition supports inductive theory building by making comparison across issue areas much easier while creating a hierarchy of IRE components, where IRE change occurs only if principles or norms are altered. Consequently, all other changes in IRE content represents changes within the IRE.

Importantly, that Krasner's consensual definition is behavioural since, as pointed out by (Ruggie 2000, 85), "convergent expectations of actors are inherently intersubjective." In that context, the categorization ensuing from the debates surrounding the consensus definition that excluded Krasner's consensus definition from the behavioural category does not accord with the nature of intersubjectivity, and is in fact, behavioural. The cognitive approach is now examined.

3.2.3 Cognitive Approach

In adopting a cognitive approach to theories of IREs, Kratochwil and Ruggie submit that:

> International regimes are commonly defined as social institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas. The emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality…. It follows that we *know* [emphasis original] regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour. Hence, the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity. (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764)

Notably, both Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, 753-775), in emphasizing an intersubjective quality of IREs, also sought an epistemology that is less positivist and more intersubjective, especially since they both recognized that positivist epistemology separates subject from object and is the antithesis of intersubjectivity (Ruggie 2000, 95). Accordingly, Hasenclever et al. (2002) is of the view that regime analysis suffers from cognitive dissonance, since epistemology seemingly contradicts ontology, a position that Ruggie (2000) supported. However, Keohane (1993, 28) defined IREs, as agreements in formal terms, with explicit rules agreed upon by more than one state, and when states recognized these agreements to be continuously valid, IREs emerged. Even though Keohane's definitions (1988; 1993) avoid the words *principles* and *norms* as contained in Krasner's (1982), and implied in Kratochwil and Ruggie's (1986), he nonetheless defined institutions as containing "… persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations" (Keohane 1988, 383). His definitional reference to rules shaping expectation of governments is intersubjective in nature (Ruggie 2000, 85). Consequently, his definition reflects some amount of cognition and partly mirrors Kratochwil and Ruggie's (1986) cognitive approach. Also observed was that the cognitive approach accords with the post-structuralist methodology of the research, which is anchored in an inductive and intersubjective approach to create understandings of the phenomena. Against the backdrop of these various definitions, a working definition for this study is offered.

3.3 Working Definition of International Regimes

Having regard to the above cited definitions of IREs and the understandings flowing therefrom, particularly those surrounding the behavioural and intersubjective nature of regimes, "International regimes are defined as social institutions that comprise principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in international issue-areas." (Working Definition) This is a combination of Krasner's, and Kratochwil and Ruggie's definition along with that of Young and Keohane. This working definition meets the essential principles of being narrow, reflecting specificity as opposed to a broad definition which dilutes the content of descriptive terms (Barkin 2010). Observing that the theoretical foundation of this research to examine theoretical approach(es) to the formation of IREs and their suitability to serve as viewing lens in the issue area of CCAF is being done against the backdrop of the working definition, IREs, as now understood, ought not to be examined outside the rubric of the IOs within which they are embedded. A definition of international organization is now offered.

3.4 Defining International Organization

According to Haas:

> [O]rganizations are very concrete entities, made up of living people, divisions, hierarchies, budgets and programs …[they] are the flesh-and-blood subsystems of the international system which, through their feedbacks, influence the parent system. (Haas 1964, 100)

Haas' definition is very human nature driven and he seems to agree with Waldo (cited in Hass 1964) that there is definitional inconclusiveness regarding the meaning of organization since it can be people or group driven, if one's perspective is psychological, or institution driven if that perspective is sociological. However, Biermann et al. (2009) conceptualized two types of organizations, 'organization simpliciter' and 'international organization'. In their view:

> [O]rganizations [simpliciter] … are commonly defined as actors that have physical qualities, such as staff, headquarters, resources, and formalized leadership, that effectively pursue a policy… [whereas] intergovernmental organizations [are viewed] as the complex of three elements: (a) a normative framework of principles and rules governing the organization; (b) state members of the organizations; and (c) a bureaucracy and its leader at the center of the organization. (Biermann 2009, 354)

Importantly, the definitions of International Organization (IO) and Intergovernmental Organization by Biermann et al. (2009) and Haas' (1964) respectively, closely represent the characteristics of the organizations within this study: the UNFCCC, UNCFM and the COP. Reference to actors, intergovernmental, principles, rules and state members are also akin to the constituent elements of IREs to which they also qualify.

3.4.1 Working Definition of International Organization

To capture the essence of both definitions, here is a working definition of an international organization:

> International organization comprises a complex of four elements: (a) actors that have physical qualities, such as staff, headquarters, resources, who effectively pursue a policy; (b) a normative framework of principles and rules governing the organization; (c) state membership of the organizations; and (d) a bureaucracy with formal leadership at the center of the organization. (Working Definition).

Against this backdrop of the working definitions of theory, IREs and IOs, IB, PB and KCB approaches to theories of IREs will now be examined.

3.5 Theories of International Regimes

3.5.1 Interest Based (Neoliberal) Theories

The discussion on theories of IREs commences from an interest (neoliberal) based perspective since "[t]his school of thought has come to represent the mainstream approach to analysing international regimes …", as opposed to the other two schools, cognitivism and realism (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 23). Secondly, readers are reminded that:

> International regimes are defined as social institutions that comprise principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in international issue-areas (Working Definition).
>
> A *theory* in an intellectual construct composed of a set of interrelated propositions that help one to identify or select facts and interpret them, thus facilitating an explanation, interpretation and prediction concerning patterns of behaviour among diverse state, non-state actors, social institutions and regimes, acting internationally or globally (Working Definition).
>
> International organization comprises a complex of four elements: (a) actors that have physical qualities, such as staff, headquarters, resources, who effectively pursue a policy; (b) a normative framework of principles and rules governing the organization; (c) state membership of the organizations; and (d) a bureaucracy with formal leadership at the center of the organization (Working Definition).

3.5.2 Differences in Rationalist Approaches to the Formation of Regimes

According to Hasenclever et al. (2002) a key point of agreement between neoliberalist and realist theories of IREs is their commitment to rationalism, a meta theory which portrays states as self-interested goal-seeking actors, maximizing benefits for states themselves in an anarchic system (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 56; Wallerstein 1979; Hasenclever et al. 2002; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1959; Morgenthau 1948). Consequently, neorealists argued that the absence of a central authority results in states relying on power, relative to other states, to guarantee their survival. Neoliberals argued, contrastingly, that states are rational egoists (Stein 1983; Keohane 1984) and that anarchy can be overcome through collaborative interactions involving IIs, IOs and IREs, to forge cooperation (Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Keohane 1984). However, Grieco (1988, 485-507), in advocating key realist propositions of the centrality of states as unitary rational agents operating under conditions of international anarchy, pointed out that rational egoism is not a characteristic that meets the demands of anarchy and states do not cooperate even to further common interests (1988, 488). In his view, it is not only the fear of being double crossed (1988, 495) that is *the* obstacle to cooperation in the neoliberal sense, but also their intolerance for relative losses (1988, 499).

Responding to Grieco's proposition, Snidal, (1991, 710-726) using the harmony game posited that, relative gains seem only to operate in a "… tight bipolar world" (702). Snidal found that absolute gain is more conducive to cooperation since each state has the dominant option of choosing the best option and are therefore better off cooperating. However, if states are only interested in relative gains, harmony is transformed in a conflict, and since pure relative gains seeking is an extreme possibility, states may well consider utilizing both absolute and relative gains. In that context, higher desires for relative gains result in cooperation being less likely. Snidal (1991, 710-726), expanding his model to multiple states found that inhibitions about "… relative gains impeding cooperation …" (702) decrease with an increasing number of states. However, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 133) seem to endorse Grieco's findings by suggesting that there appears to be more commonalities between the positions advanced by neoliberals and realists since they do arrive at similar conclusions regarding many matters and a synthesis between them may be more beneficial for their research programmes (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 135).

Interestingly, Cox (1986) points out that "… institutions reflect the power prevailing at their point of origin and tend … to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations" (219). Importantly also, Keohane (1984, 15) was able to say that with the decline of American hegemony, IREs persisted, cooperation continued, and even increased among states. Contrastingly, Mearsheimer (2001) while acknowledging that IIs increased the prospects of cooperation in a given issue area, posited that there is little evidence that institutions can convince the great powers to act against the dictates of realism.

The differences underscored so far reflected that for neoliberalists, states are rational egoists who are concerned with absolute gains, whereas realists are concerned with relative gains. The importance of power is essential to a realist perspective of IRE formation, however, even though neoliberals acknowledge its importance, they contend than constellations of interests, expectations, and contents of IIs are critical to IRE formation. Absolute gains lead to, among others, functional and institutional bargaining theories, whereas relative gains lead to, among others, balance of power and hegemonic theories (Hasenclever et al. 2002).

Against this backdrop, the examination begins with the first major IB theoretician, Robert Keohane's (1984) Functional Theory.

3.6 Functional Theory: Neoliberal Assumptions, Interests, Cooperation and Functions of International Regimes

At the outset, Hasenclever et al. (2002) makes the point that Keohane's wider theoretical focus was on the institutionalization of institutional behaviour which attracted the label "neoliberal institutionalism", and out of which regime theory emerged as a subset (Milner 1992, 475-8; Hurrell 1993), cited in Hasenclever et al. (2002). In building his functional theory of IREs, Keohane accepted the realist assumptions of international anarchy and that states are rational egoists (Keohane 1984). Consequently, like Waltz, he opted for a systemic approach to theory which emphasizes decision making based on external structural conditions to develop a functional theory that grants international institutions a critical role in international politics. As he pointed out:

> Rationality means that [actors] have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility … [and] [e]goism means that their utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others …. (Keohane 1984, 27)

Moreover, since microeconomic theory exhibits patterns of firms furthering only their own egoistic interests like states do, the study of IREs also patterns itself on microeconomic theory as a model for systemic analysis (Keohane 1984; Hasenclever et al. 2002). Interestingly, Hasenclever et al. (2002) pointed out that Keohane's functional theory of IRE operated under a precondition, where states that are active in the international issue area, share common interests,[70] which are realizable only through cooperation. However, Keohane used the two - person Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game theory to demonstrate how states, though having common interests in achieving a mutual cooperative outcome, nonetheless were unlikely to realize it. In the classic PD game, states though preferring 'mutual cooperation' to 'mutual defection', more than likely will refuse to cooperate in order to benefit from the cooperation of another state which is unlikely, resulting in non-cooperation. Consequently, he explained that common interests do not mean than states have identical interests, but rather conflicting and complimentary ones.

In that context of cooperating, it is their preferences over actions (policies) that states adjust and not their preferences over outcomes. In this regard, functional theory relies on IREs that states create in pursuit of a rational approach to achieve joint gains (Keohane 1984; Keohane 1989). However, as Hasenclever et al. (2002, 33) pointed out, "[a] theory which regarded international regimes as catalysts for cooperation needed to separate regimes (the "cause") and cooperation (the "effect") conceptually". Therefore, within the conceptual framework of functional theory, "… international cooperation materializes in mutually beneficial agreements, not (or not only) in IRE formation" (33). Regimes merely help to bring about international cooperation (Hasenclever et al. 2002; Keohane 1984).

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[70] The reference to "common interests" in Keohane's theory is presupposed and therefore treated as exogenously given (Hasenclever et al. 2002).

An analysis of rational choice models such as PD, theories of collective action and theories of market failure, all show that the essential problem affecting states' efforts at international cooperation is uncertainty. In PD models, states fear being double crossed, but monitoring arrangements may reduce this fear and the cost of cooperating. Additionally, principles, norms, and rules (essential components of IREs) operate across cases and at a multilevel creating linkages between issues and agreements. Violations at one level or in one issue area, more than likely will affect a state's ability to benefit in another issue area. Reducing uncertainty can therefore be facilitated by IREs, along with significant costs reductions. (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 31-35). Consequently, IREs enhance the continuity of political relationships by reducing mutual uncertainty; they help to assess and shape others' reputations by providing standards of behaviour against which performance can be measured and linking these standards to specific issues (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 31-35).

3.7 Functional Theory and the Emergence of Regimes

Even though most of Keohane's (1984) theory deals with effects of IREs, his theory has ample discussion on causes of IREs. Consequently, he puts is thusly:

> In using rational-choice analysis to study institutions, therefore, we are immediately led toward a functional argument. According to this line of analysis, "Institutions are functional if reasonable men might create and maintain them in order to meet social needs or achieve social goals … In general, functional explanations account for causes in terms of their effects. That's, "the character of what is explained is determined by its effect on what explains it". (Keohane 1984, 27)

As noted, in this functional formulation, the causal path is inversed: effect explains causes. This is so because functional explanations are post hoc in nature. Institutions are observed and then rationalized (Keohane 1984). IREs are therefore seen as created by states to achieve selfish goals and even though they reduce transaction costs, they are costly to create and maintain, and therefore states will seek to offset costs against anticipated advantages, with the possibility for increased IREs being created. Therefore, it is the anticipation of possible advantages in the issue areas that create the ‘effect explaining causes’ relationship. Functional theory is therefore systemic in nature and deductive in argument. It attributes causal significance to regimes. To the extent that international cooperation is essential in mitigating global crises, functionalism then enables greater opportunities for peaceful cooperation among states even though, as a theory, empirical testing is still incomplete for this deductive approach (Hasenclever et al. 2002).

However, there is lack of certainty as to what criteria, and the meta-theoretical foundation of these criteria, a statement has to meet in order for it to amount to a functional explanation, especially since functionalism is a theory where effect explains causes in a post hoc timeline. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that rationality is assumed for actors and not than actors *are* rational. Another area of concern with Keohane’s functional theory is his separation of IRE formation from cooperation. Conceptually, and for theoretical purposes it does not pose any real difficulties, however in practical and applicable terms, it is problematic since difficulties arise in determining which meta-theoretical foundation applies to either IREs or both. Interestingly, Zurn, Wolf and Efinger (1990) quoted in Hasenclever et al. (2002, 59), submitted that neither unit nor system level theories of cooperation provided perfect satisfaction and, as such, researchers should adopt approaches located at a medium or intermediate level. Accordingly, two approaches satisfy such an intermediate level, the situation-structural and the problem-structural.

3.8 Functional Theory: The Situation – Structural Approach to Regime Theory

Situation-structuralism is an attempt at further improving the interest-based argument regarding IREs as developed by Keohane. The PD aspect of Keohane’s game-theoretic interpretation of collective action reflects its commencement point (Hasenclever et al. 2002). However, its main proponents (Stein 1983; Snidal 1985, 1986; Oye 1986; Zurn 1992, 1993; and Martin 1993, quoted in Hasenclever et al. 2002) hold the view that PD represents only one type of collective bargaining or cooperation. Consequently, different types of IREs lead to different types of collective actions and different types of game-theoretic emphasis.

In the two-player PD, defection is preferred over mutual cooperation and leads to independent decision making and Pareto deficient outcomes, hence the forming of IREs to foster cooperation through collaboration. However, situation structuralists such as Stein (1983; Conybeare 1984 and Lipson 1984 - cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002) recognized that international cooperation issues go beyond the two-player formulation and should be classified as coordination games instead where, unlike PD games, several Pareto-efficient equilibra exist for actors. In this context, where there are different coordinating points for states to attempt cooperation, the game is closer to Battle of the Sexes[71] where states have different preferences about a common interest[72]. How to achieve this interest is the challenge? Ultimately, two Pareto-optimal outcomes exist as opposed to no coordination at all. However, collaboration regimes require a formal IRE that provides information that parties can use to assess compliance, whereas coordination regimes do not require a compliance mechanism once a convention for cooperation is settled.

According to Hasenclever et al. (2002), assurance and suasion situations are two additional types of situation structures that emerged in the international issue area beyond those associated with collaboration and coordination. In assurance games (Stag Hunt) two equilibrium outcomes are possible, but only one is Pareto-efficient-mutual cooperation. In this scenario, one state fears that the other's preference ordering is not an assurance, while another state doubts that that state can be trusted to act rationally on the given issue. Consequently, forming IREs may well assist in facilitating communication among states to foster cooperation. Whereas in suasion games, only one equilibrium outcome is possible - a satisfied state and a dissatisfied state. In this formulation, one state has a dominant strategy

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[71] In Battle, power may be used to determine who can play the game and the state less in need of cooperation can get its way by credibly threatening to walk away (Krasner 1991, 340; Garett 1993) which seems to align with conduct of powerful country Parties to the UNFCCC, UNCFM and the COP.

[72] However, in Battle the cooperation game has two Pareto-efficient Nash equilibra outcomes where players have conflicting interests. Consequently, cooperation is achieved by one partner adjusting to the other, since all points along the Pareto frontier are Nash equilibra.

and must be persuaded to cooperate however, the dissatisfied state may retaliate and possibly harm the dominant state but, at the same time, worsens its own situation. Establishing IREs may help states to make side payments to secure cooperation since, in many instances, suasion regimes are sponsored by hegemons who are able to secure cooperation through threats and promises (Hasenclever et al. 2002). However, Zurn (1992) posited that, of the four types of problematic situations; assurance, coordination, collaboration and suasion, the probability of an IRE emerging is most likely, the less demanding the cooperation problem which is more akin to assurance situations.

Importantly, the situation-structuralists meta-theoretical orientation in the formation of IREs, also imposes limits on its application. Examining situation-structuralists' key tenet that formation of IREs is more likely the less difficult it is to achieve cooperation, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 56) posited that this amounts to "arguing that regimes are the more likely the *less* [emphasis original] they are needed". He further posited that IREs and cooperation tend to be theoretically indistinguishable and that what explains IREs also explains cooperation. Accordingly, IREs matter for states' ability to cooperate and states' ability to cooperate depend on IREs. Consequently, Hasenclever et al. (2002) observed the mutuality of regime formation. Further, when the situation-structuralists' view is juxtaposed with Keohane's "effects explain causes" concept, their theoretical orientation becomes more problematic.

3.9 Functional Theory: The Problem - Structural Approach to Regime Theory

Scholars in this area contend that if actors' attributes nor the characteristics of the international system cannot account for variation of behavioural patterns across issue-areas then, "… the nature of issue-areas themselves … may well be responsible for at least part of the observable differences" (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 60). In their view, insufficient attention was placed on the concept of issue-area, a key component of the consensus definition of IREs (Krasner 1982, Kratochwil and Ruggie1986). Consequently, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 59-68), cited scholars of the problem-structural approach (Efinger and Zurn 1990; Efinger, Rittberger and Zurn 1988; Zurn, Wolf and Efinger 1990) who determined three steps to formulation. Firstly, they sought to clarify the concept of issue-area; secondly, they partially reconceptualized IREs, and lastly, they developed various issue-areas typologies to categorize their independent variable, generating in the process hypotheses that link these typologies to the likelihood of IRE formation.

Recognizing that IREs are also partial orders and pertain to different issue-areas (climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, refugees, inter alia) scholars of the problem-structural approach are likely to show greater interest in operationalizing terms such as issue areas, especially if IREs are easily equated with them (Hasenclever et al. 2002). Consequently, these scholars (Efinger and Zurn 1990; Efinger, Rittberger and Zurn 1998; Zurn, Wolf and Efinger 1990) defined issue-areas as consisting of one or more, in the perception of the actors, inseparably connected objects of contention and of the behaviour directed to them. They further submitted that the boundaries or limits of issue-areas are determinants of the actors' perceptions, implying that issue-areas can change without any corresponding change in the objective facts of a given situation (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 61). Importantly, at this juncture, is the subjective nature of their definition and the possible separation of objective facts in a subjective situation. Their definition also projects "objects of contention" which emphasizes the conflictual character of issues. The situation-structuralist approach, on the other hand, was observed as emphasising common interests as a basis for cooperation, whereas the problem structuralists focus on the conflictual nature of the IRE as a basis for cooperation.

3.10 Functional Theory: Typologies, Hypotheses, Problems and Weaknesses

According to Czempiel (1981- cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002) issue-areas can be categorized into three broad policy domains, security, economic well-being, and rule, where the domain of security and rule preserve the physical existence of the individual, whilst the domain of economic well-being secures the material needs of the individual. Further, Czempiel (1981, 196) hypothesized that in issue-areas where divisible gain, rather than indivisible power, is at stake, a greater propensity to cooperation is displayed (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 62). Further, Efinger and Zurn (1990, 75- cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002), agreeing with Czempiel on the economic value side, hypothesized that where issue areas, in the domain of the allocation of economic values are contested, IRE are more conducive to cooperation. However, they further hypothesized that issue areas in the domain of rule, such as human rights issues, are least amenable to cooperation, and in the middle position are issue areas of security. Conflict typologies about values and means are dissensual, less prone to IRE formation, whereas conflict typologies about absolute and relatively assessed goods are consensual and more prone to IRE formation. However, the problem-structural approach to regime formation is not without associated difficulties. Even though empirical studies have lent support to problem-structural hypothesis, thus far, problem-structuralists have not been able to produce a theoretically grounded explanation for this empirical relationship, particularly its hierarchy of probabilities for different types of conflicts. Questions surrounding why conflicts about means are less conducive to IRE cooperation, as opposed to absolutely assessed goods, are not yet answered (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 67).

3.11 Institutional Bargaining as a Basis for Regime Formation

Oran Young (1989; 1991, 282; 1995) believed that IRE formation arose out of negotiations which he called 'institutional bargaining'. His neologism for that matter focusses on the bargaining processes that precedes it, quite unlike functional, situational and problem structuralists analysis of IRE formation. He developed his model primarily through a critique of the two principal streams of regime analysis in the literature: (a) utilitarian or rationalist models represented by theories of bargaining, and (b) power-based models of IRE formation represented by theories of hegemonic stability. Young believed that the utilitarian model's expectation that rational actors will naturally cooperate is overly optimistic, since it avoids obstacles such as strategic behaviour and lack of trust among parties. Young's model of institutional bargaining is a response to the game theoretic approach that explains and predicts IRE formation promoted by rationalist as best for international cooperation. In this sense, though his approach is interest based, it is not quite rationalist (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 69).

3.12 Essential Elements of the Model

As Young (1989, 349-375) observed, actors are usually uncertain about what strategies are available to them, due primarily to lack of knowledge and uncertainty in knowing where the decision points are located on a contract or a negotiating curve. Consequently, those actors who begin a bargaining process without knowledge of decision curves tend to engage in integrative rather than distributive bargaining, and "… may consequently end up with arrangements that are Pareto-inferior, in the sense that they leave feasible joint gains on the table" (Young 1989, 361). Further, Young (1991, 283) posited that institutional bargaining is subject to the rule of unanimity, as each actor enjoys a veto power in the negotiating process and bargaining becomes difficult since multiple actors have to reach agreement. In Keohane's, functional theory, uncertainty motivates states to create IREs to reduce uncertainty, whereas in Young's model, uncertainty is a condition that enables actors to form IREs (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 73). Consequently, the three essential elements of Young's institutional bargaining are integrative bargaining; the existence of a veil of uncertainty and the requirement for unanimity, which are central to the derivation of specific hypotheses to explain the process of IRE formation (Young 1991, 281-308).

Other characteristics of Young's (1989, 349-375) institutional bargaining analysed by Hasenclever et al. (2002) include actors focusing only on a limited number of key problems, scope for transnational alliances supportive of international cooperation, and embeddedness of the negotiation process in a wider political and socioeconomic frame. Descriptively, Young's model sets out the circumstances under which collective efforts to form IREs occur, while analytically it outlines the critical factors necessary to attain this result.

3.13 Young's Hypotheses for Success in International Regime Formation

The first set of hypotheses "[i]nstitutional bargaining can succeed only when the issues at stake lend themselves to contractarian interactions" (Young 1989, 366) and "[f]or the most part, exogenous shocks or crises increase the probability of success in efforts to negotiate the terms of international regimes" (371), corresponds to the analytical aspect and conditions prior to negotiations in the model. Thus, the absence of a specified zone of agreement encourages integrative bargaining, while imperfect information ensures a veil of uncertainty prevails (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 74). Young's (1989) further hypothesis, "[t]he availability of arrangements that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed" (368) relate to factors that promote the success of integrative bargaining which fits into the unanimity rule that actors enjoy during negotiations, even though it does not speak to an equitable solution (Hasenclever et al. 2002, Young 368).

Secondly, the conditions for increasing the probability of a successful bargain are expressed through two hypotheses, "[t]he existence of salient solutions … increases the probability of success in institutional bargaining" (Young 1989, 369; Young and Osherenko 1993, 14) and "… [i]nstitutional bargaining rises when clear-cut and effective compliance mechanisms are available" (Young 1989, 370). While salience speaks to simplicity and paradoxically contra the uncertainty nature of institutional bargaining, its simplicity may result in ambiguity and uncertainty. Further, compliance mechanisms should be seen to promote bargain cooperation by reducing opportunities for actors to cheat.

Young's final hypothesis (1989, 373) "[i]nstitutional bargaining is likely to succeed when effective leadership emerges; [and] it will fail in the absence of such leadership" is not about power based leadership, but rather facilitative on the part of actors who use their skill and ingenuity to achieve a desired result. However, Young (1991, 285; 1994, 114) modified this hypothesis in two important ways. Firstly, leadership is no longer a sufficient condition for success in institutional bargaining, and secondly, leaders can only be individuals, though nothing prevents them from representing states and other organizations. This seems to be in sharp contrast to system-level and state-level explanations of IRE formation (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 77; Keohane 1984). Specifically, Young (1991, 281-308) argues that leadership, as a successful condition for institutional bargaining, should be approached from a behavioural perspective with a focus on differentiating among individual actions and then analysing interactions among them. In his view, this leads to three types of leadership: structural (leaders act for the state), entrepreneurial (leader acts for himself mostly) and intellectual, where the leader used his power of ideas to influence institutional bargaining.

3.14 Empirical Evaluation of the Model

Various hypotheses, including interest based, power based, and knowledge based, relating to IRE formation, which relied on case studies in the areas of environment and resource issues, were tested by Young and Osherenko (1993, 263) as part of a multinational research programme. According to Hasenclever et al. (2002, 78) the results were very encouraging. Hypotheses tested in relation to leadership received strong support, to the extent that Young and Osherenko believed that it may be a necessary condition for IRE formation. Several other hypotheses were tested which revealed important conditions for IRE formation such as equity; salience; compliance mechanisms; exogeneous shocks; integrative bargaining, and a veil of uncertainty. Notwithstanding these seemingly good results, Young and Osherenko (1993, 252) cautioned as to their definitiveness and encouraged further empirical studies. Additionally, further empirical tests need to be conducted to determine the extent to which their findings are constrained within the context of the universe of cases, and if significantly constrained, to what extent it may be necessary to recast the hypotheses as descriptive, rather than causal. However, Hasenclever et al. (2002) are also of the view that Young's (1989) key hypotheses relating to integrative bargaining and veil of uncertainty were seemingly lost as significant theoretical assumptions during the empirical tests conducted and, consequently it became difficult to distinguish the model of institutional bargaining and the hypotheses derived therefrom.

3.15 Power Based (Realist) Theories

This section will look at three aspects of PB theories: hegemony; distributional conflict, and a realist perspective on IREs. Realist theories of IREs emphasize relative power capabilities as a central explanatory variable, while stressing the sensitivities of states to distributional aspects of cooperation and IREs. Consequently, they are committed to rationalism and view the success of rule-based cooperation intricately linked to shifts in distribution of power resources (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 84).

3.16 The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and International Regimes

3.16.1 A Dominant Power

The hegemonic stability theory (HST) is a PB theory of IRE which links the existence of effective IIs to a unipolar configuration of power in the issue area in question, while regime theory is thought to have been developed as an alternative to HST. This paradox suggests that in the absence of a dominant power, an IRE may not emerge or even fade away, as the dominant power fades (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 86-104), even though Keohane (1984) admitted that hegemony does play a critical role in regime formation. As suggested by Hasenclever et al. (2002, 88), the HST originated in economist Kindleberger's 1973 work on the concept of *a* 'one stabilizer' to right the world economy during the great depression of the 1930s. In Kindleberger's view, stability must be considered an international public good where the exclusion of one member from consumption would be economically unfeasible. According to Hasenclever et al. (2002, 86-104), this view allowed Kindleberger to locate his thesis within the work of Mancur Olson's 1965 theory of collective action, and since no member of the group can be excluded, smaller states will free ride on the larger states and only a powerful economic and political actor can pacify a group of states operating in the world economy.

Interestingly, Snidal (1985, 579-614) characterized two types of hegemons, benevolent and coercive. The benevolent hegemon provides the collective goods to all states free of charge with total responsibility for maintaining the IRE, whereas the coercive hegemon produces the collective good and forces other states to contribute as well. However, both benevolent and coercive hegemons seem to be able to act together for the common good, whereby the powerful state produces, such as donor nations within the UNFCCC, COP and the UNCFM, and the less powerful states contribute, such as SIDS and LDCs.

3.16.2 International Regimes as Public Goods and Excludability

Applying the reasoning behind the HST to IREs results in the assertion that IREs are established by powerful actors in the issue area as a public good for all, which will decline to the extent that that power becomes more equitably distributed among members (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 90-104). The suggestion here is that the existence of IREs is inversely related to the decentralizing of power. However, neither Hasenclever (2002, 90-104) or Kindleberger (1973- cited in Hasenclever 2002) described the nature of the IRE at the point of equitable power decentralization. In other words, do they become IOs? The issue as to whether IREs are public goods is still contested particularly, since Young's formulation that IREs exhibiting attributes of collective goods means that nonexcludability becomes a critical determinant of IREs being described as public goods (Young 1989). However, Snidal (1985, 597) pointed out that "… the assumptions underlying hegemonic stability theory varies substantially across issue-areas ..." also demonstrating that "... the assumption of the general impossibility of collective action is especially tenuous". In his view, excludability from collective goods does not necessarily challenge the applicability of the HST.

Interestingly, Gowa (1989, cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002) suggested that exclusion is necessary to punish non-compliance by states, therefore while IREs help to reduce costs of sanctions by delegitimizing certain types of conduct in the issue area, they also legitimize sanctions to prevent other forms of contrary behaviour (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 90-104). However, it is fair to say that the HST is useful, but not in its strong version which advocates regimes are neither created nor maintained unless there is hegemonic leadership in the issue area. Whereas, in a less strong version, asymmetry within a grouping may be beneficial; unequal size among actors assists in cooperation; and nonexcludability may not be considered as exclusive to the formation of collective goods (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 103).

3.17 Knowledge and Constructivist-Based Theories

This section will look at two aspects of KCB theories: the weak cognitivist constructivist approach, emphasizing assumptions, epistemic communities, cognition as a variable, cooperation in learning, and IRE formation. This will be followed by the strong cognitivist constructivist approach which explores social constructivism through the eyes of John Ruggie, Nicolas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, and other key contributors, including variants in constructivism. This section also focuses on other approaches namely, international, communicative, the power of identity, the historical-dialectical, the power of norms and a realist constructivist approach. The section concludes with a critique and possibility of a synthesis of IB, PB, and KCB theoretical approaches, and a synthesis between realism and constructivism.

It is apposite to note that a cognitivist approaches to the study of international politics emphasize ideas and knowledge as explanatory variables. Cognitivists are also critical of rationalist theories of international politics which treat states' identities and interests as exogenous givens (Hasenclever et al. 2002). Black boxing the process that knowledge-based supporters depend on to produce the self-understanding of identities and interests, results in ignoring a significant source of international behaviour and outcomes. These processes, cognitivists argue, are shaped by the normative and causal belief systems of decision makers which, if changed by them, produces changes in policy. Consequently, rationalist explanations of IREs are sub-optimal, requiring a more expansive analysis on the way the distribution of knowledge establishes the identities, and shapes the preferences and apparent options of state actors. However, because cognitivists disagree significantly on how extensive a critique of rationalism is necessary, they have been divided into weak and strong cognitivist for effective and accurate analysis (Hasenclever et al. 2002). It is submitted that the views held by cognitivists, particularly strong cognitivists, are no different from that of social constructivists, to which is referred to, in detail, below.

Notably, Hasenclever et al. (2002) has not provided any explanation or definition of the term cognitivist. However, the principles, ideas, and constructs of scholars referred to by Hasenclever et al. (2002) are constructivist in nature. In that context, the term 'cognitivist constructivism' will be used pointing out, as necessary, the similarity principles. Understanding knowledge-based theories also means understanding constructivism, and understanding constructivism means understanding knowledge-based theories, IB theories and PB theories, which are essential to situate knowledge, interest, and power as mutually constituted constructs in the formation of IREs. Some critical details about social constructivism are discussed below.

3.17.1 Social Constructivism

Even though the term was only introduced in 1989 by Nicolas Onuf (Kubálková et al. 1998; Ruggie 2000), a good place to start this discussion is with the words of Ruggie (2000, 3) who stated, within the context of a discussion on IOs, IIs and IREs, "[t]hough I was dimly aware of it at the time, my constructivist turn precedes neorealism and neoliberalism". He provided evidence of his constructivists leanings from excerpts of 1972, 1975 and 1978 essays contained in Ruggie (2000, 45-61). Therein, Ruggie surveys the sociological and political contours of institutionalization, epistemic communities and the ideational and intersubjective nature of regimes which are embedded in IOs. It is not that he is to be treated as the first and only self-described constructivist, there may be more, but rather he places himself and constructivism within an identifiable period - the year 1975.

3.17.1.1 A Response to Inadequate Explanations by Rationalists and Critical Theorists?

According the Ruggie (1998, 855) "[t]raditionally, the intellectual protagonists have been realism and liberalism…." Importantly, Reus-Smit (2009) posited that the main debates in IR scholarship during the 1980s and 1990s, also referred to as the *'third debate'*[73], were firstly between neo-realists and neo-liberals, each applying rationalist economic theory to solve cooperation issues in IR, and secondly, among critical theorists and rationalists with critical theorists challenging the epistemological, methodological, ontological and normative assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism. After the end of the cold war, two new debates arose, though doubted by Zehfuss (2002, 4), between rationalists and constructivists (Reus-Smit 2009; Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Aalberts and van Munster 2008). However, Wendt (1999, 35) was quick to point out that "… the dispute between rationalists and constructivists … is about ontology, about what kind of "stuff" the international system is made of." Interestingly, Kubálková et al. (1998) and Onuf (1998) seemed to have distanced scholars, who follow Onuf's brand of constructivism, including themselves, from being connected to this oft cited third debate, even though Reus-Smit (2009, 212) posited that "… the nature and rise of constructivism in international theory, [has to be situated] in relation to both rationalists and critical theories".

However, notwithstanding the existence of these rationalists theories, rationalist IR theorists (Keohane and Nye 1972; Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979) were unable to predict any of the following critical events: (a) the peaceful end of cold war; (b) military intervention and normative justification on humanitarian grounds; and (c) increased international interactive political, social and cultural relations (Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Reus Smit 2009; Wendt 1999), or global warming, environmental degradation and overpopulation (Kubálková et al. 1998). As pointed out by Kubálková et al. (1998, 6), politicians, intellectuals, and journalists were all predicting the end of the Cold War, communism, and modernity "… with no help whatsoever from IR scholars, and "…[i]t was in this context that *constructivism* [emphasis original] emerged" (13-14). Ruggie (1998, 856), on the

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[73] Of the debates that did occur in IR, the first "great debate" ruled questions of ethics out of order, establishing the primacy of realists over so-called idealists. The second "great debate" ratified the methodological assumption that scientific testing should prevail over historical reconstruction (Kubálková et al. (1998, 13).

other hand, pointed out that the shift by rationalists in the 1990s towards neo-utilitarianism concepts created blind spots and silences, "… particularly regarding the [absence of] the ideational realm [Wendt 1999] … [which has led to] a very different approach to international relations theorizing, one that has come to be known as social constructivism".

Critical theorists, on the other hand, argued that actors' identities and interests are socially constructed and are the products of intersubjective social structures (Burchill et al. 2009, 212-218), which required interpretative understandings. Normatively, they support value-laden theorizing as key to dismantling power and domination structures. Further, post-modern critical theorists, drawing from Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, adopted a position of 'radical interpretivism' which opposed all forms of assessing empirical and ethical claims by any single criterion of validity, fearing that such actions create hierarchies of power and domination. Contrastingly, modern critical theorists, inspired by Jurgen Habermas and others of the Frankfurt School, adopted a position of 'critical interpretivism', which embraced the subjective nature of the connection between knowledge and power. However, their general writing style was more a meta-and-abstractly theoretical critique of assumptions of prevailing knowledge, driven by their conviction that theory informs practice. In that context, any critique of IR discourse, was by extension, considered substantive IR analysis (Reus- Smit 2009; Hoffman 1987, 231-249).

This focus by first wave critical theorists on explaining connections between knowledge and power, in the context of world politics, allowed other critical IR theorists, later to evolve into constructivists, to expand critical theorists' intersubjective ontology and epistemology to include norms, rules, regimes, interests, identities, intersubjective understandings, ideas and mutual constitution so as to interpret and explain aspects of world politics (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, Reus-Smit 2009; Price and Reus-Smit 1998). As pointed out by Reus-Smit (2009), constructivism is an outgrowth of critical theory. Importantly, Ruggie and Kratochwil (1986) while analysing IRE's ontology as intersubjective and its current epistemology as positivist, observed that "… epistemology fundamentally contradicts ontology!" (764). Consequently, they argued for more "… interpretive epistemologies … that would open up regime analysis to the communicative … [and] social interactions [where] a breach … within a regime [is] an intersubjective appraisal …" (774), as opposed to simply providing an objective description of a fact. Further, Kubálková et al. (1998, 18) observed that by 1986 the challengers to the positivist research agenda had taken a linguistic turn, influenced by interpretivism. By 1989, Nicolas Onuf had published his seminal work 'World of our Making' where the term 'constructivism' was first used (Kubálková et al.1998; Ruggie 1998b).

To the question posed above, the answer is in the affirmative, meaning constructivism was birthed as a response to inadequate explanations by rationalists and critical theorists to IR phenomena. The contributions of four key constructivists are now examined.

3.17.1.2 Onuf's Constructivism

According to Onuf (1998, 59), in his shorter version of "World of our Making", constructivism is a study of social relations applying to all fields of social inquiry and with its own independent concepts and propositions which were first applied within the IR domain. His fundamental proposition is that humans are social beings that are socially related and through "[s]ocial relations [we] *make* or *construct* people [emphasis original] … [and] by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other … we go about making the world what it is."[74] (59). Consequently, IR constitutes a world, which is really nothing more than a *'world of our making'* comprising a society of relatively self-contained societies (1998, 59).

Expounding further, Onuf (1998) introduced a third element to the constructivist concept, which was, people make society, and society makes people. In between society and people, are social rules which make the process by which

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[74]Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: A User's Manual," in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, edited by Vendulka et al. (1998), 59.

people and society constitute each other. Rules make agents and agents make rules through participation, and they are consequences for breach. Rules are made effective by talking, which he calls speech acts. They may be assertive but are usually stated in very specific terms. Rules and related practices usually form stable patterns which are called institutions. Stable pattern of rules, institutions and unintended consequences provide society with a structure observable by agents. Onuf (1998) then calls attention to the 'agent-structure problem' due to ontological confusion of the word structure, where scholars differ whether it exists in reality or in their minds. In this regard, Onuf (1998) advised that "… structure is what observers see, while institutions are what agents act within" (62). In relation to anarchy, Onuf (1998) sees it as a social arrangement "… in which no one state or group of states rules over the rest" (62).

Functionally, Onuf (1998) conceded that from a constructivist point of view, constitutive rules are a means of construction and regulative rules are a means of control, and all rules are constitutive and regulative at the same time. It is submitted, that Onuf seems to be aligned with the post-positive interpretive school without room for casual explanations, which Ruggie (2000) calls the neoclassical constructivist school.

3.17.1.3 Ruggie's Constructivism

Offering severe criticism to the neo-utilitarian (neorealism and neoliberalism institutionalism combined) scholarship which he described as an atomistic universe of self-regarding units whose identity is assumed, given and fixed, and responding only to assumed material interests, Ruggie posited that:

> [S]ocial constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action … [i]n short, constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life … and [i]n contrast to neo-utilitarianism, constructivists contend that not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational factors that emanate from the human capacity. (Ruggie 1998, 856)

Ruggie (2000), further contended that the constructivist approach has no antecedent in IR theory, however, a distinguishing feature of social constructivism is its close attention to the nature, origins and functions of social facts, along with any specific methodological requirements. The constructivist project is therefore about problematizing the interests and identities of actors through the incorporation of the intersubjective bases of social action and social order. Consequently, Ruggie proceeds to make three important points. Firstly, neo-utilitarian scholars are unable to provide answers about how states acquire current identities and interests that are assumed to be exogenous. Secondly, neo-utilitarians have no analytical means of challenging the constructivists view that specific identities of specific states shape, and are shaped, by their perceived interests, and consequently, international outcomes. Thirdly, there is growing empirical evidence that norms also shape states' interests, such as diffusion of cultural and humanitarian norms. Importantly, Ruggie acknowledged that constructivists, unlike neo-utilitarians, have applied empirical research to ideational causation is social life and to social facts in studies documenting the impact of principled beliefs, including human rights, decolonization, and termination of apartheid (Ruggie (2000). Consequently, identities are therefore generated by international interaction and the concept of structure is permeated with ideational factors.

Finally, Ruggie (2000) posited that constitutive and regulative rules form part of constructivists understandings where, in some situations, constitutive rules provide adequate non-causal explanatory accounts. Further, where causal explanations are required, constructivism adheres to narrative explanatory protocols and not the nomological-deductive model. Therefore, constructivist causality in narrative explanation is established through a process of successive interrogative reasoning between explanans and explanandum, also called abduction. It is submitted that Ruggie (1998; 2000) seemed to be aligned with the post-positive causation and explanandum school with room for interpretive understandings. In fact, he described himself as belonging to the neo-classical constructivist school.

3.17.1.4 Wendt's Constructivism

Interestingly, Wendt (1999, 40), in the context of an epistemology of social inquiry, stated "I am a "positivist." [and] I do not think an idealist ontology implies a post-positivist epistemology". Instead, he describes himself as an idealist and positivist who believes in constructivist understandings and interpretation, and objective reality and scientific methods of inquiry through hypothesis testing. In his view, "… what really matters is what there is rather than how we know [what is] …", which is an emphasis on ontology. Further, Wendt believes that "… science should be question rather than method-driven, [where] the importance of constitutive questions creates an essential role in social science for interpretive methods" (40). We submit that this also places emphasis on ontology.

Wendt's big project was developing a *'Social Theory of International Politics*'. Shapiro and Wendt (1992) in referring to his constructivism as modernist, posited that "… [c]ommon sense realism is the belief that the world of everyday objects exists independently of the mind" (210). In other words, scientific realism is "… a philosophy of science which assumes that the world exists independent of human beings …" (Wendt 1999, 47), where "… states and the states system are real (ontology) and knowable (epistemology), despite being unobservable" (48). Consequently, Shapiro and Wendt (1992, 210) posited that scientific realism is opposed to empiricism. Arguing that ideas constitute a cognitive factor, Wendt (1999) submitted that, in the conventional materialist (realist and liberalist) approach to IR, ideas "… are treated in causal terms as a (typically intervening) "variable" that explains some proportion of behavior beyond the effects of power, interest, and institutions …" (Wendt 1999, 92). Accordingly, the causal framing of the idealist-materialist debate is not wrong, however, the challenge is arriving at a possible consensus that ideas are products of theories that emphasize power and interests. Instead, Wendt argues that the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas and power, and interests have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up (Wendt 1999). Therefore, explanations power and interests presuppose ideas, and in that context, materialist effects, fall to be subsequent.

Structure is therefore ideational. It exists, has effects, and evolves only "… because of agents and their practices" (Wendt 1999, 185). Consequently, structure depends on agency and the social process and is both constitutive and causal. The fact that structure largely comprises ideas means that it distributes knowledge to the social system in which it is embedded (Wendt 1999, 189). Accordingly, Wendt emphasizes that the key tenets of constructivism are:

> [T]hat the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces (power and interests), and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. (Wendt 1999, 1)

In his view, the first part projects an idealist approach to social life, and the second part reflects a holist or structuralist approach, resulting in constructivism being viewed as a "… kind of structural idealism" (1). He then posited that constructivism draws on social theory but is not a theory and "… social theories are not theories of international politics … [though] substantive theory is based on social theory" (5,6). Therefore, constructivism is not a theory of international politics (7). Essentially, Wendt's (1999, 370) main argument is for constructivism to "… reclaim power and interest [expressed as power and interests] from materialism [and individualism] by showing how their content and meaning are constituted by ideas and culture", and any theorizing of international politics should start with the distribution of ideas and culture followed by material forces (Wendt 1999, 371). This is important for Wendt (1999), since ideas socially construct the identities and interests of state agents without individualist ontology, recognizing that agents might be constituted by social structures and that the nature of states might be bound up conceptually with the structure of the states' system (372).

Moving from structure to the process of international politics, Wendt (1999, 366) submitted that it is only through the interaction of state agents, that structure is "… produced, reproduced and sometimes transformed …" and, in that process of interaction, the identities and interests of agents are given, and only the behavioural choices of agents are in process. He admitted that this position is rationalist and contradicts the constructivist model which treats identities and interests of agents as interacting. However, he defended his rationalist position as not contradictory, since agents in the constructivist model choose behaviours in response to incentives, while each model is useful in answering different questions that are not mutually exclusive (Wendt 1999, 367). Consequently, Wendt's version of constructivism is a moderate one that draws especially on "… structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology…", conceding key points to materialist and individualist perspectives while endorsing a "… scientific approach to social inquiry" (1). Further, in stark opposition to Waltz' conclusion that anarchy necessarily leads to conflictual issues among states, Wendt (1991, 6) responded with his famous words, "… anarchy is what states make of it", even though states are the primary units of analysis. In the end, it is observed that for Wendt, constructivism is an epistemology as well as an ontology because theories quite literally construct the world (Wendt 1999, 49). Wendt's constructivism is considered as part of the naturalistic constructivist school (Ruggie 2000).

3.17.1.5 Kratochwil's Constructivism

Zehfuss (2002) submitted that Kratochwil's work should be seen as a critique of the poverty of epistemology in IR, on the one hand, and an analysis of the role of rules and norms in political life (Kratochwil 1984, 305-320). Criticizing positivist explanations as requiring antecedent conditions circumscribed by "… intentionality and the goal-directedness of human action …" (306), Kratochwil (1984, 305-320; 1993, 63-80; Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994, 215-247), using speech act theory, linguistic philosophy, and jurisprudential theories, asserted that IR is best analysed from the perspective that norms and rules influence all human conduct. Thus, in a sharp critique of the failure of neorealism to predict the end of the Cold War, he asserted that "[f]fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction" (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994, 216). Therefore, beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered thereby altering the rules and norms that are constitutive of their politics (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994, 216).

Further, Kratochwil (1993, 63-80) argued that explaining cooperative behavior based on actors' rule-utilitarian and act-utilitarian calculations of a rational actor's understanding is problematic, since rule-utilitarianism may be collapsed into act-utilitarianism, making it difficult to see the need for norms and rules for explanations of IR. As a solution, Kratochwil (1993, 63-80) proposed a reconceptualization of the role of rules and norms through the notion of a game, which:

> showed that rules and norms are constitutive of social life and that they cannot be understood, therefore, in terms of the regulative rules and injunctions familiar from criminal law, … [s]econdly "… rules and norms are not simply the distillation of individual utility calculations but rather the antecedent conditions for strategies and for the specification of criteria of rationality. (Kratochwil 1993, 75)

Further, norms enable the players to pursue their goals within them and establish inter-subjective meanings that allow actors to direct their actions and communicate with each other. Thirdly, it fundamentally changed my conception of action and communication, since the prevailing understanding of language was that of a "mirror" of reality (Kratochwil 1993, 76). Consequently, Kratochwil's constructivist approach emphasized the institutional nature of social systems, domestic as well as international, linked to rational understandings.

Zehfuss (2002, 16) reflecting on Kratochwil's approach, suggested that, since for him political interactions and interpretations take place due to partially shared or even contested understandings, attempts to make such interpretations more objective lead to a misconception of praxis, as human beings use moral criteria and interpretation (Zehfuss 2002; Kratochwil 1991). In Zehfuss' view, Kratochwil desires a move towards a "… conception of rationality linked to common-sense understandings" (Zehfuss 2002, 16). In this context, norms shape decisions, give action meanings, and provide a communicative medium for people, whereas rules are speech acts which depends on successful communication (Zehfuss 2002; Kratochwil 1991). In Kratochwil's view, rules and norms provide the basis for intersubjectivity in understanding IR, which involves meaningful action and normative questions.

3.17.1.6 Barkin's Realist Constructivism

Barkin (2010, 2) argued that constructivism and classical realism,[75] as approaches to the study of IR theory are not in mutual opposition, in fact, their approaches are more orthogonal (Barkin 2010, 4), as opposed to contradictory, and should be understood as concepts and not paradigms, since paradigms "obscures both the compatibilities among different approaches, and the complex ways in which they interrelate [positing that] … constructivist epistemology, and classical realist theory…are, in fact, compatible. (Barkin 2010, 3). He suggested that a realist-constructivist synthesis would create a language which would "speak to the relationship between the study of power politics and the study of ideals in international relations on the one hand, and the study of the social construction of international politics on the other" (Barkin 2010, 3).

He then constructs a four- step process to arrive at a discussion of the relationships between constructivism and classical realism. Firstly, Barkin (2010, 4) posited that "… [a]ny study of actual political practice requires both method and a theory of politics", and the second step in enabling the discussion on constructivism and realism is to view their constructivist and realist approaches to IR, not as paradigms. In this context, Barkin argued that the core concepts underlying constructivism and realism are "… intersubjectivity and power politics respectively" (5). Thirdly, Barkin (2010, 6) suggested a matrix where the core propositions of an approach "… speak to some dimensions of the study of [IR], but not to others" (7), where these dimensions can be epistemological, methodological and political. Using this matrix as a viewing lens of these two approaches provides the fourth step, where we are able to see "…points of tangent, points of opposition, and dimensions in which the two approaches are orthogonal (7).

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[75] Though constructivism emerged into mainstream IR as a critique of neorealism, and not classical realism, the tone was set for the differences between constructivism and realism more generally (Barkin 2010, 2).

3.17.2 The Ideas-Materialism Divide and Logic of the Social

Barkin (2010, 31-49) submitted that the ideas-materialism dichotomy is not as dichotomous as many scholars make it out to be. More importantly, such false dichotomy has the effect of distracting us from other related distinctions, such as that between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and between transhistoricism and contextuality, where the former is an ontological question, the latter two are epistemological. The realist ideas-materialism distinction, Barkin (2010) argued, is between approaches that look primarily to historical context and those that understand social institutions as transhistorical in nature, which allows us to study the construction of social systems with internal logics without worrying about a boundary between the ideal and material. Therefore, "[a] socially constructed international relations must be a historically contingent international relations …" (37).

According to Barkin (2010), classical realism and constructivism share a foundation in a logic of the social rather than a logic of the individual. The fact that the logic of the social is the key fundamental pillar of Barkin's realist constructivism, behoves his full explanation of this term:

> Logic of the social … is the idea that we cannot understand human society by aggregating from the behavior of individuals, whether this aggregation is inductive, as one finds with quantitative and opinion-based approaches to the study of international relations, or deductive, as one finds with rational choice approaches. Rather, we must start with the idea that human behavior cannot reasonably be studied apart from the social structures within which it occurs, and that give it meaning. (Barkin, 2010, 51)

Politics is about harnessing social institutions and channeling them in a particular direction. Social purpose is a definitional feature of the political interaction of agent and structure in the construction of social institutions, which in turn implies a public interest, whatever the public considers it to be, and by whoever considers themselves to be public (Barkin 2010, 68). The tension between constructivist and realist logic of the social comes down to transhistoricity of power, as interest (Barkin 2010, 72). However classical realists viewed power as a definitional element of politics, and not transhistorical.

3.17.2.1 Constraints on the Logic of the Social and Agency

The key constraint placed on the logic of the social is reflexivity, since the logic of the social assumes within constructivist and classical realist thinking, that political morality is contextual. Power and methods are two other important constraints on the logic of the social (Barkin 2010). As Barkin explained (2010, 85-87), power is used to explain everything in general, meaning it cannot be used to explain anything in particular. Power is also transhistorical, since it defines ex-ante actors' expectations as an ontological condition rather than an historical artifact. Further, where power politics is used as a means to an end, and not an end in itself (Barkin 2010, 72), then the goal of states is all about survival, which it is not useful to an inductive study and one of historicity (Barkin 2010, 86). Importantly, constructivism without reflexivity is either theoretically incoherent or redundant. In this context, social constructivists need to understand that "… they are studying social constructions through the lens of other social constructions" (89). Likewise, reflexivity is a form of prudence in the classical realist sense. Their reason for reflexivity stems from a need to understand the public interest, the intersubjective structure of political discourse and social purpose in other states (Barkin 2010, 89).

Methodology, as a constraint on the logic of the social and a recognition of historical contingency, is flexible. According to Barkin (2010, 99), "[a]ny method that can address questions of intersubjective understandings can be used to study the social construction of international politics …", and thus, interpretive methodology can be eclectic, in addition to narrative. Interestingly, Barkin (2010, 99) posited that if intersubjective data can be assembled, a quantitative method is appropriate. In fact, Barkin also posited that recent work from scholars suggest new game-theoretical techniques are specifically designed to highlight the intersubjective (99).

Finally, Barkin (2010, 11) submits that agency cannot be theorized because one cannot make generalized comments about agents in the same manner as structures, and as such, agency plays the role in these approaches of being the engine of, and the conceptual element that prevents both constructivism and realism from being effectively predictive. Consequently, "[t]heories [predictive] of agency are attempts to find patterns in behavior. To predict what an agent will do is in effect denying that agent agency" (Barkin 2010, 103).

3.17.3 Limits of Realism and Constructivism

According to Barkin (2010) "…[the] logic [of the social] constrains realism from confidently predicting outcomes" (118). Consequently, realism can recover its classical roots as a prescriptive theory by not making claims of scientific prediction; by being a theory of foreign policy and not a theory of systems structure; and that power politics must have a normative context to sustain a theory of foreign policy or any policy for that matter (Barkin 2010, 119). Accordingly, the crucial limit to constructivism is its inability to frame a general theory of how international politics work. Even though constructivism helps us to understand how a particular politics is constructed, it is much more limited in its ability to help us understand how politics in general is constructed (Barkin 2010, 11).

3.17.4 Constructivism and Realism - Compatibilities and Differences

According to Barkin (2010, 167), there are three key compatibilities between constructivist and realist logic, the logic of the social; a recognition of historical contingency; and a need for reflexivity. There are also differences in purpose. Constructivism's principal purpose is to explain what is happening in international politics, using the concept of intersubjectivity and the lens of co-constitution, whereas realism's primary purpose is ultimately policy prescription that relate directly to foreign policy and national interest (Barkin 2010, 167-168). Quite intuitively, he also suggested that "… good realism requires a more clearly articulated subjective political morality than does good constructivism" (168). Finally, classical realism demands a relational approach to understanding how power should be used in the conduct of policy, and not as a constraint, while constructivism is open to both the relational and the structural understandings of power (Barkin 2010).

3.17.5 Constructivism and Realism- What Are They Offering Each Other?

Barkin (2010, 169) advanced that realism can offer constructivists, particularly those who study foreign policy, a way to think about power politics that is more comprehensive, and at the same time, more social than that offered by the structural and liberal visions of power. Secondly, realism offers constructivists a way to think about the relationship between empirical research and policy, through a model of discursive and normative structures. Therefore, realism, through the shared mechanism of the logic of the social, provides a useful way of translating understanding into state policy (Barkin, 170).

On the other hand, constructivism offers to realists a set of methodological tools to facilitate the study of IR, that are both ontologically and epistemologically congenial to classical realism and particularly useful for addressing questions about social structure and change, and questions that are central to realist concerns with national interest in an evolving, yet anarchical world (Barkin, 171). Finally, Barkin (2010, 172-173) submits, that a constructivist method provides realists with a way to study political moralities comparatively without seeing the specific political morality underlying their own foreign policy prescriptions, which in turn clearly distinguishes political morality from the categories of empirical social construction and normative theory.

3.17.6 Other Key Contributors to Constructivism

In the first instance, constructivism seeks to problematize states' identities and interests (Finnemore 1996, 153; Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 267; Ruggie 2000, 33; Wendt 1999, 367; Farrell 2002, 50; Pettenger 2007) in contrast to rationalists who believe that identities and interests are exogenous givens. Secondly, constructivists view the international structure "… as a social structure infused with ideational factors to include norms, rules [and] law …" (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012, 278) which in turn influences or socially construct identities and interests of agents (Wendt 1995, 76-77; Adler 1997, 324; Wendt 1999, 342; Gould 1998, 87; Simon 1998, 149-169; Finnemore 1998, 910; Pettenger 2007, loc 485; Farrell 2002, 50). Thirdly, constructivism views "… the world as a project always under construction, a case of becoming, as opposed to being" (Adler 1997, 319-363; Kubálková et al. 1998, x; Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 279). Finally, constructivists, based on ontological and epistemological analysis, argued pure objectivity is impossible based on the subjectivity of humans. Neither do all constructivists reject the scientific method and deny explanations, rather constructivists also focus on the ontological orientations, epistemological preferences, normative concerns, and principled beliefs of actors in a value rational sense, which they believe result in a rich historical and empirical analysis (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 279).

According to Reus- Smit (2009, 212; Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 287; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 391-416), constructivism is characterised by the constitutive relationship between agents and structures, emphasising the significance of normative and material structures and how identity contribute to shaping political action by states and IOs. In this regard, an understanding of how actors develop their interests is critical to explaining a wide range of political phenomena (Price and Rues-Smit 1998, 259). However, O'Neill et al. (2004, 149-175), posited that agency depends on the actorness of the agents in the production of definitive results, irrespective of the anticipation of such results. Even though international politics may seem anarchic, structure, and by extension any security dilemma, is defined in ideational terms. Therefore, once anarchy is socially constructed, subjective and intersubjective understandings will prevent a Hobbesian outcome (Viotti and Kauppi 284-285). In fact, O'Neill et al. (2004, 151) and Viotti and Kauppi (2012, 287) supported the view that constructivists see neither agents or structures as ontologically prior, but rather as mutually constitutive, interacting with and shaping each other in ways that are not always materially apparent.

Adler (1997, 319-363) on the other hand, views constructivism as occupying the middle ground between rationalist and relativist interpretive approaches to understanding international relations. In his view, constructivism is more about the way the material world shapes and is shaped by actors' normative and epistemic interpretations. Adler's constructivists' middle ground occurs because constructivists are interested in "… understanding how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the social construction of reality" (330). To this end, constructivism explains how individual agents socially construct these structures in the first place and focuses on how structures constitute agents' identities and interests. As Adler puts it, constructivism is about not abandoning reason or rationality, but rediscovering how "… rational considerations influence collective human enterprises and situations" (348).

However, Guzzini (2000, 147-182) was quick to point out that "… rather than 'seizing' a middle ground in theoretical debates left vacant, constructivism was allowed to become its legitimate tenant". This led Aalberts and van Munster (2008, 720-746) to propose an alternative conception of the middle ground as a communicative space rather than a bridge, favouring dialogue and reflexivity. In their view, the constructivist middle ground has shifted towards the rationalist side of the debate. Accordingly, Guzzini (2000, 147-182), sees constructivism, epistemologically at the level of observation and geared towards the social construction of knowledge, and ontologically at the level of action and geared towards the construction of social reality. Consequently, theorizing and analyzing links between these two levels generate inter-subjective meanings. As he puts it, "…[r]eflexivity is then perhaps the central component of constructivism, a component too often overlooked" (150). This is a move towards Keohane's view (1987), when he described constructivism as reflectivism (Guzzini 150).

Similarly, Gould (1998, 94) argued that connecting rules to structure disconnects them from the intersubjective understandings of agents within their immediate environment, though rules arise from intersubjectivity and cannot exist without human authorship (Simon 1998, 156). However, to constructivists, ideational structures are more important than material ones where power is defined in ideational capabilities as an independent variable that shapes results in IR, and not as "… variables dependent on the preferences of powerful states …" (Viotti and Kauppi 282). As Guzzini (2000, 164) explains "… [i]ntersubjectivity is best understood through an analogy with language. Language does exist and cannot be reduced to the simple material support for communication (voice or other). In this manner, language is intersubjective, it is neither objective nor subjective (Guzzini

(2000). The discussion on norms will be taken up during the examination of its role in the formation of IREs.

3.17.7 Constructivism Variants: Neo-classical, Post-modernist, Naturalistic and Intellectual Precursors

According to Ruggie (2000, 35), there are several variants of constructivism, including sociological, feminist, jurisprudential, genealogical, and emancipatory. However, he proffered a classification, underpinned by a philosophical base, which in turn produced three variants, a neoclassical constructivism, a post-modernist constructivism, and a naturalist constructivism.

Ruggie’s neoclassical constructivism is only to indicate that it is rooted in the classical tradition of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), who advocated that interactions among actors have material and ideational causal impact, both of which can be studied scientifically (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 281), and Max Weber (1864-1920) who advanced that human actions can be value driven (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 281). It has nothing to do with the usual “noes” discussed in IR. To that classical tradition, Viotti and Kauppi added Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who articulated that phenomenon and noumena separate the social sciences from the natural sciences (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 279), and John Locke, an advocate that the state of nature is not warlike, and peace is preferred (Viotti and Kauppi 2012. 280).

According to Ruggie:

> *[N]eo-classical* constructivism [emphasis original] … include[s] an epistemological affinity with pragmaticism; a set of analytical tools necessary to make sense of intersubjective meanings, be it speech act theory, the theory of communicative action, their generalization as in the work of Searle, or evolutionary epistemology; and a commitment to the idea of social science. (Ruggie, 2000, 35)

Ruggie has put himself, along with E. Has, Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicolas Onuf, Emanuel Alder, Martha Finnemore, Peter Katzenstein, and feminist scholar Jean Elshtain, into the neo-classical constructivist school. To his list, is added Sami

Moisio, George Schopflin, Annika Bjorkdahl, Rodger Payne, ML Krook and J True, Amy Gurowitz, Kathryn Sikkink, Price and Reus- Smit and Stefano Guzzini. These constructivists, while incorporating norms and other ideational factors, do not necessarily reject science, standards, and methodologies for testing hypotheses or propositions (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 291).

The intellectual roots of post-modernists' constructivism more than likely go back to Friedrich Nietzche, Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Richard Ashley, David Campbell, James der Derian, and feminist scholar Spike Peterson (Ruggie 2000, 35; Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 292). To this list, is added Charlotte Epstein. Accordingly, Ruggie (2000) posited the following in relation to post-modernist constructivism:

> Here the linguistic construction of subjects is stressed, as a result of which discursive practices constitute the ontological primitives or the foundational units of reality and analysis. Little hope is held out for a legitimate social science. In its place, a "hegemonic discourse" is seen to impose a "regime of truth" (Keely 1990:91), instituted through disciplinary powers in both senses of that term. Lastly causality is considered chimerical…. (35)

In other words, post-modernist constructivism rejects the conventional epistemology of social science (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 292).

Finally, according to Ruggie (2000, 35-36) naturalistic constructivism is located between the neo-classical and post-modernist variants. The key proponents of this variant are Alexander Wendt, Roy Bhaskar and David Dessler. While it approaches IR as part of the social sciences, like the neoclassical variant, it is grounded in the philosophical doctrine of scientific realism which offers possibilities of a new naturalistic social science. Ruggie (2000) puts the matter of naturalistic constructivism, thusly:

> On its basis, it is no longer necessary to choose between "insider" and "outsider' accounts of social action and social order, not because social science is made to emulate the natural sciences … but because there is little difference in their respective ontologies to begin with. Scientific inquiry of both material and social worlds deals largely in non- observables … and much of the time even the intersubjective aspects of social life exists independently of the mental states of most individuals that constitute it. I call this *naturalistic* [emphasis original] constructivism. (36)

Accordingly, ideational structures are non-observables in similar manner to physical non-observables (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 292, Ruggie 2000, 36). The constructivist variants explored above allows for ease of navigation through this complex field of theoretical approaches, epistemologies and methodologies to find that which is most suitable. Against this backdrop, a working definition of constructivism is offered that fits the unique nature and boundaries of the research, embracing all linkages to the various theories and approaches that reflect constructivist principles:

> Constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of ideational as well as material factors in human action, where ontologically there is no objective reality and actors' concerns (identity, interests, power, norms, structures, beliefs, reality) are continuously socially constructed, shaping, and being shaped by actors conduct within states, IOs, IIs and IREs. Epistemologically, it confirms to distribution of knowledge and ideas, interpretive and communicative understandings, causal explanations, and discursive practices. Methodologically, it caters for value free and value laden content which can result in rich narrative, and historical and empirical analysis. (Working Definition)

A more succinct version reads as follows:

Constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of ideational as well as material factors in human action, where ontologically there is no objective reality … [e]pistemologically, it confirms to distribution of knowledge … ideas and interpretive and communicative understandings … [and] methodologically, it caters for value free and value laden content which can result in … empirical analysis. (Working Definition)

3.17.8 Critique

However, constructivists have their critics. Reus-Smit (2009, 225-229), pointed to internal division within constructivism itself over the nature of theory. One school disbelieves that a general theory of IR is possible. The other school, led by Alexander Wendt (1999) believes it is possible, and has proceeded to prove it with the release of his 'Social Theory of International Politics, which has put him at odds with most constructivists. To the contrary, most constructivists "find the pursuit of a general theory of international relations an absurdity, and confine their ambitions to providing compelling interpretations and explanations of … world politics" (Reus-Smit 2009, 226). The second discontent among constructivists surrounds its relationship with rationalism. According to Reus-Smit (2009), some rationalists believe that constructivism should deal with institutionalized norms, as the basis of shaping identities and interests, while other rationalists, treating interests as givens, would concentrate on how actors pursue their interests strategically. However, this form of division of labour tends to suggest that "…[c]onstructivism is thus not a rival theoretical perspective to rationalism at all, but rather a complimentary one" (227). Consequently, this attempt was criticized as propagating an unnecessarily thin form of constructivism (Rues-Smit 2009).

Similarly, Keohane (1988, 379-396), criticized constructivists for not pointing out limitations of rationalism and developing their own theories, and until such time. constructivism would remain on the margins in the field of research. Further, Mearsheimer (1994, 5-49), accused constructivists of having little empirical support for their assertions. However, contrary to the views of Keohane and Mearsheimer, the constructivists field is wide, with an active research programme. Keohane and Mearshrimers' challenge with constructivism, lies in their non-acceptance of intersubjectively shared understandings, beliefs and ideas being mutually constituted with a requirement for an understanding that is interpretive and qualitative, and not deductive and quantitative. Importantly, as Viotti and Kauppi (2012, 298) pointed out, beyond the numerous empirical case studies that have been based on constructivist concepts, the epistemological and ontological differences are what stand between interpretive understandings and realist and liberal approaches to IR.

It is submitted, at this juncture, that the constituent elements [76]of constructivism as observed above, are essential in understanding the KCB approach to the formation of IREs. Against this backdrop the KCB approach (weak and strong cognitive constructivist approaches) to the formation of IREs is examined.

[76] Such as ideas, identity, interests, norms, rules, agents, structures, intersubjectivity, interpretivism, speech acts, dialogical communication, and mutually constitutive actions.

The full term, constructivism, is added to enhance Hasenclever's choice of cognitivism as his description of approaches to the formation and theories of IREs. It is believed this adds to the research and evidential literature, by allowing a truer reflection of the expansive constructivist thinking in existence.

3.18 The Weak Cognitivist (Constructivist) Approach to Formation and Theories of International Regimes

According to Hasenclever et al. (2002), supporters of the weak cognitivist-constructivist approach (WCC) contend that the demand for IREs in IR depends on the perception of international problems that actors hold and produce, in part, by their causal and normative beliefs. These beliefs are independent of actors' material environment comprising power and wealth, which are complimentary to rationalist accounts of IRE formation that assumes preferences and choices as exogenously given. In this sense, the WCC approach to IREs may well fill a gap in IB theorizing by providing a theory of 'interest change' (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 137). However, there some assumptions which they make.

3.18.1 Assumptions

Firstly, WCC believe that interpretation is assumed to depend on the body of knowledge actors hold at a given time and place which shapes actors' perception of reality. Consequently, actors' interests and preferences are contingent on how they understand the natural and social world (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 140-141; Haas 1990). Secondly, weak cognitivists assume a growing demand on the part of decision makers for scientific information and other reliable knowledge. This type of knowledge allows state actors to be 'uncertainty reducers' which is a key activity of IREs, and 'gap fillers' for functional theorists who experience a lack of information about the conduct and intentions of other states (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 138-141; Adler and Hass 1992; Keohane 1993). Thirdly, WCC assume that intersubjectively shared meanings for IRE formation and regime performance are important for their research programme, which will allow them to have a general prior understanding and consensus among themselves before dealing collectively with specific matters in the issue areas (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 140-141).

3.18.2 Cognition as an Explanatory Variable and the Importance of Learning

Ideas matter in the construction of IREs. Importantly, Goldstein and Keohane's (1993) case studies, departed from the null hypothesis which holds that the actions of states can be understood based on egotistic interests in the context of power realities. Explained further by Hasenclever et al. (2002, 142), the null hypothesis is seen as a double one. Firstly, given a set of egoistic interests "… behaviour can be explained without reference to ideas …" and, secondly, "… interests do not *change* [emphasis original] as a result of changes in beliefs that actors hold." In the second instance, "… ideas do not function as an *independent* [emphasis original] variable". Based on important changes in the history of IR, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) posited that rationalist reasoning based on this null hypothesis is unable to provide adequate explanations. Accordingly, they concluded that "… the emergence and maintenance of cooperation can be explained purely in terms of self- interested behavior and the role of formal organizations (Goldstein and Keohane, 205). This was supported by Ikenberry and Jackson (1993- cited in Goldstein and Keohane 1993), who submitted that ideas matter over power realities in their study of postwar interests and the abolition of colonialism, respectively. Moreover, variations in principled and causal beliefs can explain changes in international behaviour. Further, ideas as beliefs, serve as road maps allowing decision makers to choose that which best suits their normative understandings. Additionally, ideas may even facilitate cooperation in the absence of a unique equilibrium and their own enhancement through international norms and rules created under the influence of widely shared beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). The absence of ideas may even prevent regime formation (Garret and Weingast 1993).

Learning, in the IR sense, means a process by which consensual knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in IREs so that the results induce members to question the appropriateness of earlier actions leading to new priorities and trade-offs (Nye 1987, 380; Haas 1990, 2-6; Haas 1993, 175). As a result of learning, states do change strategies to achieve different interests by adjusting to structural changes in the IRE, in keeping with a rationalist approach, as opposed to recognizing any redefinition of interests due to cognitive change, with or without a redistribution of power and wealth (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 146). We observe, at this juncture, that states' dependence on structural changes seemingly disallow an understanding of the objective of actions. Importantly, Nye (1987, 371- 402) and Hasenclever et al. (2002) pointed out that new information suggesting the US-Soviet nuclear arms build-up could have led to mutually assured destruction, instead, forced cooperation and produced a nuclear non-proliferation IRE. In their view, there is a causal relationship between IRE and knowledge. It is also important to keep in mind, that robust IREs (ideas that lead to learning) are required, in the absence of an international regulatory authority, to foster cooperation among states.

3.18.3 Epistemic Communities and Regime Formation

Defined as networks of professionals with recognized expertise, competence, and authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in a particular issue area, epistemic communities are crucial channels through which knowledge can be shared in order to impact IRE formation and change (Haas 1992; Hasenclever et al. 2002, 149). Consequently, if this network of professionals can, by consensus, infer cause and effect as well as means and ends linkages, such an outcome would certainly contribute to learning within the inter-state level (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 150), though Young and Osherenko 1993 (cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002, 153) pointed out that "… consensual knowledge is not a guarantee for the emergence of international cooperation". In our view, the IPCC and SBTA come to mind as crucial examples of epistemic communities within our research. According to Haas (1992) and Hasenclever et al. (2002, 150) epistemic policy coordination, in the context of formation of IREs, would occur in the presence of a high degree of uncertainty; consensus; scientific advice; and political power. IRE formation is also shaped by policy innovation, diffusion, selection and persistence (Adler and Haas 1992). Epistemic communities facilitate this coordination through framing of new ideas, political integration, and persuasion.

Thus, a larger segment of the causal chain leading to the formation of IREs and transformation into IRE theory is still required, notwithstanding the WCC's approach to IREs that emphasizes the payoff structures that contribute to the emergence of options for actors and the maintenance of the utilitarian core and ontological assumptions of rationalist approaches.

3.19 The Strong Cognitivist (Constructivist) Approach

Strong cognitivists constructivists (SCC), such as Thomas Franck, Friedrich Kratochwil, Harald Muller, John Gerald Ruggie, Alexander Wendt and Robert Cox, while rejecting utility maximization (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 155), have all questioned the appropriateness of the rationalist perspective of studying IREs, especially since normative structures of IREs escape rationalist theorizing that there is no optimizing of behaviour without prior socialization. Contrastingly, as pointed out by Hasenclever et al. (2002), March and Olsen (1989, 21-6, 160-162) created a model of political behaviour for actors' actions, called the logic of appropriateness, defined by political and social institutions, and transmitted through socialization. Further, SCC analysis of IREs encountered an ontology where state identities and cognition are a condition precedent to regime formation and a condition ex post facto to IIs.

3.19.1 Critiquing Rationalist Approaches to the Study of Regimes

According to Ashley (1984, 225-286) and Wendt (1999), the ontology of some rational choice approaches to the study of IREs support a state-centric model where states are conceptualized prior to the formation of IREs. "Its individualism stipulates the theoretical primacy of individual actors rather than of social collectives" (Ashley 1984, 243). Consequently, laws discovered in this interaction are taken to be objectively true. Other rational scholars prefer an institution-centric approach (Hollis and Smith 1990, 54), where the behaviour of states presupposes normative structures (Wendt and Duval 1998, 67; Snidal 1986, 45). Further, the workings of norms, rules, and normative frameworks within which actors operate represent a normative constitutive approach to IRE formation (Snidal 1986, 45; Krasner 1988, 89; Wendt and Duvall 1989; Buzan 1993, 350- cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002, 160). However, even though some rationalists agree to normative constructs of IR, they claim utility maximization is best for IRE creation (Keohane 1988, 390), whereas SCC urged the application of the regulative and constitutive dimension of shared knowledge and norms as practices, rather than their mere regulation (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 767; Muller 1993- cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002). However, while the regulative rules of IREs can indeed cause a state to behave in a particular manner, the constitutive rules of IREs can cause states to behave in any manner that suits them, blurring the distinction between cause and effect (Dessler 1989, 453). Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of IREs is both objective as well as subjective (Hasenclever et al. 2002).

In the context of rule governed cooperation, SCC have advocated for an opening of the positivist epistemology to more interpretative strains associated with IREs, emphasising interpretative and shared understandings (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 766). Importantly, the rationalist view that in IRE analysis the subject must be separated from the object is rejected as illusory and socially harmful since "… theory is never a neutral image of society, but itself a causal factor in ongoing social conflict … it goes beyond simply describing and explaining an independently given reality (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 165; Cox 1986, 207; Hoffman 1987, 233; Neufeld 1994). In that context, theory must become critical and reflect its own impact on the social world rather than to simply describe and explain reality (Cox 1986, 208). Theory must therefore become part of the explicit ontology of social research (Hoffman 1987, 231-249).

3.19.2 The International Society and Communicative Approaches to Formation and Theories of International Regimes

Also referred to as the power of legitimacy in international politics, theorists of the international society approach (ISA) to IRE formation, Hurrell (1993, 49) and Frank (1990) advanced the proposition that states are dependent on the existence of a rule governed international society, while cooperation amongst them depended on the extent of correspondence between the specific norms and rules that constitute IREs and the broader normative structures underlying international society (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 167). Therefore, norms and rules tend to have a natural compliance and compelling pull that operates as an irreducible crucible against the key rationality of interacting agents (Franck 1990). More particularly, only norms and rules that states perceive to be legitimate will fit into the compliance pull (Hurrell 1993). In this context, norms and rules are only considered legitimate where there is textual clarity in how they are communicated, validated, adhered to, and considered coherent (Franck 1990). These properties of normative structures underpinning the international system in which norms and rules operate, provide as a sense of obligation on the part of states to comply with other states knowing fully well that non-compliance may lead to sanctions by the international society.

Further, scholars Kratochwil (1989, Ruggie 1986, and Muller 1994, - cited in Hasenclever et al. 2002) focused their emphasis on the importance of intersubjective meanings expressed through communicative dynamics of rule interpretation and rule application which are integral to IREs in their attainment of international cooperation. Consequently, the success of IREs depends on communicative action which is informed by practical discourses between states aimed at producing and maintaining the convergence of expectations that IREs live by (Ruggie1986; Kratochwil 1989). As opposed to rationalists' preference for strategic action, which is success oriented, depending on the application of agreed upon norms and rules (Stein 1983, 137; Keohane 1988, 386), communicative action is oriented towards mutual understanding aimed at coordinating social behaviour by persuasive arguments. On the view that states usually put up with violations of agreed upon norms without prescribing sanctions, promoters of SCC argued that through shared understandings, an IRE may conclude that a particular norm or rule was too harsh or unjustified. IREs, norms, rules and principles are all products of ongoing processes (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 774). They represent an objective set of principles (Kratochwil 1989, 101; Hasenclever et al. 2002, 179).

Whether international discourse succeeds or fails depends on the respect given by parties to norms, such as equality in participation, the principle of no harm, and respect for the binding nature of agreements. Secondly, the success of international discourses depends on principles of equity and reciprocity and the principle that contractual arrangements extracted through fraud, duress and undue influence should not be observed. (Hasenclever et al 2002, 180). However, important unresolved problems continue, particularly since states' conduct is usually circumscribed by failing to engage in communicative action in the face of evidence, and practicing bargaining and coercive moves, rather than persuasion and shared values. A solution lies in states having a greater understanding of the interrelated phenomena of trust and morality in IR. Finally, the ontological relationship between IREs and communicative action requires further clarification, particularly since IREs no longer appear as the unproblematic basis for meaningful action, but as starting points for convincing sequences of communicative action. The issue is not whether one of the two (IRE or communicative action) is ontologically prior to the other, but whether they are under constant construction (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 183).

3.19.3 The Role of Norms in the Formation of International Regimes and International Organizations

Importantly, there is general agreement in defining norms as standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891; Shannon 2000, 294; Katzenstein 1996, 5). In much stronger terms, "[n]orms are also defined as intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural [world] that define actors, their situations, and their possibilities of action" (Farrell 2002, 49). Focusing more on the role of norms, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 887-917) posited:

> [N]ormative and ideational concerns have always informed the study of international politics … [and] [t]he regimes scholarship of the early 1980s similarly emphasized the role of principles and norms in ways that opened the door for a more sweeping ''ideational turn'' in the late 1980s. (Finnemore and Sikkink 887-888)

Further, IREs are principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, and not actors (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 700) that have power to constrain other actors' conduct in the international issue area (Shannon 2000, 296). Using an inductive approach, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 888) argued that norms evolve in a patterned life cycle with segments of the life cycle dominated by different behavioural logics. Norms and rationality are thus intimately connected and cannot be separated from normative influence or change. Consequently, contesting norms against rationality or rational choice is unhelpful in explaining political processes observed in empirical research (Shannon 2000, 295). Arguing that there is a return to norms, after a turn away for methodological reasons, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) make this fundamental point:

> As contemporary researchers make their arguments about norms, culture, and ideas, they will need to specify ideational causal claims and mechanisms clearly, think seriously about the microfoundations on which theoretical claims about norms rest, and evaluate those claims in the context of carefully designed historical and empirical research. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 890)

In support, Farrell (2002, 62) contended that constructivists' explanation of actions within IR depends on theorizing about the mechanisms that produce causal relationships. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argued that notwithstanding regulative (constraining) and constitutive (creating) norm types, of critical importance is the less researched evaluative or prescriptive norm type, since it is that prescriptive quality which separates norms from other kinds of rules. Further, many international norms started out as domestic norms and later became international through the efforts of norm entrepreneurs. Accordingly, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 895) posited that the norm life cycle is a three stage process. The first stage is norm emergence (through persuasive action by norm entrepreneurs), the second is norm acceptance or cascade (international socialization), and the final stage is norm internalization (the norm becomes the prevailing standard) and no longer a public matter.

On the issue of what accounts for norm emergence, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) posited that by using process tracing or genealogy as a method "… the accounts of norm origins in most studies stress human agency, indeterminacy, chance occurrences, and favorable events …" (896). Further, norm entrepreneurs use organizational platforms that includes IOs, and NGOs that are aligned to their specific agenda, and through cognitive frames, language and names, they proceed to construct the norm. Once a critical mass of states (usually more than one third) has adopted the norm, the norm is considered to be at its tipping point and then cascades. Obviously, some states are more critical than others in the evolution towards norms cascade.

Interestingly, actors conform to norms based on the 'logic of appropriateness' concept, where conformance is driven by the actors' understanding that the norm is good, desirable and appropriate (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897-913). It is submitted that it seems clear from the immediate discussion above that norms are embedded in IOs, and a norm based approached to IRE formation cannot be discussed without the benefit of a discussion about norms in the context of IOs. Consequently, Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 699-732) questioned the extent to which IOs follow the purposes for which they were created. Acknowledging that most IOs are created as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency, Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 699) treat IOs as social facts that respond, as a priority, to normative and cultural forces that shape how organizations see the world and conceptualize their own missions. Material interests are not a priority from a constructivist standpoint (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 703) and IOs are considered purposive and independent actors with their own multiple agendas and sources of agency. Further, IOs must be seen to have ontological independence and not necessarily as intervening variables in the neoliberal sense.

As cultural sites of authority, IOs also exemplify three types of power. In the first instance, they classify the world by "… creating categories of actors and action" (Finnemore 1999, 710). Secondly, IOs fix meanings in the social world that are attached to their classification and categories, such as the meaning attached to development, which in turn determines what constitutes development (the norm), Finally, IOs "… articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors around the globe" (710) by using their technical resident expertise, supported by state power, to spread the benefits of a particular norm as a model of good behaviour for actors, mostly in developing countries. Significant norm diffusers include the World Bank, the IMF and the UN (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 712-715). Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 699-732) further submitted that IOs develop distinctive cultures that lead to dysfunctional behaviour that is pathological. Consequently, the pathologies found in IOs are bred by bureaucratic cultures such as mechanisms of irrationality of rationalization, universalism, organizational insulation, cultural contestation and the normalization of deviance. Finally, Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 716-724) posited that the connection between these mechanisms and pathological behavior is probabilistic and not deterministic, which is consistent with their constitutive analysis. It is observed that Barnett and Finnemore's constructivist view of IOs situates norms and rules as constituent elements of its formation and existence.

Payne (2001, 37-61) argued that constructivist theorists view norms as ideationally shared understandings underpinned by persuasive communication that reflect a community's legitimate social purpose. According to Payne (2001), persuasive communication is critical to norm building, however, norm entrepreneurs, using material levers, often create *'issue'* frames for their benefit and those who control power to promote a specific norm or norms. Acharya (2004, 239-275), in somewhat similar terms, argued that agents in diffusing norms, reconstruct foreign norms to fit with their cognitive priors and identities. Congruence, as opposed to persuasive communication, thus becomes the key to norm acceptance. Consequently, there is no general or total acceptance of norms, instead, norm acceptance is localized which in turn serves to mitigate normative contestation.

Gurowitz (2006, 305-341), in contrastingly different terms, argued that norm diffusion, such as the invocation of international norms domestically, takes place within the context of state identity, identity crises, and how secured that state is about its own identity. This means norms may matter differentially depending on the states' identity and the extent of its own resources. Interestingly, Krook and True (2010, 103-127), posited that diffusion of international norms affect policy and political behaviour. Differing from Gurowitz (2006, 305-341), Krook and True (2010, 103-127) viewed norms as dynamic processes of adoption and implementation suggesting that a discursive approach was best suited for theorizing and analysing life cycles of international norms. Dynamism, in this context, has both internal and external sources. Payne (2001, 37-61) also highlights the illegitimacy of non-consensual norms due to distortions in communication, notwithstanding its resonance with the public.

Bjorkdahl (2002, 9-23), on the other hand, argued that norms are a useful and lasting analytical tool in analysing international relations because states rely more on norms, ideas and values as opposed to the traditional '*think'* about distribution of power. Though Bjorkdahl (2002) agreed with Payne (2001, 37-61) that norms are '… social structures consisting of shared knowledge and intersubjective understandings" (20), he also posited that the origins of international norms were influenced by social practices, and international and domestic processes. Further, norms constitute interests and identities, and to that extent, they are coterminous necessitating interconnectedness between interests and norms as opposed to any distinctiveness, which is central to rationalists' perspectives. This mutual constitutive relationship between norms and interests serve to provide states with opportunities to pursue their preferences. Notably, at the international level, constructivists practice norm driven politics, which facilitates multiateralising agreements and their compliance shaping. At this juncture, both IREs and IOs include norms as constituent elements. To the extent that norms are embedded in both IREs and IOs, is the extent to which IREs and IOs are mutually constitutive. Therefore, norms are essential in the formation of IREs and IOs.

3.19.4 The Power of Identity in the Formation of International Regimes

Viotti and Kauppi (2012, 287) viewed "[i]dentities as relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about one's self that are acquired by interacting with or defining the self in relation to an 'other'", which in constructivist terms means "… a structure composed of social relationships, shared meanings, rules, norms, and practices" (287). Viotti and Kauppi (2012, 287) also suggested that due to this interaction, identity breaks down the realist and liberal dichotomy between systemic and state levels of analysis, providing in the process a standpoint on the mutual constitution of the state and system or agent and structure. Interestingly, Wendt (1994, 384-396) proposed that interactions at the systemic level change state identities and interests. Therefore, identities are also collective, and since interests are dependent on identity and identities are the basis of interests, collective identity and collective interests interact where actors empathize with each other, and decisions are made consensually. At this juncture, it is important to note identity and identity formation are key ingredients in the construction and function of IREs. They are formless but are embedded in IOs which are material. Identity formation is not a theory, but it contributes to a constructivist approach to the construction of IREs.

Wendt's position of differentiating between different social identities and relating different behavioural regularities to these identities would probably provide a better understanding of what kind of identity is more suited to IRE change (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 190). However, the relationship between identity and actor requires clarification. The ability of actors' identities to change due to intersubjective understandings, and actors' self-understandings to change due to constituted interests in a dynamic changing world, may well challenge the constructivists' criterion that social actors cannot be reduced to utility maximizers (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 191). Further, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 191) challenge to the constructivist assumption that the fundamental structures of the international system (states, identities and IREs) always tend to an internal balance, and if one changes the others will change, invites the question as to what causes the change in the first place, and a further question as to when do states act against or in favour of existing structures. Notably, constructivism is about intersubjective meanings and shared understandings that are mutually constituted among actors or states in the international arena, including IREs. Therefore, there is no apriori. There is no ontological prior. Consequently, the difficulty envisioned by Hasenclever et al. 2002, remains unclear.

Schöpflin (2001, 1-10), on the other hand, argued that expansion into the non-material sphere threatens our identity. Consequently, he submitted that we take refuge in our 'collective' identities to resolve our individual fears. This said, identities are constructed around a set of moral values, discourse, and behaviour involving ideas of right and wrong, and in that identity construction there is a hierarchy of norms, which requires actors to be judgemental in condemning, or approving types of behaviour. In this context, every collective seeks moral value and worth recognition as a priority, and where this is lacking, collective communities are usually willing to redouble their efforts in arriving at identity acceptance. However, Schöpflin, (2001, 1-10) stopped short of suggesting that collectives will impose their identities on the weak for recognition in the formation of IREs.

3.19.5 The Historical- Dialectical (Power of History) Approach in the Formation of International Regimes

According to Hasenclever et al. (2002) "[i]t is the presence of an international community [or institution] that makes the permanent renegotiation of the meaning of regime injunctions possible, since states know that their legitimate interests will be taken into account" (193).

However, Robert Cox was more concerned with what might cause the breakdown and replacement of IIs. In essence, Cox theorized how historic changes in IR can contribute to an unravelling of current IOs and IREs of the existing world order by social forces, and the possibilities of the emergence of a new global order (Cox 1981; 1983; 1992). Cox's (1981) aim was to deconstruct, and then construct through the lens of critical theory, hegemonic orders and apply a critical theory of world order, which takes "… the form of an interconnected series of hypotheses …" (139), in creating that new global order (Cox 1981; 1982; 1992). Against the backdrop of Cox's (1981) famous words, "[t]heory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose [emphases original]" (128), Cox classified neorealism and neoliberalism as problem-solving theories, particularly since they take the world as they find it, and contrasted both with critical theory, which he explained thusly:

> [I]t stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts. (Cox 1981,139)

Cox argued that what we really need to examine is the relative stability of successive world orders. Consequently, he defined this hegemony as "… based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality" (Cox 1981,139). In this formulation, state power ceases to be the sole explanatory factor and becomes part of what is to be explained. In other words, Cox's hegemonic orders are historic structures operating as a fit between power, ideas and institutions (Hasenclever et al. 2002). In Cox's view (1981, 135), a shift in world order begins "… not from the top but rather from the bottom … and "… [w]e must shift the problem of changing [the] world order back from IIs to national societies" (1983, 173).

Further, Cox (1981, 135) submitted that, in taking the bottom-up approach, a critical theory formulation of a world order recognizes that any framework for action begins with:

> [A] historical enquiry … into the historical structures which comprise a particular combination of … thought patterns, material conditions and human institutions … [constituted by] habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action takes place (Cox 1981).

Cox (1981, 125-155) also differed from neorealists by giving ontological primacy to societal actors over governmental and international actors. However, as pointed out by Hasenclever et al. (2002, 196), this does not mean that Cox (1981) was unaware of the fallacy of seeking to give a single-factor explanation of a complex social phenomenon. Therefore, his approach is deliberately non-reductionist taking into account the interdependence which exists between the strategic intentions of societal actors, national institutions, and the international system. In other words, effective operation of IIs is an indicator of an existing hegemony, where hegemonic orders manifest themselves in IREs which implement the concept of rule in accordance with the transnationally dominant social class and their allies (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 198). Importantly, critical pillars of the hegemonic structure, include the international production and class structures, and the internationalisation of production.

Accordingly, Cox (1981, 140) posited that IIs, post WWII, were part of a hegemonic world order, led by the United States, where "[t]he *pax americana* [emphasis original] produced a greater number of formal IIs than the earlier [pax britannica] hegemony". These IIs, then enjoyed unjust distributive advantages to sustain capitalist domination over the rest of the world and the establishment of a liberal world society led by the bourgeoisie ruling class (Cox 1981, 142; 1983, 172). According to Cox, (1981, 125-155) the principal task, in this liberal hegemonic construct, is for actors to ensure optimal political and economic conditions for the global exploitation of private capital (Cox 1981, 142,149; 1992, 173) which resulted in the emergence of the modern welfare state underpinned by the principle of embedded liberalism (Cox 1981,150; Ruggie, 1998). In this construct, the economies of the world, including the Third World, are integrated into the world market.

For Cox, (1981, 125-155) it is critical to recognize that power and conflict, which are upheld by IIs, play a significant role in the approach to hegemonic orders, but not in the neorealist sense. Cox (1983, 164) seems to fancy a broader concept of power, more in the Machiavellian sense, which endorses physical coercion with ideological manipulation. Importantly, Cox (1983), similar to Ruggie and Kratochwil, calls for greater interpretative approaches to the analysis of international politics since research methods forming general laws are incompatible with interpretative understandings and historical structures. However, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 207) further pointed out that though Cox (1983) adumbrates a change in direction of IIs, "… he is admittedly unable to estimate analytically in which direction such a change is likely to lead …", and he makes no effort to understand the conditions under which these social conflicts are dealt with peacefully. Further, Cox (1983) seems not to consider issues of collective action associated with PD, and is unable to determine whether a future world order is more desirable than the existing one by showing how the power of history makes its contribution to formations of IREs.

3.19.6 Prospects for a Synthesis of Interest Based, Power Based and Knowledge and Constructivist-Based Theories

Hasenclever et al. (2002, 211) submitted that neither of the three schools, neoliberalism (self- interest), realism (relative power) and cognitivism-constructivism (causal and social knowledge) is capable of "… capturing the essential dimensions of regimes" and juxtaposing them is not only a way of classifying IIs, but also a way of being "… faithful to an intersubjective reality as well." Against this backdrop, the authors explored synthesis possibilities. In the first instance, Hasenclever et al. (2002) looked at the possibility of a *'synthesis through contextualization between realism and neoliberalism'*, particularly since both theories recognized states' concern for both relative and absolute gains. In their view, there is considerable potential for a combination of ideas from each of the schools. Citing realist Grieco (1988) and neoliberalist Keck (1991; 1993), Hasenclever et al. (2002, 214) posited that in a situation where states are unwilling to accept a gap in 'cooperation gains' in favour of partner states, IREs need not be irrelevant, but instead assume additional functions, even though there is uncertainty as to whether IREs may serve the purpose of managing relative gains. Additionally, Powell (1991) constructed a game-theoretic model, which demonstrated that when efficiency of force was high, states acted as if they were concerned with relative gains, and when other constraints were introduced, states maximized absolute gains. Accordingly, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 215) submitted that the possibility of a unified rationalist theory of IREs emerged where predictions and explanations are conditional on situational attributes of three distinctions: non-problematic social situations where rationalists expect IREs to be absent or of no consequence; mixed-motive situations with weak concerns about relative gains" (neoliberals); and mixed-motive situations with strong concern with relative gains (realists). However, further research is still needed to advance this unified possibility.

Secondly, Hasenclever et al. (2002) looked at the possibility of a *'synthesis between rationalism and weak cognitivist-constructivism through complimentary explanations*.' In this construct, rationalists and WCC appear to work best "… when they are seen as addressing subsequent links in one causal chain" (216), thereby filling frequently admitted gaps in rationalist explanations of IREs. In this synthesis, WCC complimented rationalists' treatment of actors' preferences as exogenous in their game-theoretic analysis, by studying casual knowledge phenomena such as complex learning, epistemic communities, and normative changes - a sort of division of labour that links game theory and theories of pay-offs in explaining actors' preferences and perceived outcomes.

Also, in this synthesis, Hasenclever et al. (2002) observed that instead of cognitive-constructivist factors driving interests in the causal chain, a second type of synthesis of rationalist and cognitivist-constructivist approach allowed for "… ideas [to] *intervene* [emphasis original] between preferences and outcomes, such as regime formation" (217).

Thirdly, Hasenclever et al. (2002, 219) looked at '*no possibility of a synthesis between rationalism and strong cognitivism-constructivism, but a fruitful dialogue'* being possible which already obtains between the two theories in the study of IREs. Hasenclever et al. (2002) doubts that a rationalist-SCC synthesis is possible that preserves the fundamental assumptions and concerns of both theories. Additional to the positivist and interpretivist methodological differences in analysis of IREs, was the view by March and Olsen (1989), that rationalists study state behaviour under the premise of a logic of consequentiality (160), whereas SCC argued that states confirm to a logic of appropriateness (38). Notwithstanding these differences, both agree that IREs develop a life of their own and do not necessarily collapse or adapt to any change in the external environment. Additionally, it may well be that there is no need for any synthesis, since each theoretical approach to the formation of IREs has an independent story to tell, one focusing on the sociality of choices and the other emphasizing their rationality (Hasenclever et al. 2002, 224).

3.20 Key Theoretical Concepts

Table 3.1 reflects the key theoretical concepts that emerged from the discussion on the various theories and approaches to the formation of IREs.

Table 3. 1: Key Theoretical Concepts

Categories	Theoretical Concepts
Neorealism	hypotheses; anarchical international system; power; positivism; relative gains; game theory; separation of object from subject; blind spots; the state is the principal actor; power is predictive; value free; causal explanation; positivism; epistemology; methodology.
Neoliberalism	hypotheses; anarchical international system; power; positivism; absolute gains; game theory; separation of object from subject; blind spots; the state is the principal actor; hegemonic stability; value free; causal explanation; positivism; epistemology; methodology
Classical Realism	power is prescriptive; causal explanation; anarchical international system
Constructivism	humanistic actions are immeasurable; mutual constitution; under construction; interests and identities are not exogenous; intersubjective understandings; interpretative understandings; ideas as the basis of interests; interests as the basis of identity; interpretive epistemologies, speech acts; communicative action; narrative explanation, thick description; nomological-deductive model; power; cause without effect; ideational structures; interpretivism; mutual constitution; value laden; post-positive; orthogonal; ontology; epistemology; methodology
Critical Theory	institutional bargaining; critical theory of world order; value laden; positivism; hypotheses; ontology, epistemology and methodology

3.20.1 Analysis and Implications for Research

The adoption of constructivism as the lens through which the CCAF phenomena will be examined does not discount the influence and importance of IB, PB or KCB theories within the issue area. What is aimed, is an examination, through the lens of constructivism, of the influence of IB, PB and KCB theories in the formation and operationalisation of IREs. Consequently, the UNCFM is treated as an IRE and its constituent elements (COP, AF, GEF and GCF) as IREs, where neo realism, neoliberalism, constructivism, and critical theory are treated as theories and approaches to the study of IR and to the formation and operationalisation of IREs, respectively. After all, an expected outcome of a theoretical application is a reasonable explanation. Situating the IB, PB and KCB theories of IR and approaches to the formation of IREs, within the issue area of CCAF, allows for an examination and possible applications of *a* theory or *various* theories, or *an* or *various* approaches.

A functional theory (IB) of IREs, which seeks to foster cooperation among actors within the issue area of CCAF, will only be evident when effects explain causes since functional explanations of IREs are post hoc in nature. When applied to the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS, that is not new and additional, the theory is found wanting. Keohane's functional theory of IRE does not treat with all aspects of what an IRE represents. There is no evidence of his theory addressing the intersubjective nature of IREs, expressed through conversion of actors' expectations in the CCAF issue. In the result, Keohane's functional theory of IREs and the problem-structural approach do not match up, as being suitable to be embedded within the UNCFM as applicable lens through which the phenomenon can be viewed. However, elements of it are practiced by Parties in operationalising the UNCFM as an IRE. Though Young's institutional model of IRE formation is more reflective of the ideational content of the working definition of IREs, it is *not* fully compliant, and notwithstanding it is behavioural in nature with a non-focus on the rationalist concept of utility maximizers, it does not satisfy the ideational limb of the working definition of IREs.

It is therefore not suitable as the viewing lens, but as an acknowledgement that institutional bargaining takes place within the CCAF issue area.

The PB theoretical approaches to the formation of IREs uses power as an explanatory variable, therefore cooperation is not viewed as a natural possibility in an anarchical structure, neither do neorealists rally around an institutional approach where actors' expectations converge. Instead, PB theorists developed, inter alia, the HST as a means of forming IREs under the direction of a hegemon. However, the continued existence of international cooperation, IIs, and the UNCFM, against the backdrop of a fading hegemon (the United States), challenges the effect of the HST since no collapse has occurred, raising the question as to what accounts for their persistence? The answer lies in the mutual constitutive nature of agents, norms, actors, ideas and structure, and the fact that the international system in under constant construction. Therefore, PB theoretical approaches are unsuitable lens through which the issue of CCAF should be viewed. There is no concession that power is an absolute factor in the formation and operationalisation of IREs, however, and there is disagreement that is it *the* absolute factor. Applied to the CCAF issue, power determines who are allowed effective participation within the UNCFM and who has the power to walk away from negotiations within the issue area. PB theorists use Battle to understand the formation of IREs, and even though multiple cooperative outcomes are possible, Battle, and by extension cooperative outcomes, are weakened by the fact that power determines who are allowed to play the game. Consequently, PB theoretical approaches to the formation of IREs do not address the phenomena of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF for the SIDS.

Normatively, KCB actions support value-laden theorizing as key to dismantling power and domination structures within the CCAF issue area. In this context, the constructivist approach to the formation of IREs fits into the working definition of IREs since its exhibits the characteristics of ontology and epistemology. Further, the SCC approach fills the ideational and humanistic gap or blind spots, akin to the neorealist and neoliberalist approaches. Thus far, constructivism is both ontological and epistemological. However, there is also a methodological content to constructivism. It is inductive in orientation and intended to help interpret the meaning and significance that actors ascribe to collective situations. The method used is best described as “cause without effect” and, since effect is of no direct application to interpretative understandings, it is expressed through explananda. This is referred to as post-positivist/post structuralist causation explained through interpretative understandings. This interpretative method is quite suitable to examining the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional, especially since it is quite difficult to measure humanistic behaviour. With a constructivist approach/viewing lens to the formation of IREs, the researcher is able to examine and explain through interpretive understandings how interests and identities are constructed within the UNCFM; how norms and ideas contribute to the formation of IREs in the issue area; how ideas and interests contribute to the meaning of and formations of power; how rules influence norms; and how speech acts and communicative actions contribute to interpretative understandings. This constructivist interpretive methodology also aligns with the working definition of theory. In the result, constructivism is found to be an ontology, epistemology, and a methodology useful for viewing, forming, and operationalising IREs.

The realist constructivist approach brings nothing new to mainstream constructivism, except perhaps an emphasis on co-constitution (agent and structure) and logic of the social (an absence of objective reality), which are inherent in the constituent elements of the constructivist approach. However, it is believed that they are orthogonal and not in mutual opposition. The rejection of agency as a predictive construct and the fact that agency constitutes an essential element of realist constructivism also means that realism was not meant to be predictive, but rather prescriptive and interpretive in keeping with classical realist thoughts about prudence and humility. Further, what Barkin (2010) refers to as reflexivity is equal to what is called value laden in constructivism, which is also a constraint on power. The realist constructivist approach does align with aspects of the working definitions of IREs and theory. However, while it is not best suited as an independent examination lens, it can nonetheless subsume the classical realist concepts of political morality, human behaviour, and prescriptive methods within the constructivist viewing lens to the formation of IREs, and to the operationalising of IREs. Likewise, that part of Robert Cox's critical theory where power ceases to be the sole explanatory factor and becomes part of what is to be explained through thought patterns, fits into the working definitions of IREs and constructivism, and can also be subsumed within the constructivist viewing lens as a means of explaining hegemony within the UNCFM.

3.21 Summary

The chapter begins with an overview followed by an examination of the importance, types, and a working definition of theory. The chapter also provided a working definition of IREs, IOs and constructivism, and the different types of theories of IREs. The chapter further continued with an examination of IB, PB and KCB theoretical approaches to the formation of IREs, emphasising differences in rationalist and cognitive approaches. In particular, the chapter explored the application of functional theory to the formation of IREs; institutional bargaining as a means of forming IREs; HST and the formation of IREs; and game theoretical approaches to the formation of IREs. The chapter continues with an examination of social constructivism, realist constructivism and constructivist variants. The chapter concludes with a critique of constructivism; the WCC and SCC approaches to formation of IREs; the role of norms in the formation of IREs; the power of identity in the formation of IREs; the historical-dialectical (power of history) approach to formation of IREs; prospects for a synthesis of IB, PB and KCB theories; some key theoretical concepts; and an analysis and implications for the research. The overall conclusion is that constructivism presents the best lens for us to examine the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS, that is not new and additional.

The theoretical concepts that emerged in this chapter played an integral part in constructing the conceptual framework which provides the boundaries and scaffolding within which the research was conducted.

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

"The conceptual framework doesn't come out of the sky, or even from one theorist's book. Rather, it is developed by the researcher himself" (Marshall and Rossman 2016, 67).

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS, that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC, COP and the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and the GCF.

The review and critique of the literature, the development of the theoretical frame, combined with my own experience and insights, contributed to the development of the conceptual framework of this study. The conceptual framework helps to focus and shape the research process, informing the methodological design and influencing the data collection instruments to be used. Further, the conceptual framework also becomes the repository for the data to be collected, providing the basis for, and informing on, various iterations of a coding scheme. As such, it provides an organizing structure both for reporting this study's findings and for the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis. In this way, the conceptual framework is essentially a "working tool" and the scaffolding that holds up and supports the study (Marshall and Rossman 2016).

Each category of the conceptual framework originates directly from the study's research questions, as outlined in Chapter 1. The research questions were generated from the background to the problem and refined after the literature review and theoretical framework. The first research question seeks to determine the relationships perceived to have emerged among Parties within the UNCFM, surrounding CCAF for SIDS, particularly within the AF, GCF and GEF. The category selected to capture responses to this question is "Concepts Through Interactions". The second research question seeks to identify perceived changes within the UNCFM that influenced the priorities for providing CCAF to SIDS, particularly within the AF, GCF and GEF. The conceptual category selected to capture responses to this question is "Changes Affecting Priorities". The third research question seeks to determine the extent to which organization behaviour influences the actions of the UNCFM in the provision of CCAF to SIDS, particularly within the AF, GCF and GEF. The conceptual category selected to capture responses to this question is "Organization Behaviour". The fourth question seeks to determine the extent to which uncertainty surrounding key CCAF concepts contributes to the provision of CCAF to SIDS. The final conceptual category selected to capture responses to this question is "Climate Finance Uncertainties". The explanation of what is perceived as happening within the UNCFM is based on the emerging constructs, concepts and observed relationships which could give rise to tentative theories, some of which may be similar to the theories identified in the previous chapter. During data collection and analysis, some of the descriptors within each of the major categories remained, while others were modified, deleted or collapsed into others due to the conceptual framework being revised and refined continually during the research.

4.1 What is the Conceptual Framework?

The conceptual framework helps the researcher explain the '*what'* of the study. Maxwell (2013) defined the conceptual framework as comprising a system of concepts, assumptions, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs one's research and the overall design. Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1994) cited in Maxwell (2013) defined the conceptual framework as a tool "…[which] explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied- the key factors, constructs or variables, - and the presumed relationships among them.

Frameworks can be rudimentary or elaborate, theory-driven or commonsensical, descriptive or casual” (39).

Contrastingly, Ravitch and Riggan (2012, 7) defined conceptual framework as an “… argument about why the topic one wishes to study matters, and why the means proposed to study it are appropriate and rigorous”, linking all of the elements of the research process: disposition; interest; positionality; literature; theory; and methods. This means that the problem you are trying to investigate, the research questions you pose, the research design and methodology you choose, and the actual research methods you employed to gather and analyse data, must be tied to the framework. Further, the conceptual framework unfolds both generatively and recursively as the research process progresses, and as such, should be construed as including both rigor and fluidity in its iterative development and refinement (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). According to Schram (2006) cited in Marshall and Rossman (2016), the researcher's task is to determine what is relevant and what is problematic among the ideas relating to the problem at hand and thereafter develop an argument that “positions [him or her] to address that problem” (loc 1936). This is followed by an investigation to produce a report, description, solution or an interpretation (Marshall and Rossman, 2016), notwithstanding that research is messy, nonlinear and recursive, with the final product usually devoid of such evidence (Kaplan 1964; Bargar and Duncan 1982). Consequently, the conceptual framework creates the boundaries within which a research’s recursive nature is reduced to a final and acceptable product that demonstrates that the research is valuable, the researcher can conduct the study, and that the research is well planned and can be executed (Marshall and Rossman, 2016).

The essence of these definitions and understandings, contributes to the presentation of the conceptual framework, primarily in a narrative form, supported by, if necessary, graphical representation. Consequently, the presentation of concepts, constructs, or variables to be examined, and any presumed relationships among them or inferences therefrom will be in narrative form.

4.1.1 The Conceptual Framework and Theory

The theoretical framework describes the 'why' of the study, prior to data analysis (Ravitch and Riggan 2012). Consequently, the theoretical framework informs the conceptual framework, setting the stage to influence methodology and data capture. As a research project within the discipline of IR, this research is grounded in theoretical approaches to the study of IR. Further, any tentative theory deduced will serve to inform the research design and exemplified by appropriate methods (Maxwell 2013; Ravitch and Riggan 2012). As Maxwell (2013) also pointed out, it is important to focus on existing theories and research, because they represent key sources for understanding what is going on with the phenomenon. Importantly, understanding research paradigms, such as positivism, constructivism, realism, pragmatism, interpretivism and postmodernism, are valuable elements in constructing a conceptual framework (Maxwell 2013). In this research, interpretivism and constructivism are the key research paradigm and approach, since they accord with my view that there is no objective reality, which makes the research qualitative and subjective.

4.1.2 The Conceptual Framework and the Literature Review

A good literature review presents opportunities for synergies of the existing literature but also between theory, methodology, research design, data analysis and findings. In this regard, the conceptual framework will guide the entire research. As pointed out by Ravitch and Riggan (2012), the literature review allows us to identify the intellectual and analytical tools required for an understanding, and the multiple theoretical and practical contexts related to synthesizing and integrating existing work with the research topic.

4.1.3 Conceptual Framework and the Research Problem

Maxwell (2013) suggested that a conceptual framework must not only be descriptive, but also critical in the sense that one is able to understand and clearly communicate the research problem, identify problems with previous research and theory, enumerate contradictions and holes found in current views and indicate how one's study can make an original contribution to learning. Maxwell (2013) and Ravitch and Riggan (2012) also identified the "research problem" as part of the conceptual framework, particularly since it reveals that something complex is going on that needs explanation. However, it is more suitable and logical to identify the research problem in the introduction chapter.

4.1.4 The Conceptual Framework and the Research Question

My interest in exploring the area of CCAF and the difficulties the SIDS experience in accessing that financing was influenced through a multiplicity of actions. My curiosity first arose while doing research for my master's thesis on *Sustainability of a Small Island Developing State: The Influence of Global Environmental Governance on Guyana's Low Carbon Development Strategy*[77]. From that research, it became apparent that the SIDS were encountering significant difficulties accessing CCAF. My curiosity also grew as I interacted with literature on climate change and its impact on the SIDS. In particular, the challenges that the Government of Guyana faced in accessing funds to implement projects under the Guyana- Norway climate agreement[78] propelled me to dig deeper into this area with the hope of finding out why the SIDS experience difficulties in accessing CCAF. It seemed to me that the financial fate of the SIDS lies at the mercy of developed states, and the IOs that dictate financial matters within the regime of the UNCFM. Many questions arose as the literature was reviewed. These included questions surrounding adequacy, uncertainty, additionality, adaptation justice, interests, identities, norms, power relations, types of discourses and organization influence.

4.1.5 Constructing the Conceptual Framework

In addition to the above required elements in constructing a conceptual framework, Maxwell (2013) identifies four more sources that one can use to construct it for a study: (1) experiential knowledge, (2) existing theory and research,

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[77] With the IIR of the UWI, St Augustine.

[78] An integral part of its Low Carbon Development Strategy.

(3) pilot and exploratory research, and (4) thought experiments. When a researcher brings experiential knowledge (personal experience, technical knowledge) to his research, it is usually classified as 'researcher's bias and something that should be gotten rid of. However, more recently, that subjectivity is no longer seen as an affliction[79], but rather a useful tool in the arsenal of the researcher (Maxwell 2013, Berg and Smith, 1988; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Ravitch and Riggan 2012). In any event, I consider any researcher bias on my part, based on my personal experience and technical knowledge, to be minimal. With regards to existing theory and research, Maxwell (2015) cautioned that existing theory in the literature and assumptions embedded in it can distort the way one frames one's research.

Notwithstanding, the researcher exercised an open and critical mind to theories in the literature surrounding the problem under examination, particularly theories on CCF, CCAF and uncertainty. With regards to existing research, the researcher demonstrated how gaps in the literature were addressed, decisions about methods for one's own study and review of methods and strategy sections within the literature relating to methodological and alternative approaches. There was no test or modification to any theory, particularly since the research is qualitative and interpretative, the results of which were expressed through thick description. Further, there was no general pilot of the study, except the research questions for the semi-structured interviews conducted. On the issue of thought experiments as part of a conceptual framework, Maxwell (2013) posited that there is little evidence of its use in qualitative research design. Consequently, none was used in this research.

Based on all of the above considerations, the conceptual framework was built around the research questions and categories from the literature review and theoretical framework, since they are all interrelated. The discussion within categories and sub-categories included:

(a) reference to experiential knowledge as applicable;

(b) theories of IREs, including those on CCF, CCAF and uncertainty;

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[79] See also C Wright Mills, 1959; Alan Peshkin, 1992; Anselm Strauss, 1987.

(c) interpretivism;

(d) constructivism;

(e) gaps in the literature;

(f) methods and methodology;

(g) analytical tools required for an understanding of adequacy, uncertainty, additionality, interests, identities, norms and power relations;

(h) types of discourses and organization influence;

(i) data collection;

(j) development of methods; and

(k) guiding tools for findings, data analysis and interpretation.

As the conceptual framework was being built, the constituent elements identified above became a common thread throughout its construction (Marshall and Rossman 1999; 2016; Ravitch and Riggan 2012; Maxwell 2015; Bloomberg and Volpe 2016).

Constructed in this manner, the conceptual framework informed the research of its ontology, epistemology and methodology (Ravitch and Riggan 2012). As the argument was presented for this research, the tensions and cross currents that arose from my own influence on the process resulted in creative and elucidating research findings as opposed to researcher bias (Ravitch and Riggan 2012; Russell and Bohan 1999). The fact that a well thought out conceptual framework works as a controlling mechanism for the entire research, made it possible for it to assist in presenting, explaining, and contextualizing the findings (Ravitch and Riggan 2012). The conceptual framework is now presented.

4.2 The Conceptual Framework

4.2.1 Relationships Through Interactions; Changes Affecting Priorities; Organization Behaviour and Uncertainties

The examination of the perception that actions of Parties within the UNFCCC, COP, UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF (the UNCFM) contributed to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS, that is not new and additional, uncovered what I believed to be important relationships that emerged among the Parties, through their interactions within the UNCFM. These interactions among the Parties, produced intersubjective meanings and understanding, expressed through the formation and construction of norms, coalitions of interests, identities, power asymmetries, structure and agency, contrary to the interests of the SIDS. This eventually led to an asymmetrical association among the Parties where equity, fairness, burden sharing, and justice were ignored as specific to the provision of CCAF to the SIDS. As I delved deeper, my observation turned to the view that the developed country Parties viewed the UNCFM as an anarchical system where they operate as the principal actors, as opposed to my belief that the UNCFM is socially constructed, constantly under construction and infused with ideational structures.

As this asymmetrical structure took root, significant changes within the UNCFM affecting the priorities of SIDS also took root. This emphasis moved developed country Parties from obligatorily providing public financing for CCA, towards public funds unlocking private financing as the new priority. Importantly, this commodification of CCAF is in keeping with the neoliberal market philosophy of the developed country Parties. This also meant that the polluter pays principle and developed countries' historical responsibility for climate change were bypassed in favour of new concepts, such as more mitigation means less adaptation, financialization of CCAF, co-financing, and leverage. Importantly, it was observed that private capital required profits as a return on investment, and new decisions by the UNCFM, such as voluntary emissions reductions, effectively linked CCAF to mitigation actions on the part of the SIDS. With mitigation as preferred investment goods, as opposed to adaptation - which is a contested good, less CCF became available to the SIDS for CCA. This trajectory was possible by developed country Parties' use of minilateralism and discursive dominance which eventually led to a shift favouring less adaptation and more mitigation.

Probing further, it was recognized that the dominance with which developed country Parties operated within the UNCFM was a product of several interrelated concepts and constructs that influenced behaviour within the UNCFM. To this end, the absence of distributive justice within the CCF was primarily due to blind spots created by the application of rational choice theories, such as hegemonic stability, game theory and institutional bargaining. Consequently, developed country Parties separated how structures surrounding the provision of CCAF were created, from the way knowledge surrounding the provision of CCAF was generated. This was the classical separation of object from subject and their belief that the interests and identities of all Parties were exogenous givens, and any determination of cooperation and negotiation matters were best arrived at by testing hypotheses and determining patterns of human behaviour. It is unlikely that the conduct of Parties within the UNCFM could be measured. However, the structures within the UNCFM are ideational and the best way to determine why adequate and predictable CCAF is unavailable to the SIDS was to examine the intersubjective nature of humanistic actions within the UNCFM through interpretative understandings and narrative explanations.

The perceptions held, the asymmetry and dominance observed, were all fueled by various degrees of uncertainty that existed within the UNCFM. The COPs have failed, thus far, to agree on a precise cost for CCA. There is no agreed meaning for additionality, vulnerability, adaptation finance, burden sharing, scaled up financial resources, adequate and predictable flows, and even climate finance. Consequently, there is recognition that uncertainty, particularly by the SIDS, about the meaning of mainstreaming adaptation and mitigation because the source of these funds was meant to be different. Importantly, the SIDS do not agree that ODA is the same as CCAF, which is a point of tension within the UNCFM. Further, there is no agreement on the merits of direct international transfers. This level of uncertainty within the UNCFM contributed to weak adaptation governance and an absence of adaptation finance justice. In the result, the developed country Parties created constellations of interests and identities that are averse to the SIDS, through the application of dominant discourse and financial power to their decisions within the UNCFM.

Unless an empirical data driven understanding of the problematic can be generated, the SIDS may not be able to use their collective power to influence a more adequate and predicted delivery of CCAF, that is new and additional. The conceptual framework matrix is presented at Table 4. 1.

Table 4. 1: Conceptual Framework Matrix

Concepts generated from the literature review led to the research questions (the 'what'). The research questions led to the theoretical framework (the 'why'). The 'why' and 'what' of the research led to the study's conceptual framework.				**Data Collection (How, Where)**
Categories	**Linked to Question**	**Links to Theory**	**Links to Methods**	
Descriptors				
Relationships Though Interactions	**Question1** neoliberal market mechanisms, minilateralism, distributive justice, international transfers; game theory	Norm construction, coalition of interests, identities formation, power asymmetries, international anarchy	Interpretive understandings, Intersubjective meanings, mutual constitution	**1. Semi-Structured Interviews:** Key Informants across C'bean, Canada, UK, South America, EU & Africa.

Table 4.1 ***(continued)***

Concepts generated from the literature review led to the research questions (the 'what'). The research questions led to the theoretical framework (the 'why'). The 'why' and 'what' of the research led to the study's conceptual framework.				**Data Collection (How, Where)**
Categories	**Linked to Question**	**Links to Theory**	**Links to Methods**	
		Descriptors		
Changes Affecting Priorities	**Question 2** Co-financing, leverage, financialization, distributive justice, power relations, more mitigation means less adaptation	Neoliberal market philosophy, public capital unlocking private capital, discursive dominance, minilateralism	Interpretive understandings, Intersubjective meanings, structures of dominance and power	2. **Document Review:** Reports, Decisions, Minutes; & Speeches from COPs, GCF, GEF; AF, AOSIS & CARICOM.
Organization Behaviour	**Question 3** voluntary emissions reductions, historical responsibility, balancing adaptation and mitigation, linking CCAF to mitigation, equating adaptation to mitigation.	Hegemony, rational choice bargaining, knowledge generation, identity and interest formation, hypothesis, cause without effect	Interpretive understandings, Intersubjective meanings, structures of dominance and power, narrative explanations, humanistic actions, ideational structure	3. **Genealogy:** Across Research Historical timelines for the COPs, GCF, GEF; AF, AOSIS & CARICOM.

Table 4.1 ***(continued)***

Concepts generated from the literature review led to the research questions (the 'what'). The research questions led to the theoretical framework (the 'why'). The 'why' and 'what' of the research led to the study's conceptual framework.				**Data Collection (How, Where)**
Categories	**Linked to Question**	**Links to Theory**	**Links to Methods**	
		Descriptors		
Climate Finance Uncertainties	**Question 4** adaptation finance, new and additional, vulnerability, estimating climate finance, adequate, predictable, weak adaptation governance	Constellation of interests and identities, dominant discourse, financial power, financialization,	interpretive understandings, norm formation, Intersubjective meanings, structures of dominance and power	

4.2.2 Research Design Overview

The research design is the plan for conducting the study. It is an attempt by the researcher to establish "methodological congruence whereby all the study's components are interconnected and interrelated" (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016, 151). Four categories were identified under which the literature was reviewed: (a) Uncertainties in The Climate Change Finance Regime; (b) Financing CCA; (c) Mitigation Is Now the Business of SIDS; and (d) Adaptation Finance Governance. Several key concepts emerged from the literature review and theoretical framework, while the research questions were then teased out and refined from the key concepts that emerged.

Against the backdrop of the research questions and what best theoretical approach was available to examine the phenomenon, three categories emerged under which the theory was reviewed: (a) IB theories; (b) PB theories; (c) KCB theories. A critical analysis of the various theoretical concepts resulted in constructivism being identified as the most suitable theoretical approach from which to examine the phenomenon of the study. Linked directly to the research questions, the following conceptual framework categories emerged: (a) concepts through interactions; (b) changes affecting priorities; (c) organization behaviour; and (d) climate finance uncertainties.

With the completion of the literature review and the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, the researcher was able to offer a rationale for the study; identify post-structuralism as the study's methodology; provide the research sample and information for the study; and identify genealogy, document review, and semi-structured interview as the research methods, which in turn, informed the analysis of data and findings, data interpretation, data triangulation and data synthesis.

4.2.3 Rationale and Significance

The rationale for the study stems from a desire on the part of the researcher to understand why, despite the establishment of a UNCFM, the provision of CCAF to the SIDS remained inadequate and unpredictable, and whether such inadequate provisions of CCAF to SIDS was a function of actions by, or resulting from, Parties within the UNCFM, the characteristics of the UNCFM itself, or a combination of the actions of Parties and the characteristics of the UNCFM. Or, whether it was just a perception on the part of the researcher. While previous studies focused on various aspects of climate finance, and a few in particular on examining modalities of the various financial organizations within the UNCFM, this topic was far from exhausted as a research area. In this context, the research served to eliminate some gaps in the literature. Further, increased understanding of the characteristics relating to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional affords an opportunity for the SIDS, as a negotiating group within future COPs, to approach such negotiations from an empirical standpoint, while identifying other opportunities for immediate correction and implementation of actions by Parties within the UNCFM. Finally, the research allows the researcher to continue examining the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, in phases, over the long duree.

4.2.4 Scope and Delimitation

The definition of the term SIDS is a universally accepted norm. Consequently, the researcher believes that the findings of the research may be of general application to the SIDS, in addition to the LDCs, whom together with the SIDS are classified as vulnerable countries. In particular, the data captured and analysed in relation to CCAF, and the SIDS came from KIs who were drawn from the Caribbean, South America, North America, Europe, Asia and Africa, though a greater number came from the Caribbean. Additionally, the data captured and analysed in relation to CCAF, and the SIDS came from the COPs, GEF, AF, GEF and the AOSIS, representing and reflecting climate finance matters relating to the SIDS, as a whole.

The research was limited to activities within the UNCFM that dealt exhaustively with CCAF. The level of analysis was international (country Parties, COP, UNCFM) whereas the units of analysis were the AF, GEF, and the GCF. The researcher used the data emanating from the units of analysis to interpret and understand the phenomenon under study.

4.2.5 Researcher Assumptions

Based on the researcher’s experience in CCAF research, background in international relations theory, and the results of the analysis and implications of the background and context, four primary assumptions were made regarding this study. First, interactions among Parties within the UNCFM produced intersubjective meanings and understanding expressed through the formation of norms, interests, identity, structure and agency, contrary to the interests of the SIDS. This assumption was based on the premise that the composition of the UNCFM groupings reflected an asymmetrical association among the Parties. Secondly, dominant discourse was driven by the developed country Parties and imposed on the SIDS during the negotiation and decision-making stages of the COPs. This assumption was based on the ability of developed country Parties to be persuasive in encouraging the SIDS to confirm to their general thinking. Thirdly, because of the absence of international agreed definitions of key CCAF terms, the UNCFM was unable to determine the amount of funds required for CCAF. This assumption was based on the premise that the absence of international agreed definitions of key CCAF terms resulted in uncertainty within the UNCFM. Fourthly, the shift from a bias in favour of public financing for CCA to a bias in favour of using public finance to unlock private finance and the concept of co-financing resulted in difficulties on the part of the SIDS to unlock CCAF from the UNCFM. This assumption was based on the premise that the SIDS had limited financial and human capacities to deal with such a complex financial mechanism.

4.3 Researcher's Perspective

The researcher developed experience over the past seven years in CCAF research and thus brings to the inquiry process, knowledge from presenting conference papers and advising government on the subject matter. Believing that there is no objective reality, the researcher is quite aware that qualitative research inquiry brings with it a perception of research design and bias, and consequently, bias in the interpretation of the findings. However, the researcher relied on the current literature negativing researcher bias and engaged other professional colleagues, including thesis advisors as a means of reducing bias. Further, to address subjectivity and strengthen the credibility of the research, the researcher pursued triangulation of data sources and multi methods as additional measures along with credibility, dependability, and reliability checks. Additionally, the researcher has annexed materials developed and used in this research to increase credibility.

4.4 Summary

This chapter detailed the conceptual framework of the study, which comprised a system of concepts, assumptions, beliefs, and theories that supported and informed the research and overall design. It highlighted the theoretical framework- the ‘why’ of the study before data analysis, which informed the conceptual framework, setting the stage to influence methodology and data capture. Additionally, the conceptual framework and the literature review presented opportunities for synergies of existing theory, methodology, research design, data analysis and findings. Linked to the research problem, the conceptual framework is not only descriptive, but also critical in that we were able to understand and clearly communicate the research problem and indicate how the study can make an original contribution to learning. Further, there is a link between the conceptual framework and the research questions, which provided the categories for its construction.

The chapter then detailed the conceptual framework for the research, pointing out that it informed the research’s ontology, epistemology and methodology, and that it was developed and articulated around the following categories derived from the research questions: (a) concepts through interactions; (b) changes affecting priorities;(c) organization behaviour; and (d) climate finance uncertainties**.** The chapter continued with the selection of interpretivism and constructivism as the key research paradigm and approach, since they accorded with my view that there is no objective reality, which makes the research qualitative and subjective. In this context, constructivism provides an excellent lens through which to interpret the problem under study.

The chapter also included a discussion of the research overview, highlighting the research design and the conceptual framework matrix, and a discussion that unless an empirical data driven understanding of the problematic was developed, the SIDS may not be able to use their collective power to influence a more adequate and predicted delivery of CCAF, that is new and additional. Finally, the chapter concluded with a discussion of the rationale and significance of the research, its scope and limitation, the researcher assumptions and the researcher’s perspective.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS, that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that, through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC, COP and the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and the GCF. To understand this phenomenon, the study has addressed one main research question: What characteristics, if any, contribute to the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional? The four secondary research questions were:

(a) What relationships may have emerged during interactions among Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, surrounding the provision of CCAF to SIDS?

(b) What changes may have occurred within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, in determining priorities for CCAF to SIDS?

(c) To what extent, if any, does organization behaviour influence the actions of the UNCFM, in particular, the AF, GEF and GCF in the provision of CCAF to SIDS? and

(d) To what extent, if any, does uncertainty surrounding key CCAF concepts contribute to the provision of CCAF to SIDS? The answers to the secondary questions answer the main research question.

This chapter describes the study's research methodology, particularly:

(a) rationale for the research approach;

(b) description of the research sample;

(c) summary of information needed;

(d) the research design;

(e) methods of data collection;

(f) analysis and synthesis of data collection;

(g) ethical considerations;

(h) trustworthiness; and

(i) limitations of the study (Bloomberg 2007, 79).

5.1 Rationale For Qualitative Research Design

In the context of qualitative designs, the methodological struggles often referred to as "the paradigm wars" of the 1970s and 1980s, have fallen away (Denzin and Lincoln 2013a, 2013c; Ercikan and Roth, 2006; Reichardt and Rallis, 1994 - cited in Bloomberg and Volpe 2018, 38). The global community of qualitative researchers is now caught between "… mixed methodologies and calls for scientifically based research, on the one side, [and] renewed calls for social justice inquiry from the critical social science tradition, on the other" (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016, 38). Notwithstanding, qualitative research has emerged as a field of inquiry that involves crosscutting disciplines and subject matter, encompassing in the process a complex interconnection of concepts, terms, and assumptions.

Qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical position that is essentially constructivist, ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. It involves an interpretive naturalistic approach to the world by studying people and materials in their natural settings with a view of interpreting phenomena in terms of the meaning they bring to them. It allows the researcher to achieve a holistic rather than a reductionist understanding of the phenomenon being studied. The research approach is inductive since it is about idea generation and is conducted within natural contexts of real situations as they unfolded. To achieve this goal, the researcher entered the world of others to gather data directly. Consequently, the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and data analysis, since description, understanding, interpretation and communication are the primary goals. Further, an underlying assumption of qualitative research lies in the belief that the interactive process between the researcher and the research participants (people and materials) serves to produce rich data. No one methodology or method is advocated for qualitative research, and it is best to appropriately match the research approach to purposes, questions, and issues.

Design flexibility is another significant hallmark of qualitative methodology, whereby instrumentation can be modified when necessary to explore new insights and to address revised research questions (Klotz and Lynch 2007; Maxwell 2013; Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). Additionally, the research design is influenced by the researcher’s belief that reality is socially constructed, and the world cannot be viewed objectively, nor as an object separate and apart from the people and materials contained therein. Therefore, the research paradigm/theoretical approach is constructivism, and the theoretical perspective is interpretivism, given that the intention is to explain the phenomena through interpretative understandings (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016).

Having regard to the nature of the phenomenon under study and the objectives set out above, the researcher is of the view that when contrasted against quantitative methods of inquiry which emphasize testing of hypotheses to establish facts, truth claims, and relationships among variables, a quantitative approach would be unsuitable to measure for perception and provide the rich data required to address the research questions. Against this backdrop, the researcher adopted a qualitative approach to the phenomenon under study and a post-structuralist methodology.

5.2 Rationale for Post-modern/ Post-structural Methodology

Amongst the qualitative methodologies available (including case study, ethnography, biography, grounded theory, action research or phenomenology) a post-modern/post-structural methodology offered the best approach to the phenomenon under study. The term post-modern/post-structural is preferred, recognizing at the same time, that it is difficult to disentangle (Devetak 2009, 183). They are also used separately to mean the same thing (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 322). It is important to point out at this juncture, that phenomenology forms part of the structure of post-modernism/post-structuralism. This becomes apparent by examining their meanings thusly:

> [P]henomenology … [is] a subjective or interpretive understanding in human consciousness of what we observe or think we see in the world around us … that leads one to reject claims to knowing any "objective" reality independent of human consciousness. (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012, 322, 328)

For Post-modernism, on the other hand:

> [W]hat we see, what we choose to see or measure, and the mechanisms or methods we employ are all of human construction that essentially rely on perception and cognitive processes influenced particularly by prior understandings and meanings. (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012, 333)

Consequently, a post-modern/post-structural methodology is not devoid of phenomenological influence. Post-structuralists or post-modernists affirm the subjectivity of human nature and reject the idea of pure objective or absolute truth, an external reality, or a value-free science. They engage in linguistic deconstruction of what had been said or written, employing discursive practices that emphasize reasoned argument. Consequently, post-structuralists assume an intimate connection between power and knowledge, where the production of knowledge is a political process related to power (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 334). All truth claims are based on putative emancipatory meta narratives which must be unmasked so the correct perspective and interpretations are revealed. Post-structuralism has its own ethico-political purpose in problematizing prevailing identity formations, where it refuses to use history as affirming present identities, and instead, uses it to disturb identities that have become dogmatized, conventionalized, or normalized.

In terms of methods, post-structuralists tend to trace, over time, the genealogy and significance of power-knowledge relations and dominant discourses in IR and its structures, highlighting in the process, competing historical perspectives, narratives or trajectories (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 334). Its influencers include Friedrich Nietzsche, Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida, James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro and Richard Ashley (Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Devetak 2009; Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002). The research fits well within the essential elements of post-modern/post-structural methodology since it interprets and understand data relating to a perception that actors within the UNCFM contribute to inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS, that is not new and additional.

5.3 The Research Sample

5.3.1 Research Sites and Classification

This sub-section begins by first looking at the research sites, which are five in number. Firstly, the UNFCCC Secretariat, which was established in 1992 is in Bonn, Germany. It has a staff of approximately 450 persons and houses the UNFCCC, which comprises 197 country Parties, along with its protocols and agreements thereto. The Secretariat facilitates the intergovernmental climate change negotiations and meetings of the COP, analyses and review climate change information and prepares reports on its activities to the COP. Secondly, the COP, which is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention, comprising 197 country Parties, meets every year, in Bonn, the seat of the secretariat, unless the Parties decide to host the session elsewhere, which is more than often the case. The COP reviews the implementation of the Convention, and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts and take decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention. Thirdly, the AF was established in 2001 to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It usually meets in Bonn, Germany, and is financed from a 2% share of proceeds from the CDM. Fourthly, there is the GEF which was established in 1991 by the World Bank with funding from the major economic powers (G7) to serve the needs of developing countries in confronting the difficulty of climate change mitigation and adaptation. It serves as a financial mechanism for several environmental conventions[80]. It is located in Washington DC, USA. Finally, the GCF, located in Songdo, (Republic of Korea), serves as a financial entity of the UNCFM comprising approximately 220 staff members and governed by the GCF Board which meets three times per year, functions under the guidance of, and accountability to, the COP. The Green Climate Fund is the only stand-alone multilateral financing entity whose sole mandate is to serve the UNFCCC and deliver equal amounts of funding to mitigation and adaptation with meeting attendance from civil society, private sector organisations, NDAs, and AEs.

In the context of the material examined in this research, the UNFCCC, COP, AF, GEF and GCF are all classified as IREs (ideational) and IOs (material). As IREs, they are embedded in themselves as IOs, forming structures and agents in mutual constitution. Importantly, structure includes both ideational and material components. The next stage is the selection of the research participants, having regard to the identification of the research sites (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016, 147).

5.3.2 Participants

Having regard to the methods anticipated for this qualitative study, the word participants take on a much broader meaning for us. The researcher classified participants as human and material. Firstly, the human participants were not drawn necessarily from the research sites above, though some are members of one or more research sites. What is important, is that the human participants are key informants (KIs) with special expertise and knowledge consistent with the research area. The researcher adopted the purposeful sampling and snowballing procedures, consistent with post-structuralist methodology, to select the study's human participants. Purposeful sampling provided an opportunity for selecting information-rich

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[80] Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and Minamata Convention on Mercury.

participants who provided insights and understanding of the research phenomenon, particularly since, in qualitative research the intention is to conduct in depth discussions and not generalizations. This contrasts with random procedures associated with quantitative research, which controls for selection bias, thus enabling generalizations from sample to a larger population (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). Further, the human participants were drawn from national, regional, and international agencies associated with CCF, CCAF and CCA, and are considered experts in their related fields. Some human participants were selected, outside of the research sites settings, based on being deemed experts. These sites included national offices of climate change, regional offices associated with climate change (ROCC), the IDB, CARICOM, University of Guyana (UG), UWI, UNEP-DTU, World Bank, and the EU.

Secondly, the material participants comprised the documentary materials located at the various research sites identified in this research. These will be detailed more in the section on methods. However, it is important to state that data collection, analysis and synthesis were based on a rigorous interrogation of the documentary materials located at the research sites, on the one hand, and a rigorous interrogation of data emanating from interviewing the KIs, on the other hand. This process allowed for what Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) called data triangulation, which in effect strengthens data analysis confidence, while reducing bias at the same time.

5.3.3 Information Required to Conduct the Study

According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2016, 149), contextual, demographic, perceptual and theoretical matters are the areas required for qualitative studies. Contextual settings are more suited to case studies. Demographic information helps to explain underlying perceptions of key informants. It includes information on age, gender, occupation and ethnicity, collected via the completion of a personal data sheet by participants after competition of interviews. Notably, the KIs of the study brought their own expertise to enrich the data collection. I was interested in their perception of the phenomenon under study, and not in a study of them. Therefore, the study did not require detailed demographic information of the KIs. Perceptual information, on the other hand, refers to the KIs' perception in relation the phenomenon under study. This, the requirement of the KIs was their objective view of what they perceived was happening within the research and non-research sites. The researcher captured this information during the data collection phase by applying the semi-structured method, which will be discussed under the section on data collection. Finally, theoretical information is that which was researched and collected from the literature and used to assess what is already known about the phenomenon under study. In this context, theoretical information provided support for the methodological approach, theories related to the research questions and conceptual framework, interpretation, analysis and synthesis. Table 5.1 reflects the research question matrix.

Table 5. 1: Research Question Matrix

Research Questions	**Types of Information Needed:** (a) Contextual (context/background) (b) Demographic (c) Perceptual (d) Theoretical (e) Documentary materials	**Information Yielded:** (a) Background/History, Culture, Mission, Site Description (b) Age, Gender, etc (c) Ideas, Perceptions, Expertise (d) Power, Dominant discourse, Relationships (e) Reports, Minutes, Interviews, Reviews,	**Methods of Data Collection**
Research Question (1)	Perceptual, Theoretical and Documentary materials	Expert knowledge, Identities, Interests, Conjunctures, Asymmetries, Contested meanings, Decisions	Semi-Structured Interviews; Genealogy; and Document review
Research Question (2)	Perceptual, Theoretical and Documentary materials	Expert knowledge, Identities, Interests, Conjunctures, Asymmetries, Contested meanings, Decisions	Semi-Structured Interviews; Genealogy; and Document review

Table 5.1 ***(continued)***

Research Questions	Types of Information Needed:	Information Yielded:	Methods of Data Collection
	(a) Contextual (context/background) (b) Demographic (c) Perceptual (d) Theoretical (e) Documentary materials	(a) Background/History, Culture, Mission, Site Description (b) Age, Gender, etc (c) Ideas, Perceptions, Expertise (d) Power, Dominant discourse, Relationships (e) Reports, Minutes, Interviews, Reviews,	
Research Question (3)	Perceptual, Theoretical and Documentary materials	Expert knowledge, Reviews, Decisions Identities, Interests, Conjunctures, Asymmetries, Contested meanings,	Semi-Structured Interviews; Genealogy; and Document review
Research Question (4)	Perceptual, Theoretical and Documentary materials	Expert knowledge, Reviews, Reviews, Decisions, Identities, Interests, Conjunctures, Asymmetries, Contested meanings, Decisions	Semi-Structured Interviews; Genealogy; and Document review

Having identified the research sample and the information required to conduct the research, the research design was then constructed.

5.3.4 The Research Design

The research design is the plan for conducting the study. It is an attempt by the researcher to establish “methodological congruence whereby all the study’s components are interconnected and interrelated” (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016, 151). Consequently, the theoretical, conceptual and methodological congruence were sought where all of our research components were interconnected and interrelated. In the two previous chapters, the categories under which the literature was reviewed were identified, the categories under which the theory was examined, and the conceptual framework categories that arose therefrom. The interrelatedness of all these factors when applied to the research problem resulted in the research design flowchart shown in Figure 5. 1.

1



Figure 5. 1: Research Design Flowchart

Source: Adapted from Bloomberg and Volpe 2016.

*Interpretation and Analysis
** Discourse Analysis, Constructivism, Cross Case and Genealogy

5.4 Data Collection Methods

According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2016, 153) engagement with participants in their social worlds is essential to understanding subjective meanings. This included the human participants, not all of whom were research site specific, and material participants which reflected the subjectivities from documents located at the research sites. The researcher garnered subjective meanings from analyzing semi-structured interviews of the human participants and from analyzing documentary materials. Consequently, the data collection methods applied related to structure, agents, identities, interests and norms. The multiple methods of data capture presented below contributed to data triangulation and research credibility.

5.4.1 Genealogy

5.4.1.1 Rationale

According to Klotz and Lynch (2007) genealogy is a form of process tracing across historical periods, emphasizing the techniques of power that operate within discourses, and the ruptures and disjunctures that obtain in IOs, IIs and IREs. Genealogy starts with a consciousness of structural inequalities based on meanings within material structures and identifying the instruments that produce shifts in dominant discourse. Genealogy's concept of discourse encompasses more than language. It includes clothing, religion, gender, gestures and music. Klotz and Lynch (2007) added that genealogy is suitable for the study of IREs because it assumes that actors therein share understandings about social purpose and expected behaviour in managing global affairs. Further, genealogy requires researchers to examine primary and secondary sources, and it draws attention to alternative voices ignored by the powerful. Vucetic (2011, 1295-1312), in similar terms, posited that in IR, genealogy analyses the many agents and structures that constitute each other within historically culturally specific sites, especially the productive power of discourse. Episodes narrated through examples over historic periods and effectiveness depend on the problematization of the socially constructed reality and knowledge in that process (Vucetic 2011, 1295-1312). On the other hand, Eagan (2011, 453-458), suggested that the purpose of genealogy was to deprive narratives of their natural character and trace the history of something that becomes natural through repeated actions of storytelling. In this sense, genealogy traces the effects of discourses and disciplines of subjects over time, uncovering different types of resistance and local forms of knowledge that challenged what had been handed down.

5.4.1.2 Development of Instrument

Genealogy as a method is suitable to answering the research questions that require an examination of the UNCFM as a structure or agency since it allows for an examination of continuities and changes in discourses over time. In this context, genealogy, through process tracing, focused on the relationship between, power, commitment, and responsibility within the UNCFM. Thus, a researcher can use speeches, decisions, reports and other data to examine contestation over meanings within the UNCFM through shifts in discourse by IREs, such as the COP, AF, GEF and the GCF. Genealogy allowed us to trace and identify the operation of power through dominant discourse within the UNCFM and determined ruptures and disjunctures in institutionalized practices within it. The data gathered from shifts in discourse and power through dominant discourse enabled us to capture the intersubjective nature of the UNCFM, and how it legitimized certain norms and made decisions. The instrument for the genealogy method for data collection was developed by identifying the structures within the regime of UNCFM and the activities to be conducted in support of data collection, including data coding, application of data collection software and data storage. Table 5.2 is a presentation of the genealogy method.

Table 5. 2: Genealogy Method

Genealogy Method	
Data Collection using Genealogy Method: Instrument	Time Horizon: 2007-2020 (COP13,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25) (GEF 2007, 10, 11, 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 2020) (GCF, 2012, 13,14,15,16,1,7,18,19,2020) (AF, 2009, 10,111,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,2020) (AOSIS, 2007, 10, 12,13,14,5,16,17,18, 2019)
Instrument	Reports, Decisions, Minutes, Interviews, Speeches
Structures	AF, GEF, GCF, COP (UNCFM)
Key Activity	Analysing agents and structural changes
Mutual Constitution	humanistic actions are immeasurable, identities are not exogenous, intersubjective and interpretative understandings; ideas as the basis of interests; norms, rules, interests as the basis of identity; interpretive epistemologies, speech acts; communicative action; narrative explanation, thick description; nomological-deductive model; power; cause without effect; ideational structures; value laden; post-structural; orthogonal; ontology; epistemology; methodology
Data Coding	Themes and sub-themes: Reports, Decisions, Minutes, Interviews, Speeches
Application of Software	nVivo QDAS
Data Storage	Hard drive and cloud, with PW protect
Activities Driving Analysis	• Focus on shifts in discourse in the UNCFM regime. • Tracing the process of power that operates within discourse over the time frame. • Identifying power mechanisms, which produce shifts in discourse over the time frame. • Identifying ruptures and disjunctures in institutionalised practice over the time frame. • Determine how dominance gets constituted and maintained despite challenges • Identify the role of contested meanings in the constitution of dominance

5.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews

5.4.2.1 Rationale

In-depth interviews are considered best for qualitative research to capture perceptions, perspectives, experience, attitudes, and even emotions of participants. It allows for thick descriptions, clarification of statements and information probes (Creswell 2013; Marshal and Rossman 2015). Semi-structure interviewing, which is a specialized type of interview, was used to facilitate a more focused exploration of the research specific topic (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016) According to Bernard "… there are many intellectual problems for which quantitative methods are not yet available. Those problems require qualitative measurement" (Bernard 2000, 68). In the result, the semi-structured interview method used was appropriate to examine the perception surrounding actors' actions within the UNCFM as contributory to the inadequate and unpredictable flow of CCAF to the SIDS.

5.4.2.2 Limitations

Not all participants are cooperative, articulate, and perceptive. Additionally, the semi-structured interview method is not a neutral tool for gathering data (Rubin and Rubin 2012). The possible threats to the accuracy of the data from the semi-structured interview method are acknowledged by the researcher. According to Bernard (2000), in some instances, interviewees attempt to answer all the questions simply because a promise was made, while in other cases some interviewees suffer from memory failure. However, based on the experience level of the KIs, responses to questions flowed naturally with most KIs initiating the follow-on questions through their own answers. Importantly, the semi structured interview method would usually raise issues of reliability and subjectivity because the use of the snowballing technique did not allow for repeated taking and testing of the interviewees, while subjectivity arose particularly because a single researcher was assigned for this study (Babbie 2010). Notwithstanding these difficult circumstances, the semi- structured interview method used in the research allowed us to capture the data relating to the CCAF issue from the KIs, who are all experts in their areas, thus reducing possibility of bias. As pointed out in the earlier chapters, the association of researcher bias as a negative in qualitative research is no longer the applicable academic position. Instead, it is seen as a positive to the research process. Importantly however, the KIs from the SIDS, and the developed countries respectively, were fixed in their views about CCAF, each seeking to hold the other responsible for it not being adequate, predictable and new and additional.

5.4.2.3 Development of Instrument

The semi-structured interview allowed the researcher to cover a list of questions and topics relevant to the research. Most of the talking was done by the KIs. In many ways, a qualitative field research is useful when it is likely that the researcher will only get a single opportunity to conduct an interview with a KI (Babbie 2010; Bernard 2000), which was the case based on the location of the KIs. The questions to the KIs were formulated based on the secondary questions identified. The questions design allowed for anonymity and confidentiality by allowing the KIs to lead the discussion (Bernard 2000). Careful attention was taken that ensured the follow up questions asked of key informants did not attach any subtle bias of the researcher (Babbie 2010). Questions were asked in a manner to allow for probing and were open ended, which stimulated the KIs to produce more information without interposing the researcher so much into the "inter-view", and the data captured reflected what the KIs actually said. The researcher also used the 'silent', 'echo' and 'tell me more' probes which allowed the KIs to continue uninterrupted.

The construction of the instrument for the semi-structure interview method of data collection was developed by listing all the broad categories of the research. Each category was placed at the head of a column and under each column a list of general areas of inquiry and subsequent questions based on those areas of inquiry were formulated (Berg 2009). The question order adopted was that which was suggested by Patton (cited in Berg 2009), who advocated the use of a matrix listing the specific question areas. For this research, knowledge and opinion, and value questions were formulated to elicit the responses from the KIs. As far as was possible, questions were constructed using the language familiar to the KIs, to allow them to enjoy a sense of comfort that the researcher was knowledgeable of the subject matter. Interviewees were identified by a pseudonym and coded for anonymity. Table 5.3 is a presentation of the semi-structure method.

Table 5. 3: Semi Structure Method

Data Collection Semi-Structure Method: Instrument	Time Horizon: 2007-2020 (COP13,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25) (GEF 2007, 10, 11, 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 2020) (GCF, 2012, 13,14,15,16,1,7,18,19,2020) (AF, 2009, 10,111,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,2020) (AOSIS, 2007, 10, 12,13,14,5,16,17,18,2019)
Instruments	Interview Schedule. Coded Interview Transcripts, Key Informant Information Matrix
Research Regime	CCAF, CCA, CCF
Key Activity	Analysing expert information from key informants
Information relating to:	identities, interests; norms, rules, co-financing, leverage, adaptation justice, speech acts, discourse, power, asymmetries, historical responsibility, more mitigation means less adaptation, financialization, communicative action, new and additional, adequate, predictable, balancing adaptation and mitigation
Data Coding	Themes and sub-themes: Interview Transcripts
Application of Software	nVivo QDAS
Data Storage	Digital: hard Drive and the Cloud with PW protect
Activities Driving Analysis	• Focus on shifts in discourse in the UNCFM regime. • Contestation between ODA and CCAF • Implications of public finance unlocking private finance • Implications of more mitigation means less adaptation. • Commodification and financialization of climate change • Contestation over market based as opposed to public grant-based approaches to sourcing CCAF.

5.4.2.4 Testing of Instrument

The nature of these semi-structured interviews located at different sites did not lend itself to KI testing. However, the researcher pre-tested the interview schedule to ensure it reached the standard necessary to provide quality responses and pilot tested one set of interview questions with a nominal KI. Berg (2009) suggested that a critical review of the schedule be done by persons familiar with the subject matter and subsequent practice interviews to assess whether the information expected is likely to be captured. In this regard, the researcher shared the interview schedule with colleagues and tested it using members of the inter-rater reliability group.

5.4.3 Document Review

5.4.3.1 Rationale

The documents for the research included reports, minutes, decisions and interviews that were located within the research sites. Documents serve as a valuable source for confirmation of data from other methods, and analysis that portrays beliefs and values of actors within the UNCFM. The analysis of the documents was done through coding of sub themes across time frames for continuities and discontinuities of dominant discourse within the UNCFM; structural and institutional changes within the UNCFM; the extent of actors' impact on frames over time; the extent and use of power within the UNCFM; and the impact of ideas, norms, interests, and identities on actors' conduct. Table 5.4 is a presentation of the document review method.

Table 5. 4: Document Review Method

Data Collection using Document Review Method: Instrument	Time Horizon: 2007-2020 (COP13,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25) (GEF 2007, 10, 11, 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 2020) (GCF, 2012, 13,14,15,16,1,7,18,19,2020) (AF, 2009, 10,111,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,2020) (AOSIS, 2007, 10, 12,13,14,5,16,17,18, 2019)
Instrument	Reports, Decisions, Minutes, Interviews, Speeches
Structures	AF, GEF, GCF, COP (UNCFM)
Key Activity	Analysis of Key Documents
Information relating to:	identities, interests; norms, rules, co-financing, leverage, adaptation justice, speech acts, discourse, power, asymmetries, historical responsibility, more mitigation means less adaptation, financialization, communicative action, new and additional, adequate, predictable, balancing adaptation and mitigation Coding for themes and sub-themes:
Data Coding	Reports, Decisions, Minutes, Interviews, Speeches
Application of Software	nVivo QDAS
Data Storage	Hard drive and cloud with PW protect
Activities Driving Analysis	• Focus on shifts in discourse in the UNCFM regime. • Structural and institutional changes within the UNCFM. • Actors’ impact on frames over time. • The extent and use of power within the UNCFM. • Impact of norms, interests, and identities on actors’ conduct

5.4.3.2 Testing of Instrument

No test was required for document review.

5.4.3.3 Application of Methods

The effect of the multi methods (genealogy, semi-structured interviews and document review) used for data capture in this research, beyond strengthening credibility, dependability and reliability, also resulted in an analysis through mental rigor of the data related to agents, structures, norms, identities and interests within the UNCFM, producing in that process, data triangulation and synthesis. This is separate and apart, but in addition to the mutual constitution of agents, structures, norms, identities and interests that is continuous within the UNCFM. Appendix B presents a matrix of the data triangulation and synthesis. More importantly, because constructivists view the world as constantly under construction, the multi methods used allowed the SIDS to have multiple approaches and viewing lenses to the issue of CCF. Beyond the perceptions shared by the KIs from the semi-structured interviews, the documents reviewed provided added corroborative evidence about the uncertainty and sources of CCF and the privatization of climate change solutions. Similarly, in the issue area of CCAF, the multi methods provided the SIDS with a third source of data capture, genealogy, which was used to trace the origin, emergence and determination as to whether the CCAF norm became obligatory. No one method would have been able to address these concerns in the research. The semi-structured interviews allowed us to deal the question surrounding relationships and concepts that emerged within the UNCFM, and all three methods separately and collectively allowed us to address the issue of CCAF not being adequate, predictable, and new and additional.

The research also sought to determine changes that affected priorities for CCAF. In this regard, the document review method was able to capture large amounts of data from which the search for changes was conducted, and which would have otherwise been ineffective if it were done using only semi-structured interviews. Actual changes that occurred within the UNCFM affecting the flow of CCAF to the SIDS were required, and not only the perception of the KIs. Importantly, the multi methods used did not impact directly on behaviour of the COP, AF, GEF and the GCF, which was pursued through the discourse analysis method during the analysis of findings phase of the research. Importantly, the value of the multi methods was in the richness of the data captured for coding and analysis through semi-structured interviews and document review. All three methods contributed to capturing data that addressed the question of uncertainties surrounding definitions, quantities, and sources of CCF and CCAF, and techniques used by Parties negotiating for CCF and CCAF. Finally, the multi methods used resulted in capturing data from various research sites which, when coded, laid the foundation for the multi methods used to analyse the research findings.

5.4.3.4 Ethical Considerations

As the researcher, I am aware of ethical issues that may have arisen during the research, including data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and dissemination of the findings. In this regard, the key instrument was the KI's informed consent process, which protected the rights of KIs from harm, established confidentiality, retained autonomy, and allowed them to be the judge of what risks were attached to the research process. A sample of the informed consent form is shown as Appendix A.

5.4.3.5 Trustworthiness

The central question addressed here is, how does a researcher know that this qualitative study is accurate, plausible and believable? In the context of quantitative research, validity and reliability are the standards used mostly for a convincing research. However, in qualitative research, the standard for good research is determined by how well the researcher has provided evidence that the descriptions and analysis generated represent the reality of the situations relating to the material and human participants studied (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). Following Lincoln and Guba (1985) the researcher adopted the terms credibility and dependability as opposed to validity and reliability, as the standards against which qualitative research is evaluated. Accordingly, credibility refers to extent to which the researcher has represented the participants' perceptions about the phenomenon under study.

Credibility was demonstrated up front by clarifying any bias on the part of the researcher; collection of data from three methods which enabled triangulation, strengthening in the process data interpretation, opportunities to disconfirm the findings through contrary information, and increased accuracy of findings by making use of checks and peer debriefing by members of the inter-rater reliability team. Dependability was demonstrated by: (a) providing an audit trail of the data process; and (b) coding of interviews by colleagues to improve inter-rater reliability (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). Additionally, qualitative researchers seek to establish the extent of transferability, not to be confused with generalizability. Transferability, in this context, means looking to see if lessons learned in this study might be applicability to others from the perspective of the readers. This was enabled by: (a) a rich description that provided to the readers with a sense of shared or vicarious experience; and (b) communication to the reader of a holistic and realistic picture of the findings associated with the research. It is important to restate, that as the researcher in this qualitative study, I am aware that I am also an instrument of data collection which bears sensibility and sensitivity on my part.

5.4.3.6 Limitations

The key question to answer is, do these problems with errors, methods, and trustworthiness eventually matter, and if so, to what extent? (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). Importantly, all research has limitations and pointed to them as they arose across the research, including those associated with restrictions surrounding identification of KIs, reliability of certain techniques for data capture, use of not so familiar methods for data collection, and researcher bias. However, the researcher does not claim to have covered the entire field of possible limitations with the study.

5.5 Conceptualizing Qualitative Data Analysis and the Researcher Approach

According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) data analysis is an ongoing process and doesn't begin at the end of data collection. Once data collection is completed, the next essential task is to "… transform them into something meaningful by analysing them and making inferences from these discrete pieces of information" (188). Consequently, "qualitative data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the masses of data collected" (189). In other words, the researcher must, inductively, transform the raw data into meaningful findings that are linked to the research questions by transcribing, organising, categorizing, identifying themes, and coding the data. In a qualitative study, quantitative data can be used but they are considered secondary and only used to supplement primary qualitative findings (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). According to Brinkman (2014), the methods of data analysis can be inductive (data driven analysis that may produce a grounded theory), deductive (theory driven analysis utilizing theoretical and conceptual frameworks) or, abductive (relationship between situation and inquiry).

In keeping with the research methodology, significant use was made of statements (transcripts, decisions, speeches) that generated units of meaning and the development of what Moustakas (1994), called "essence" description, particularly since the focus was on the attitude and objective responses by the KIs to the phenomenon under study, supplemented by contents of documents to achieve analytic description and not generalizable outcomes.

In qualitative research, the researcher enters the field with certain assumptions and perspectives gathered from his own experiential knowledge, the literature review, and theoretical and methodological frameworks. As a result, an *a priori* coding matrix was developed (Table 5. 7) comprising themes, concepts, and genealogy. The study is therefore a combination of inductive and deductive thinking. However, as Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) advised, we "approach[ed] [the] transcripts with an open mind, seeking [only] what emerge[d] from the text" (192). Significantly, the inductive and deductive approaches to data analysis corresponded to what Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) called the template-editing approach, where the *a prio*ri codes are few, if at all, and most codes are emergent. Importantly, themes and sub themes were modified as data analysis progressed, producing an iterative coding scheme development chart located at Appendix C.

5.6 Actions Leading up to Data Analysis and Findings

5.6.1 Ethics Approval, Identification and Contact

To conduct the research, the researcher required approval from the UWI Campus Research Ethics Committee (CREC), St Augustine. However, prior to the consideration of any application for the Ethics Committee approval, the researcher is required to undergo a mandatory Responsible Conduct of Research Course (RCR) under the auspices of the UWI and the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI PROGRAM). The researcher successfully completed the course over period 07th December 2020 to 10th December 2020. Subsequently, a research ethics application was dispatched to the UWI (CREC), on 19th December 2020 for approval. The application comprised the pass transcript and certificate from CITI, a draft consent form in keeping with CREC guidelines, and an email from the researcher's PhD Supervisor, supporting the application. The application was approved by the CREC on 21st December 2020, advising that the research topic "has met the criteria for Exemption from Review from the Campus Research Ethics Committee." The consent form informed the participants that the risk associated with the research was minimal, and equal to that of any usual interview. Additionally, participants were advised that the data will be recorded, hard drive stored anonymously for five years, and password protected, and all references to participants will be by via a pseudonym. Additionally, participants were also advised that their participation was voluntary, and they could withdraw at any time without jeopardy or harm. Table 5. 5 presents a matrix depicting key informant identification and response.

Table 5. 5: Key Informant Identification and Response Matrix

Identifiers	Outcomes
Sample Methods	Purposive and Snowball
Contact Methods	Emails, WhatsApp messages and mobile calls
Key Informants Contacted	Sixty-five (65)
Regions	Caribbean, Asia, Europe, North America, Africa

Table 5. 5 ***(continued)***

Identifiers	Outcomes
Agencies	Universities, Departments of Environment, Offices of Climate Change, Multilateral Development Banks, International Environment Organizations, Environment Protection Agencies; UN Climate Change Institutions; CARICOM, UNFCCC, UN, Private Sector Development Agency, Green Technology Centre, North American Government, European Governments, Caribbean SIDS' Governments, High Commissions (India, Canada) Embassies (USA, Russian Federation, China, Brazil, EU), Development Institutes
Professions	Consultant, Negotiator, Bankers, Ambassador, High Commissioner, Policy Analysist, Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Climate Change Advisors, University Lecturers, Applied Scientist, Policy Specialist, Economist, Natural Resource Management Specialist, Climate change Practitioners, Energy Development Engineer, Conservationist, Researcher, Adaptation Practitioner,
No. of Responses from Key Informants	Forty-four 44/65 KIs = 67% response by KIs
No. of Non-Responses from Key Informants	Twenty-one 21/65 KIs = 33% non-response by KIs
No. of confirmed Interviewees	Thirty-five 35/65KIs = 79% confirmed interviewees
Actual No. of Interviews	Thirty-two 32/35 KIs = 91% actual interviews

The KIs for this research were identified through purposive sampling and snowball methods. A total of 65 emails were sent out to prospective KIs across South America, the Caribbean, Pacific, Asia, Africa, Europe and North America, including the Embassies and High Commissions of Russia, Brazil, the United States of America, Canada, India and the United Kingdom, located in Guyana. A total of 44 out of 65 KIs (67%) responded and 35 out of 65 KIs (79%) agreed to be interviewed. A total of 32 out 35 KIs (91%) did the interview with the researcher. Table 5.5 provides key identification and response data for the KIs. Multiple follow up emails were sent to prospective KIs in South America and the Pacific SIDS, but to no avail. In some cases, WhatsApp calls and messaging supplemented email correspondence in setting up the interview schedule. Each email sent out to a potential KI comprised an invitation, the UWI ethics approval letter and a consent form which the KI signed as an indication of his/her consent.

Anticipating that signing the consent forms (electronic or otherwise) was likely to prove onerous for many of the KIs, the researcher also included in the email invite, the option for KIs to agree that their acceptance email would also be evidence of their signature, and that the consent form was read and understood. Most of the KIs chose the option of the ‘return email’ as their required signature, which reduced the burden of procuring physical signatures. A sample email invitation, a zoom invite, UWI ethics approval and the UWI approved research consent from are located at Appendices D and E.

5.6.2 Interview and Transcription

Agreement on scheduling the interviews for the KIs took at least four rounds of email correspondence, supplemented by WhatsApp calls and messages. A pseudonym for each KI was developed and a total of 32 interviews were conducted over the period 13th December 2020 to 05th March 2021, amounting to thirty-nine (39) hours and thirty-three (33) minutes, or 2,372 minutes of data. The longest interview spanned one hundred and eight minutes (108 mins) and the shortest, forty-eight minutes (48 mins). All the interviews were conducted using the Zoom platform, except for one each, using Skype and Microsoft Teams respectively, and one other using ‘in person’ note taking method at the request of that KI. Appendix F provides more details on each KI’s datum and interview.

The recordings, both video and audio, were saved on the researcher’s computer hard drive and uploaded to the researcher’s OneDrive cloud server where they are password protected to ensure confidentiality. The recordings were subsequently retrieved by the researcher, beginning September 2020, and uploaded to the nVivo's qualitative data analysis software (QDAS) automatic transcription module. The audio interviews were transcribed for each KI, using nVivo QDAS, and presented to the researcher in a text format, with the audio equivalent available on a scroll below that allowed the researcher to edit the transcript for grammar and accuracy. Importantly, all the nVivo automatic transcribed interviews had to be edited, facilitating data familiarization. The edited transcribed interviews were subsequently exported to nVivo QDAS coding module.

5.6.3 Data Interaction, Themes and Memoing/ Systematic Data Analysis Procedure

Data analysis is flexible and iterative. The data should be read, reread, reviewed, and explored through multiple iterations (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). Over the period September 2020 to July 2021, the researcher interacted no less than 12 separate and overlapping occasions with the data. The transcripts were read and reread at least three times; the audio of the transcripts was listened to at least three times; the documents were read and reread at least three times; memos and notes were read back as least four times. Throughout these data iterative interactions, themes and sub themes were generated. Table 5. 6 provides a template on data interaction and frequency.

Table 5. 6: Data Interaction and Frequency Template

Activity	Outcome	Time Horizon
Lit Rev/Theoretical and Conceptual frameworks	*a priori* Coding Themes and Coding Categories	September 2020
Identification of Frames	Coding Themes	October 2020
Identification of Genealogies	Coding Themes	November 2020
Interview of Key Informants	Coding Themes	December 2020 to March 2021
Listening, reading and editing transcripts views of Key Informants	Coding Themes	December 2020 to March 2021

Table 5. 6 *(continued)*

Activity	Outcome	Time Horizon
Listening to interviews of Key Informants prior to coding transcripts	Coding Themes/Sub themes	February 2021 to April 2021
Reading and coding transcripts using nVivo software	Coding Themes/Sub Themes	February 2021 to April 2021
Document retrieval and reading	Coding Themes	October 2020 to February 2021
Document review and reading	Coding Themes	December 2020 to February 2021
Reading and coding documents	Coding Themes/ Sub Themes	February 2021 to April 2021
Read back of Notes and Memos	Coding Themes/ Sub Themes	February 2021 to April 2021
Coding Scheme Development Chart	Recoding, code collapsing; theme collapsing; code expansion; theme expansion	September 2020 to May 2021
Continuous coding using nVivo software	Coding Themes/Sub Themes/ Sub-Sub Themes/ Sub-Sub-Sub Themes	February 2021 to May 2021
Collapsing coding themes, sub-sub into main coding themes and sub coding themes	Emergence of seven (7) main coding themes and thirty-six (36) sub coding themes	May 2021 to July 2021
Multiple interactive and overlapping sessions with the research data		

The coding scheme development chart created remained iterative throughout recoding; code collapsing; theme collapsing; code expansion; and theme expansion actions. Continuous coding for themes, sub themes and sub-sub themes continued throughout the entire process. Themes were identified through recognition of recurring patterns across the data (Merriam 2009; Saldana 2013) and their relevance to the research questions. Constantly memoing was being done from the early stages of the research, but it was significantly enhanced from the data capture phase. Memos were stored in the nVivo QDAS coding module and available for coded if, and when necessary. Notably, the memos created were not coded, but used instead as part of the cross analysis for the research findings.

5.6.4 Coding the Data

There are several texts on definitions and explanations of what coding is and, or what is a code. These include: Bazeley (2013), Kuckartz (2014) and Richards (2015). However, Saldana's (2016) definition was adopted since it is more reflective of our qualitative study. According to Saldana:

> A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence capturing attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data .… Just as a title represents and captures a book, film or poem's primary content and essence, so does a code represent and captures a datum's primary content and essence. (Saldana 2016, 3-4)

Keeping in mind that coding is a cyclical act, our aim was to learn from the data until emergent patterns and explanations were generated. However, Saldana (2016) disagreed that coding in qualitative research is reductionist, instead he argued that it discovers a participant's voice, emotions, beliefs, values, conflicts, and judgments, which is the antithesis of being reductionist.

The data were coded and recoded, which generated expanded themes and concepts, however no theory building was sought since it was the pre-existing theories, contained in the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, that drove the research process. Consequently, this research is not about developing a grounded theory, even as elements of grounded theory emerged from the data. Alphabetical codes were considered more suited to the research in the context of having them generated using the nVivo software. It is important to note that the nVivo software did not analyse the data. The software organized the data in many forms. However, it was the application of mental rigor to the data by the researcher that provided the analysis.

The nVivo QDAS was used to reduce the data to manageable categories for coding, using content analysis to establish the frequency and presence of concepts represented by words and or phrases, and relational analysis to examine for relationships among concepts in the text. However, a significant disadvantage of content analysis is a tendency for it to be more of a word count that disregards the textual context and thus seen as reductionist (Leedy and Ormrod 2013). Consequently, because qualitative coding goes beyond content analysis, the researcher reflected deeply on the data collected, organised and grouped similarly coded data into categories, and searched for combinations and categories inductively and deductively.

Data coding commenced with thirteen predetermined coding themes generated from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks reflected in the coding matrix, conscious of the fact to avoid coding the data according to what *we* had expected to find. Additionally, the coding matrix remained flexible and opened to change throughout. In support, Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) provided a useful matrix identifying the qualitative data coding steps, which the researcher adapted and followed. The qualitative data coding steps are reproduced in Figure 5. 2, indicating where Chapter 6 ends and where Chapter 7 begins. However, the reality is that the analysis and interpretation of the research findings began from this current chapter, as the researcher determined patterns and whether they contradict or confirm previous studies or earlier analyses identified in the research. The analytic outcomes formed part of the findings that were analysed and synthesised and in chapter seven.

Qualitative Data Coding Steps

Step I

Re-read and Examine Data

Step

Data

Revise Coding Scheme

Report Findings

Step III

Chapter 6

Data

Summarize Key Findings

Informatio
n

Interpret Findings

Step IV

Chapter 7

Knowledge

Figure 5. 2: Qualitative Data Coding Steps

Source: Adapted from Bloomberg and Volpe 2016

5.6.5 Development of Coding Categories and Descriptors

Whereas the conceptual framework provides the boundaries and limits of the research, the "… [coding] categories form the backbone" of the study (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). The conceptual framework provided four categories, each linking to one of the four research questions, while several descriptors for each category were generated. The conceptual framework evolved into a coding matrix comprising coding categories and coding themes. As will be seen later, the coding categories of the coding matrix will become the analytic coding categories, while the descriptors (generated from the literature review, theoretical and conceptual frameworks) will become analytic coding themes, since the descriptors and the themes are one and the same. Therefore, the coding matrix will not comprise any descriptors.

After conducting the literature review, the researcher developed initial frameworks that would guide the coding process. The literature review led to the research questions (the 'what'). The research questions led to the theoretical framework (the 'why'). The 'why' and 'what' of the research led to the study's conceptual framework. Four frameworks were developed by the researcher:

(1) literature review;

(2) theoretical;

(3) conceptual and

(4) methodological.

Some of the concepts that emerged from the literature review and the conceptual framework, formed the *a priori* coding themes. The categories that emerged from the conceptual framework became the coding and analytic categories for the research.

By the time the data were ready for coding, the scheme comprised four broad analytic themes, relating to the study's four research questions and identified as:

(1) "Relationships Through Interactions";

(2) "Changes Affecting Priorities";

(3) "Organization Behaviour" and

(4) “Climate Finance Uncertainties”, along with 13 alphabetic coding themes, eight thematic frames and eight thematic genealogies. Table 5. 7 reflects the coding matrix with descriptors up to this point.

Table 5. 7: Coding Matrix with Descriptors

Categories	Themes/ Descriptors (Concepts codes)	Themes/ Descriptors (Versus codes)	Frames/Themes	Genealogy/Themes	Qs
Relationships Though Interactions	Distributive justice Constructing asymmetric structures	Developed nations to mitigate vs All must mitigate	1. Creation of structures of dominance 2. Construction of a dependency syndrome	1. Ruptures and disjunctures of discourse over research period 2. Structural inequalities based on meanings	**RQ1**
Changes Affecting Priorities	Financialization of climate change. Use of language to dominate discourse	Public vs Private Finance More mitigation vs less adaptation	3. Private finance as key instrument for CCAF 4. Neoliberal mechanisms to drive CCF solutions	3. Instruments that shift dominant discourse 4. Problematizing social construction of reality and knowledge	**RQ2**
Organization Behaviour	Constructing identities, norms and interests Linking CCAF to mitigation	Developed nations to mitigate vs All must mitigate	5. Pressure for all nations to mitigate climate change 6. Coalitions of interests among the great powers	5. Tracing the effects of discourse on power 6. Legitimization of certain norms	**RQ3**
Climate Finance Uncertainties	Climate Finance Uncertainties	New and additional vs ODA Adequate vs Inadequate	7. Uncertainty surrounding key CCAF terms 8.Commodification and financialization of CCAF	7. Contestation over meanings via shifts in dominant discourse 8. continuities and discontinuities of discourse	**RQ4**

5.6.6 Collapse of Descriptors, Number of Coding Themes, Alphabetic Codes and Documents Coded

By December 2020, the descriptors from the conceptual framework mirrored that of the predetermined coding themes resulting in the collapsing the descriptors into the coding matrix. On 03rd January 2021, a pilot KI interview was coded using the nVivo QDAS across the *a priori* themes. The results of the pilot interview coding confirmed that the *a priori* coding themes fairly reflected the likely answers to the research questions through the numerous sub codes that emerged in support of the coding themes. By the 27th of April 2021, the researcher upgraded the coding matrix and the nVivo QDAS coding module to reflect four coding categories consistent with the conceptual framework and the research questions: (1) concepts through interactions; (2) changes affecting priorities; (3) climate finance uncertainties; and (4) organization behaviour, after conducting a detailed review of the coding scheme by introducing categories into the coding matrix and collapsing concepts, frames and genealogy into themes. Table 5. 8 reflects the coding matrix with descriptors collapsed.

Table 5. 8: Coding Matrix with Descriptors Collapsed

Categories	Themes (Concept Coding) *	Themes (Concept Coding) *	Frames/Themes (Concept Coding) ***	Genealogy/Theme**	Qs
Concepts Though Interactions	Distributive justice Constructing asymmetric structures	Developed nations to mitigate vs All must mitigate	1. Creation of structures of dominance 2. Construction of a dependency syndrome	1. Ruptures and disjunctures of discourse over research period 2. Structural inequalities based on meanings	**RQ1**
Changes Affecting Priorities	Financialization of climate change Use of language to dominate discourse	Public vs Private Finance More mitigation vs less adaptation	3. Private finance as key instrument for CCAF 4. Neoliberal mechanisms to drive CCF solutions	3. Instruments that shift dominant discourse 4. Problematizing social construction of reality and knowledge	**RQ2**
Organization Behaviour	Constructing identities, norms and interests Linking CCAF to mitigation	Developed nations to mitigate vs All must mitigate	5. Pressure for all nations to mitigate climate change 6. Coalitions of interests among the great powers	5. Tracing the effects of discourse on power 6. Legitimization of certain norms	**RQ3**
Climate Finance Uncertainties	Climate Finance Uncertainties	New and additional vs ODA Adequate vs Inadequate	7. Uncertainty surrounding key CCAF terms 8.Commodification and financialization of CCAF	7. Contestation over meanings via shifts in dominant discourse 8. continuities and discontinuities of discourse	**RQ4**

Note:
* Descriptors were collapsed into themes.
** Genealogy discovered as not suited for coding, but required mental rigor
*** Collapsed into themes due to similarity.

The nVivo QDAS allowed the researcher to colour code the data and create child codes which were called sub codes. Importantly, nVivo QDAS provided a feature that allowed the researcher, while coding the transcripts and documents, to see the codes alongside the transcripts and documents, as coding progressed. With a click, it allowed the researcher to see the data or datum stored under each coding themes/sub themes as they were created or at any time, because they are permanently stored in the programme. Appendix G provides a sample coded page from an actual transcript of the research. The attributes of location, occupation and organization were assigned to each KI under the heading participants to allow for varying types of data organization outputs using nVivo QDAS, and cross case analysis through mental rigor. Coding continued as an iterative, showing development up to July 2021 reflected in Appendix C. A total of 32 transcripts was coded and recoded totalling 554 pages. A total of 11 GEF reports was coded amounting to 1,235 pages, while a total of 12 GCF reports was coded amounting to 765 pages. Further, a total of 11 AFB reports was coded which amounted to 573 pages. A total 18 COP reports was coded amounting to 831 pages and 10 AOSIS reports were coded amounting to 56 pages. The total pages altogether amounted to 4,014. See Table 5. 9 for more details on Materials Coded. Importantly, by the end of data coding seven main coding themes emerged as final for the research: control; issues within the UNCFM; negotiation metrics; whole of government approach; adaptation finance constraints; market-based push; and climate finance uncertainties.

Table 5. 9: Materials Coded

Units of Analysis	Documents/Name	No. Pages	Total
Key Informants 32 Transcripts	Transcripts: CRS; AC; WJN; AS; BD; CFC; CK; DCU; DG; DS; DT; GM; GQB; HSC; JC; JFC; LCA; MP; MG; PC; PB; OG; LC; SH; TS; TTW; VS; RT; NS; SD; JT; MB	17/ 17/18/21/14/19/17/ 14/15/17/14/16/18/24/ 20/22/17/19/21/13/18/23/ 22/13/16/11/13/23/19/20/13/ 10	554
GEF 11 Reports	Reports to the COP: 2007/ 2010/ 2011/ 2012/ 2013/ 2014/ 2015/ 2016/ 2017/ 2019/ 2020	70/121/94/107/118/141/ 100/125/100/125/135	1,235
GCF 12 Reports	Reports to the COP: 2007/2010/2011/2012/ 2013/ 2014/ 2015/ 2016/ 2017/ 2018/ 2019/ 2020/	10/62/21/44/45/87/132/ 124/122/30/43/45/	765
AFB 11 Reports	Reports to the COP 2009/ 2010/ 2011/ 2012/ 2013/ 2014/ 2015/ 2016/ 2017/ 2019/ 2020	44/44/44/52/74/42/49/93/ 55/49/27	573
COP 18 Reports	Reports to the UNFCCC 13/16/17/18/19/20/21/22/ 23/24/25	60/75/143/129/116/41/64 /45/35/59/64	831
AOSIS 10 Reports	AOSIS 2010/2012/2013/2014/2015/ 2016/2017/2018/2019/2020/	25/3/3/3/3/3/4/4/5/3	56
Total Units of Analysis = 6	**Total No. Documents = 94**		**Total pages = 4,014**

It is important to note that the frames and genealogies did not contain data to be coded due to its ideational and abstract nature, rather they functioned as conceptual analytical constructs and will return to prominence during the analysis and interpretation in chapter seven.

5.6.7 Generation of Findings

The findings are presented in narrative form, through what Denzin (2001) called, rich descriptions, using the question driven approach supported by various quotations from the participants and documents in a manner so that readers feel as though they are living the experiences described by participants. This approach was selected as best for presenting the findings since it allows the researcher to stay closely connected to the research questions by providing data that can serve to provide answers. The findings that emerged resulted from mental rigor applied, supported by data summary tables during examination and interrogation of the data. The data summary table recorded the frequency of who said what, and the frequency of what was said, while nVivo QDAS programme (where a record of each KI/document response and coded data was stored) provided what was said by each KI/document, which allowed for individual and cross case analysis. A data summary table was prepared for each of the seven main coding themes, identifying in descending order the frequency of KIs/ document response to each of the coding themes, and the number of references, in descending order, by each participant/document to the coding theme. In the result, seven data summary tables were generated, each representing data captured under the respective main coding themes. It also reflected the highest frequencies within each of the four coding categories, commencing with the most important. Details of a data summary table are shown at Table H. 1.

Additionally, document summary and participant summary forms were also recommended to compliment data summary tables and data analysis (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016). However, for this research, documents and participant summaries were impractical given the volume of data that coded. The non-practicality of preparing at least 94 document summaries and 32 participant summaries, as would be required, demonstrated that such summaries were meant for research using much less data. The findings are supported by quoted responses from the KIs, and or multiple, reflecting the concepts discussed. They are meant to be representative of what several of them think about the coding themes in issue, and not any particular individual’s view, reflecting at the same time, examples of patterns in the data. The same principles applied to document responses to coded themes that served to confirm or disconfirm data provided through the KIs' responses. Consequently, the data summary tables prepared for this research quantified qualitative data for the purpose of supplementing the narrative presentation of the findings. The nVivo QDAS was also useful in classifying, sorting, filing, storing, and reconfiguring the data captured during the research. A research codebook was also generated, which is detailed at Table I. 1, all of which enabled analytic reflections and the emergence of the research findings. Thirty-one key research findings emerged, and it is important to also note that for each of the seven main research themes, at least two key findings emerged.

5.7 Summary

This chapter provided a detail description of the study's research methodology, highlighting the research as qualitative and grounded in a philosophical position that is essentially constructivist, ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. It involved an interpretive approach to the world by studying people and materials in their natural settings with a view of interpreting phenomena in terms of the meaning they bring to them. A post-structuralists/post-modernist methodology was selected since it affirms the subjectivity of human nature and rejection of a pure objective or absolute truth, any external reality, or a value-free science.

The chapter continued with the research design and explanations of the three methods (genealogy, document review and semi-structured interview) used for data capture. The chapter also explained the instruments for data collection and analysis, including how the instruments were developed. The chapter continued with the importance of ethics and its application through informed consent, the importance of establishing trustworthiness through credibility, dependability and transferability, recognition that reliance on certain techniques and use of not so familiar methods are likely to pose limitations to the study, and the importance of triangulation of data to improve credibility and reduce bias. The chapter concluded with actions leading up to data analysis which included interview and transcription, data analysis procedure, development of coding categories and coding themes, coding of the data, materials coded and generation of findings.

CHAPTER 6

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that, through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC and the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and the GCF.

This chapter presents key findings obtained through data coded from 32 semi-structured interviews, 18 COPs, reports from 11 GCF, 11 GEF and 12 AF meetings respectively. Thirty-one findings emerged from the study. The researcher adopted the view that in qualitative data analysis, research findings should be presented free of researcher bias, speculation, and as objectively as possible (Miles and Huberman 1994). The findings that emerged resulted from mental rigor, supported by data summary tables, during examination and interrogation of the data. They are presented as they unfolded from the data analysis, which represents the views garnered from the KIs and the documents. The findings are presented below using the research question driven approach (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016)[81], comprising the research question, the main and sub coding themes associated with it, and the findings that emerged.

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[81] Several other different ways of presenting qualitative research findings include: developing participants' profiles and vignettes (Saldana 2014); developing the findings as a tale (Van Maanen 1995); and presenting the findings as thematic connected categories (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016).

Coding Category: Concepts Through Interactions

Question associated with this coding category: What relationships may have emerged during interactions among Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, surrounding the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS, that is not new and additional?

A total of four main coding themes emerged: Control; Issues within the UNCFM; Negotiation Metrics; and Whole of Government Approach.

Figure 6. 1 depicts the hierarchy of codes under coding theme, Control.

Main Coding Theme: Control



Figure 6. 1: Hierarchy of Codes Under Main Coding Theme, Control

Source: nVivo QDAS

Five coding sub themes emerged under this main coding theme Control:

(1) Bureaucratic Dominance with 20 direct respondents (DRs) and 49 coding references (CRs). Note that DRs refer to the number of responses by KIs and documents for each coded sub-theme. Coding references refer to the individual chunks of data coded to each sub-theme;
(2) Directional Actions with 28 DRs and 78 CRs;
(3) Minilateralism with 14 DRs and 28 CRs;
(4) Unfair Int'l Rules with 11 DRs and 18 CRs;
(5) International Greed with 4 DRs and 9 CRs.

Three key findings emerged from this Coding Category.

Coding Sub-Theme: Bureaucratic Dominance:

Bureaucratic Dominance comprised 20 DRs and 49 CRs. See Figure 6. 2.



Figure 6. 2: Number of Coding References and Direct Respondents, Bureaucratic Dominance

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 1: *The rules set by actors within the UNCFM create structures and attitudes of dominance, preventing any meaningful compliance by the SIDS.*

The essential thrust of the UNCFM is to develop a financial infrastructure that mirrors standards within the developed countries. There seems to be little or no evidence that the CBDR principle is being applied so that groupings, such as the SIDS, do not suffer adversely. To the extent that size matters in multiple contexts, KIs pointed out, thusly:

> I think the special circumstance of SIDS is indeed recognized by the United Nations process, to be conveniently forgotten by donor countries because

> of, I suppose the small size of these states and the apparent disregard for their influence in the international community (PC).
>
> [T]he whole idea of maintaining control of the design [of projects] is to make sure that there is not much developing happening, that what is being done is a hand out rather than a hand up, because the longer, a SIDS remain a SIDS, the more control the developed countries have over them, [and] if you continue to be a developing country, then you need a developed country to help you to raise your, your status (JT).
>
> [I]f they are controlling the rules of the supply chain, is it really our money? If accessibility is the challenge, if they burden you with reporting, you know, to the point where you do not even have time to implement, and then they turn around tell you …we are not seeing the development impact. [And] that's why I talk about [control of] the entire supply chain (TS).

As highly indebted nations due, inter alia, to negative climate impacts, decisions by the AFB (16-2011), such as agreeing "… that countries assessed as being at high risk of debt distress were not eligible to access PPCR credits for public sector projects", but can, in turn, access PPCR credits for private sector investments, only serve to accentuate the SIDS' debt problems. Even if the SIDS were to be assessed at moderate risk of debt distress, to qualify for PPCR credits for public projects, they would have to provide evidence that "… they conducted a macro-economic analysis to evaluate the potential for PPCR credits to impact their debt sustainability" (AFB 16-2011). The capacity challenges of the SIDS outweigh the possibility of them meeting such requirements. Importantly, the absence of any exemptions has the made the rules set by the UNCFM particularly harsh to groupings such as the SIDS, exemplified by an AFB deciding that:

> Procurements by the implementing entities or any of their attached organizations shall be performed in accordance with internationally accepted procurement principles … [and] to be eligible to submit funding proposals implementing entities had to be accredited with the Fund and follow its fiduciary and safeguard standards when accessing financial resources … [along with a] commitment to abide by [the]Adaptation Fund's environmental and social policy and gender policy (AFB 21-2013).

Matters relating to gender are extremely sensitive among many SIDS, therefore including it as another prerequisite to be eligible to submit funding proposals imposes additional untimely burdens on their legislative regimes. Clearly, the bureaucratic burdens are ‘built in’ mechanisms that ignore the development trajectory of the SIDS especially where they are meant to subscribe to platforms that “enable coordination, maximize learning opportunities and foster knowledge-sharing to facilitate transparency enhancements […] implemented by the UNDP and UNEP” (GEF 23-2017). In fact, the key drivers of bureaucratic dominance are the decision makers within the AFB, GEF and GCF, with 56% of the coded references coming from the AFB, followed by the GEF and then the GCF.

Importantly, it was reported that developed nations infiltrate the ranks and cause changes in SIDS’ positions:

> It's interesting to see the little side conversations and negotiations that go on in these big meetings where companies will approach the government or representatives of a smaller state and make a bid, make a pitch for some kind [of] intervention in mitigation […] [a]nd so countries I find, sometimes forget, why "dem guh deh"[they went there] […] there have been instances where, you know, SIDS agree on a position … and all of a sudden, it changed its position and everybody realized, oh, so dem, dem, dem flexible, you know, dem thing nah strong [they are flexible and their position is not strong] (AC).

There is resistance even by the international financial community to adjust the criteria used for accessing CCAF. As one KI pointed out:

> There is a long, long running battle by small states to get these international institutions to change the definition of small states for the purpose of financing using per capita income [and] there is a lot of contradictions and anomalies in the approaches that are used by the international community where that is concerned, but generally to the detriment of small states, particularly in the Caribbean (WJN).

Even where excess money is left over from a project due to the diligence of SIDS, “it has to go back to the funding agency. You can't transfer it to another area where you think that it is needed or even if they agree it is needed, you still can't transfer it” (SHC).

Coding Sub-Theme: Minilateralism

Minilateralism comprised 14 DRs and 28 CRs. See Figure 6. 3.



Figure 6. 3: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Minilateralism

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 2: *Notwithstanding balanced country representation within the UNCFM, minilateralism drives decision making.*

Financing for development is designed, primarily for the benefit of the funders. As WJN remarked, “[t]he thing is, is that at the end of the day, most of the, of the conceptualization and so on are driven by the donor […] [and] if those ideas are not consistent with their ideas of what they wish for you, they don't [donate]” (WJN). Similarly, in relation to a carbon tax regime for the SIDS, MP recalled that “the big powers are watching each other, and on the watch out for who will get an advantage, who will get an upper hand, etc, […] so, it's probably not a lot about you [the SIDS], but it's about themselves and each other ….” There are challenges even with recognizing the special circumstances of the SIDS from important actors that interact with the UNCFM, as pointed out by multiple KIs:

> [T]he G20 was very, very hesitant, and still is, I think, about looking at SIDS as a category of special needs for want of a better term, you know, and of course, that carried over in the IMF and the World Bank and so on, because it's the same G20 countries that are the big boys there (CRS).

> [W]e continue to be lumped with Latin America and the Caribbean, and that in and of itself continues to be problematic, overshadowing [our] realities … so, you know, if at that level they can be so blinding as to what's happening, just imagine at the global level, where, again, that big picture scenario does not take into account what is happening so readily in the smaller regions and countries of the world (AC).

Notably, the World Bank continues “as trustee to the Adaptation Fund”, while the Global Environment Facility “[continues to provide] secretariat services to the Adaptation Fund Board” (AFB 35- 2020 Second Session), and the World Bank “formally accepted the invitation by the COP […] [to be] Interim Trustee for the Green Climate Fund” (GCF 1-2012). Additionally, the majority (75.8%) of projects and programmes disbursed under the LDCF went to UNDP (49.6%); FAO (13.7%); UNEP (12.5%). The World Bank also benefited from the LDCF with 5.8%, and the AfDB with 10.7%. Importantly, there is no mention of the CDB which, as established, should be facilitating Caribbean SIDS. In relation to the SCCF, the majority (62.4%) of projects disbursed went to the World Bank (27.1%); UNDP (25.4%) and UNEP (9.9%), followed by FAO (6.8%); EBRD (5.1%) and AfDB 3.8% in terms of significance (GCF 26- 2020). The obvious dominance of international finance actors is clear. Indeed, this is quite remarkable when contrasted with the COP 20 Part 2 report that states “there is transparency at the level of the GEF…[but] there remains room for improvement in information disclosure by GEF agencies to GEF stakeholders.” Keep in mind, also, that the World Bank is also the trustee for the GEF. Consequently, minilateralism is embedded in the structure and operations of the UNCFM, evidenced by 66% of the coded references for minilateralism being found within the AFB, GCF and GEF.

Coding Sub-Theme: Directional Actions

Directional Actions comprised 28 DRs and 78 CRs. See Figure 6. 4.



Figure 6. 4: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Directional Actions

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 3: *A majority of the KIs indicated that developed countries prefer to direct the efforts of the SIDS at transferring and determining the use of CCAF.*

The extent to which there is an 'it's our money' attitude by developed countries was underscored by a KI who, reflecting on the Guyana Norway Agreement, posited that "… the money wasn't available to us. It was held by Norway, then it was handed over to the World Bank, then you had some interlocutors such as UNDP, … [and] by the time the money comes …[t]hey are telling you what you can do with it" (WJN). Another KI mentioned that some SIDS are hesitant to question the funders because "they don't want to miss out on this seemingly glorious opportunity" presented to them and so you find that "if UNDP is doing a project in the Caribbean, usually it's across all Caribbean countries, and there's very little leeway for the nuances between and among countries" (AC). There is no doubt that accountability is important to the funders but "… I don't want to say it is a facade, [laughter] maybe it isn't, but the very skeptical side of me wants to say that, you know, they're sometimes the need to do things for the sake of appearances and optics […] it's whatever the global north says, and that happens" (AC). Multiple KIs pointed out that there is a push by funders to direct and impose their values and conditions on CCAF delivery:

> [Y]ou have to recognize that the same forces that operate in the international arena are the ones that operate in the COP, because remember, those financing mechanisms are governed by boards and the same countries that are on the World Bank and the OECD and whatever, are also on the boards, right. So, the same pushback that we get as SIDS, you know, it happens on the negotiating floor, it will happen in the boards as well (AS).
>
> But …everybody knows that boards are managed by the powers that be, who have the voting powers. And it's, it's not the same, you know, a simple one vote per man per country type of situation there. So, I think whatever obtains in terms of priorities for those board members and the banks, that will prevail as … the focus or the priorities for funding (JFC).
>
> [W]hile the principle of the negotiation is that, you know, everybody is equal, and you respect the exchange, there is always the influence based on the position in, in, you know, the whole geopolitical sphere where you have the, the, powerful countries, they do have their back-room discussions and agreements so they know how they will vote or support or not support certain things (JC).

Additionally, the projects being developed by these international partners are done in a such a manner that make you think you are in the know of the projects, but in essence "… we've been placed in a cage [and] we have to directly work with them in order to develop such a project to be implemented" (CK). One KI recalled that “half the time the smaller countries are then being pressured to take up positions, you know, on one side or the other” (DT). The directed actions to pressure the SIDS to meet international standards are even more clear where “the GEF Secretariat has been carrying out a comprehensive review of the GEF’s fiduciary minimum standards for GEF partner Agencies … [which] would require a complete, third-party assessment of Agencies’ compliance, *including on AML-CFT* [emphasis mine] (GEF 25-2019). Further, the political economy of climate change finance is also important. As SD surmises, “[a]t the end of the day, they have to make cuts. …. I think it's a balancing act. … there are limits to how much a country can get ... [even though] you have the best project in the world [and] the highest capacity.” Further, some countries are so insecure that one KI remarked, “we also feel that our current security depends on our capacity. So, the donor and the international agency is (sic) still important for our development as an LDC country” (TTW), while donors tend to “have their funds linked to specific deliverables which can be measured and where they can hold somebody accountable” (VS).

There was no need to examine coding sub-themes ‘unfair international rules’ and ‘international greed’ for any findings because the data contained therein were also contained under ‘directional actions and bureaucratic dominance’ that contributed to the three findings.

Main Coding Theme: Issues Within the UNCFM

Figure 6. 5 depicts the hierarchy of codes under coding theme, Issues Within the UNCFM.



Figure 6. 5: Hierarchy of Codes under Main Coding Theme, Issues Within the United Nations Climate Financial Mechanism

Source: nVivo QDAS

Six coding sub-themes emerged under this main coding theme: Programming and Projects with 26 DRs and 201 CRs; Governance with 28 DRs and 125 CRs; Financials with 29 DRs and 122 CRs; Access with 22 DRs and 46 CRs; Capacity Building with 14 DRs and 40 CRs; and Accreditation with 17 DRs and 40 CRs. Six key findings emerged from this Coding Category.

Sub Coding Theme: Programmes and Projects

Programmes and Projects comprised 26 DRs and 201 CRs. See Figure 6. 6.



Figure 6. 6: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Programmes and Projects

Source nVivo QDAS

Finding 4: *The decisions of the AF, GCF and the GEF on projects/programmes hardly reflect any evidence of the SIDS, as a special category, for receiving CCAF within the UNCFM. In fact, allocation of CCAF is skewed towards developing and least developing countries, widening the category of countries that are particularly vulnerable while implementation of projects/programmes are dominated by international financial agencies over regional and national ones.*

The AF uses the term programmes and projects interchangeably and it is not unusual to see statements such as "… the Adaptation Fund had programmed US $166.4 million for 25 projects or programmes in 25 countries". The terms also include climate change, vulnerability, and climate variability. However, it appears as though a programme is wider in latitude than projects**.** In the result, the AF defined projects/programmes thusly:

> A concrete adaptation project/programme is defined as a set of activities aimed at addressing the adverse impacts of and risks posed by climate change. The activities shall aim at producing visible and tangible results on the ground by reducing vulnerability and increasing the adaptive capacity of human and natural systems to respond to the impacts of climate change, including climate variability…. [P]rojects/programmes concern activities with a specific objective(s) and concrete outcome(s) and output(s) that are measurable, monitorable, and verifiable. An adaptation programme is a process, a plan, or an approach for addressing climate change impacts that is broader than the scope of an individual project (AFB 21- 2013).

Further, the allocation of CCAF via the AF to Parties to reduce their vulnerability includes, in addition to the SIDs and LDCs, allocations to developing countries with nuclear technology such as India and Pakistan (AFB 24- 2014); developing countries known to have strong economies, and described at times as 'more developing countries', such as Argentina and Chile (AFB 13- 2011); developing countries such as Egypt (AFB 16- 2011), Mexico (AFB 24-2-14), Nigeria (AFB 35-2020), South Africa (AFB 21-2013), Georgia, Turkmenistan and Iran (AFB 33-2019). See Figure 6. 7.



Figure 6. 7: Other Categories of Developing Countries that Receive CCAF via the AF

According to this allocation pattern, the category for countries that are vulnerable is very wide and perhaps beyond the expectations of the SIDS. Consequently, the funds in the AF are inadequate to meet this large demand and, as observed elsewhere in this research, normal demands for adaptation projects far outstripped available finance in the AF. A brief examination of this reality can be seen from a straight analysis of the anticipated USD 250 million that would be available at the end of 2012 (AFB 16-2011). If that amount were to be evenly allocated to the 44 SIDS, each would receive USD 5.6 million. If that were to be allocated to the 47 LDCs and the 44 SIDS, each would receive approximately USD 2.7 million for all its projects. When you consider adding the other developing countries that qualify for adaptation finance, it becomes clear how inadequate funds are. Any straight allocation would result in countries receiving mere thousands of US dollars to execute their adaptation projects that require multiple millions, if not billions.

There is no evidence, over the period 2010 to 2020, that the AF disbursed CCAF to the SIDS as a ‘special category’. Within the GCF portfolio, climate finance allocation is described in terms such as “[t]he 143 projects and programmes in the GCF portfolio will benefit 106 countries comprising 39 African countries, 35 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 25 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 7 countries in Eastern Europe” (GCF 26-2020). Caribbean SIDS are lumped into Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Pacific SIDS within the Asia-Pacific region. See Figure 6. 8.



Figure 6. 8: Green Climate Fund Climate Change Finance by Country/ Percentages, and by Regions 2020

Even though the GCF report indicated that its disbursement translates into:

> [A] funding distribution of 42 per cent (the largest portion) to the Africa region, followed by the Asia-Pacific region (36 per cent), Latin America and the Caribbean (17 per cent) and Eastern Europe (6 per cent). About 28 per cent of GCF funding has been committed to LDCs and 13 per cent to SIDS (GCF 26-2020).

However, there is no such separation shown in their own allocation report (GCF 5-COP 2016; 2020) and therefore it is extremely difficult to identify the above 13% of GCF funding to the SIDS.

The evidence shows disbursements by individual countries. Importantly, over a period of 11 years, no more than two Caribbean SIDS received approved projects under the AF, while at least seven projects were approved for India (AFB 24 -2014, 26 - 2015, 26 - 2016, 35 -2020) and four for South Africa (AFB 21-2013, 24 -2014). Figure 6. 9 depicts a nuclear developing country (India) receiving the most adaptation funding, and the SIDS receiving the least funding in approved AF Projects for the 2010 to 2020 years.

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

Figure 6. 9: Approved AF Projects (2010-2020)

Over the same period, international agencies dominated the awarding of projects. Close to 90% of all AF projects in 2010 were implemented by the UNDP, and the others by WFP (AFB 21-2010). Funding decisions in December 2011 reflected MIEs being awarded USD 63.8 million in contrast to NIEs, which stood at USD 9.9 million, a difference of USD 53 million (AFB 16-2011). Out of a total project allocation of USD 234.9 million, MIEs (UN Habitat, UNDP, IFAD, AfDB, UNESCO, WFP), accounted for USD 178.1 million worth of projects in the pipeline, representing 75% of the total funding (AFB 33-2019). Importantly, the CDB appeared once vying for a USD 9.8 million project in St Lucia.

The situation is no different within the GCF. As of June 2016, international accredited entities (UNDP, ACUMEN, KfW, IDB, ADB) accounted for USD161.8 million out of USD 168 million in project financing, representing 96%. In the area of readiness financing, international accredited entities represented 71% or USD 9.3 million in projects awarded. The CCCCC appeared once with a project for USD 300,000. Allocations are made mainly to countries and some regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean. There is no allocation to the SIDS, as a grouping (GCF 5- COP 2016). However, in the case of the GEF, there is a SIDS allocation within the LDCF reflected in two disaggregated projects valued at USD 12.6 million with USD 60.7 million co-financing out of a total amount of USD 129 million (GEF COP 26- 2020). That represents 9% of the total LDCF allocation. See Figure 6. 9.

Cumulatively, as of June 2020, Africa would have received USD 1.01 billion or 66.3% of LDCF funding, while the SIDS would have received USD 36.3 million or a mere 2.4% (GEF COP 26- 2020). See Figure 6. 10 which reflects a highly disproportionate cumulative adaptation funding in favour of Africa over the SIDS.



Figure 6. 10: Highly Disproportionate Cumulative Adaptation Funding

In terms of cumulative implementing agencies distribution, 40.6% or USD 747.4 million went to the UNDP; 13.7% to the FAO; 12.5% to the UNEP; 10.7% to the AfDB and the remainder split among other international agencies. There was no allocation reflected to the CDB (GEF COP 26- 2020). Figure 6. 11 reflects the dominance of international implementing entities.



Figure 6. 11: Dominance of International Implementing Entities

The GEF reports prior to year 2020 did not reflect the SIDS as a grouping whether it was under the LDCF or the SCCF. In fact, those reports referred to Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Global regions (GEF COP 23 - 2017, GEF COP 25 -2019, GEF COP 16 -2010, GEF COP 18- 2012, COP 19- 2013).

Coding Sub-Theme: Governance

Governance comprised 28 DRs and 125 CRs. See Figure 6. 12.



Figure 6. 12: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Governance

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 5*: *Notwithstanding attempts at balanced representation on the Boards of the UNCFM, their operation procedures are more akin to those of international financial institutions and not reflective of a climate finance mechanism based on the principle of CBDR and facilitative of the SIDS.

The challenges the SIDS face in receiving CCAF go beyond the negotiations at the COP. As KIs pointed out:

> “[Y]ou have to recognize that the same forces that operate in the international arena are the ones that operate in the COP, because remember, those financing mechanisms are governed by boards and the same countries that are on the World Bank and the OECD and whatever are also on the boards, right. So, the same pushback that we get as SIDS, you know, it happens on the negotiating floor, it will happen in the Boards as well (AS).

Additionally, the funds within the UNCFM have their own “key performance indicators in terms of the numbers, [such as] how many women benefit, how many men benefit, all of these things” (JC). That is not something that is easily achievable by the SIDS who by size “don't have those big numbers, which would look good in a review and how a fund is doing” (JC). Consequently, when one looks at the financial landscape one recognizes that “[within] the LDCs, African countries and the large Latin American countries, lots of resources go there” (JC). The principle of CBDR seems not to apply to the SIDS, and more alarmingly, their comfort in a dedicated fund such as the AF, albeit difficult, seems likely to change over time, as pointed out by one KI:

> What we've seen in recent times is this, the promotion of the view that the Green Climate Fund is going to become the, the only mechanism for financing climate change responses, and that so many of the other bilateral and multilateral funds that were set up would simply be phased out. And we've seen that beginning to happen (PC).

Even if there is consensus that the SIDS do require to adapt to climate change more than other nations, certainly they do not attract any serious attention in managing that process to the extent that an upper middle-income SIDS could not qualify to be host nation of the AF. The matter was put thusly:

> Following its decision at its seventh meeting to defer consideration of selecting a host country, the Board took an intersessional decision to select Germany as its host Country (decision B.7-8/1). The Chair congratulated Germany for being selected but he also warmly thanked the government of Barbados for their generous offer (AFB 8- 2009).

To the extent that the financial systems are no longer going to be separate is evidenced by the fact that the AF and the GCF are even considering "… funds on fund-to-fund arrangements, including joint financing and the decision-making process" (AFB 13 –2017, AFB 35-2020). Even though the GCF's Governing Instrument speaks about "channeling new, additional, predictable and adequate financial resources to developing countries to promote the paradigm shift" (GCF 5 COP 2016), in achieving low emissions pathways, their "fiduciary principles and standards were drawn up […] based on the standards of the GEF in addition to those of the Adaptation Fund […] and on best practices from most multilateral development banks" (GCF 4 COP 2015). The GEF's instrument also provides "it shall operate for the purpose of providing new and additional grant and concessional funding to meet the agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global environmental benefits" (GEF 13-COP 2007). Unlike the GCF, the GEF funds incremental costs that provide global benefits, and since the SIDS provide local benefits, the principle of CBDR is not evident. It is thus difficult to envisage, against this backdrop, how governance within the UNCFM favours the SIDS.

Coding Sub-Theme: Financials

Financials comprised 29 DRs and 122 CRs. See Figure 6. 13.



Figure 6. 13: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Financials

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 6: *The collapse of the CER market, as a mechanism for raising CCAF for the SIDS, revealed the vulnerability of market-based systems for raising finance and the importance of pledges and financing from private sources.*

Since the commencement of the CER monetization programme under an agreement between the COP and the CMP in May 2009, contributions from the CDM registry to the AF, under the 2% share of proceeds formula, were unpredictable. In fact, in 2010 the Trustee informed the AF Board that according to "the CER monetization programme […] [f]or the past five months, short-term daily CER prices had fluctuated considerably, driven by supply and demand issues", and at the same time also reported that "a donation agreement with Sweden (SEK 100 million) ha[d] been fully executed along with a contribution from Germany of EUR 10 million" (AFB 12-2010). The low contributions were also affected by an attempted "… theft of the CERs from the CDM registry" (AFB 12-2010). This resulted in low returns on investments since the:

> [T]rust fund's liquid balance was invested in a pool following a very conservative strategy. The trustee noted that the uncertainty of the Adaptation Fund's project and program disbursement timetable made liquidity a primary consideration for the investment portfolio (AFB 16 - 2011).

Recognising that CER prices would continue to fall, the Trustee reported that "… additional significant resources for the Adaptation Fund would be "unlikely by the end of 2012 […] if CER prices did not increase from their current levels" (AFB 19 - 2012). To avert such a crisis, the AFB decided to "[e]stablish a task force of Board members that works in conjunction with the secretariat on outreach, strategy, and other efforts to achieve the interim US $100 million fundraising target by the end of 2013" (AFB 19 - 2012). In fact, it appears that the Trustee was able to secure what appeared to be a preferential price for the CERs when one examines the text of the representative presenting the Trustee's report:

> CER sales in the first quarter of the year had focused on the remaining CERs derived from industrial gases, in accordance with Board guidance. The prevailing market price for them had approached zero in May, although the trustee had secured an average price of EUR 13 cents (AFB 21-2013).

It is also interesting to note that when one looks at the representation on the AFB, while there is a representative from the SIDS, that person was there to represent Latin America and the Caribbean (AFB 24- 2014). By this time, contributions from donations had outstripped those from the CER market evidenced by the Board stating "[a]t the end of June 2014, total revenue to the Adaptation Fund amounted to US$ 404.1 million, of which US$190.4 million was from CER sales, and US$213.7 million from contributions" (AFB 24 - 2014). The CER market was very weak. Thereafter, the AFB continued to receive most of its contributions from donations as a result of a weaking of the CER market (AFB 26- 2015; AFB 28 - 2016; AFB 33 - 2019). Notwithstanding, the negative experiences of CDM as a private CER market, the incoming Chair of the AFB expressed a keen interest in seeing a similar market under the Paris Agreement to be “[a]dopted and approved by the Parties and operationalized with the technical contribution by the Fund” (AFB 35 - 2020).

Coding Sub-Theme: Capacity Building

Capacity Building comprised 14 DRs and 40 CRs. See Figure 6. 14.



Figure 6. 14: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Capacity Building

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 7*: *Capacity building modules constructed by the agencies within the UNCFM are not institutional to the SIDS. Their impact is not levelized since they are designed and executed, at significant costs, specifically in support of projects and programmes funded by the donors.

Capacity building by agencies within the UNCFM is specifically aligned to projects and programmes, and not to the developing country Parties' development thrust. Benefits to country Parties, where relevant, are by-products of the capacity building process. In that context, the AFB noted that:

> [T]he process of accreditation had acted as a trigger for building internal capacity, and that one applicant had indicated that it had undergone a process of internal restructuring during the accreditation process, [while] all applicants had sought ways to address the issues of fraud and corruption to comply with the fiduciary standards and the associated capacity-building had been an additional benefit that had been instituted by the accreditation process (AFB 19- 2012).

The specific capacity building initiatives included, inviting "donors to support NIEs in the design and submission of quality project/programme proposals […] including a readiness program […] for submission to the Board within their existing work programmes" (AFB 19 -2013). However, the COP noted "that capacity-building is a country-driven and learning-by-doing process that responds to the specific needs and priorities of the countries […] [s]trengthening local, national and regional research institutions", in the process (COP 16 Part 3). The GCF followed a similar pathway as the AF, though more quantitatively, by approving out of a total of 141 countries, "readiness support […] for 49 countries to strengthen their NDAs and develop projects and programmes in line with national climate strategies and the GCF mandate" (GCF 5 - COP 2016).

The GEF also has played a key role in rolling out several different types of capacity building in support of donor funded projects. These included the National Dialogue Initiative which "provides a forum for consultations on global environmental management and national sustainable development issues in GEF recipient countries …[including] workshops … for GEF Focal Points" (GEF- COP 16 - 2010). Several GEF projects have built in capacity development such as National Communications, BURs and NAMAs, and stand-alone capacity development such as the TNAs (GEF -COP 17- 2011, GEF- COP18 – 2012). As pointed out by the GEF:

> Among the 67 climate change mitigation projects approved in FY 2012, 64 projects have included activity components on capacity building. The total GEF amount for these components is $111.0 million …[and] [a]ll 76 projects approved under the LDCF as of June 30, 2012, and 39 of the 41 projects approved under SCCF-A, include components or sub-components aimed at capacity building (GEF- COP18 – 2012).

By 2013, the GEF had introduced its cross-cutting capacity development (CCCD) programmatic framework. However, by 2015 "… [t]he total GEF funding towards supporting these capacity building activities for [the] reporting period amount[ed] to approximately $396.4 million" (GEF-COP 22 – 2016). Shortly thereafter, and in keeping with the Paris Agreement, "Parties requested the GEF to support the establishment and operation of CBIT as a priority reporting-related need, including through voluntary contributions during GEF-6 … [and] … GEF's climate change support for GEF-7…" (GEF-COP 22 – 2016). Even though the GEF indicated that CBIT funding will be prioritized for those countries that are in most need of capacity-building assistance for transparency related activities, "… in particular small island developing States (SIDS) and least developed countries …" (GEF-COP 22 – 2016), in the actual allocation breakdown, the SIDs are lost under Latin America and the Caribbean.

Coding Sub-Theme: Accreditation

Accreditation comprised 17 DRs and 40 CRs. See Figure 6.15.



Figure 6. 15: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Accreditation

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 8: *Accrediting entities successfully to the UNCFM is linked to country applicants meeting international fiduciary standards, including the ability to undertake and interact with a range of financial instruments such as grants, loans, equity and guarantees. This has resulted in long delays in becoming accredited, and a tendency for some developing country Parties to assign their projects to MIEs for implementation.*

Even though the AF has balanced representation from developed and developing countries, the 15 agencies that were invited to serve the Fund as MIEs included the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the IADB, the UNDP, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the UNESCO, WMO, the FAO and the WHO (AFB 8- 2009).

Moreover, the accreditation process can also be intrusive in the process of approving or rejecting an entity. The AF report puts is thusly in relation to the rejection of a country applicant:

> On the basis of the initial application the additional information received throughout the period of the review and the telephone discussion with representatives of the various ministries, the Panel has not been able to establish sufficient evidence that the Adaptation Fund's fiduciary standards are met by the NIE …[therefore] the Panel is not in a position to recommend to the AFB that the NIE be accredited (AFB 12- 2010).

There are also instances where, "[f]or many countries, it would seem easier to assign their national projects to an MIE rather than accredit an NIE, but gradually, the number of NIEs are increasing, and this trend could be expected to accelerate" (AFB 16 - 2011). Further, the fiduciary principles of the AF are rigorous to international standards and include "[f]inancial [i]ntegrity; [m]anaging and disbursing funds efficiently; [p]roduc[ing] forward-looking financial plans and budgets; [and] legal status to contract with the Fund and third parties" (AFB 21-2013). As a result of long delays and significant rejections the AFB reviewed the guidance for designated authorities in selecting an NIE and concluded it should be updated to emphasize that its use by the designated authorities would facilitate the accreditation process. However, according to the KIs, accreditation of a SIDS is a difficult process that impact their human capacities. In many instances, the GCF was mirroring the AF, which mirrors the development agencies, and when it comes to accreditation of Caribbean SIDS, there is very limited success. Importantly, to get the resources from the adaptation fund:

> [T]here's a preference of having what they call country ownership …. You can have a national entity that can become accredited, right? [I]n fact, the adaptation fund introduced, this country ownership, because of all the others … [meaning] the development agencies that you have to go through, which is another barrier…[and] they are not too many countries that have their national entity that is accredited to the fund … I know Antigua's accredited, and I believe Jamaica is accredited. I know Belize is making some strides, but those are the ones I know of within the CARICOM region. Now, they are in a better position because their national entity now goes directly to the fund … so, the countries who have been accredited to the Adaptation Fund are on a fast track if they desire to become accredited to the GCF because

> they would have already gone through that screening process to be accredited to the Adaptation Fund (JC).

Importantly also, the SIDS must increase their capacity and expand the number of accredited institutions "… within their own states and be able to accelerate access to the many opportunities that are developing within the GCF "[and] show a willingness …to have to five Cs accredited", and an eventual SIDS approach to accessing climate financing based on their special circumstances (PC).

Coding Sub-Theme: Access

Access comprised 22 DRs and 46 CRs. See Figure 6. 16.



Figure 6. 16: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Access

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 9*: *The decisions of the COP in relation to the UNCFM (GEF, GCF, AF,) because they are couched in weak non-directional language, are not geared to improve access to CCAF, and consequently, these entities operate as independent bodies.

The action words used by the COP that anchors its decisions relating to the UNCFM are not compelling or obligatory in any meaningful way. As pointed out by CFC, “if you notice, any decision that comes from the COP says, it invites the GCF to do so and so”. In support of CFC, the non-directional language consistently includes words and phrases, such as the COP “notes with concern the challenges in accessing financial resources for climate action in developing country Parties” (COP 23 Part 2), or, the COP “[n]otes the decision of GEF/C.50/074 … and invites the Global Environment Facility to further consider ways to improve its access modalities for developing country Parties … including small island developing States and the least developed countries…” (COP 23 Part 2). Moreover, decisions are made at the level of the boards of the entities within the UNCFM and the consistency of language used therein is clearly directional, as opposed to that of the COP. It is expressly thusly:

> The Board decided: (a) That the cumulative budget allocation for funding projects submitted by MIEs, should not exceed 50 per cent of the total funds available for funding decisions in the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund (AFB 12 - 2010). Having considered the recommendation of the Project and Programme Review Committee (PPRC), the Adaptation Fund Board (the Board) decided: (a) To approve the pilot for projects submitted through the window for enhanced direct access… (AFB 35 – 2020).

When it comes to the UNCFM responding to the COP’s non- directional decisions, their language also takes on a non-obligatory tone, expressed thusly:

> [The Board] noted convergence on the need to develop the Fund’s own access modalities …. [T]he Board will consider additional modalities that further enhance direct access, including through funding entities with a view to enhancing country ownership of projects and programmes (GCF 2-COP 2013).

Many KIs opined that the decision-making independence of the boards within the UNCFM poses significant challenges for the SIDS when it comes to access. Some remarks by KIs, in the context of the GCF, are noteworthy:

> [I]t also has a governance system that is not working. It is comprised of people who are negotiating, sitting on a board and they are accountable to nobody. So, they are blocking each other to the detriment of SIDS. So, we have board members sitting on it from developing countries that are not there in our best interests … [b]ut we also have people from the Asia Pacific,

> well it's more the Asia area, OPEC members, these big countries that use it, I believe, against SIDS. It's sort of like a payback because of the whole issue of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. And there's also the area of ego. If you are a negotiator in the Convention and you have not made enough headway there, you then go into the GCF board and try to continue that negotiation, which is wrong. And that is where I think we need to put that firewall (CFC).
> [S]adly, you find that, and this is a criticism more recently that came out of the G77 finance coordination, and [the] point of view is that the GCF seem to want to operate like a multilateral development bank (JC).

The conditionalities and interpretations attached to climate finance developed by the boards and usually noted by the COP hampers access to funds by SIDS. Even though the governing instrument of the GCF provides for a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, "… when you look at a board decision, and you look at how they calculate that balance … that balance would be determined on a grant equivalent basis" (JFC). Of course, a lot of adaptation financing is grant based and "… what that means is, it then looks like you're getting more adaptation finance than mitigation finance, because mitigation isn't grant based. But it is a fiction … [a]nd I've argued this on the board …" (JFC). That interpretation, unchallenged by the COP, results in SIDS accessing less CCAF, and because of this fiction "[d]eveloped countries have made the argument that adaptation finance is on balance, in fact, more than compensated for in the projects that have been issued because they use that fiction of the grant equivalency" (JFC). If the SIDS desire an uptake at the level of the AF and the GEF "… we have to organize ourselves nationally and regionally and put in the hard work that is required to go after this funding …" (AS) using the platforms of CCCCC and the CDB.

Main Coding Theme: Negotiation Metrics

Figure 6. 17 depicts hierarchy of codes under coding theme, Negotiation Metrics.



Figure 6. 17: Hierarchy of Codes under Main Coding Theme, Negotiation Metrics

Source: nVivo QDAS

Five Coding Themes emerged: All About Adaptation with 38 DRs and 108 CRs; Always About Mitigation with 28 DRs and 87 CRs; Developed Countries Must Pay with 13 DRs and 62 CRs; Responsibility with 23 DRs and 74 CRs; and SIDS' Platform with 40 DRs and 192 CRs.

Four key findings emerged from this Coding Category.

Coding Sub- Theme: All About Adaptation

All About Adaptation comprised 38 DRs and 108 CRs. See Figure 6. 18.



Figure 6. 18: Coding References by Direct Respondents, All About Adaptation

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 10**:** *Even though it is all about adaptation for the SIDS, and adaptation is its highest priority, some climate change impacts cannot be addressed through adaptation and therefore loss and damage actions are also critical. And while the SIDS seem to link their survival to supporting high mitigation actions, particularly by developed and developing countries, placing adaptation and loss and damage in different boxes is also a survival issue for SIDS, but at the same time a recognized challenge to the UNCFM, which tends to link them both, as adaptation.*

Although adaptation formed part of the UNFCCC, it was not emphasised enough in its first two decades and the SIDS were determined to do something about having to adapt due to “the irresponsibility of many other countries …not really being serious in their commitment to climate change (RTC). Accordingly:

> [W]hile the focus was on mitigation, the Caribbean recognised that adaptation was the area that we needed to go to because the emissions were so low … and we had to adapt to climate change …. [I]ndeed we did begin addressing climate adaptation very early, but only through a very small window, it was only during the negotiation process that countries recognized that we had to take on adaptation … that is why when we were going to negotiate a new agreement CARICOM states indicated … we had to have a segment in the Paris Agreement, dealing with adaptation, and they had to be another article dealing with loss and damage. And so … you will notice that it is in one of the objectives of the Paris Agreement. So, I would say indeed, adaptation has come in slowly. And when I now listen to various policymakers speaking about various climate impacts in their country, I hear them speaking about climate change. So, I think it has now gotten traction (CFC).

While the SIDS are united that developed country Parties must take the responsibility of mitigating more seriously “and recognize that where we are now, in the trajectory of emissions, it would not take a lot more to push us over the edge … [in fact] [s]ome of us are already at the tipping point” (OG), some SIDS do question whether they themselves should be also mitigating climate change. Further, “insisting that we … put forward nationally determined contributions [towards] a mitigation target … seems somewhat counterintuitive that we would be demanded to do that” (JFC). According to MG, our mitigation action is not necessarily “geared towards solving the global problem. Obviously … it is also important to our development … if we have inefficient energy … [to] move to a clean technology.” However, based on the current global emissions trajectory, we have to adapt and mitigate, and “strengthen within the SIDS … also on mitigation. But the larger portion currently is also on adaptation” (BD), knowing “there's not a lot we can do about it except to prepare and try to reduce the impacts and increase the rate at which we can recover and protect ourselves” (VS). While “pouring carbon into the environment at one end and trying to take it out at the other end …

makes no sense (DT)", the COP believes that "adaptation must be addressed with the same priority as mitigation" (COP 16 Part 2). On the other hand, the AOSIS was clear on the need for adaptation when it posited "the outside world deserves to know and understand the dangers and risks that are coming our way if we fail to limit warming to below 1.5° C (AOSIS 2015-SBI).

Loss and damage, resulting from permanent and irreversible damage due to inadequate reductions of GHGs, is now an important crucible whose position in the climate change financial architecture must be understood to mean separate financing for SIDS to restore permanent loss. Therefore, when "we ... look at the other end of the spectrum of adaptation [there] is loss of damage… [and] you will need finance for loss and damage" (HSC), and even though "we've made a very strict distinction between the two, it's obviously … part of a spectrum" (JFC). Indeed, the AOSIS commented that "[i]n light of the inadequate mitigation ambition, the need for a loss and damage mechanism is even more urgent" (AOSIS -2012), and it supports the position that "[l]oss and [d]amage must be a central and distinct element of the Paris package" (AOSIS 2015-Opening Statement). However, there is language that the COP and the GCF will not treat loss and damage as a distinct platform. In fact, loss and damage is subject to same issues affecting adaptation financing such as bureaucratic dominance, control, and capacity negatives. The COP and GCF have expressed it in the following manner:

> The COP at its twenty-fifth session … invites the GCF Board to continue providing financial resources for activities relevant to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in developing countries to the extent consistent with the existing investment, results framework and funding windows and structures of the Green Climate Fund (COP 25 PART 3, GCF 9 - COP 2020).
>
> [T]he Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme supports countries implementing loss and damage-related activities to improve enabling conditions at national level. This includes impact and vulnerability studies (to inform policy), data collection and analysis, development or amendment of policy and regulatory documents, capacity development of key institutions and strengthening social safety programmes (GCF 9 - COP 2020).

This clearly resembles the ‘one size fits all’ approach to CCAF by the UNCFM, with all its attended obstacles. Additionally, how do SIDS ‘avert and minimize’ permanent loss?

Coding Theme: All About Mitigation

Always About Mitigation comprised 28 DRs and 87 CRs. See Figure 6. 19.



Figure 6. 19: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Always About Mitigation

Source: nVivo QDAS

***Finding 11*:** *While the objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, and it was always about mitigation, which is now a shared vision even by the AOSIS, such emissions reduction should not be at the expense of clear adaptation for the SIDS, consequently the SIDS should ensure its language does not ultimately result in diminishing the historical responsibility of developed countries to provide CCAF.*

It was clear from the outset of the UNFCCC with the establishment of the GEF as the first operating entity of the UNCFM, that climate change actions were geared to make mitigation the top priority. As CFC explains:

> [F]or all the donors to the GEF … their money is for mitigation. How do we cut emissions of greenhouse gases for developing countries? How do we get the big emitters to cut down the emissions of greenhouse gases even among developed countries? So, it was only a very tiny fraction in the GEF that was for adaptation and CARICOM jumped on it (CFC).

As early as COP 13, the AR 4 of the IPCC (2007) posited that “delay in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve [the] shared long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention” (COP 13 Part 4). Further, even though the impacts of climate change affect a disproportionate number of the world’s nations and populations, the COP affirmed “that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet, and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties” (COP 17 Part 2), and at the same time reaffirmed that “a low-emission development strategy is central to sustainable development, and the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social development needs” (COP 17 Part 2), requiring in the process, that non-Annex 1 Parties, which include the SIDS, “submit their first biennial update report by December 2014” (COP 17 Part 2).

We note that at every step mitigation was promoted at the expense of adaptation by distinctly linking it to enabling adaptation by the SIDS rather than leaving them separate, in the context of CCAF. Further, the COP 24 decided that:

> [I]n-session workshops on long-term climate finance in 2019 and 2020 will focus on: (a) The effectiveness of climate finance, including the results and

> impacts of finance provided and mobilized; (b) The provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for their adaptation and mitigation actions in relation to holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2º C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ºC above pre-industrial levels (COP 24 Part 2).

Even though AOSIS' support for mitigation is to get the big emitters to reduce their emissions to give the SIDS a fighting chance to adapt, it is not without significance that the AOSIS, in adopting the 'shared vison', also spoke in non-obligatory language that tends to diminish historical responsibility. The AOSIS has put the matter thusly:

> A long-term global goal for emissions reduction is part of the shared vision. The Parties shall be guided by a shared vision to limit global average temperatures to well below 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. All Parties should contribute to the global effort to combat climate change on the basis of equity in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, which oblige developed country Parties to *take the lead* [emphasis mine] in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof (AOSIS 2010).

As pointed out by one KI, "don't forget, [that] we did not get the developed countries to agree to the words compensation and liability appearing in the Paris Agreement. I can't remember whether it was Article five …[b]ut those two words will not appear in there" (HSC).

Coding Sub-Theme: SIDS' Platform

SIDS' Platform comprised 40 DRs and 192 CRs. See Figure 6. 20.



Figure 6. 20: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Small Island Developing States' Platform

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 12: *The AOSIS, as part of the G77+China grouping, has become the principal negotiating voice for the SIDS within the UNCFM. However, there is a view that its singular focus on climate change and climate change finance matters, emphasising vulnerability, operates to the detriment of other corresponding development issues which, to many, is the result of an intended or unintended drowning out of the SIDS' voice within the complex G77+China grouping. Consequently, many questions arise as to whether the AOSIS is best placed to effectively negotiate on behalf of the SIDS.*

Though the SIDS are particularly vulnerable to climate change by nature of what they are, “low-lying ..., and in the case of Guyana, a low lying developing coastal state” (PC), and under the Paris Agreement, “[the] SIDS got to protect their special circumstances, which was important because [they] were being attacked from within” (HSC), it is also important to recognize that according to the Paris Agreement, vulnerability is an inclusive term and wider than being specific to the SIDS. This wide ambit for vulnerability was recognized by a KI who stated that:

> [W]henever we claim vulnerability, then you have the LDCs and the LLDCs saying, hey, you all are vulnerable, but, what about us? … you know, so there is always pushback … it [is] how they classify us, how we measure our development? So, it is GDP per capita and we're saying that it is not, that is not useful for countries that are so vulnerable, right? They have been, they have been pushing for alternative measures of development (AS).

Our vulnerability is not confined only to the impacts of climate change and, as serious an issue that climate change is, it is not the only development issue that the SIDS must contend with, “and in some ways, failing to address these other developmental issues makes us even more vulnerable to some of the impacts of climate change” (AC). Micro focusing on climate change blurs our attention from setting up other climate finance related institutions “to deal with, trade, to deal with other MEAs, to deal with sustainable development, governance, environmental governance in places like UNIDO, in Nairobi. We don't have representation there except for one, one or two SIDS” (TS).

Additionally, many KIs differ on the effectiveness of AOSIS to negotiate on behalf of the SIDS. While PB believes that the “the greater the negotiating bloc, … the better”, CFC submits that we need “to strengthen the infrastructure of AOSIS …to make sure that the information from capitals, which is where the adaptation is required, is feeding into the negotiating machinery”. As pointed out by MG, “climate change will become a mafia [laughter], and the focus really is on negotiations and not on adaptation … [and] we in SIDS have not really spent enough time developing our negotiating capability”.

Further, the negotiations strategies of the AOSIS are not always clear because there are too many nuances that surround AOSIS' positions. As pointed out by HSC:

> AOSIS doesn't have a negotiating strategy when it goes into these meetings. We have negotiating positions written down on paper … we don't go in there and say who's a friend? What is their red line? What do we have to trade for their red line …The Arabs are very good at doing it, they will hold everything else to ransom. Brazil is very good at waiting till the end, and …get up and say, no! Whereas AOSIS doesn't have that testicular fortitude. We have tended to be, wanted to be perceived as the ones who would facilitate an agreement.

It is therefore necessary to ensure that we have "strong representation at the highest level … [supported by] institutions such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center, to help the countries because each country has its own challenges in terms of its capacity" (JC). According to CRS "nothing happens in the UN without the G77+China. It's a very powerful group … of diverse countries and you don't have agreement on everything". However, notwithstanding differences among SIDS, within the G77+China "there is, there is a collective voice on the need for greater finance that's equitable [and] predictable" (PB). The SIDS should also consider carving out its niche within the G77+China, particularly because since "we come from the same historical place, we cannot be a full part of that because we have different … interests … [and so] China and India will tell you they didn't contribute to the emissions levels until the early 50s, 60s" (BD). There is support for the AOSIS to function as a separate group within, and even outside the G77+ China grouping:

> I believe that what has become evident in the Group of 77 and China … is the importance of subgroups … and the political importance of these subgroups. So, if you can have the … the AOSIS …working as a sub group, issuing its own arguments, I think to that extent they can better represent their views separate and apart. The G77+China would be less likely to support a total SIDS approach because it may conflict with the strategic positions of China, of Singapore or, you know, some of the others … even within Latin America. So, I think AOSIS, as a separate subgroup within the G77 + China, should be the best place to represent the interests of SIDS (PC).

Even the intra representativeness of the SIDS within the G77+China is challenged. This matter was expressed further:

> [F]rom my experience in the negotiations, the voice of the SIDS doesn't always come across through the G77. So, I think there's also a barrier in terms of when you speak in such a large grouping of countries, you lose that SIDS voice. I have personally had trouble being able to speak to SIDS in meetings, to speak with them directly to get their specific view. I'm told sometimes go talk to South Africa. They [South Africa] will represent our view, but they don't represent their view (LCA).

Consequently, the AOSIS can be a force within the UNFCC if it strategizes differently. The matter was put thusly:

> I think [if] it's made, you know, it's very clear that … AOSIS speak on behalf of every single member. If it is made clear that that is the reality and it is capable, then that's a sizable chunk of potentially influential countries of the grouping …. So, if AOSIS can come together, really, and can get past personality issues so that it negotiates as a grouping of like-minded, not as a loose sort of group of member states who all have different agendas. Then I think the potential for them to make a real impact is clear (GQB).

The negotiation strategies of the AOSIS must be adjusted to reflect a leading and not a following attitude into exclusions. Some suggestions to achieve this was put in the following manner:

> I think the group of G77 and China is a very difficult group for SIDS to work in. There are certainly negotiating tactics that are used against us … [a]nd those countries like China, India, Brazil, you know, they're the ones who get called into the small rooms. We get sidelined. [However]we, as a group, can push within G77 and China ...it has its role. We need to use that role very carefully…[and] in the adaptation group, because it tends to be more cohesive than the finance group… [the] AOSIS can actually drive that discussion (JFC).

Our negotiating tactics must change to reflect a more integrated approach across a wider spectrum of platforms that are integral to climate change solutions and our permanence and influence in the climate change negotiations. As keenly put by a KI:

> When we negotiate, are we mindful of how financing works? Do we follow the Basel consultations? Do we follow the OECD DAC consultations? Do we follow the G20 processes? Do we follow the World Bank processes? All

> of these things work in tandem with each other. And I find that we are so focused on climate that I think that we really do not, we really do not appreciate and understand the big picture (TS).

Coding Sub- Theme: Developed Countries Must Pay

Developed Countries Must Pay comprised 13 DRs and 62 CRs. See Figure 6. 21.



Figure 6. 21: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Developed Countries Must Pay

Source: nVivo QDAS

No findings emerged since the coded data are relevant to other coded themes such as financials, negotiations and the UNCFM.

Coding Sub-Theme: Responsibility

Responsibility 23 DRs and 74 CRs. See Figure 6. 22.



Figure 6. 22: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Responsibility

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 13**:** *The developed countries have not voluntarily accepted their historical responsibility for the negative impacts of climate change that their own economic development has caused. For them, its more about avoiding the consequences of sole responsibility and promoting shared responsibility, instead. In fact, they have shown a greater willingness to also place that burden on developing countries that are large emitters, and on the SIDS, through mechanisms such as NDCs. To that extent, the historical responsibility of developed nations went down and that of* *developing countries went up, leaving the SIDS as sitting ducks to the negative impacts of climate change from both developed and developing countries.*

The concept of historical responsibility is rooted in the UNFCCC. As pointed out by JFC, “I think in general, the principles that undergird the Convention [are] historical responsibility and equity of course”. Against strong pressures to lessen its importance through evolving actions by powerful Parties, JFC had this to say:

> I]n terms of climate finance, I see an imposition of a convenient interpretation of responsibility … with the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 and right into the Paris Agreement, [and] the switch to the bottom-up approach did in fact, I think, result in some way of reinterpreting or maybe even softening the expectations … from the developed countries. But in terms of the action that's expected, including on finance, there is no doubt that there's a push to ensure that others … contribute more to the climate response (JFC).

Historical responsibility is a fundamental concept and aligned to it is the whole notion of CBDR and to that extent “the developed countries… have a responsibility. I don't think you can escape that” (MG). The United States don't like that idea of historical responsibility at all, “so that's why the issue of loss and damage is a no go… they block anything that…will remotely, you know, signal a historical responsibility” (AS). As pointed out by LC, “[t]here's this saying that the truth is the truth, no matter who it offends …[i]t's a burden that they have to shoulder”. However, as a comprise to the language of historical responsibility, when you see in the Paris Agreement the phrase, “… the developed countries are to take the lead … that alludes to their historical responsibility” (HSC). On the other hand, admitting to historical responsibility has other economic and historical challenges for many developed countries in areas, such as reparations.

This matter was put thusly:

> I think historical responsibility is a minefield and has the potential to open up huge problems more broadly… I'm linking it directly to things like reparations, for example. I think there is a, there is a concern among some of the countries that, you know, once you've admitted historical responsibility, for one thing, you're opening up the, the floodgates for any number of other things. And I don't think anybody would say that, publicly

> … [a]nd, the Chinese also use the historical responsibility argument, which doesn't sit as well with me as it does with, say, the Caribbean SIDS (GQB).

There are many who believe that historical responsibility should be handled more skillfully for the SIDS to achieve its climate change finance objectives. "I think it's good to recognize it. But in practice, we are interested in moving forward", is how GM sees it. Historical responsibility is important but "being blatant about it might put you in the long path towards success… [and] personal responsibility in the sense that getting access to resources is one thing, what you do with it is another" (DC). Further, the limits to adaptation and loss and damage in terms of climate impacts "really push[es] the space of that legality with respect to countries that are responsible and who do you hold accountable. It's very, it's a very sensitive area" (DC). In fact, with the decision "we would all do something, but it's going to be on these nationally determined contributions, …the developed countries had their obligations come down and developing countries contributions went up to the same level" (CFC).

There is a thus a strong push to look at emissions now and determine how to address it, notwithstanding historical responsibility. In this context, MP has argued that "we know that some of the developing countries… are at a place now where they are fast surpassing many of us. So, you can say historical burden or not, I think, go with the facts, go with who are emitting." There is also a role for government to also take responsibility. As put by TS, "the burden must come back to governments, they must…push for a level playing field … [and since] companies only respond to consumption demands… all must work together, businesses, society and government" (TS). Likewise, there is a place for individual responsibility, and it should not be used as an excuse for the SIDS to appear as mendicants. Even, as it can be said that:

> "H] istorically, we didn't break it so we don't have to do anything about it. But if you push that logic to its final finality, no one owes you anything at the end of the day. It has always been part of this whole political economy of transfer of capacities [and] financing from develop to developing countries, right. And I can understand that they want to abdicate their responsibilities and everything else … [but] that shouldn't detract us from

> the fact that we should be able to gradually start to stand up on our own feet (SD).

Importantly, historical responsibility will “never go away. It's like slavery, you know, slavery will never be out of history…and that argument always has to be made…[and] what it is that the SIDS can argue for, that acts as a bridge between the two extremes” (WJN).

Main Coding Theme: Whole of Government Approach.

Figure 6. 23 depicts hierarchy of codes under coding theme, Whole of Government Approach.



Figure 6. 23: Hierarchy of Codes under Main Coding Theme, Whole of Government Approach

Source: nVivo QDAS

Four Coding Themes emerged: Capacity with 31 DRs and 163 CRs; Integrated Planning with 25 DRs and 149 CRs; Strategic Alignment with 23 DRs and 134 CRs; and Trust with 10 DRs and 21 CRs.

Three key findings emerged from this main coding theme.

Coding Sub-Theme: Capacity

Capacity comprised 31 DRs and 163 CRs. See Figure 6. 24.



Figure 6. 24: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Capacity

Source: nVivo QDAS

***Finding 14*:** *The challenges in building capacity among SIDS are internally and externally driven, and exist at national, subnational, and local levels. For capacity building to make a meaningful contribution to the development of SIDS, it must be sustainable, institutionally driven and underpinned by a recognition that by collectively sharing knowledge and data generated by both the SIDS and the developed world, the SIDS stand a better chance at accessing CCAF, and the developed world in combating climate change.*

Capacity exists at different levels with the SIDS. According to AS, "Barbados was like collecting data, like beach profiling … back in the 1980s, long before all of the international 'tra-la-la' on climate change". In Belize, "a study at two degrees [effect] on rice and on maize and on beans show[ed] that we could lose up to 20 percent of our crops" (CFC). We therefore need "to document our outcomes and our processes… [because]we don't have that kind of supporting literature and evidence to say, here's why we needed to do this and here's why, in future, we need to take this approach" (AC). We also need to articulate our achievements more, "[s]omebody has to make the case, that the one point five temperature change came from the Caribbean. It came from work that Professor Michael Taylor did in UWI Mona" (AS). We also must recognize that:

> [W]hen you build capacity, it is for sustainability, it is not only to react, or to respond to a specific thing … capacity building is an ongoing process ... because in order to retain the capacity that you have, you have to be able to build on it even more … so again, it comes back to systems thinking … [and] the research cannot only lie within the ambit of the work of the University researchers. I feel there are [other] key institutions that should be undertaking research (PB).

There is capacity, but not enough "[b]ecause the requirements are as many as the funding windows that are present … [and] we have a small pool" (BD), and not "a critical mass of individuals in the country, because it requires a lot of effort to be able to do, the doing" (JC), which "creates an additional challenge in the countries trying to get that direct access to funding" (BD). As pointed by DS, we need investment in human capital since "we are exporting a lot of our technical capacity to Canada [for example], and… [while] we're grateful for the support the Canadians are providing … don't forget the incredible human capital that Canada's benefitting from" (DS). Even though "the GEF has been around now for the last almost 30 years …if you can find 10 persons that can develop GEF projects, you will find a lot ... [but] I would [also] argue that we have not spent enough time in the region in developing that capacity" (MG).

> Contrastingly, there is a view that:
>
> [T]he way they [developed countries] even talk about capacity building [makes] you wonder if it, if it's like deliberate to have you in the state where you are never at the point where you basically can be classified as having what *they* [italics mine] consider capacity, because they're the ones benchmarking acceptability for financial flows to come directly to your national entities (JC).
>
> Further:
>
> [T]he international community has never allowed the smaller countries to really build their capacity. Let me give you an example … Guyana is one of the founding members of GGGI, [which] is an accredited agency of the Climate Fund. And GGGI operates out of Guyana as well. They have an office here. They have an individual here whom they brought in from Spain. He is the one who liaises with agencies. He is the one who then reports back to GGGI. He is the one who writes all of the project proposals. When he leaves, all of that, all of that institutional knowledge leaves with him (NS).

The practice of three- and four-day workshops cannot build capacity, "it goes beyond a project life" and requires continued partnership to enable "access to know how on concessional terms" (TS). It requires "recognition to be given to that traditional knowledge… [and equal] attention to nature-based solutions and to technology driven solutions" (PC). Capacity must be built in, to "aid in the in the sustainability [and] long term maintenance of the project" (JT). There are also "good regional organizations that are bringing some of this knowledge together, [and while] a lot of these global concepts are mainly for the process ...[capacity] still has to come from a process that is local" (MP). Therefore, the scientists in the SIDS must work towards becoming "co-authors or co lead authors or whatever they're called for the [IPCC] reports… [and] we learn better from each other than we will from some major economy or big country (JFC). The SIDS must also "develop the skills necessary to understand the financial mechanisms [of the UNCFM] and avoid going "into that victimhood role as if we are still colonized" (SD). The developed countries "have outrun us [and] they outthink us… [so], we fight back with data, we fight back with up-to-date information, we fight back with knowledge" (NS).

Coding Sub-Theme: Integrated Planning

Integrated Planning comprised 25 DRs and 149 CRs. See Figure 6. 25.



Figure 6. 25: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Integrated Planning

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 15: *The SIDS must move beyond prizing out development from contestations between ODA and CCAF and transition to a more longer-term political and economic integrated planning process, that obviates insularity and territoriality in the creation of a climate resilient society that aligns outcomes with existing development platforms such as the SDGs, CSME, SENDAI and the Paris Agreement, as appropriate.*

A good mixture of domestic and international policies can build a resilient economy, and we must be prepared to learn from others. As WJN points out, "Singapore is a classic example where a good judicious mix of domestic policies …[a]nd international associations and relations can build a modern country." In fact, when you run to donors for every crisis without seeking international solutions "you are putting yourself at the mercy of somebody else, you are corrupting your own domestic arrangements and you are in a sense re-enslaving your own self and your own people" (WJN). In the context of CARICOM, we need to "accept the concept of political integration …and even harmonized elections… [and] this experiment with virtual meetings… might open up a new doorway in terms of how we govern the CARICOM space" (TS). Importantly, decisions of CARICOM have standing, however "the translation of those decisions into action, this is where we've suffered [and] we really need to strengthen the Secretariat" (TS).

The SIDS should move to sectoral planning linked to development platforms, as opposed to the prevalence of country-to-country approach, in order to benefit from integrated outcomes that are scalable to the extent that a new development paradigm is necessary. As, KI, CRS points out:

> We have the Paris agreement. We have the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. We have the SENDAI framework on disaster management. So those are three main ones …. All of these are our international guide[lines] on how we should approach development, especially the SDGs. But have we actually taken those down to the national level, how many people, how many parliaments have debated the sustainable development goals and when they are considering their budgets, you know, [do they] see that linkage with that, you know, and this is where I'm talking about, this new development paradigm (CRS).

Integrated planning is necessary to avoid the environment being treated as an externality without value to the economic system. We need to bring climate and environmental matters into the economic analysis, because “if you treat the environment as an externality, obviously, you're not going to put a value in dollars and cents on a lot of the environmental goods that we have to deal with” (MG). Moreover, climate change matters are expected to be mainstreamed into discussions at “the table of the G20 meetings, the G7 meetings, the table of the IMF meetings, the World Bank meetings about the global economic situation … the European Union, the WTO […] there is not one place to have this conversation, but one global negotiation room” (MP). A collective effort to bring about an intergenerational vision for climate change cannot be short term, “it's a long-term thing that spans generations” (RTC). In fact, “because our economies are small, we simply don't have the critical mass of skills to pursue a bifurcated approach” (PC).

Further, at the national level, development of the SIDS should pursue “a holistic approach from the national perspective...[s]o it has to be enshrined in [our] policy. It has to be enshrined in [our] national planning” (JC). Further, disaggregated planning produces too many conflicts across entities within the SIDS:

> So, it becomes very territorial, if you understand what I am saying…basically they’re some ministries of environment in this region that have two or three people. So, if I tell them, look [to] the GCF and the GEF, everything is going through central finance you, you know, it's going to require a paradigm shift because they have gotten used to programming the money and that sort of thing (AS).

Coding Sub-Theme: Strategic Alignment

Strategic Alignment comprised 23 DRs and 134 CRs. See Figure 6. 26.



Figure 6. 26: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Strategic Alignment

Source: nVivo QDAS

***Finding 16**: The developed countries dominated neoliberal market system, based on high production and consumption patterns, is counterproductive to the development of the SIDS, given their demographics and lack of scale. Consequently, the SIDS need to look more within themselves and align their development processes and resources to better economic and development options, such as eco systems services and nature-based solutions, and use the power of their numbers as leverage to access national, organizational, and global channels to negotiate better outcomes.*

Careful alignment of the SIDS' international interests to critical global economic and political forces are essential to its survival within the current neo-liberal system dominated by the developed nations. The SIDS must strive to be omnipresent at the international level. Consequently, this matter was expressed in the following terms:

> [W]e have to be more political. I think that's why having a seat at the table in every space is so important, I think, that's where we have to use our relationships with the countries that make up the G20 from our region, be it Brazil or Argentina, I think that's why we have to reach out and get them to speak on our behalf, and therefore hemispheric fora is very important. The OAS is important, the Forum on Sustainable Development, the ACP grouping is important. We have to use whatever space to advance the arguments and that's the only way, to me, because they need us for their markets, we are their markets (TS).

To our disadvantage, many of the SIDS' "ministries of finance … across the region have never really looked at these environmental facilities [GEF and GCF] as credible and viable sources of financing for national development" (AS). Instead, more focus was placed on executing projects. However, a project may be important to the environment, "but is it important to our state and national goals? Is it important to food security? Is it of importance to job creation?" (AS). International SIDS alignment can provide the necessary scale that is not possible going it alone. As DC puts it, "we just haven't really been able to successfully set up the type of institutions that would allow us to get the most out of each other and to support each other better …[and] [t]hat was the whole essence of the single market and economy". The SIDS need to align its negotiation representation to suit the COP particularly since "it's all now about finance. It's about technology. We should be sending people from the Prime Minister's office [and] the Ministry of Finance to these negotiations [and explore] ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions" (HSC), "sufficiently recognizing our value [and not] approach[ing] the whole negotiation as if we're the ones begging for handouts from Europe" (DS).

Even though the SIDS are not homogenous, and one size does not fit all, when you are "twenty-four or so percent of the UN body…you have a greater chance of having an impact than if you are…operating individually" MG. We should also remember that "the AOSIS was negotiated into a formal body by the SIDS before the negotiations on the UNFCCC begun…[and] that never went to the G77+ China" (MG). Our political alignment should not be limited only to UN type organizations, since we can explore the “benefits of having been UK territories [which] makes us a part of the Commonwealth, which, I believe, is a great area for us to negotiate … with the UK and Canada, Australia and New Zealand... and South Africa and India” (CFC). As CRS urges “you've got to, you've got to talk until people are fed up listening to you and do something about it”.

Strategically the SIDS should consider aligning their needs to the global commons and using their power of numbers in the UN, push to have discussions on solutions such, as ‘climate forgiveness for debt forgiveness’. As put by PC “perhaps if we were to say strategically, listen …there is forgiveness on your part for causing climate change, and we want to exchange that for … debt forgiveness on our part and therefore we try to meet each other”. Concomitant to that alignment, the SIDS should push for a study, beyond anthropogenic reasoning, “to come up with new ways of accounting for the developed countries contribution to a changing climate, rather than just this measure of CO_2 emissions … [and the] negative impacts these developed countries are having on earth” (PC). One KI offered this poignant comment, “[w]e are spinning top in mud …. China is positioning itself with us, knowing of our influence, … [so] we must know our power [and]… the day that SIDS recognize their political capital… the game is going to change” (TS).

Coding Sub-Theme: Trust

Trust comprised 10 DRs and 21 CRs. See Figure 6. 27.



Figure 6. 27: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Trust

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding: *No finding arose here since the coded data under this sub-theme cut across other coded sub-themes such as access to finance and control.*

Coding Category: Changes Affecting Priorities

Question associated with this coding category: What changes may have occurred within the UNCFM, in particular the GEF and GCF, in determining priorities for CCAF to SIDS.

Main Coding Theme: Adaptation Finance Constraints.

Figure 6. 28 depicts hierarchy of codes under coding theme, afaptation finance constraints.



Figure 6. 28: Hierarchy of Codes under Main Coding Theme, Adaptation Finance Constraints

Source: nVivo QDAS

Five Coding Themes emerged: Co-financing with 19 DRs and 94 CRs; Public Finance Unlocking Private Finance with 31 DRs and 87 CRs; Mainstreaming Adaptation with 36 DRs and 125 CRs; More Mitigation Means Less Adaptation with 26 DRs and 53 CRs; and Grants versus Loans with 24 DRs and 46 CRs. See Five key findings emerged from this Coding Category.

Coding Sub-Theme: Mainstreaming Adaptation

Mainstreaming Adaptation comprised 36 DRs and 125 CRs. See Figure 6. 29.



Figure 6. 29: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Mainstreaming Adaptation

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 17: *There are diverse opinions, particularly among the SIDS, as to whether adaptation should be mainstreamed into development. Though most KIs tend to agree that it should, that agreement is largely conditional.*

An overwhelming majority of KIs agreed, though conditionally, to mainstreaming adaptation into development, but from different perspectives. Some key responses are shown below:

> [I]ntegration needs to be done based on the country needs not necessarily on the financing. So, it is what you call no regret action to ensure that fauna and flora, ecosystems services continue and also support for resilience … [and] [a]lthough the footprint from SIDS in the global emissions is limited, when measures are put in place through multilateral environmental agreements, it's applicable and it expands from one country to another and in the end, it's applicable for everyone. And to adjust later on, than early on, will be at a premium (BD).

> If you're going to mainstream it, it should be additional, right? These should be additional funds for adaptation because the priorities of countries depend on so many different things … you don't want to encourage small countries to, to be climatic offenders, right [but at] the same time development has a climatic dimension to it (DT).

> You know, I think this is a question of, you know, what are the consequences of the language and, if development means less funding for projects rather than development plus adaptation, or adaptation in development. This is a game … and the SIDS need to understand the game (GM).

Some KIs didn't see any difference between adaptation and development, as one remarked "I don't see it necessarily as there is something called adaptation development and there's something called general development, you know" (CRS). Another stated "adaptation is developmental because you are actually putting countries or helping to put countries on a firm footing […] [a]nd so by default, by helping them survive, you're helping them to develop" (GQB). "I believe mitigation becomes part of the whole adaptation discussion" is how DS saw it. Further, "[m]ainstreaming is a process, right, and it doesn't have an end product […] similarly […] adaptation is a process, and it doesn't have an end product". So, we never get to say "… that we have adapted to climate change [...] if ya understand wha [you understand what] I mean. (DCU). However, JFC remarked that mainstreaming adaptation into development is part of the UNFCCC process, so "I don't know that we'll get around it by insisting on trying to debunk the argument of mainstreaming adaptation, because that's now a part of the climate narrative. And mainstreaming adaptation into development is in the Paris agreement, part of the adaptation goal itself". As pointed out by LC:

> [W]e need to also go back to the definition of this word 'development' and determine what … do we mean when we say development, because in the board rooms of the GCF and the GEF … there is a lot of difficulty where a board member may say this is no longer adaptation, this is now development, and another board member may say this is not development, this is adaptation" (LC).

Moreover, climate finance should not be linked to development aid. According to PB, "the G77 and China are support[ing] the position that we do not want climate finance to be linked to development aid…[and] I see a solution based on [solving] the dilemma of climate finance itself as a definition, that will allow us to identify clear parameters and indicators". However, the appetite for broadening the whole concept of mainstreaming is another key feature coming out in the research, as MP points out, "when I was on the board of GCF, there were several discussions…where certain board members really wanted to distinguish and say what we are doing here is not development, it is climate! [chuckle] as if climate finance cannot deliver development. Of course, it can, and vice versa (MP). Mainstreaming is already occurring since our climate financing comes from our ODA budget…[and] [o]ur ODA budget was increased to address the demand of climate finance" (LCA). According to OG, the SIDS cannot have "development in this day and age that is not climate resilient, it is a recipe for disaster… [and] the challenge [has been] in the SIDS trying to… attain support for what is referred to as the rationale". Further, the issue of mainstreaming has always been a key development paradigm for actors within the UNCFM.

As early as 2007, the GEF considered mainstreaming adaptation into development as critical to its financial provision platform. This has continued to date and across various GEF platforms (GEF 13-2007; GEF 18-2012; GEF 23-2017).

Coding Sub-Theme: Co-financing

Co-financing comprised 19 DRs and 94 CRs. See Figure 6. 30.



Figure 6. 30: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Co-financing

Source: nVivo QDAS

***Finding 18**: Co-financing ratios, which apply to mitigation and adaptation projects, are financial sums greater than the project sums, and a part of the financial qualifications for project approvals. However, apart from being an integral part of the GEF and the GCF financing, they also pose a burden on the SIDS in meeting such ratios.*

Co-financing should not be a specific qualification for the SIDS in accessing CCAF that is delivered via projects. As put by JC, “I think it should be grants, […]

you are being placed back several steps, several times because, you know, a devastating hurricane passes by, [and] now you have to […] take a loan to address a situation that you really did not create in the first place."

Specified co-financing ratios are unfair burdens on SIDS, particularly since no project is executed in isolation of significant spending by host nation governments. One KI express it thusly:

> Much of the work would have been advanced by that time with government funding. And when they do provide the funding 10 years down the road, they expect to have co-financing from the government, to implement this project because the adaptation finance … is very specific ... it is only to implement the adaptation aspects of the project .... And so … if you're going to say that adaptation finance must go specifically to cover the adaptation costs ... then how is the project going to be implemented? Where is the funding going to come from, for M&E … for administration, for project management, for all the other costs that are associated with managing a project and implementing those very adaptation measures that are necessary. So, when you talk about funding specifically for adaptation measures, all of these other elements need to be taken into consideration. They are all a part; they all make up the whole the sum total of the project (JT).

Co-financing ratios opens opportunities for private capital, but crowds-out grants as the expected option for the SIDS, and crowds-in private sector financing as the preferred option within the UNCFM. The co-financing ratios of the GEF are even higher than that of the GCF and includes a wide variety of sources. The GEF has expressed this matter accordingly:

> Since its establishment in 1991, the GEF has been funding projects with CCM objectives in developing countries and countries with economies in transition (CEIT). As of June 30, 2020, the GEF has supported 1,008 projects on CCM with more than $6,689.7 million GEF funding, including Project Preparation Grants (PPGs) and Agency Fees, in over 166 countries. The GEF funding leveraged $57,193.7 million from a variety of sources, including GEF Agencies, national and local governments, multilateral and bilateral agencies, the private sector, and civil society organizations (GEF-COP 26- 2020).

It is important to note that adaptation was not spared co-financing ratios by the GEF. According to the GEF:

> The LDCF was designed to address the special needs of LDCs under the UNFCCC. From its inception to June 30, 2020, $1,505.9 million has been approved for 305 projects, programs, and EAs, including PPGs and Agency Fees, to meet this mandate, mobilizing an additional $6,529.4 million in co-financing, which is not required.
>
> And:
>
> From its inception to June 30, 2020, the SCCF has supported a total of 86 projects with $349.8 million in GEF funding and approximately $2,660.5 million in co-financing, which is not required (GEF- COP 26- 2020).

Curiously, the GEF indicated that though it did not need to raise co-financing under the LDCF and the SCCF, it still did. However, the GEF does not go on to say what was the effect of its actions on the SIDS.

Coding Sub- Theme: Grants Versus Loans

Grants versus Loans comprised 24 DRs and 46 CRs. See Figure 6. 31.



Figure 6. 31: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Grants versus Loans

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 19**:** *Even though there is an understanding amongst most SIDS that CCAF should be channelled through public sector grants mainly, the trajectory of the GEF is to transition from grant to non-grant financing for adaptation, which makes adapting to climate change impacts even more difficult, particularly, since the resources of SIDS were already reduced by these impacts, while the GCF has moved towards grant equivalency funding, which creates an illusion of increased adaptation funding.*

There is significant support for public grant-based financing. According to the AOSIS, "access by SIDS, especially to public, grant-based support for adaptation … is critical to effective [adaptation] implementation" (AOSIS 2015). At the COP 23 and 24 Parties were urged "to continue their efforts to channel a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation activities" (COP 23 Part 2; COP 24 Part 2). Further, at the COP 25, developed country Parties were urged to consider scaled up financial resources for "the least developed countries and small island developing states, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation" (COP 25 Part 2). However, notwithstanding these high-level assurances, the GCF and the GEF have begun to crowd out grant financing. The GEF has submitted that "by demonstrating and validating successful models for the use of non-grant instruments, the GEF is helping to catalyze large-scale changes that may also be useful for other international environmental finance mechanisms, such as the GCF" (GEF COP 23-2017) while "non-grant investments have unlocked early-stage financing in renewable energy and energy efficiency" (GEF COP 25- 2019).

The negative impacts on the SIDS are clear with the GEF indicating that its move to non-grant investments "attracted private sector participation in projects designed to deliver climate change benefits" (GEF COP 25- 2019), and in one case "providing $2 million and leveraging $52 million in co-financing" (GEF COP 23-2017), reflecting significantly high co-financing ratios that pushes CCAF more into the private financing domain. The operations of the GCF, on the other hand, tend to reflect that of a multilateral bank, particularly when it uses language such as, "[g]rant elements should be tailored to incremental cost or the risk premium required to make the investment viable, or to cover specific activities such as technical assistance" (GCF 2013).

Most KIs support a combination of grants and concessionary loans in various proportions. Interestingly, NS points out that "whilst it can be a combination of both loans and grants, it should be skewed towards grants", whereas RTC supports outright grants because "we're helping to protect them […] [and] they should be paying us". However, for the purposes of the SIDS grants should be sourced from private and public sources but repaid from public funding. According to JT:

> "[A] loan should be, should not even be on the table where adaptation finance is concerned … it can still be public private financing, however, the private aspect of it will be repa[id] … from the public coffers and not [by] the beneficiary countries … [and] in that [manner] private financing can support the public financing (JT).

The GCF is still providing grant financing but “the argument for a hundred percent grant is not an easy argument… [and] there's a push now for blended financing ... [T]here's always a price you got to pay; nothing is free when it comes to these institutions” (DG). Even though grants are preferred, “[s]ome entities would only give you a grant if you have an existing loan with them. [Though] I’m very mindful of climate justice, right… it must not feel like you just have money and there is no way to account for it” (DCU). However, public goods should attract concessionary financing and the issue of fiscal space should not arise. This matter was put thusly:

> If I clean up my environment, I'm doing everybody a favour, you know, this is the classic public good, so the resources, you know, should be concessionary and also the mere fact that everybody, you know, would benefit. The other thing is that … nobody has fiscal overcapacity… [a]nd so the idea that a country doesn't need, a small country doesn’t need fiscal support for an event, for an activity that benefits everyone … doesn't make sense (DT).

Grants are likely to decrease because the grant financing pot is not going to increase anytime soon. “[T]here is only a certain amount of money available. And, you know, that's not going to change… certainly not in the short term. In fact, it's likely to reduce in the short term” (GQB). For a particular developed country, it should be a combination of grants and loans and “adaptation for SIDS and LDCs is where most of those grants are delivered, [particularly since] adaptation does not have a revenue stream” (LCA).

Coding Sub- Theme: Public Finance Unlocking Private Finance

Public Financing Unlocking Private Finance comprised 31 DRs and 87 CRs. See Figure 6. 32.



Figure 6. 32: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Public Finance Unlocking Private Finance

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 20: *While the UNCFM talks about public finance unlocking private finance and the SIDS have acknowledged that public finance alone will not be able to meet the bulk of finance required to deal with climate change, the SIDS have also observed that crowding-in private finance locks out CCAF because private investors do not see a revenue stream from adaptation measures, and where public goods do not attract markets, governments have a responsibility to step in with financial resources and minimise doubts about availability.*

Governments will not be able "to reach the adaptation target on the public purse, and that is something that SIDS, in particular, I think, need to be very clear about" (OG), and therefore "[private finance] would be an additional window to look to…that would not, with the use of technology…necessarily…increase what you call…the transactional costs" (BD). Additionally, "investing in adaptation to mitigate the impacts of climate change would benefit the private sector [s]o I would not argue for just public finance" (PB), and since the "private sector entity is contributing to the problem, they should help solve it" (MG). Even though the public purse is not sufficient to meet the requirements for adaptation funding, the private sector also does not operate in a vacuum, but rather it "operates under the policies and practices and standards that are set by governments…[s]o I believe the onus is on the public sector…first on governments of big countries to put their money where their mouth is" (NS). However, it is important to recognize that it would be difficult to prioritize climate investments from the public purse due to "severe budget deficits in SIDS [and] high indebtedness" (VS). In any event, it is still quite "hard to attract private sector finance for adaptation" (HSC) because "it's hard to identify an adaptation project that has a revenue stream" (LCA). Therefore "when you have public goods for which you don't have any markets, then government should step in and basically do the public financing" (SD).

Coding Theme: More Mitigation Means Less Adaptation

More Mitigation Means Less Adaptation comprised 26 DRs and 53 CRs. See Figure 6. 33.



Figure 6. 33: Coding References by Direct Respondents, More Mitigation Means Less Adaptation

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 21: *The view held within the UNCFM that there is an inverse relationship between adaptation and mitigation which translates into more mitigation means less adaptation, and by extension reduced adaptation costs, does not reflect the reality of the SIDS. In fact, less adaptation would result in further loss and damage to the SIDS to which, in some instances, it is difficult to attach a monetary loss value. What the SIDS do require is more adaptation actions alongside mitigation actions on the part of the large emitters of GHGs.*

The COP has set out to make a case for mitigation over adaptation in no uncertain terms, notwithstanding other pro adaptation urgings. In this context, it advised thusly "… the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs" (COP 25 Part 2) and, "…[i]t is widely recognized that the overall costs and risks of climate change will far exceed the cost of action to mitigate climate change" (COP 25 Part 2). There is absolutely no doubt among the SIDS that adaptation is the most important climate action on their part and, though "[their] level of adaptation is going to be inversely proportional to the amount of mitigation that is required (CFC), it doesn't "matter how much mitigation we do, we're not going to make a difference" (AS). Further, "we are going to need adaptation for a long, long time to come" (DT). We certainly cannot mitigate at the rate needed, and since "every year the planet is getting hotter and hotter…in the meantime we have to adapt" (CRS).

Adaptation goes hand in hand with mitigation and are both considered necessary. According to DC, more mitigation meaning less adaptation is "a statement that lends itself for deep controversy…. We all want to see greater mitigation [and] there are limits to adaptation … and in some areas there are some irreversible damage". Interestingly, DS avoids seeing a distinction between adaptation and mitigation and posits that "at a global scale, the two come together, mitigation and adaptation…[and] as you get more and more granular…you get more and more distinction between what is mitigation and what is adaptation". While they are seen as "not contradictory [but] complementary, because the one point five to stay alive minimizes impact. It doesn't remove the impact and to deal with the impact, it will require adaptation (GQB). Accordingly, SD posits that "mitigation is adaptation because the driver of the whole thing…is the emission, so …by transforming your economies to a low carbon economy, or net zero emission, you're adapting to the impacts of climate change".

On the other hand, MP posits that "it's more like a political toast, a nice atmosphere speech, because the reality is that what has happened already will mean that we have to adapt a lot in many, many, many years to come, even if we stopped completely at this point". There are financial implications also. As pointed out by BD, "if you get that rhetoric that mitigation should be more emphasized, it would mean that most of the funding that's being created additionally, would…basically, it would remain in the North". Additionally, spending a lot on mitigation and maybe arguing that down the road these “measures are going to reduce the need for adaptational altogether [is possible]. But there are some who will argue that we've passed the tipping point already so…there is a need for us to adapt” (VS).

Figure 6. 34 depicts a hiearachy of codes under coding theme, Market-based Push.



Figure 6. 34: Hierarchy of Codes under Main Coding Theme, Market-based Push

Source: nVivo QDAS

Six Coding Themes emerged: Access Metrics with 52 DRs and 180 CRs; Burdensome Requirements with 22 DRs and 51 CRs; Financialization with 36 DRs and 96 CRs; Prioritization Metrics with 16 DRs and 74 CRs; Structural Dominance with 11 DRs and 27 CRs; Transfers with 27 DRs and 124 CRs.

Six key findings emerged from this Coding Category.

Coding Sub-Theme: Access Metrics

Access Metrics comprised 52 DRs and 180 CRs. See Figure 6. 35.



Figure 6. 35: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Access Metrics

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 22*: The challenges the SIDS face in accessing CCAF, whether through the modalities of the UNCFM, do not fall exclusively on the part of the UNCFM, but to a lesser extent on the SIDS as well. However, in their attempt to protect themselves from risks in making CCAF available, the mechanisms of the UNCFM, whether intentionally or unintentionally, act as barriers instead of enablers, while the complexity of access procedures and capacity constraints of the SIDS result in implementation deficits and absorptive capacity negatives.*

The entities of the UNCFM bemoan lack of access by the SIDS, but at the same time they create the conditions that make access by the SIDS more difficult. Throughout the history of the COPs, access was lamented to the extent that the AOSIS posited “[w]e still need simplified procedures to help SIDS and LDCs access their fair share of much needed resources” (AOSIS 2016 APA); “the LDCs and SIDS still face challenges in accessing all of their resources” (COP 20 Part 2); “[a]ccess to adaptation finance remains a challenge, particularly for small island developing states and the least developed countries” (COP 22 Part 2) and ; “developing countries face [challenges] in accessing financial, technology and capacity-building support” (COP 25 Part 2). Over the period of the UNCFM, impediments to access continued to be erected. Access is linked to “building internal capacity, internal restructuring …[and] ways to address the issues of fraud and corruption” (AFB 19-2012), [including] “fiduciary standards…for project management” (GCF 8 -COP 2019). Additionally, at COP 16, Parties to the UNFCCC included as prerequisites “… youth and persons with disability, gender equality and the effective participation of women and indigenous peoples…[and] respect for human rights” (COP 16 Part 2).

Many KIs lamented on the role of the UNCFM in limiting access by the SIDS to CCAF. As pointed out by CRS, “the EU is putting a big emphasis on human rights ... It means abolition of the death penalty… [and] recognising gay rights in your, in your law…. It's nothing to do with climate. But if you want financing for adaptation these things got to be met”. When one looks at the tax haven issue, “it's like looking at the smallest countries to punish them…[y]ou know, [if] you lose your correspondent banking relations, which private sector companies are going to and come invest…[s]o it's a lot of connected issues” (CRS). Access will also depend ultimately on what the vertical funds determine, and more specifically the Green Climate Fund and perhaps the multilateral development banks… as the climate action” (JFC). Even when that is given, to access the GCF “you need to have…a pipeline of projects and a work program at the national level” (SD). Importantly, “there was a pilot of a simplified approval procedure and the

GCF itself condemned its own procedure, saying basically we simplified paperwork, but we actually didn't simplify the process [laughter]" (JFC).

The SIDS themselves must shoulder some blame for not accessing CCAF. A critical factor was "our inability really to put the effort and…carry the fight to be able to access the financing" (DG), while "you also need to have a mechanism to implement… when you receive the funding [with] that limited pool of government staff" (BD). Further, complexities are deliberately built in by the UNCFM to limit access. Therefore, we "must be really familiar with the language, otherwise you would develop something that would not really meet the required benefits" (CK). The SIDS also suffer from absorptive capacity negatives, so "[w]e can't deploy [the funds] fast enough in the timelines" (JFC) for the project. Further, according to WJN, "accessing the little monies that were made available was more, was harder than climbing Mount Everest, to be quite honest".

Coding Sub-Theme: Transfers

Transfers comprised 27 DRs and 124 CRs. See Figure 6. 36.



Figure 6. 36: Number of Coding Sub-theme References by Direct Respondents, Transfers

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 23**:** *Most SIDS, recognizing that adaptation is a process and not a one off activity, prefer direct transfers into national budgets for CCAF with specific links to a programmatic profile therein, separate and apart from ODA, whereas developed countries, due mainly to past experiences suggesting that budgetary support did not reach the targeted activity, opt for transfers via projects and programmes for greater transparency and opportunities, with a possibility of direct transfers only on conditions of strong guarantees.*

Direct transfers are the preferred method for the SIDs though it comes with challenges and objective conditions. The SIDS have outlined their priorities based on their own national circumstances and "[w]hat then, ought to happen is, [for] the international community [to] give countries the money directly so [it] can be incorporated into [the SIDS] national budgets to treat with climate change" (NS). Though, direct transfers are fraught and difficult in terms of governance, "in my view until responsibility is given, responsibility will not be taken, and…given the urgency…responsibility is the way to go…with very clear criteria for how things will be measured" (GM). According to GQB, "we've done direct budget support …. I think we started to move away from direct budget support, more to projects …and the reason for that was [the] money…was not being used for the purposes in which it was meant to be used." There are also challenges with control and tracking of funds transferred into national budgets. As pointed out by MG, "if you make direct transfers to budgets, it is going to go into the consolidated fund [and] … then it might be lost. So, I really don't have a difficulty with… a separate fund to host the monies that are coming in". Even though concerns about monies not being used for purposes intended are real, "we don't have the economic base to generate the kind of taxes [needed]…therefore extra budgetary investments…should be supplementing the general budgets of the country" (VS).

Programmes and projects, as transfer vehicles for CCAF to SIDS, and preferred by the UNCFM, may provide more transparency, but doubts surround tangible successful outcomes. According to the GEF, it has "shifted to a more programmatic approach to adaptation" (GEF COP 16- 2010) [and] "NAPA implementation" (GEF COP 18-2012), while the COP urges that "projects and programmes…for mitigation and adaptation finance…[should] facilitate enhanced access." (COP 23 Part 2). However, there are national, international and financial opportunities from the practice of transfer of resources. The matter was put thusly:

> [A country driven] … programmatic approach ... depend[s] on your ability to identify your needs … in a very cohesive way… [and if] the IDB or the World Bank does a country report, that whole exercise gives the country a chance ... to say what are [their] priorities for the next three years or the next five years, and so on …. And it's clear that if you're a big country, you have to become a member of the IDB, so that you can get in on the procurement, right. So, in a way, that problem of the projects, project finance … is part of the larger problem of transfer of resources or the lack of transfer (DT).

Importantly, CCAF should "target projects that are within the budget as opposed to you wanting …to frame projects …which are outside of the framework of the budget that you are dealing with, [which] is an opportunity cost in economics" (WJN).

Coding Sub-Theme: Financialization

Financialization comprised 36 DRs and 96 CRs. See Figure 6. 37.



Figure 6. 37: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Financialization

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 24: *Market-based mechanisms are an integral part of the UNCFM, particularly for the AF which was meant to receive and provide funding mainly to the SIDS and the LDCs from the now collapsed CDM. Additionally, the UNCFM targeted private financing to meet public shortfalls resulting in a push towards non-grant financial instruments. Moreover, market-based mechanisms received a significant boost, and returned under the recent Paris Agreement, leaving doubts whether adaptation can be commodified and the extent to which the natural resources of some SIDS will play a central role.*

The market-based approach to CCAF is a construct of the UNCFM and not of the SIDS. The agreement by the AOSIS to support a market mechanism for CCAF, notwithstanding the failure of the CDM, is an expectation that “it [w]ould generate a share of proceeds for adaptation that is substantial, moving to a 5% share, from the 2% now in place under the Kyoto Protocol" (AOSIS 2016 – SBSTA), and conditioned by "not depending on a single source of revenue to fund either adaptation or mitigation activities" (AOSIS 2017- AF), while "ensuring that the use of market-based mechanisms do not erode the environmental integrity of Parties' NDCs, individually or in aggregate." (AOSIS 2017-SBSTA). However, many KIs expressed differences and doubts as to the viability of the market approach in raising CCAF for SIDS. According to AC, "economies of scale and other things would exclude us from being able to tap into the more market driven approach. While DS posits that "… we have to start marketing ourselves differently… [and explore] the willingness for tourists to pay some tax on carbon to the Caribbean countries." Additionally, CFC suggests "they probably are social inequalities in these developed countries that they have to address to be able to impose [a]carbon tax…[b]ut I still think that is the way that they will have to go to meet their objectives under the Paris Agreement." With regards to CARICOM SIDS, "I think that niche [market] should be found and it might not be…the commercial investors …but you might have a space for…community to community…small individual investors [and] diaspora" (BD). According to CRS "maybe we need to also look at what are our incentive regimes as well. [A]re we encouraging this kind of, you know, this kind of investment?"

Even though TS argues that a lot depends on how adaptation is packaged in terms of "fiscal policies…[with] things like rebates and things that can make the private investor attractive…and still be win-win on adaptation", LC points out that "market-based solutions…will benefit…the developed countries who have the mechanisms in place already and can reap greater benefits from it…[including] protectionism…policies". The ownership challenge with adaptation is also important to consider. "[W]hen we talk about adaptation, we are often talking about non privatized benefits…global public goods…so this idea that somebody could own something and earn money on investing in adaptation hasn't really been correct". However, according to MG, eco-system-based management with respect to adaptation "… can be monetarized… [a]nd you can link that to the tourist industry. It’s probably a bit more difficult than…a renewable energy project… [and so,] I don't share the view that adaptation is difficult and cannot be monetarized.” However, GM posits that “this is pointless…[and] I think, I think, you know, shoehorning an adaptation project into, into a business model is a non-starter…that's a complete waste of time”. According to PC, the markets tend not to respond to natural solutions:

> We’ve seen how the whole argument about avoiding deforestation not having any basis whatsoever for increased financing … the Amazon Fund has not received any, any contributions beyond the Norwegian contribution …[t]he appetite is in energy solutions, green energy solutions, that gives the developed countries an advantage (PC).

Whatever the market mechanism, adaptation must benefit. This matter was put in the following manner, “it's not the value in, it's the value out that becomes relevant to anyone who's investing in adaptation” (JFC).

Coding Sub-Theme: Prioritization Metrics

Prioritization Metrics comprised 16 DRs and 74 CRs. See Figure 6. 38.



Figure 6. 38: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Prioritization Metrics

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 25*: The metrics surrounding prioritization of CCAF for the SIDS do not reflect their realities, particularly their unique vulnerability due to climate change. In fact, what is being enforced by the UNCFM, as a benchmark for priority financing, are activities that provide measurements of emissions reductions and human beneficiaries in keeping with per capita GDP practice, emphasising in the process, alignments with environment and social policy safeguards, NDCs and the SDGs. However, the SIDS continue to argue, with some support from developed countries, that a vulnerability index is a much fairer means of assessing their eligibility for financing. In their view, good economic performance disqualifies them from concessionary financing and bad economic performance signals capacity constraints in meeting the UNCFM requirements for the same financial assistance.*

Objective measurements are a principal outcome for the UNCFM, notwithstanding that the SIDS, given their demographics and vulnerability, cannot be at scale. In particular, the GEF presents its report quantitatively with language such as: “delivery of 1.5 billion tCO2 eq in GHG emission”; “support to 26 LDCF and SCCF projects and programs”; “9,773,667 direct beneficiaries, of whom 4,996,941 are female”; “810,493 hectares of land under climate-resilient management”; “297 policies, plans, or development frameworks that mainstream climate resilience”; and “260,221 persons with enhanced capacity to identify climate risks and/or engage in adaptation measures, of whom 132,890 are female” (GEF-COP 26- 2020). The GCF is no different, as it observed that “[o]f the 43 projects and programmes approved, 29 involve LDCs, SIDS and African States. It is expected that the projects and programmes in the portfolio will abate 981 Mt CO2 eq of greenhouse gases and reach 218 million beneficiaries” (GCF 6- COP 2017). However, the vulnerability of the SIDS, unless addressed, diminishes the value using GDP as a benchmark measurement. Further, there seems to be a lot of in-house protection preferences. As DG puts it:

> I think there has been a constant push to really move away from just the measure of per capita GDP, which donors tend to focus on, but to now come up with other metrics to make the argument as to why SIDS and other vulnerable or countries should receive more concessionary financing. My experience is that … there's been the fear that if we were to employ this metric, then those countries that would have would have graduated from concessionary financing, and I'm talking now about the World Bank, some of those countries may easily come back and qualify for concessionary resources because of their high vulnerability.

Some SIDS formed the view that “being categorized as middle income, you know creates a problem…it is almost like being punished for good behaviour, you know, being penalized instead of being encouraged” (DT). A vulnerability index is intended to provide a fairer assessment of the needs of a SIDS, particularly since, “… you may have a higher income, but if your entire GDP can be wiped out in four or five hours when a hurricane passes over your country, then, you know, your vulnerability [is high]”, “[and obligations] should be independent of GDP” (VS). Importantly, the SIDS should be careful with a vulnerability index since it can be “very dangerous because it is a double-edged sword for a middle-income country” (HSC). The classification of the SIDS through the GDP measure is unfair and prejudicial to SIDS, and in some places “… the GDP per capita is skewed by a few very rich individuals…that's why we've pushed the DAC so hard on Antigua…on reverse graduation" (GQB).

Coding Sub-Theme: Burdensome Requirements

Burdensome Requirements and Accountability comprised 22 DRs and 51 CRs. See Figure 6. 39.



Figure 6. 39: Coding References by Direct Respondents, Burdensome Requirements and Accountability

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 26: *Even as the SIDS grapple with finding solutions towards accessing CCAF, the application requirements by the entities of the UNCFM, to enable access to financing and accountability are complicated, repetitive, expensive, and frustrating. Consequently, the SIDS are saying that it is difficult to credit progress seen in their countries to adaptation interventions given that accountability measures are in the hands of UNCFM, and perhaps it is time that the SIDS themselves establish their own mechanisms to hold the UNCFM accountable for the processes they use to determine successful project application and implementation.*

The mechanisms within the UNCFM that complicate and makes access to CCAF expensive, and frustrating are built into the system, which can be intrusive in nature. Importantly, just preparing an application form and putting everything in place "is so much work and in some instances quite expensive [and]…that in and of itself, acts as a deterrent … and sometimes they [SIDS] even have to seek funding to prepare themselves to apply for funds, which is interesting". There is no uniformity within the UNCFM surrounding the application process to access CCAF.

According to JC:

> Each of them comes with their own specific guidelines and templates, which can be quite onerous …[s]o even though there might be a willingness to go after it, you don't have the time … there's also the challenge as it relates to some of the mandatory requirements in terms of the conduit that you, that you have to use. And therein lies a second set of problems, because depending on who, you now have to partner with by lack of choice, you then have to deal with their requirements, their administrative and other bureaucratic requirements in order to get the support that you so badly need (JC).

If the finance is blended as is now being promoted within the UNCFM, the burden increases for the SIDS. As expressed by LCA, "I know funds like the GCF, they have quite a cumbersome application process and if a country "wants to apply for funding at the World Bank, they have a whole other list of requirements that country will need to fill". However, the bureaucracy and burdens are designed to ensure accountability. As LC points out, "there have been cases where funding has been transferred…[a]nd there was very little accountability for whatever reason…[and] this is some of the justification used for having…all these procedures…to access this funding". According to NS, the SIDS should set up their own accountability system to determine the level of success of projects and programmes executed, for example, "ensuring that there are mechanisms in place [to] treat with monies that countries are going to get…that allows for us to declare in a transparent way how monies are spent" (NS). As observed by DCU, "we can't account for a lot of the…climate investment or investment in adaptation and mitigation, primarily adaptation in the region…you know…monies have been invested, but not a lot of change has been observed". In fact, there are "a lot of structures that are not available within…the AOSIS to make sure that accountability is held in high regard" (JT). Additionally, the donor country can consider setting up a tracking system for their funds. According to SHC:

> [I]f you look at a direct transfer, is it not better to give the Ministry of Agriculture the USD 10 million to implement [an] adaptation project … [a]nd send somebody from your agency as a representative to be incorporated into the process to make sure that the money goes where it's supposed to go as a measure of accountability?

The process of getting the funds to the SIDS is a very arduous one. "The requirements include lots and lots of data, strong climate rationale and generally speaking, all kinds of fiscal measures that have to be put in place in order for the countries to get the funding in the first place" (VS).

Coding Sub-Theme: Structural Dominance

Structural Dominance comprised 11 DRs and 27 CRs. See Figure 6. 40.



Figure 6. 40: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Structural Dominance

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 27*: The requirements imposed on the SIDS in accessing CCAF allow the UNCFM to create structures that obscure opportunities for national agencies in the SIDS, and at the same time dominate structures of governance within them through linkages to NCs, BURs, NAPAs, NAMAs and MIEs, creating in the process, transparency and fiduciary overload. To combat this type of dominance, the SIDS have situated themselves within broader developing countries' frameworks, an action which unfortunately tends to dwarf their own voices within the international arena.*

Access to internal controls of country Parties in the process of accessing CCAF presents structural dominance concerns. The AFB, for example expressed in its report that an NIE had financial statements for the year 2009 "which had a positive opinion from the Auditor General…[and] there is an independent internal audit function that pre-audits the departmental expenditures and…these audits raised some control questions that need to be corrected by the applicant" (AFB 12-2010). Further, capacity constraints force the SIDS to rely, and depend on institutions of the developing country Parties to meet standards of "self-investigation and anticorruption measures" (AFB 12-2010). In fact, part of the accreditation process required "a statement from top management [within a country], communicating that entity's commitment to abide by the Adaptation Fund's environmental and social …and gender policy, which attracted objections and reservations" from many SIDS (AFB 12-2010).

The agencies invited to serve as MIEs include most IOs and MDBs, such as the World Bank, UNDP, WHO, UNEP, IDB, ASD and EBRD, but excludes the CDB. There is also clear fiduciary overload for the SIDS reflected in the contents of GEF projects, designed to:

> [B]uild on the extended network of practitioners through the GSP for NCs and BURs, … coordinate with existing transparency-related initiatives, such as the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT), the Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement, and the NDC Partnership … [and] collaboration with key work streams under the UNFCCC, including the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (GEF 23- 2017).

Compounding this fiduciary overload is the way in which the GEF restricts partnerships at the agency level within some SIDS. This matter was put thusly:

> CARICOM, via its institutions, has been trying, to start going out, like developing GEF projects for the region based directly on mandates that the member states give to us, right, but it's very hard to get into. So, like we usually have to find ourselves partnering with one of these agencies… you know, the UNDP has the market cornered, [the] UNEP, FAO, you know, and I feel … it's almost like, you know, like colonial days when they don't trust you to look after yourself (AS).

Further, DS poignantly stated that "the only way in which projects will be accepted is if the consultants and the procurement come from the country from which the funds are coming … [it is] a system which is rigged against us…[and] I don't believe it's going to change".

Coding Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties

Question associated with this coding category. To what extent, if any, does uncertainty surrounding key CCAF concepts contribute to the provision of CCAF to SIDS?

Figure 6.41 depicts a hierarchy of codes under, Accounting for Finance.



Figure 6. 41: Hierarchy of Codes under Main Coding Theme, Accounting for Climate Finance

Source: nVivo QDAS

Five Coding Themes emerged: Predictability with 30 DRs and 81 CRs; New and Additional with 37 DRs and 100 CRs; Availability with 16 DRs and 37 CRs; Finance Capture with 34 DRs and 73 CRs; Adequacy with 29 DRs and 62 CRs; and Availability with 21 DRs and 51 CRs.

Four key findings emerged from this Coding Category.

Coding Sub-Theme: New and Additional

New and Additional comprised 37 DRs and 100 CRs. See Figure 6. 42.



Figure 6. 42: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, New and Additional

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 28: *There is no new and additional finance. Climate finance comes from the overseas development assistance funding platform, since for many donors, climate finance is development finance.*

An overwhelming majority of KIs felt that funds provided for climate finance are not new and additional. As pointed out by AS, “[t]hey recycle money. So, it's not like every year they say, you know, this year we're going to, we're going to give more money to ODA. There are no additional funds going to ODA”. In fact, [t]he UK made some very ambitious announcements in terms of their contributions to the Green Climate Fund. “but that came a couple of weeks after they [the UK] cut ODA right, so, it's not, it's never new money (AS)”. Determining whether funding for climate change is new and additional can also be complicated if you look at it from a middle-income country perspective. Admitting that ODA is decreasing, one KI submitted that:

> Based on ODA, … certain SIDS countries…including Suriname, would be phased out … using the middle-income country definition. However, given these commitments towards SIDS, there is also dedicated funding being made available … so, one can make the case that, dependent on the mechanism, that's additional, [b]ecause, otherwise … SIDS would not be eligible (BD).

Some KIs posited that climate finance is “...disguised and polished […] it's almost like a new wine in an old bottle” (CK), and it is problematic because “different agencies are using different measurements in how they count what is provided” (CRS). As some KIs further remarked:

> [T]he literature is clear that, of the zero point seven percent (0.7%) of GDP that was … pledged or promised, to be development aid, the European Union as a grouping has not met that target … that in itself suggests that if they haven't met that threshold of zero point seven (0.7%) percent, there is the view that any, any resource that is allocated to the GCF, for example, cannot be new an additional (DG).

> It can’t be new and additional, if from the 70s you decide that you're going to have zero point seven percent of your GDP [that] you’re going to make available and you haven't reached that threshold. There's no new and additional finance … for me, it is still ODA … so they still count it as a percentage of their GDP (MG).

There is some sympathy for the argument that adaptation funding should be separate from development funding. As pointed out, some of it “is going to those non-ODA eligible countries who still need help…which come from existing funding lines…. It’s moving the deck chairs…isn't it? [A]nd you're deciding what is a higher priority” (GQB). According to one KI, once the climate finance is new and additional and governments subscribe to integrated planning, countries would be able to “mainstream adaptation efforts with the new and additional financing into their own national development plans, [which should] pass through their national budgets (NS).

However, to an extent it is new and additional with the advent of the GCF, here's how it was put:

> There's a perception that it's not new or additional, by some, but to some extent, when you look at what has been provided since the inception of the GCF, and the magnitude of the support financially, it is technically new and additional, [particularly] now the GCF is the only climate change finance mechanism … [and] we have not removed the funding from GEF, it doesn't take away ODA provided because there are developed countries with very strong partnerships with developing countries (OG).

According to SHC, "the US is the usual suspect when it comes to relabeling money…. [W]hen they're due to give you ten dollars for climate change financing, they will give you two or three and then…say we have already given you the seven through US AID". Other KIs point out that developed nations have not even met their USD 100 bn pledge, so whatever they are giving is going towards "… that old commitment, that existing commitment that they still haven't met (JC). However, the issue of separating adaptation finance from ODA is already part of the screening process at the GCF:

> I do agree that it should be separated because … when you go to the GCF with a proposal, when they screen it, they like to make the distinction that if it is not addressing climate challenges, then it's development and it cannot be supported …. If you're not able to make that distinction they classify it as a development project and then it will not be eligible for financing (JC).

By arguing for an adaptation finance goal, SIDS felt it "would be able to bring focus to finance…going directly to adaptation, making that case for new and additional, a lot more clear" (JFC). There is support for this position since funding for CCA comes from ODA:

> [I]f you look at GCF money and what is in the coffers, they are from countries such as, Denmark, it comes from the development aid budget. The development aid budget is what [is] sent to GCF, for GCF to be able to do climate finance together with money we're probably also sending to Asian Development Bank, which is labelled development (MP).

> [A]t least from [our] perspective … our climate financing comes from our ODA budget. Our ODA budget was increased to address the demand of climate finance and our new commitments, but it's channeled through our international assistance envelope, and it's channeled through there because that's the way we do it, because the nature of climate finance is development finance (LCA).

The fact that an overwhelming majority of KIs acknowledge that the financing provided is not new and additional is evidenced by calls from the GEF itself for funds pledged to it to be new and additional (GEF 13 -2007; GEF 16-2010; GEF 4 2015).

Coding Sub-Theme: Availability

Availability comprised 21 DRs and 51 CRs. See Figure 6. 43.



Figure 6. 43: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Availability

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 29: *Without a specific CCAF goal, availability will continue to be inadequate through market-based measures and voluntary contributions.*

A majority of KIs believe that the availability of CCAF is a problematic that requires a specific solution. There may well be an underestimating and misunderstanding of the challenges in mobilizing climate finance. As GM pointed out, “I think it's not so much a question of lack of, or insufficient funds. I think it's insufficient dialogue across society and throughout the economy of how this [climate change] impacts people (GM). Our capacity to mobilize public climate finance is likely to reduce in the short term, and that money would have to be found elsewhere, and more than likely it may have to be “concessional, you know…whether it's private finance or whether it's concessional multilateral bank finance” (GQB). Importantly, the ratio of adaptation finance to mitigation is very prejudicial to the SIDS. It was put thusly:

> If you look at the balance between mitigation and adaptation financing, if you agree with the numbers that OECD are putting out for climate finance, mitigation is getting three times more financing than adaptation. Adaptation is getting about 21 percent. Mitigation is getting about 74 percent … but also the fact that the trend in climate financing is towards loans rather than grants (HSC).

Even though climate finance has increased “[a]daptation finance is still lagging behind, a lot” (MP). There is a strong view that donors are suffering from fatigue. As remarked by WJN:

> [E]very time something comes up, we look towards our friends in the donor community … particularly the multilateral debt relief that was given in the case of the IMF, World Bank, [and] IDB …. [A]s a result many more middle income countries, began to ask the international community too for debt [w]rite-[o]ff ... and the European Union … had to find more resources for these countries that were joining …so monies that would have been targeted and earmarked for developing countries went to those second countries, as they were called, and so forth (WJN).

At the level of the AF, it was recognized that the modest level of resources was “… caused in part by low CER prices” (AFB 16-2011), and while the fund did not rely on ODA. “[I]t was hostage to the carbon markets”, since “[f]unding came through a tax on emission reductions, and not on the emissions themselves, which was a policy that needed reconsideration by the COP/CMP (AFB 19- 2012)”. As a result, the AFB recognized “[t]here was also a need for additional funding and a donor outreach strategy” (AFB 19- 2012). Additionally, the AF was unable to disburse funds to projects, which was put thusly:

> Currently, the demand for LDCF resources considerably exceeds the funds available for new approvals. As at June 30, 2017, resources available for new funding approvals amounted to $57.3 million; whereas funds amounting to $175.5 million were sought for 27 country-driven priority projects (GEF 23-2017).

> The SCCF’s effectiveness and efficiency has been seriously undermined by limited and unpredictable resources … the SCCF resources have been completely inadequate to meet demand, with contributions to the Fund effectively stalled since 2014 … [further] [t]he SCCF resource situation can be characterized as a vicious circle: no resources are available, so no proposals are developed, which can be interpreted by donors as limited interest or lack of demand, so donors do not provide resources (GEF 23-2017).

Reflecting on an LDC experience, CK remarked:

> I can point at this moment to one instance where we are developing our NAP, so far, that is one of the major financing scheme[s] that I could point to in terms of adaptation finance, even though there have been a couple of them. But they are not substantial in terms of many of the requirements for our country. So, we can only point at the moment to development of the NAP.

The political dimension of climate finance has also affected availability and adequacy. As pointed out by one KI:

> We would have seen globally an increase in the amount of funds available to countries. This is no different in small island states in general, and that's from the top. But we've also seen a sort of ebb and flow, because if you can recall, before this decade, NGOs and community-based organizations were central to the implementation of environmental initiatives. But then, government got involved … because climate finance is bigger money and, you know, the political clout that comes with, you know, shepherding in that type of investment is good, is good capital. And so, the politics, mixed with the finance have really steered funding in a way, not away, but have

> really taken control over the funding that is available to entities that work on the ground (DCU).

As OG points out "[an] India or Brazil…potentially dwarfs the needs of almost the entire Caribbean SIDS [and] we are not going to see the USD 100 bn in the GCF for any four-year cycle, however, that promise needs to be realized [through] the private sector" (OG). Further, the SIDS tend to be underrepresented in the budget meetings which "tend to be dominated by the donor countries, [additionally the] SIDS would have to ensure that they are contributing to increasing the number of their own representation within these meetings, because that's where the decisions are taken" (PC).

Coding Sub-Theme: Finance Capture

Finance Capture comprised 34 DRs and 73 CRs. See Figure 6.44.



Figure 6.44: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondent, Finance Capture

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 30: *The mobilization and identification of CCAF for SIDS, as captured by the SCF, is influenced by several predatory factors ranging from definitional and methodological issues, absence of disaggregated data, long term financial focus on mitigation, public and private finance for adaptation and mitigation, and a wide range and mixture of instruments and sources. Consequently, the SIDS assert that only promises of CCAF are being made and the developed countries should consider using the same alacrity exhibited in addressing the COVID-19-19 pandemic to address adaptation financing. After all, if the environment is not protected, more bouts of COVID-19-19 will descend on us.*

Mobilizing and identifying CCAF for the SIDS are conditioned by a multiple uncertainty. Against the backdrop of a new market mechanism under the PA and the experience of the SIDS with the CDM, the AOSIS has pointed out that "we have still not succeeded in addressing fundamental concerns, including crediting period length, the avoidance of double counting…[and], in the new Article 6, …governance, ongoing additionality and the need for corresponding adjustments" (AOSIS 2016-SBI). As also pointed out by the AOSIS:

> While the BA [biennial assessment] continues to suffer from shortcomings (which the SCF itself acknowledges) the reports have been useful to identify gaps and lessons learned on definitional and methodological issues for accounting and reporting of climate finance flows …. AOSIS recognizes that reporting on support received and needed will be critical … [and] the importance [… of] the SCF [… to] focus its efforts on how appropriate disaggregated data can be generated in an effort to better reflect how and where climate finance flows are distributed (AOSIS 2017 – SCF)

The mobilizing of the USD 100 bn per year by 2020 is to address the needs of developing countries, and not just the SIDS. Further, not all will go to the GCF. Accordingly, the COP posited that a "a significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should flow through the Green Climate Fund" (COP 16 Part 2). It is interesting to note that while the COP urges the SCF "to consider ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance, including private finance", at the same time it also called on developed country Parties to "to channel a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation activities" (COP 19Part 2). Further, the finance capture can become very confusing, and the meaning of adaptation appears to be stretched to other limits. Apart from the GCF only financing "agreed full and agreed incremental costs" (GCF 23 Part 2), the COP urged developed country Parties to "scale up the mobilization of climate finance, including through greater engagement of the private sector, to increase finance for adaptation" (COP24 Part 2). The COP also pointed out that:

> There is a lack of systematic collection of data on climate-related private finance flows globally, due to difficulties in identifying climate-related finance, restrictions based on confidentiality, and conceptual and accounting issues … [while] there are no internationally agreed methods for reconciling financial support provided against support received. Also, MDBs and IDFCs do not have a standard procedure to review their climate finance data. The major source of uncertainty regarding flows to developing countries relates to the amount of private climate finance provided (COP 22 Part 2).

There is a lot of doubt on the part of the SIDS as to whether the UNCFM mobilized the USD 100 bn per year by 2020, as pledged. According to CFC, "there is a big debate on whether that has been provided as yet…[however], developed countries would say we are either there or very close to it" (CFC). Contrastingly, developing countries are saying, "sorry, we're not seeing that" (CFC). Even though the SIDS made good headway in securing a decision that 50% of the funding in the GCF should go to adaptation, "that obviously is not enough, because when you look at the amount of money… [and the cost of] the NDCs for the Caribbean, there's not enough funding in the GCF" (CFC). However, bilaterally the financial situation might be different, as CRS points out, "[m]aybe when you go down to ask them individually, how is your relationship with the UK on climate finance, or with the EU, you might have different stories".

Coding Sub-Theme: Adequacy

Adequacy comprised 29 DRs and 62 CRs. See Figure 6.45.



Figure 6.45: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Adequacy

Source: nVivo QDAS

Finding 31: *While there is consensus that more climate finance is available now than before, the general view, among the SIDS, is that the amount available to them is inadequate to meet their adaptation needs, particularly evident from the UNCFM reports indicating that projects requests far outstrip funding availability. Consequently, the SIDS are of the view that because adaptation doesn't benefit the developed countries financially, they prefer to link scaling up CCAF to* *mainstreaming climate actions into national budgets, rather than to the special circumstances of SIDS.*

The COP found that though funds provided to the LDCF and SCCF have substantially increased "the main obstacle to adaptation programming under the SCCF remains the lack of adequate and predictable resources…as [t]he needs … have also increased during that period and there remains a backlog of fundable projects" (COP 20 Part 2). Many SIDS acknowledged that CCF has increased, however "adaptation finance has not really been really forthcoming, as expected" (CK). AS JT points out, "we're pretty much putting a band-aid on a broken arm… trying to find the funds to do a little bit here and a little bit there…meanwhile, we are waiting for major financing from the Adaptation Fund or GCF or GEF to be able to do the work". As further pointed out by DG, "I don't think we are accessing the financing at the scale that we really need…[and] the funds that we are currently accessing doesn't really scratch the surface". At the same time, the GEF has linked scaling up to mainstreaming. Accordingly, it submits that "[t]he key constraint to actual scaling-up was the post-implementation difficulty in securing sufficient resources and/or mainstreaming the work within, for example, national budgets" (GEF COP 23- 2017). However, developed country Parties in many instances appear to have a template of fixed amounts that they work from, irrespective of the particular SIDS they are dealing with. This matter was put thusly:

> What I have noticed also is sometimes the amount available is a fixed amount. For example, if we look at the TNA project that helps countries looking at both mitigation and adaptation needs. [For] Guyana, which is bigger with a larger population than, say, Dominica … it's a fixed amount for these two countries. So, adequacy can be questioned in that sense, …[o]ne dollar might go further in Dominica than in Trinidad and Tobago, for example. However, the funding available for such projects is identical for the countries (LC).

The mobilizing of the USD 100 bn per year by 2020, or its lack thereof, is a benchmark for many SIDS in assessing the adequacy of CCAF. According to PB, "it's just like a dream", while CRS posits that "the one hundred billion dollars basically is the bedrock of climate finance", and NS points out that "even the hundred billion dollars is not adequate and the fact that we have not even been able to meet that [amount] tells me then that we are in some serious trouble". Financing for the SIDS has always been inadequate, and it forms part of a wider deliberate plan to make the availability of CCAF, difficult.

Accordingly, the following view was expressed:

> "[F]inancing tends not to accommodate the special circumstances of SIDS. I believe it has to do with their strategic, what's strategically important to the … provider countries … and adaptation really doesn't benefit them in any way. [A]s a matter of fact, they have, they have actually tied adaptational most often to ODA. It tends to be sector driven, whether it has to do with agriculture, whether it has to do with energy, or some ecosystem-based intervention. It tended to be tied to other kinds of funding, not necessarily new funding, but funding already committed through other multilateral processes (PC).

In the context of the amount of CCAF to deal with post disaster reconstruction and resilience building, it was pointed out by VS that, "it's not small amounts of money, you know, a little hundred thousand here, or a little one point two or point three million there, that is really not going to do what needs to be done […] and I don't know that the existing financing mechanisms may, either".

Coding Theme: Predictability

Predictability comprised 30 DRs and 81 CRs. See Figure 6.46.



Figure 6.46: Number of Coding References by Direct Respondents, Predictability

Source: nVivo QDAS

No reasonable finding could be generated due to non-corresponding data. Predictability is to be inferred from availability, adequacy, and finance capture.

A summary of the thirty-one findings is displayed in Table K. 1.

6.1 Summary of Findings

This chapter presented thirty-one Findings that arose from the data analysis under their seven respective main coding themes: Control (3); Issues Within the UNCFM (6); Negotiation Metrics (4); Whole of Government Approach (3); Adaptation Finance Constraints (5); Market-based Push (6); and Accounting for

Climate Finance (4). They were supported by coding and sub-coding thematic charts depicting the number of DRs and CRs respectively. Additionally, each finding was supported by direct quotes from the data coded for the KIs and documents, which provides evidence of the research integrity and trustworthiness.

In the next chapter the findings continue to take centre stage. The researcher will conduct an analysis of the findings which will then provide the tools to conduct an interpretation and synthesis.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

7.1 Outline of the Analysis and Interpretation of Findings

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that, through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS, severally and individually, will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC and the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and the GCF.

In this chapter, all the related parts came together to produce an analysis, interpretation and synthesis of the findings identified in the previous chapter. As observed by Bloomberg and Volpe (2016), that the process of qualitative data analysis and synthesis is iterative, involving reflections about the findings, and the asking of analytical questions. In the previous chapter, the researcher stood as objective observers, in order to identify the findings as they occurred. However, in this chapter the researcher moved from the objective to the subjective.

The analytical multi method (ology) used for interpreting the findings are Foucauldian influenced discourse analysis and genealogy; a Ruggie inspired constructivism; and cross-case analysis, which are in keeping with a post-structural methodology. The methods were applied to the coded discourse to generate the analysis, and the outcomes therefrom were used to conduct the interpretation and synthesis of the findings. Though several genealogies can be conducted in this research and multiple emergent norms identifiable, CCAF was treated as the key emerged norm relevant to the research questions and conducted a genealogy of it over a 30yr period. The outcome of that genealogy trace, contributed to the interpretation and synthesis of the findings. Importantly, constructivism, as an epistemology, ontology, and a methodology provided us with the only single IR approach that comprised the three essential elements of academic research which made its use in this research very pivotal. As all these parts were brought together, the themes, patterns, understandings, and concepts that emerged were considered in light of previous research; memos reflecting the researcher’s considerations as the research progressed; the research literature; and the wider discussion on CCAF, for confirmation and or disconfirmation, contradictions, similarities and or differences, as necessary. The researcher emphasise that mental rigor underpinned the analysis, interpretation and synthesis of the findings. Further, all ambiguities and inconsistencies were highlighted, which added to research credibility and continuous audit trail.

The analysis and interpretation are presented through thick description of the phenomena as opposed to hypothetical outcomes and without any pronouncement of generalizable outcomes. No objective causal claims were made. An analysis and interpretation of research findings matrix is shown at Table 7.1, and an analysis and interpretation of research findings process is shown at Table 7.2. Together they to provide a visual picture of the multiple methods, applications, and the analytical flow for the analysis, interpretation and synthesis of the findings.

Table 7.1: Analysis and Interpretation of Research Findings Matrix*

Analytic Category:	**Concepts Through Interactions** **Linked to:**
Linked to Question 1	*What relationships may have emerged during interactions among Parties within the UNCFM, in particular the COP, AF, GEF and GCF, surrounding the provision of CCAF to SIDS?*
Research Findings	Presentation of research Findings under this category as a Narrative
Genealogy **of CCAF as a norm**	Findings and Supporting Data/ CCAF Discourse a. Ruptures and disjunctures of discourse over research period b. Structural inequalities based on meanings c. Norm formation/contestation.
Frame	Findings and Supporting Data a. Creation of structures of dominance b. Construction of a dependency syndrome
Discourse Analysis	Findings and Supporting Data a. discursive construction b. the subjective self c. power as producing reality d. dominant discourse e. discourse and institutions
Constructivism	Findings and Supporting Data a. Interest Formation; Identity Formation b. Norm formation/contestation. c. Mutual constitution
Cross Case	Findings and Supporting Data a. Cross case classification matrices
Synthesis	a. How do the findings relate to the literature and theory. b. How do the findings relate to prior assumptions? c. To what extent findings from data collection methods can be interpreted the same way.
Interpretation	a. Search for patterns and themes. b. Going beyond the findings, asking ‘why? why not” c. Making connection with findings in the literature. d. Explaining contradictions, confirmations. e. Search for alternative patterns, themes and competing interpretations. f. Answering the research questions.

* A similar matrix was done for each of the remaining three analytic categories.

Table 7.2: Matrix of Methods: Collection, Coding and Analysis and Interpretation of Findings

Main Research Question: What characteristics, if any, contribute to the perception that actions of parties within the UNCFM, in particular the COP, AF, GEF and GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional.					
		Time Horizon 2007-2020			
Research Sites	**Research Data**	**Collection Methods**	**Coding Methods**	**Data Analysis Method**	**Findings Analysis Methods**
COP/ UNFCCC website	Decisions/ Speeches	Document Review	Concept/ Thematic	Deductive/ Inductive (Data Summary Tables)	Discourse/Genealogy Constructivism Cross Case
AOSIS UNFCCC website	Speeches/ Submissions	Document Review	Concept/ Thematic	Data Summary Tables/ Mental Rigor	Discourse/ Genealogy Constructivism Cross Case
GEF website	Reports/ Decisions	Document Review	Concept/ Thematic	Data Summary Tables/ Mental Rigor	Discourse/ Genealogy Constructivism Cross Case
GCF website	Reports/ Decisions	Document Review	Concept/ Thematic	Data Summary Tables/ Mental Rigor	Discourse/ Genealogy Constructivism Cross Case
AF website	Reports/ Decisions	Document Review	Concept/ Thematic	Data Summary Tables/ Mental Rigor	Discourse/ Genealogy Constructivism Cross Case
KIs at Multiple Sites	Interview Transcripts	Semi-Structured	Concept/ Thematic	Data Summary Tables/ Mental Rigor	Discourse/ Constructivism Cross Case

7.2 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a research tool that looks at the ways text and talk are used to assert power. The linguistic turn to analysis in IR can be traced to the works of Wittgenstein (1922) in identifying the use of language and symbolic systems as a social science focus. Language is never too clear even though it influences our society, its power structures, and constructs our world. As pointed out by Wittgenstein (1922) "… [i]n the language of everyday life it very often happens that the same word signifies in two different ways" (3.323), where the "totality of propositions is the language (4.001**)** [and] […] [l]anguage disguises the thought" (4.002**).** Onuf (1998) would later contribute to these language thoughts by expressing that through "social relations [we] *make* or *construct* people [emphasis original]" (59). Wittgenstein's use of language, words, and symbols as descriptors of the world was later challenged as limited because many words or speech acts go beyond describing the world. They are actually "doing" *and* describing the world; and as Onuf observed "by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other … we go about making the world what it is" (Onuf 1998, 59).

Conversation analysis, influenced by Harvey Sacks[82], was a second important stage in the march towards discourse analysis. In the context, Gibbs (2015)[83] referred to Sacks' work as looking in detail at real speech and dialogues among persons and what they did to keep the conversation going. Accordingly, discourse can be characterised as series of conversations, texts, or a shared way of thinking about a particular topic, generating in the process social interactions which are analysed as activities. In his view, the different types of discourse schools

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[82] For a detailed understanding of Conversation Analysis, refer to Harvey Sacks, Lectures on Conversation, Edited by Gail Jefferson with an introduction by Emanuel A. Schegloff, Blackwell 1992.

[83] Graham R Gibbs, "Discourse Analysis, Part 1: Discursive Psychology" (Lecture, University of Huddersfield, May, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5rEy1lbvlw

include narrative analysis (Labov 1997; Chafe 1994); text linguistics (Halliday 2014; Van Dijk 1993); critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2013; Foucault 1976; Wodak 1999); discursive psychology and social psychology (Potter 1987; Wetherell, 1998) and semiotics (Foucault 1976; Eco 1986; Lotman, 2003). Interestingly, discursive psychologists reject cognitivism in psychology, arguing instead, like Onuf (1998) that language is performative rather than simply being descriptive[84]. Factual talk is designed to convince the listener by demonstrating a stake and or interest in the matter through bias or an outright independence of it altogether using corroborating evidence[85]. Therefore, bias and corroboration are critical elements in language performance acts.

7.2.1 Foucauldian Approach

A survey of Foucault's major works[86] do not provide any clear definition of discourse, even though it is one of two major planks [87] of his writings. Perhaps it was up to Hall to formulate one, who opined that by 'discourse' Foucault meant:

> [A] group of [several] statements which provided a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about - a particular topic … working together to form what … Foucault (1976-84) calls a "**discursive formation**."[emphasis original] … [where] anyone statement implies a relation to all the others … Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language [which] … is itself produced by a practice: "discursive practice" - the practice of producing meaning … [and] … since all social

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[84] For more understanding of language as performance actions, refer to Potter, Jonathan, and Margaret Wetherell. *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour*. Sage, 1987.

[85] Potter, Jonathan. *Representing reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction*. Sage, 1996., provides detailed discussions on stake, interest and factual talk.

[86] Madness and Civilisation (1961); The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972); The Birth of the Clinic (1973); Discipline and Punish (1975); and three volumes of The History of Sexuality: Volume One, The Will To Knowledge (1976); Volume Two: The Use of Pleasure (1984); and Volume Three: The Care of the Self (1984).

[87] The two major planks of Foucault's writing are 'archaeology' and 'genealogy'. For a full discussion, see Mark Olsen. (2014). "Discourse, Complexity, Normativity: Tracing the elaboration of Foucault's materialist concept of discourse." *Open Review of Education Research*, (1).

> practices, entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect (Hall 1992, 201).

According to Olssen (2014), a discourse is defined in terms of “statements (énoncés) of ‘things said’…[and] [s]tatements are events of certain kinds at once tied to an historical context and capable of repetition” (2014, 28). In his view, Foucault sees “the emergence of discursive frameworks as precarious and contested assemblages characterized by indeterminacy, complexity, openness, uncertainty and contingency” (2014, 28). As the researcher too observed, Foucault (1976) seemingly treats ‘discourse’ as an antecedent *a priori* which needs no explanation. In his words, “[w]hat is essential is not the market, but discourse linking sex, revelation of truth, revolt against laws and proclamation of new day and pleasure” (1976, 1). Foucault (1980) even suggested that it may be self-evident by asking, “isn't there an explanatory discourse that involves a number of dangers?” (1980, 45) or even constitutive, and as he posited, “[w]riting a monograph history of a hospital would involve making the whole archive of the hospital emerge in the movement of its formation as a discourse in the process of constituting itself (1980, 45).

Foucault’s interest was in the rules and practices that produced meaningful statements and not in discourse as a linguistic concept, rather, discourse is about language *and* practice. In this context, discourse constructs the topic and defines the objects of our knowledge, regulating in the process, the way a topic is discussed and how ideas influence the conduct of others. As pointed out by Hall 1997, “[j]ust as a discourse ‘rules in’ certain ways of talking about a topic…it ‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of talking…or constructing knowledge about it” (29). According to Olssen (2014), methodologically Foucault employs an archaeological and genealogical approach to the study of discourse.

His archaeological analysis is centrally concerned “to uncover the rules of formation of discourses, or discursive systems… (29), whereas his genealogical analysis aims “to explain the existence and transformation of elements of theoretical knowledge…by situating them within power structures and by tracing their descent and emergence in the context of history" (31). However, in Foucault's later writings these two approaches merge to the extent that they are interrelated.

In referring to Foucault's 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' (1972), Olssen (2014) submits that the statement(s) that generates a discourse comprises three key elements: a subject (which is a position that may be filled in certain conditions by various individuals); an associated field (which is a domain of coexistence for other statements); and a materiality (which is not only the substance or support of the articulation, but a status, rules of transcription, possibilities for use and re-use). Therefore, through discourse the subject is constructed, and characters are then positioned according to the nature of the subject, creating subject positions. An example would be a discourse on lesbianism, where people positioned as lesbians may be seen as abnormal and to be avoided. Depending on the subject, different positioning of characters is taken up.

7.2.2 Power and Knowledge

Foucault (1980) began by stating that Nietzsche, the philosopher of power, managed to think of power without having to confine himself within a political theory to do so. Foucault himself sees power as knowledge being put to work through discursive mechanisms to regulate conduct. In his mind, power and knowledge are mutually constitutive. He submits thusly:

> The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power (52) … [it] creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information (51) … power linked to knowledge [is] diffused, entrenched and dangerous, they operate in other places than in the person of the old professor …. It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power (52).

Power is also not a pyramidal construct where it is delegated right to the top of the state system. Instead, Foucault (1980), sees the mechanism of power through "its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals…and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives" (39), thus reinforcing its subjective and objective nature. The view that power is about repression and controlling is rejected by Foucault as "very inadequate and possibly dangerous" (59), particularly since it is so deeply rooted that avoiding its clutches would be difficult. For Foucault (1980, 119), it is a juridical concept that identifies power with a law and disregards that power induces discourse, forms of knowledge that should be considered a productive network that runs through the entire social being. Importantly, truth is connected to power and produced through discourse that is underpinned by society's conduct in determining the types of discourse which it accepts as true from false, and the way procedures are accorded value in the acquisition of truth. In fact, "[t]ruth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements…linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it" (133). Therefore, with power not being localised in the State apparatus, evidently any change in society would require a change in the mechanisms of power that lie "outside, below and alongside the State" (60). However, Spivak (1988) submits that Foucault miscalculated the role ideology played in the formation and accumulation of knowledge, with the oppressed as 'subjects', and the 'object' being a 'directed voice' given to them, a demonstration of power and the resulting subjugated knowledge.

7.2.3 Dominant Discourse

According to Gang (2015), dominant discourse, produced through discursive formations within societal subjects and objects, operate within a particular historical moment and hierarchical arrangements understood as reinforcing certain already established identities or subjectivities by legitimating existing power relations and social structures. However, for Foucault (1980) discursive formations are reflected "… in the form of a system of regular dispersion of statements" (63), which Gang (2015) has interpreted as "the relationship between some certain kinds of serious discourses and other discourses…[and], is in fact defined by the contradictory discourses it contains" (54) – a counter to dominant discourse. According to Gang (2015), dominant discourses are reinforced by existing systems of law, education and the media, and the implication of Foucault's theory is that societal members are implicated in discourse and in the discursive regimes or systems of power and regulation. This has prompted Snowdon and Karlsson (2021) to highlight that "discursive practice[s] creates polarity…[and] dominant discourse, which manifests in wider social practice, can facilitate racism and social exclusion" (1). They also add that dominant discourse, which is produced by "… elite actors such as politicians" (2), has the most power and influence over society and it is therefore necessary to analyse the text or talk produced by them to reveal how people are represented and how the discourse is established. Importantly also, is the recognition that discourses can contribute to the "production and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups" (3). As pointed out by Gang (2015) the discursive practice that produces dominant discourse – and Foucault insists that 'dominant discourse' is not a theory - refers only to the speeches of the those in power that can be accepted by the common people unconsciously as the 'truth'. Discourse, in this sense, is a power that can operate as a mind constraint, preventing people from thinking outside the dominant discourse. Therefore "discourse becomes the subject that power pursues" (54). Or, put another way, this kind of discourse is hegemonic.

A counter to dominant discourse or a counter-discourse is also possible. Gang (2015) pointed out that, for Foucault, "[p]ower takes place at innumerable points in the game of unequal and movable relationships. Where there is power there is resistance. There is a dialectical relationship between power and resistance" (55), resulting in discourse becoming a hindrance, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Two strategies to resistance are promoted by Foucault. One way is to "desubjecticate the dominant power by conducting a political struggle for the equal rights of one's class, and the other way is to reveal the hypocritical nature of the dominant group through cultural criticisms" (55).

Discourse is also bound up with institutional practices. A lot depends how one is positioned within a particular discourse. If, for example, one is positioned as a 'researcher' in an academic discourse, then one's work becomes an object of legitimate interest and inquiry. Importantly, discourse is inherent in political institutions, which exercise power in subtle ways. Power in this sense is not taken by force - it is through consent rather than coercion, resulting in the hegemon's values becoming the common sense of the state and that of the population. Additionally, the hegemon as the controller of the dominant discourse, can change the regime of knowledge because of his grip on power and knowledge but, because of this grip on power and knowledge, he shows the least interest in changing the regime (Snowdon and Karlsson, 2021).

Gibbs (2015) pointed out that in conducting a discourse analysis the things to look for include:

(a) hidden relations of power present in the text. Who is exercising power that is, whose discourses are being presented (people or institutional)?

(b) who is the ideal subject or audience for the text? What is left unspecified or unsaid? The use of passive voice, or processes expressed as things (reification);

(c) the use of colourful, descriptive language (adjectives) to indicate a strong discourse; and

(d) processes of oppression or processes of empowerment.

Additionally, the things to ask include:

(a) would alternative wording of the same information have resulted in a different discourse being privileged?

(b) how are events presented? How are people in the texts characterised?

(c) what messages does the author intend that you get from the text?

(d) why particular images were chosen to accompany texts?

(e) what repetition exists (1) within the text and (2) between different texts on the same topic?

(f) what professional media practices assist with the presentation of dominant discourses? (e.g., editorial constraints, journalistic standards etc.).

7.2.3.1 The Foucauldian Driven Constructivist Approach

Snowdon and Karlsson (2021) pointed out that language use is socially, and historically placed, and other facets of the social domain are in "a dialectical relationship that is "socially shaped" but also "socially shaping" or "socially constitutive" (dialectic - discussing the truth of opinions)" (4). This is a direct reference to the mutual constitutive concept of constructivism. That said, the discourse approaches discussed in this paper may all be classified as constructivist in a broad sense as they theorize and investigate the co-constitutive relationship between agents and structure, text and context, albeit with differing assumptions on the degree to which agents are masters of discourse (Holzscheiter 2014, 3). Importantly, an examination of contemporary discourse scholarship in IR may still confirm that no common understanding has emerged about the best way to study discourse, and it would in fact be contradictory for such understanding, considering the profoundly social constructivist legacy of the notion of discourse which is a contested concept (Milliken 1999, 226).

However, the interrelated and constitutive nature of Foucauldian discourse to constructivism was explained thusly:

> [D]iscourse is the space where human beings make sense of the material world, where they attach meaning to the world and where representations of the world become manifest. The existence of a material world outside discourse is, thus, not denied—what is refuted is the assumption that we can relate to this material world without discourse. In its essence, discourse analysis is an engagement with meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality is constructed … the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, transformed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality… an exploration of discourse asks for the social and political effects that result from using a particular vocabulary on the one hand and the productive effects of particular constructions of reality on the agency and identity of individuals and groups … [and] meaning [is] understood as intersubjectively shared interpretations of reality (Holzscheiter 2014, 144).

The researcher concludes, from the above, that both Snowdon and Karlsson (2021) and Holzscheiter (2014) agree that reality is socially constructed as constructivists do. Snowdon and Karlsson's approach to discourse is methods driven. In their research, which analysed the discourse in the public policy domain regarding Travellers in the National Traveller and Roma Inclusion Strategy, a critical discourse analysis of the policy was conducted with the overall aim of showing signs of the power imbalance through language use and revealing the discourses used by elite actors to retain power and sustain existing social relations. Their research was constructed around three key analyses: (1) descriptive analysis of text; (2) interpretative analysis of discourse; and (3) interpretative analysis of social practice. The researchers found, inter alia, the use of 'medium affinity' and 'higher affinity' words depending on whether policy directives were meant to be obligatory or non-obligatory; a hegemonic established order, exercised through unequal power relations, maintained control over dominant discourse; and hidden meanings discovered through intertextuality - power was being exercised by maintaining a negative impression of the travellers under study in their research (Snowdon and Karlsson (2021). Importantly, the researchers identified as limitations to their study: (1) qualitative studies provide for varying interpretations; (2) the study was carried on a small corpus and generalisations may be limited; and (3) interpretations are subjective, relying on understanding the interdiscursivity of discourse types formed in discursive practice. In our view, the three-stage analytic method used by Snowdon and Karlsson (2021) addressed most of the 'things to look for' and the 'things to ask' as posited by Gibbs (2015) in conducting Foucauldian driven research.

Continuing with our Foucauldian constructivist discourse analysis model, Holzscheiter (2014) is recognized as identifying two approaches to the study of discourse:

(1) the Deliberative Discourse–Power Relationship from a Micro-Interaction and Macro-Structure Perspective; and
(2) the Productive Discourse–Power Relationship from a Micro-Interaction and Macro-Structure Perspectives.

Though acknowledging the role paid by constructivists such as Ruggie (1998), Onuf (1989; 1998) and Wendt (1999) implicitly supporting that intersubjectivity is constituted through language, communication, and discourse, Holzscheiter (2014), nonetheless pointed out that there was hesitancy by Kratochwil (1989), Onuf (1989; 1998), and Wendt (1999) in agreeing that intersubjectivity needed a methodological focus on language, communication, and discourse.

In similar fashion to Wendt (1999) and Kratochwil (1989), Holzscheiter (2014), also made a distinction between thick and thin discourse along similar ontological lines. Accordingly, "thick discourse approaches [...] perceive discourse to be the precondition for social and political life and its analysis as the only way to access and observe social reality and thin ones... [and to] treat discourse as one social *logic* among others" [emphasis original] (Holzscheiter 2014, 4).

In the researcher's view, thick discourse approaches are akin to the constructivist approach to the study of IREs, while thin discourse approaches reflect the 'middle ground' between rationalism and constructivism as articulated by Alder op.cit., in Chapter Three. Thick constructivist approaches therefore reflect the mutual constitutive nature of constructivism where all social relations constitute discourse and are, in turn, constituted by discourse.

On the issue of macro and micro perspectives to discourse analysis, Holzscheiter (2014) presented the ontological differences in this manner. In the micro-interaction approach, discourse is seen as text in context, but emphasis is on discourse as a communicative exchange and the level of analysis is at agents/individual - subjects make meaning where texts represent small instances of everyday communication. In contrast, a macro-interaction approach discourse is seen as text in context, but emphasis is on historically grown structures of signification, the level of analysis is at structure/holistic, where meaning makes subjects and texts represent aggregated evidence for large meaning-structures within broad historical or socio-political context. Some of the techniques that accompany the micro and macro approaches include moral persuasion, shaming and blaming, reflective discourse and rhetorical coercion, emphasizing language as a central parameter in power relations and discourse as a fundamental dimension of society. Her approach embraces the Jurgen Habermasian discourse theory, 'the power of the better argument' within a truth-based construct, and Foucault's critical analysis of the production of knowledge and power under specific historical circumstances and within specific cultural contexts of the discourse.

On the other hand, Milken's (1999) view on discourse is particularly relevant since she provided a theoretical approach to the study of discourse analysis, giving meaning and interpretation to Foucault's extensive writings on the subject. Milliken (1999, 229) pointed out that the first theoretical commitment was to a concept of discourse as 'structures of signification' which constructed social realities, underpinned by a constructivist understanding that the material world does not convey meaning, rather people construct the meaning of things (Onuf 1989), using language and sign systems to distinguish objects and subjects. Further, discourses were expected to be structured in terms of binary oppositions, such as developed /developing nations, first world/third world, and strong /weak, where one element in the binary is privileged due to the power relationship (Milliken 1999).

According to Milliken (1999), "[t]he view of a discourse as 'a structure of meaning-in-use' implies that discursive studies must empirically analyse language practices …" (231) to draw out relational distinctions and hierarchies that orders the knowledge the subjects have about the things defined by the discourse. One method is 'predicate analysis' which is suitable for studying interview transcripts and documents. Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of predication, such as the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns in a set of texts by different authorised speakers. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named with particular features and capacities (Milliken 1999, 232). In an analysis, one may encounter judgement predicates, emotion predicates, immaturity and or maturity predicates, among others. The abstraction nature of predicate analysis where theoretical categories and answers are drawn from the data upon which the research is based is what gives it a theoretical character, similar to grounded theory (Milliken 1999, 234).

The second theoretical commitment, according to Milliken (1999, 229) relates to viewing 'discourses as productive' and or reproductive. Here, discourses define subjects (e.g., climate scientists, climate finance negotiators) for authorized actors to speak and to act, and in the process, knowledgeable practices by these subjects towards the objects of the discourse. Discourses must be understood as being able to work, to define, to enable, and also to silence and to exclude.

A method used to study discursive productivity in this context, that is not necessarily theory/empirically based, but rather on scholarly reasoning and reflection is ‘international diplomacy/organization studies’, which seek to demonstrate how the coordination of policies is made possible between different state elites and how policies that might seem, *a priori* plausible, are excluded from the international agenda and from state practices within a discovery and justification context.

The final theoretical commitment is the ‘play of practice’. In this construct, discourse draws out efforts to stabilize and fix dominant meanings, as well as ‘subjugated knowledges’, and alternative discourses excluded or silenced by a hegemonic discourse. The play of practice also explains how these alternative discourses worked, or work, perhaps in resistance to the dominant knowledge-power nexus. In the play of practice, fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it can only be partial, since the incomplete nature of discourses opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation (Milliken 1999, 230). Consequently, efforts by authorized speakers to produce and reproduce discourses are not always successful due to resistance from subjects, leading to new relationships adverse to their initial expectations. According to Milliken (1999, 243) the two methods suitable to study that orderliness and for it to be reproduced, are ‘subjugated knowledges’, which focusses, in some depth, on exploring alternative accounts that are underpinned by discourses and the extent to which subjugated knowledge produces resistance to dominant discourse, and the other is genealogy which is dealt with later in this section.

In the context of conducting an analysis of discourse, there are similarities with the stages that Gibbs (2015); Snowdon and Karlsson (2021); Milliken (1999) advanced and that of Holzscheiter (2014), which are all Foucauldian and constructivist in nature. Given the nature of the research we opted for a modified Holzscheiter’s combined deliberative and productive discourse-power approach at the macro level that included particulars from Gibbs (2015), Snowdon and Karlsson (2021), and Milliken (1999).

7.2.3.2 Some Limitations

Discourse scholarship is regularly criticized as bad science, because of its lack of testable theories or empirical analyses (e.g., Keohane 1988; Mearsheimer 1994), and indeed, as dangerous science, seductive but 'prolix and self-indulgent'. Based on their postmodern critique of foundationalism, these scholars - leading figures of the community - have represented the 'foreignness' of discourse analysis as partly lying in its rejection of methodological and research design criteria, which, in their view, constitutes attempts to silence alternative experiences and perspectives (Milliken 1999; Ashley and Walker 1990; Campbell 1996).

7.2.4 Genealogy

Methodologically, post-structuralists tend to trace over time the genealogy and significance of knowledge-power relations and dominant discourses in IR, highlighting in the process, competing historical perspectives, narratives, or trajectories. Its influencers include Friedrich Nietzsche, Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida, James Der Derian, Michael J Shapiro, and Richard Ashley. As posited above by Olssen (2014), Foucault's approach to the study of discourse is archaeological and genealogical. However, they are not dichotomous. While archaeology focuses attention on the link between perception and action, and that knowledge specialists perceive objects differently at different periods, genealogy is more interested in the conditions which make it possible for the structures to arise, than in the structures themselves (Olssen 2014). One must study a genealogy of a thing, or something. That thing or something comprises actions, statements, things said *and* the conditions that make them possible. For a genealogy to be conducted, archaeology is an *a priori*. There is an interrelatedness exiting between the two.

Foucault explains genealogy thusly:

> [A] form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault 1980).

It is important to remember that the world of speech is not stable and is usually invaded by ploys, disguises, and struggles. Genealogy does not oppose history, it opposes a search for origins, which is the key element of history. Genealogy therefore follows the concept of descent to identify accidents, deviations, errors and faulty calculations and appraisals surrounding statements and discourses. It is meant to discover that the truth does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but rather at the exteriority of all the surrounding circumstances (Foucault 1977). It is not about questioning the reality of the past, but rather an interrogation of the rationality of the present (Foucault 1980, 242). Price (1994) in his thesis on chemical weapons taboo posited that research should be 'question driven' rather than 'method driven'. His research burden was to demonstrate that "… genealogical analysis can be fruitfully applied to questions of utmost importance in global politics …" (40), including the study of "norms" in IIs (17) and, "… an element of power into the study of norms, a dimension that often seems neglected in the attempt to distance the normative aspects of international relations from realism's focus on power" (22). Price (1994) also pointed out that genealogy is one of many traditions of interpretive social science and, often the historical beginnings of matters do not reflect their best perfection after being construed through reason. Referring to Der Derian, Price (1994) went on to point out that genealogy is a method of analysis in which specific cultural practices are historically related to the exercise of power to disclose modern discursive practices. Noted, for emphasis, is the interrelatedness of genealogy and discourse. Additionally, genealogy's focus on several sites of power constitutes a challenge to the state centrism of realism, while not denying the importance of power in international politics (Price 1994)

According to Milliken (1999), in a genealogical study “history is not interpreted as a progression leading to the present, but as a series of discursive formations that are discontinuous, breaking with one another in terms of discursive objects, relations, and their operationalization” (243). Power relations are therefore central to genealogical studies, where emphasis is placed on dominating discourses, including contemporary ones, in which unity with the past is artificially conserved and order is created from conditions of disorder (Milliken 1999). Returning to Olssen (2014), genealogy provides a causal explanation for change in discursive formations and epistemes. It is interested in institutional analysis and technologies of power aiming to isolate the mechanisms by which power operates, with a particular objective of demonstrating how culture attempts to normalize individuals through increasingly rationalized means, by constituting normality and turning them into meaningful subjects and docile objects. Power relations are therefore critical. However, Price’s approach best represents a Foucauldian driven genealogy modified by inputs from Olssen (2014) and Milliken (1999) for the conduct of a genealogy of the CCAF.

7.2.5 Constructivism

Constructivism extensively in Chapter 3 and concluded therein that it would be the theoretical IR approach underpinning the study. In that chapter constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constituted relationship between agents and structures. The researcher further emphasized, that unlike rational choice models, constructivists seek to problem solve and cooperate by forging intersubjective understandings within IREs. Normative and ideational structures are just as important as material structures. For constructivists, there is no objective reality out there and identities are not givens but generated through interactions among states’ interests which shape and are shaped by identities, over time.

7.2.6 Cross Case Analysis

Cross-case analysis is a method involving the use of in-depth exploration of similarities and differences across cases with a view to identifying themes and patterns that can support empirical generalisability and theoretical predictions. Each coded interview of the KIs and each coded Report in nVivo, represent a case. A total of 106 cases was coded.

7.3 Analytical Approach: The Deliberative and Productive Discourse-Power Analysis from a Macro Structure Perspective Triangulated by a Genealogy of Climate Change Adaptation Finance

The deliberative and productive discourse-power analysis of the coded discourse is a combination of the methods and procedures presented by Holzscheiter (2014), Snowdon and Karlsson (2021) and Milliken (1999) in a constructivist post Foucauldian world, while the genealogy approach is a combination of inputs from Olssen (2014), Milliken (1999) and Price (1994). Importantly, the multiple research sites, multiple methods, levels of analysis and the capturing of data from primary and secondary sources for the research, pointed to a combined approach as best reflecting the nature of the study.

7.3.1 Key Objectives

(1) Determine the ‘structures of signification’, transparency of decision-making structures, hierarchical and or horizontal relationships of power, and rules for participation and communication within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM, applying, inter alia, predicate analysis to the coded discourse.

(2) Determine whether coded discourse (speech acts) produced by actors within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM are instances of larger systems of signification and or expressions of discursive formations from which speaking subjects cannot escape and which constrain not only possibilities for articulation but also for cognition.

(3) Determine the extent to which a knowledge-power nexus exists within the coded discourse produced by actors within the IREs and IOs of the

UNCFM, and the extent to which scholarly reasoning and reflection using ‘international diplomacy/organization studies’, seek to demonstrate how the coordination of policies is made possible.

(4) Determine the extent to which coded discourse (speech acts) produced by actors within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM also represented a counter discourse to dominant discourse and the extent to which ‘subjugated knowledges’ which focusses, in some depth, on exploring alternative accounts are underpinned by discourses which do not overlap with dominant discourses.

(5) Determine the extent to which deviations, errors and faulty calculations surrounding statements and discourses within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM affected the conditions that made the CCAF norm possible.

7.3.2 Key Activities

(1) In the context of the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM, identify ‘structures of signification’ and communicative events reflective of deliberative micro-interaction argumentative properties of discourse, not necessarily only within small institutional settings.

(2) In the context of the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM, identify ‘structures of signification’ and communicative events reflective of productive macro structure properties of discourse with evidence from a wide range of texts and events, covering larger historical spans, but existing at specific points in time and being both a condition and resource for political action.

(3) Identify the different kinds of social power displayed in dominant discourses produced by actors within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM and the extent to which subjugated knowledge produced a counter discourse.

(4) Identify how discourses shape the everyday realities of country Parties within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM and populations not directly involved in politics or those positioned weakist in global politics, such as local communities, women, etc., and by extending the range of potentially powerful speaking agents - particularly those considered to be without the means to coerce or threaten.

(5) Identify silent workings of power hidden within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM and social practices that have become both the dominant discourses and its genealogy, and the natural ways of perceiving reality and reacting toward it.

(6) Identify the concept of discourse that serves to exhibit the transformative/deliberative potential of international politics.

(7) Identify the creation of subject positions such as subjective self; agenda control; project design; financial delivery controls; and discursive practices and power as producing reality within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM which were becoming increasingly influential, the more mitigation became increasingly important, and the less adaptation became important.

(8) Identify discourse and power (hidden relations of power in text; who is exercising power; who is being heard; who is the ideal subject for the text; unsaid text, passive voices, colour, language, complex language) and discursive resources, such as themes and patterns.

(9) Identify discursive formations and epistemes within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM and any changes thereto, as a result of dominant discourse, that affected the CCAF norm.

(10) Identify and isolate the technologies and mechanisms within the IREs and IOs of the UNCFM by which power operates and their effect on the CCAF norm.

7.4 Analysis of Findings

7.4.1 Applying Discourse Analysis, Constructivism, Cross Case Analysis and Genealogy to Findings (Coded Discourse)

There are four main constructions (by elites) of discourse as structures of signification emanating from the research: (1) market-based systems are best to raise climate finance; (2) actions are necessary to control climate finance; (3) climate finance is uncertain and constrained; and (4) it’s always about mitigation and a lot about adaptation. Additionally, these four constructions address the issues surrounding the four research questions. Though, for the most part the discourses are not structured in terms of binary opposition by the elites, in practice they do become a binary in opposition in many circumstances, as will be observed later in this section.

The construction of discourse that speaks to market-based systems as being best to raise climate finance is also a construction of the social reality surrounding CCF and CCAF. Within the IREs of the UNCFM (COP, GCF, GEF, AF) - constituted by principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures - discourse defines the authorized speakers (the COP, GCF, GEF, AF) and the mode of communication and subjects, notwithstanding otherwise presented. Various predicates are used to define the subjects and objects of the discourse. In this regard, languages such the AF will “facilitate the collection of private donations” – an assistance predicate; or Trustee “will provide advice at the Board’s 17th meeting on options for potential investments” (AFB 16-2011) - reflect a hierarchical subjugated predicate, where the Trustee occupies a position of privilege over the AFB and the Board, and as a subjugated position to the Trustee. At the COP 16, Part 2 (2010), “promoting private-sector financing and investment to address climate change activities” is suggestive of the ‘better option’ predicate designed for subjects such as the SIDS. Based on these language predications, the SIDS are constructed as a subject that responds to appeals, and one that is in a financially disadvantaged position. When the COP 24 (Part 2) decided there was “an urgent need to scale up the mobilization of climate finance, including through greater engagement of the private sector”, a predicate of exhortation was observed; where the COP 25 (Part 2) decided there was an “important role for non-Party stakeholders” in mitigating climate change – a Convention objective predicate was observed; and when the GCF 5 (COP 2016) offered countries “a menu of choices both in terms of delivery channels and instruments”, reference a strategic plan for financing - a ‘you can depend on me’ predicate was observed.

The GEF’s (COP 2016) remark that it had “engaged with the private sector since its inception”, reflected an assertive ‘historical matter of fact’ predicate. When this is contrasted with the GEF’s (COP 2016) statement indicating it had deployed a “flexible range of non-grant instruments, including debt, equity, and risk sharing instruments, that delivered innovative projects and catalytic partnerships”- a proof of concept and success predicate was observed, which constructed the GEF as successful and always in keeping with the Convention, and the SIDS as dependent subjects who have been given options. Where the GEF (COP 2020) spoke to “approving projects that contribute to climate adaptation and mitigation actions” and the GEF (COP 2014) observed that financial needs were necessary “to transform markets towards low-carbon development, and the GEF (COP 2015) “further expanding the use of non-grant instruments”, these statements amounted to collaborative and imposing predicates that constructed the SIDS as mitigation states. The language practiced in these predications is a clear shift in discourse from public financing for the SIDS to adapt to climate change.

Over the period of nearly three decades, beginning in 1992 with the establishment of the UNFCCC, and the GEF and GCF’s Instruments of Incorporation, the discourse surrounding market-based systems as best to raise climate finance, created by the authorised speakers with power, became dominant after being reinforced over this period through successive meetings of the COP, GEF and later the GCF. Though representations within the COP is expressed as a vote per country, and within the GCF AF and GEF, touted as balanced representation, that representation was unequal due to the knowledge-power balance in favour of the authorised speakers from the developed country Parties. However, the discourse, though dominant, was unable to operate as a mind constraint, preventing the SIDS from thinking outside of it. In response, the SIDS produced subjugated knowledge that provided a counter discourse through, inter alia, the AOSIS (2016-SBI), which pointed out that the COP had not “succeeded in addressing fundamental concerns” relating to the CDM despite ongoing “review of modalities and procedures - predicates of frustration, and the AOSIS (2016-SBTA) in a reference to Article 6 of the PA, used the medium affinity, to indicate that the new market mechanism *should* be operationalized to contribute to overall mitigation in global emissions and it *should* generate a share of proceeds for adaptation that is substantial, moving to a 5% share, from the 2% now in place - a predicate of support for mitigation. However, the AOSIS (2017-AF) advised that based on the negative CDM experience, "the lesson is not to depend on a single source of revenue to fund either adaptation or mitigation activities" - a predicate of reason and concern.

The construction of discourse that speaks to access to finance is led by the authorized speakers with power and knowledge, *and* subjugated knowledge produced by the less powerful actors. There are many interplays and sleight of hand by the powerful. When the COP 22 (Part 2) decided that "[a]ccess to adaptation finance remains a challenge, particularly for small island developing states and the least developed countries", it resembled a 'concern for others' predicate. However, there was a complimentary discourse where the AIOSIS (2016-APA) affirmed that "simplified procedures were needed to help SIDS and LDCs access their fair share of much needed resources" - an assertive and clarification predicate. However, the SIDS, using subjugated knowledge pointed out that "the EU is putting a big emphasis on human rights" which means "abolition of the death penalty and recognizing gay rights in your law" - a coercion predicate, where power is hidden within the text. Further, the efforts by the SIDS arguing for direct transfers of finance instead of delivering it via projects was met with a dominant discourse from the developed country Parties in the manner of, "if you're going to give direct budget support, whoever we are giving it to needs to give a cast iron guarantee that it is going to be used appropriately" (GQB) - a condescending and distrusting predicate. The language of predication here constructs the developed country Parties as the powerful, and the SIDS, as the weak.

Decisions by the GEF and the GCF to express climate change outputs in semiotic language represented in figures such as "the GEF expects to deliver 1.5 billion tCO2 eq in GHG emission reduction or 26 LDCF and SCCF projects and programs are anticipated to provide 9,773,667 direct beneficiaries, of whom 4,996,941 are female or 810,493 hectares of land will be under climate-resilient management" (GEF-COP 26- 2020), reflects the interests and identities socially constructed for the benefit of the powerful within the regime of the UNCFM. This is an overwhelming predicate whose language constructed the SIDS as being at the mercy of the powerful, even where there are admittance predicates within subjugated language by the authorized speakers.

There were intrusion predicates, expressed where the AFB 12 (2010) during the review period of project proposals would have "telephone discussion with representatives of the various ministries" within the SIDS countries "to establish sufficient evidence that the Adaptation Fund's fiduciary standards are met by the NIE", while KIs from developed county Parties, who expressed them as an accountability predicate. The SIDS articulated a counter discourse based on its own accountability predicate, expressed as "ensuring that there are mechanisms in place [to] treat with monies that countries are going to get, … that allows for us to declare in a transparent way how monies are spent" (NS). However, this view of subjugated knowledge by the SIDS was not sufficiently discursive to ripen into a decision by the COP due to hidden powers within agents of structural dominance and dominant discourse, particularly obvious where the agencies invited to serve as MIEs include most IOs and MDBs, such as the World Bank, UNDP, WHO, UNEP, IDB, ASD and EBRD, but excluded the CDB, and CARICOM (GEF 23- 2017). These are 'exclusion and lack of trust' predicates designed to construct asymmetric systems of dominance and control for the benefit of the authorized speakers. The discourses, dominant and non-dominant, were socially constructed through ideational structures and *are* also ideational structures. They were created intersubjectively via macro communicative events, in particular meetings and decisions of the UNCFM, where interests and identities are constructed, each mutually constituting the other.

The construction of discourse that speaks to climate finance control actions is also a construction of the social reality surrounding CCF and CCAF. There is a clear knowledge-power nexus that drives dominant discourse concerning the availability of CCAF for the SIDS. When the AFB 21 (2013) stated that procurements by the IEs or any of their attached organizations "shall be performed in accordance with internationally accepted procurement principles", the use of the high affinity operated as a negative to the SIDS, given its stage of development, further, where to be eligible to submit funding proposals, "implementing entities had to be accredited with the Fund and follow its fiduciary and safeguard standards when accessing financial resources" (AFB 12- 2010) - a directional predicate was observed. Additionally, a "commitment to abide by the Adaptation Fund's environmental and social policy and gender policy" (AFB 35-2020), is a cultural imposing predicate. The high affinity 'shall' often appear in a directional and top-down fashion such as the World Bank, as Trustee, "shall hold the assets of the Green Climate Fund separate and apart from the assets of the trustee but may commingle them for administrative and investment purposes with other assets" (COP 16 Part 2) - a top-down financial practice predicate, usually frowned upon when considered by other financial institutions. GEF partner entities would "require a complete, third-party assessment of Agencies' compliance, including on AML-CFT" (GEF COP 25-2019) - a 'threat to business predicate' enabled by the high medium affinity, 'would'. As the discourse defines the subjects, this easily applies to the SIDS.

This type of predication language constructs the AFB as having its own identity and interests and the SIDS as an 'agreeable' partner because they too are involved in the decision making of the AFB. There is an appearance that the Parties within the AFB have similar and agreed interests underpinned by a stable understanding among them. However, the express knowledge of the text hides the power behind it and creates the illusion of consensus. This discourse is so dominant that it produces and reproduces the common sense(s) of the participating SIDS and the wider climate change society, limiting possible resistance among a broader public to a given course of action, while reinforcing and legitimating the AFB as an entity of power, though hidden. The dominant discourse usually crowds out a subjugated voice, such as the SIDS due to the unequal power ratios.

In constructing the climate finance uncertainty and constraints discourse, as a system of signification, the subjects are defined, and or excluded by the discourse. The GCF 9 (COP 2020) stating that the 143 projects and programmes in their portfolio will benefit 106 countries comprising 39 African countries, 35 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and 25 "countries in Latin America and the Caribbean", or the GCF 9 (COP 2020) funding distribution of 42 per cent (the largest portion) to the Africa region, followed by the Asia-Pacific region (36 per cent) "and Latin America and the Caribbean (17 per cent), " there is a clear 'exclusion of the SIDS' predicate that has been intertextually linked for continuity. The exclusion of the SIDS predicate is historical when one recalls that the AFB in 2009 "selected Germany as the host country for the AF" (dedicated to financing the SIDS and LDCs) and "thanked the government of Barbados for their generous offer" to host the AF. This language predication constructed Germany as more suitable and preferable to host the AF, and any 'equal voice' in representation within the AFB functions as a 'window dressing and tokenism predicate'.

There is complexity in language predicates used to demonstrate power hidden as knowledge observable when the GCF 2 (COP 2013) expressed that its management framework included "a risk appetite statement or risk rating/scoring models or risk guidelines for funding proposals or risk policies managing compliance and legal risks". Clearly these are 'finance constraints' predicates disguised as finance enablers, especially where the GEF expressed that the process of accreditation "had acted as a trigger for building internal capacity", and that all applicants had sought ways to address the "issues of fraud and corruption to comply with the fiduciary standards" (AFB 19- 2012). This language constructed the SIDS as inferior and corrupt entities in need of help from the authorized speakers of the powerful.

Importantly, the COP uses low and medium affinity words that are non-directional when it makes decisions about the GEF and GCF. In this regard, the COP 23 (Part 2) stating that it "notes with concern the challenges in accessing financial resources" and that "it notes the GEF's decision C.50/074" and "invites the Global Environment Facility to further consider ways to improve its access modalities" for developing country Parties, including the SIDS is reflective of this type of affinity. However, when it comes to decisions being made by the GEF, AF or GCF, the predicate language is more directional with medium and high affinity words. Thus, it is expressed as the AFB 2010 "decided that the cumulative budget allocation for funding projects submitted by MIEs, should not exceed 50 per cent of the total funds available". Further, when the GCF or GEF or AF responds to the

COP, the use of medium to low affinity words are obvious, exemplified by the GCF 2 (COP 2013) “noting” convergence on the need to develop the Fund’s own access modalities. On the complex and diverse opiniated issue of mainstreaming adaptation into development the GEF (COP 13 2007) stated that “an evaluation will be undertaken to draw initial lessons and to assess the potential for mainstreaming adaptation into GEF’s focal areas”, and “with respect to the mainstreaming of adaptation, an approach to reduce climate change risks will be developed”. This constructed discourse of mainstreaming adaptation became a dominant one enabled by intertextuality and the ideational structures of the UNCFM. Identities and interests were mutually constituted and there is hidden power within the text that prevents the SIDS from separating adaptation efforts from development efforts.

Co-financing is a GEF constructed dominant discourse since 1991. As of June 30, 2020, the GEF had supported 1,008 projects on CCM with more than $6,689.7 million GEF funding, “leveraging $57,193.7 million from a variety of sources”. The AOSIS countered stating that CCAF should be grant based *and* market driven but not to the detriment of grants. The OASIS’ position represented a shift in discourse by a subject and a reinforcing of the dominant discourse by a subject. In this case, the intersubjective understandings within the UNCFM widened to include the SIDS. The dominant discourse favouring private finance over public, and loans over grants was met by a counter discourse constructed by AOSIS (Opening Statement Paris 2015), which stated that “access by SIDS, especially to public, grant-based support for adaptation … is critical to effective adaptation implementation” - an exhortative predicate. However, GEF (COP 23-2017) resorted to the knowledge-power nexus when it stated that the “key constraint to actual scaling-up was the post-implementation difficulty … [of] mainstreaming the work within … national budgets”, while at the same time the COP 23 and 24 “urged Parties to continue their efforts to channel a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation”, reflecting a high affinity predicate. Even though there is balanced country representation at the GCF, coalition of interests and identities were constructed that excluded the SIDS as evidenced by the GEF 4 (COP 2015) decision that public finance will unlock private finance using “guarantees and equity, both of which have potential to leverage third-party funding at scale". At scale, excludes the SIDS and represents a 'boxed in' predicate where the discourse crowds out resistance by the less powerful.

The dominant discourse of mitigation over adaptation was even further crystalized in financial terms at the COP 25 and the PA, which decided that the current need for adaptation *is significant* and that "greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs" (Article 7:3 PA) - a high affinity predicate. That, it is widely recognized that "the overall costs and risks of climate change will far exceed the cost of action to mitigate climate change" (COP 25 Part 2), is another high affinity predicate. The high affinity predicates continued to be attached to discourse that is directional to the SIDS and constructs the SIDS as decision takers even though they appear to be part of the decision-making process. In this regard, the SIDS, as subjects, constructed knowledge and produced a counter discourse such as, it doesn't "… matter how much mitigation we do, we're not going to make a difference …" (AS). Further, "… we are going to need adaptation for a long, long time to come" (DT) - expressed with high affinity.

Though the Convention calls for new and additional finance, the dominant discourse constructed by authorized speakers used affirmative predicates that pointed to the contrary. Authorized speakers interviewed from the developed countries submitted that "to be brutally honest our contributions to the GCF, for example, will count against our ODA targets" (GQB) and if you look at GCF money and what is in the coffers there "from countries such as, Denmark, it comes from the development aid budget" (MP). When contrasted with the COP 16 (Part 3), which stated that developed countries had provided new and additional funding to developing countries, but "[it had] been insufficient to cover the increasing agenda of the Global Environment Facility as agreed", and that the GCF 4 (COP 2015) urged that "new and additional resources continue to be pledged to the Fund" on an ongoing basis, an inferential and manipulative predicate was observed.

Importantly, the construction of the finance capture discourse is underpinned by varying levels of affinity predicates coming out from the UNCFM to dominate the discourse space, at the expense of accuracy, it may seem. The COP 16 (Part 2) expressed that "… a significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should flow through the Green Climate Fund" - a medium affinity predicate. At the same time, the COP 19 (Part 2) also called on developed country Parties to channel "… a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation activities" - a low affinity predicate, while Parties were to scale up the mobilization of climate finance, including through "greater engagement of the private sector, to increase finance for adaptation" - a high affinity predicate in favour of private finance for CCAF. Additionally, the GEF's (COP 23 2017) statement that "the demand for LDCF resources considerably exceeds the funds available" for new approvals, amount to language predications that construct the UNCFM as playing a game, where there is no Nash-equilibra, and Pareto efficiency is maximized against the SIDS.

Further, the construction of the discourse, 'it's always about mitigation and all about adaptation'- as a system of signification - draws on the production and reproduction of common sense in the construction of policy practices. The production of policy within the UNCFM is guided by the knowledge generated by the IPCC - in this case, AR4 - which stated as early as the COP 13 "that delay in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve the shared long-term global goal for emission reductions", to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention - a 'mitigation or doom' predicate. This predication language constructed the IPCC as a reliable IO that speaks the truth, which is directed to all the Parties, as subjects. Several IPCC's assessments present intertextual evidence of a dominant discourse by restating the same scientific conclusions, thus creating the conditions for reinforcing the policy practice of mitigation by all Parties, (re) producing common sense, and limiting resistance in the process. Therefore, the agenda is set and coordinated by the authorized speakers on behalf of all Parties with limited or no objections. The predicate for this text is also an excluding one. The SIDS are minimal contributors to the science of the IPCC, while the "shared long term global goal" aspect of the text is an 'inclusion power' predicate, hidden in camouflaged discourse, which convinced the SIDS to embrace a shared long-term goal.

Reinforcing this dominant discourse, the COP 16 (Part 2) used an acknowledgement predicate to state it believed that "… adaptation must be addressed with the same priority as mitigation", a high affinity predicate. Where the COP 17 (Part 2) expressed that "… climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies" which must be "urgently addressed by all Parties", and where the GCF 2014 provided support to developing countries "to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change" – these were observed as high affinity predicates that constructed the SIDS as mitigating nations. As a result, the AOSIS (2015-SBI) produced a warning predicate based on subjugated knowledge indicating that the outside world deserved to know and understand "the dangers and risks that are coming our way if we fail to limit warming to below 1.5 degrees." These discourses deliberately transformed international politics by producing a structure of signification called the 'PA', comprising ideational structures of interests and identities constructed through intersubjective understandings during the multiple negotiation meetings, but to the disadvantage of the SIDS.

The inference of scientific awareness is clear, paving the way for the SIDS to produce a series of counter discourse aimed at influencing policy practice with all Parties as subjects and extending the adaptation imperative to loss and damage concerns. Thus, the AOSIS (December 2012) stated that considering "…the inadequate mitigation ambition, the need for a loss and damage mechanism is even more urgent", and that "… [l]oss and damage must be a central and distinct element of the Paris package" (AOSIS 2015- Opening Statement). The use of high affinity predicates by the AOSIS resulted in the COP 25 (Part 3) "[inviting] the [GCF] to continue providing financial resources … addressing loss and damage in developing country Parties, to the extent "consistent with the existing investment, results framework and funding windows and structures of the GCF." When read carefully, the low affinity predicate used by the COP seemingly made loss and damage conditional to current GCF funding, meaning, no new monies were likely to be made available for it. These language predicates constructed a policy that is undergirded by a coalescing of interests and identities generated intersubjectively at meetings of GCF, GEF, COP, and among the SIDS. However, the knowledge-power nexus operated in the developed countries Parties favour, limiting the SIDS' discourse from becoming dominant, but sufficiently dominant in "limiting warming to below 1.5 degrees" - a key feature of the PA.

There is also a discernible shift in discourse when it comes to the issue of historical responsibility between the 1992 Convention, which states that "the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases originated in developed countries" – an 'acknowledgement of responsibility' predicate, and the 2015 PA, which states that "developed countries should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance"- a 'not us alone' predicate, which constructed the COP as an entity coercing a bottom up approach to emissions reductions, "reinterpreting or maybe even softening the expectations … from the developed countries … [and] a push to ensure that others … contribute more to the climate response" (JFC). In what appeared to be the common sense being applied based on a constructed policy that all Parties would accept, the AOSIS 2010 presented a complimentary discourse with medium affinity stating that "all Parties should contribute to the global effort to combat climate change based on equity and in accordance with their [CBDR] which obliged developed country Parties to *take the lead* [emphasis mine] in combating climate change – an 'aiming to please' predicate that constructed the AOSIS as conference pleaser. The knowledge-power nexus is obvious within the COP, and subjugated intersubjective understandings within the AOSIS.

The dominant discourse produced authorized speakers within the UNCFM, and also produced different elements of social power because of knowledge control. The authorized speakers controlled the agenda despite balance country representation; produced complex reports that included semiotics; used the media as a knowledge extension to convince the wider populations that decisions emanating from the UNCFM are in their best interests. These types of social power were part of discursive formations from which the authorized speakers could not escape and were met within the wider discourse that constructed the global capitalist market-based development system of signification. The use of the media by the authorized speakers to extend knowledge, constructed realities similar to their dominant discourses for rural non-political communities, and the global poor and vulnerable, particularity women and girls. The discourse was also extended to include a range of powerful speaking agents —particularly those considered to be without the means to coerce or threaten, such as the AOSIS. A consequence of this social power was the ability to exclude from decisions by the COP, matters such as a ‘vulnerability index’ as a measure of development, definitions for terms such as vulnerable, climate finance, new and additional, and adaptation finance. In this context, the ‘power of the better argument’ prevailed over a consensus favouring the SIDS.

As the probing of the genealogy of the CCAF obligation norm began, it was observed that the literature on norms has been well expounded in Chapter 2, where it was pointed out that the rationalist/neorealist positivist approach of treating norms as intervening variables in a causal chain is unsuitable to understanding behaviour by actors within the international arena, and opted instead for a more interpretative approach inspired by Ruggie and Kratochwil (1986), where norms are part of IREs, and intersubjectively constructed as ideational structures. However, a key factor is the understanding that actors not only reproduce normative structures, but they also change them through practice, through change(s) in the essential conditions and constraints, or through the presence of new actors. Consequently, in this section goes further by using Foucauldian dominant discourse and power constructs to examine the genealogy of the adaptation finance obligation norm, without any specific focus on causal explanations, but with more emphasis on the origins and constitution of the CCAF obligation norm. In the process, the researcher sought to determine any (de) legitimation of the CCAF obligatory norm, and any continuities, discontinuities, and ruptures.

An understanding of the attitudes towards the CCAF norm will presumably go a long way in explaining why CCAF is not adequate, predictable, and new and additional for the SIDS.

A good starting point is the early beginnings during the period 1945-1972. Even though several conventions[88] dealing with the environment came into being, only the 1958 Convention on the High Seas had any resemblance of a financial mechanism until the UNCHE (1972) established an Environment Fund committed to ensuring that “the development priorities of developing countries shall not be adversely affected, and adequate measures should be taken to provide additional financial resources to developing countries” on terms “compatible with their economic situation”. The discourse produced at UNCHE was underscored by a mandatory predicate with the highest affinity word ‘shall’, and the medium affinity ‘should’. This predication language constructed an emerging financial mechanism, and the UN as a protector of developing countries from environmental hazards, using additional financial resources from developed countries. However, there is little evidence that this discourse became dominant within the period up to 1992, notwithstanding the establishment of several other Conventions[89] that dealt with the environment. Up to this point, there is no evidence of an adaptation finance norm.

The period 1992- 2007 witnessed the UNCED (1992), and of the four instruments adopted[90] principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development stated that the special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most vulnerable *shall be given special priority*. Importantly, the mandatory predicate was used in constructing the SIDS

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[88] Chapter One: The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954); the High Seas Fishing and Conservation Convention (1958); the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf; the 1958 Convention on the High Seas; and 1968 UNESCO Conference the Biosphere.

[89] Chapter One, these include the 1973 Convention on Marine Pollution (MARPOL Convention) and its 1978 Protocol; the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); the 1980 World Conservation Strategy which gave effect to the term ‘sustainable development’; the1982 World Charter for Nature; the1985 Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention) and the1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol).

[90] The other being The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol; Agenda 21; and the Convention on Biological Diversity.

and LDCS as a priority category for climate change protection. Keep in mind that this was outside of the UNFCCC to which attention is now given. Article 4 (3) of the UNFCCC (1992) states that “the developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs” incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12 - this is an obligatory predicate. Further, the developed country Parties “shall also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology”, needed by the developing countries to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures - another obligatory predicate. The implementation of these commitments “shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds” and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties – yet another obligatory predicate. The predication language used in Article 4 (3) related to CCF and constructed the UNFCCC (developed countries) and its organs as being obliged to provide CCF to developing countries, and as observed, the interests of all Parties coincided around this particular discourse. However, Article 4 (4) states that the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II “shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation” to those adverse effects - a mandatory predicate ‘shall’, was used, which constructed an obligation for developed country Parties to provide finance for adaptation, referred to in this research as CCAF. The predicate ‘also’, that preceded the discourse, constructed an additional financial responsibility - separate and apart from other developing countries - of developed country Parties towards a constructed category called ‘particularly vulnerable’, which is now referred to by the UNCFM as the SIDS, inter alia. It is within this last discourse that the researcher located the emergence of the CCAF obligation norm which was sponsored by the norm entrepreneurs within the UNFCCC, through persuasive communicative discourses at prior meetings and during the actual negotiations of the UNCED. Whether this norm cascaded into international acceptance and became a dominant discourse now falls to be determined.

The Bali COP in 2007 provided a significant push for CCAF through Decision 1/CP.13. However, “the mobilization of public and private-sector funding and investment” spoke to the source of CCAF, no doubt in conformity with Art 11(5) which states that the developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties may also “avail themselves of financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels”. Importantly, the AF, which was established in 2001, was also officially launched in 2007 to fund adaptation projects “from a 2% levy on the proceeds from the CDM” - a market based dependent predicate - which was managed by the Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction trading scheme. This predicate constructed the AF as dependent on market-based mechanisms to provide CCAF and mitigation as the dominant discourse that would drive adaptation actions. By the time of the Cancun COP in 2010, developed country Parties had agreed to provide developing country Parties, particularly LDCs and SIDS with long-term, scaled-up, “predictable, new and additional finance approaching USD 30 billion” for the period 2010–2012. However, there was no mention whether the CCAF for the SIDS would be public. As observed in Chapter One, Cancun was more about lowering the world’s temperature to 1.5 degrees, than about CCAF. While the CCAF norm was beginning to cascade, it was being done within the prevailing dominant mitigation discourse. Importantly, though the CCAF obligatory norm was being reproduced, the presence of new actors within the COP began to change its focus from public, to private ‘for profit’ finance, obviating the CCAF obligatory norm from becoming a dominant discourse, at that time.

The Durban and Doha COPs in 2011 and 2012 were no different from Cancun. Their focus was convincing Parties to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. The decisions of these COPs reflected the formation of coalitions of mitigation interests and emission reductions identities within the UNCFM. The issue frame is clearly mitigation driven by power, hidden within the decision texts directed at the SIDS, as subjects. Importantly, we observed that new texts, as hidden orders, were reinforced by newer ones. However, in Doha, Parties noted with concern issues related to the sustainability, adequacy and predictability of funding from the AF based on the current uncertainty regarding the prices of certified emission reductions - an uncertainty predicate, and the need for adequate and predictable resources under the LDCF to allow for the full implementation of the least developed countries work programmes - an inadequate predicate. Importantly, the AF and the LCDF were established to provide adequate and predictable CCAF but were clearly unable to do so. Further, even though the CCAF norm had cascaded by achieving acceptance among Parties to the Convention, the predication language constructed CCAF discontinuities in preference to mitigation.

Notably, the Warsaw and Lima COPs in 2013 and 2015 saw a rupture - the original concept being significantly altered - in adaptation actions surrounding CCAF and significant linkages to mitigation added. Their focus was on a new climate change agreement. Consequently, country Parties thereto constructed a dominant discourse of all Parties submitting "indicative national determined contributions (iNDCs)"; commitment to support country Parties for "loss and damage" resulting from climate change impacts; "co-financing ratios for LDCs and SIDS that are much lower" than the approximately 41 percent for the more developing countries. The effect of these dominant discourses was the construction of CCAF as directly dependent of mitigation actions by developed, developing and the SIDS, and in the process, blurring the lines and chances for CCAF to become an obligation norm.

The CCAF norm was also ruptured with the introduction of loss and damage which careened the discussion into debates about where adaptation ends, and where loss and damage begins. Consequently, it was difficult to determine, at that stage, whether the CCAF norm had become the prevailing standard, and no longer a public issue.

The Paris COP of 2015 and the COP 22 of 2016 within the context of the new climate change agreement respectfully provided, inter alia, for making financial flows "consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development" - a directional predicate; and, that greater levels of mitigation "can reduce the need for additional adaptation cost" - a 'power of better argument' predicate. The COP 22 stated that "assessment of adaptation needs in developing countries is fundamental" for scaling up adaptation finance - an obligation predicate in the context of 'adaptation needs' and not CCAF. In any event, after more than two decades since the Convention, any assessment in 2016 of adaptation needs should be considered a predicate of resistance to CCAF becoming an obligation norm. The subtexts therein are obvious requirements to *comply* in order to receive CCAF, a reflection of the knowledge-power nexus and the reinforcing of dominant discourse that is not CCAF, but rather a subjugated understanding that CCAF is dependent on mitigation actions by *all* Parties. The CCAF norm was not allowed by the authorized speakers within the UNCFM to become a dominant discourse and thus completing the final stage of norm internalization to become a CCAF obligation norm. The promoters of the CCAF discourse were primarily from the AOSIS, an organization that is required to attend exhaustive and costly iterative meetings, constructed by the authorized speakers on behalf of 'all' Parties.

The power exercised within the UNCFM over the period 1992-2016 was located within the decision texts, which reflect the power to decide that CCAF will be an obligation on the part of developed country Parties, and the power to prevent it from becoming a dominant discourse through shifts that produce ruptures and disjunctures in the CCAF discourse. As observed, the instruments that produced shifts in discourse included decisions to 'link CCAF to mitigation efforts'; 'treating loss and damage as if it were the same as CCAF'; and 'using public finance to unlock private finance for CCAF'. The weight of the knowledge-power nexus among the authorized speakers within the UNCFM allowed them to construct CCAF as historically competing with financing for mitigation, drowning out the historical responsibility discourse for climate change that is a central provision of the Convention. These meanings given to the different types of discourse and outputs created structural inequalities, while alternative voices, such as the AOSIS and the SIDS, produced by subjugated knowledge, were ignored by the powerful and masked out. The drowning out of the voices of the less powerful demonstrated how organization culture can normalize individuals and groups through increasingly rationalized means, constituting normality using ‘common sense’, and turning them into meaningful subjects and docile objects by using their multiple sites of power. Consequently, the CCAF’s norm, within the context of Art 4 of the Convention, did not become an obligatory norm due principally to the effects of the ‘dominant discourse of mitigation’. Table 7.3 highlights the challenges SIDS face accessing CCAF.

Table 7.3: Key Challenges Small Island Developing States Face in Accessing Climate Change Adaption Finance

Key Challenges SIDS Face in Accessing Climate Change Adaptation Finance			
1	Non consideration of direct financial transfers to developing country Parties/SIDS	7	Equal country representation does not translate into equal decision-making powers
2	Much more focus on a mitigation pathway for achieving the ultimate objective to the UNFCCC	8	Decision making within the UNCFM is dominated by institutional bargaining and hegemonic orders favouring the more powerful
3	Climate change financial pledges are made under conditions of CCF uncertainties	9	Inter-subjective understandings only used within the UNCFM to exert collective agreements from the SIDS, in favour of the most powerful
4	ODA is used as a main source of climate finance	10	More mitigation means less adaptation, became the dominant discourse
5	Externalising of adaptation costs by the SIDS and resistance to mainstreaming by adaptation into development	11	Market-based mechanisms, as a tool for raising CCAF, crowds out public finance
6	Externalising the cost of adaptation solutions	12	Public finance is used to unlock private finance for CCF and CCAF

Table 7.3 ***(continued)***

Key Challenges SIDS Face in Accessing Climate Change Adaptation Finance			
13	Non agreement to SIDS' request for ODA to be separate and apart from financing for CCAF	21	Linking CCF and CCAF to science outcomes as opposed to socio-historic responsibility
14	Insistence on a new market-based system similar the failed CDM model	22	Decision that adaptation is not an investible product, alongside the decision to use more private finance
15	The absence of a clear adaptation finance goal	23	The fiscal burdens to SIDS economies with loan-based solutions for necessary climate change adaptation actions
16	Non recognition of adaptation as a global public good	24	Dominant knowledge-power (IPCC) used in favour of the most powerful
17	Insistence that adaptation finance meets global benefits tests	25	Reparations for climate change may lead to reparations for other historical wrongs
18	Implementing financial ratios (GEF) and co-financing (GCF) as requirements to unlock CCAF	26	Acceptance by the SIDS that all parties must share a responsibility to mitigate
19	Linking adaptation finance to mitigation actions	27	Dependence on key mitigation nations (G77) to advance SIDS' cause for CCAF
20	Using current financial and economic modelling, such as GDP to determine eligibility for CCAF		

7.4.2 Analytic Category Development

Against the backdrop of a careful analysis of the concentrated responses from the participants within the data summary tables, the coded data in nVivo QDAS, and the themes and patterns that emerged, the overall finding pointed to a perception that concepts emerged during interactions among Parties within the

UNCFM may have contributed to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. This was called Analytic Category 1 and named it “Concepts Through Interactions”. Analytic Category 1 speaks to Findings 1, 2, and 3. The perception, based on the coded responses of participants, that priorities for determining CCAF for SIDS within the UNCFM, may have been affected by deliberate adaptation finance constraints and a market-based finance system, have led this to be Analytic Category 2 and named “Changes Affecting Priorities”. Analytic Category 2 speaks to Findings 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 & 27.

The perception held by participants, based on the analysis and interpretation of the coded discourse that the behaviour of the IREs of the UNCFM may have contributed to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional have led this to be Analytic Category 3, and named “Organization Behaviour”. As pointed out in Chapter 6, it was not useful to code for intersubjective understandings and ideational structures and the researcher opted instead for them to emerge during the Analysis, Interpretation and Synthesis phase of the research. Therefore, Analytic Category 3 is not aligned to any specific findings but is aligned to all the findings where organizational behavioural characteristics are present.

Against the backdrop of a careful analysis of the concentrated responses from the participants within the data summary tables, the coded data in nVivo QDAS, and the themes and patterns that emerged, the overall finding pointed to a perception that the absence of definitions of key CCF and CCAF terms may have contributed to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional. This was called Analytic Category 4 and named “Climate Finance Uncertainties”. Analytic Category 4 speaks to Findings 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 &16.

7.5 Interpretation and Synthesis

7.5.1 Analytic Category 1: Concepts Through Interactions

The first research question sought to determine the relationships and or concepts that emerged during interactions among country Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the GEF, GCF and the AF, surrounding the provision of CCAF that is not new and additional. The research found that the rules set by the actors within the UNCFM created structures and attitudes of dominance, preventing any meaningful compliance by the SIDS. Consequently, the meanings generated by actors through dominant discourse within the UNCFM created the SIDS as subjects who are decision takers through the knowledge-power nexus within the UNCFM and the subjugated intersubjective understandings within the AOSIS. Olssen lends some credence to this perspective:

> [Genealogy] through its focus on power, also …aims to document how culture attempts to normalize individuals through increasingly rationalized means, by constituting normality, turning them into meaningful subjects and docile objects (Olssen 2014, 31).

At times the discourse was so dominant that there was little scope for resistance due to a strong knowledge-power influence on subjects. Foucault (1980) explains this mutuality thusly, "[t]he exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power … [and] power linked to knowledge [is] diffused, entrenched and dangerous (52). However, the dynamics of rule interpretation and rule application, which are integral to IREs (UNCFM) in their attainment of international cooperation, depend on intersubjective meanings expressed through communicative action aimed at producing and maintaining the convergence of expectations that the IREs live by (Kratochwil 1989; Ruggie 1986; and Muller 1994). This finding suggests that these structures and attitudes of dominance are strongly entrenched and reinforced by repetition and intertextual connections which may only be shifted by strong communicative action among the SIDS, and between the SIDS and the elites. It is consistent with the theory, literature for the most part, and the researcher's earlier opinion.

Notwithstanding balanced country representation within the UNCFM, minilateralism drives decision making. This finding speaks to the power of coalitions of interests and identities that dwarfed out potential rivals, allowing the authorized speakers (elites) to set the agenda and make the decisions, crowding out discourse and resistance by the less powerful, and making their discourse hegemonic. Cox (1981) explained this as hegemony, and posited that hegemonic orders are historic structures operating as a fit between power, ideas and institutions. Interestingly, Wilkens (2017) drawing on critical theory, argued that postcolonial scholars sought to disrupt hegemonic discourses designed to mask hidden practices of Eurocentric liberal domination. Further, effective operation of IIs is an indicator of an existing hegemony where hegemonic orders manifest themselves in IREs that implement the concept of rule in accordance with the transnationally dominant social class and their allies (Hasenclever et al., 2002). Khan et al. (2020), in support of minilateralism pointed out that the neoliberal construct facilitates "… exclusive decision-making processes in which core decisions are increasingly made bilaterally between powerful States outside of the consensus-based process of the UNFCCC" (15). As pointed out in Chapter 3, hegemonic stability theory also created blind spots in the pursuit of distributive justice for CCAF within the UNCFM. This is because of uncertainty that the counter discourse and subjugated knowledge produced, particularly by the AOSIS, were sufficient to allow for justice. Khan et al. (2020, 15) lends credence to the absence of justice:

> Specifically, the post-Paris context is characterized by a neglect of distributive justice as a guiding principle in favor of libertarian justice ideals, which emphasize the rational pursuit of self-interest, the deemphasizing of public responsibility in favor of a focus on the market and private sector to solve collective problems, the sidelining of the "polluter pays" principle and command-and control forms of governance in favor of a focus on transparency without robust systems of accountability (Khan et al. 2020,15).

This finding suggests, though possible via a counter discourse of moral persuasion, shaming and blaming, reflective discourse, and rhetorical coercion (Holzscheiter

2014), the elites' control of dominant discourse appears formidable. It is consistent with the theory, literature, and the researcher's earlier opinion.

A majority of the KIs indicated that developed countries prefer to direct the efforts at transferring and determining the use of CCAF by the SIDS. This finding situates the SIDS in the dependency role due to the knowledge and power of the developed countries in constructing the systems and dominant discourse. The SIDS' counter discourse, that direct transfers into budgets as better than delivering CCAF via projects, has been met with strong textual language from developed country Parties, with support from some SIDS. GQB, one of the KIs posited, "if you're going to give direct budget support, whoever we are giving it to needs to give a cast iron guarantee that it is going to be used appropriately". This is exemplary of a hegemonic discourse using text to demonstrate the power of the hegemon who conforms to rational choice models to dominate his subjects (Cox 1981). We also note the comment by LC, one of the KIs from a SIDS, who posited, "for adaptation finance, I think…projects work better for the sake of accountability". Interestingly, the literature shows that direct transfers would result in more financing reaching the SIDS (Jakob et al. 2015; Eyckmans et al. 2013). However, Scoville-Simonds (2016) lends credence to the propensity of the developed country Parties by positing that "donor support tends to be concentrated in channels that offer the highest degree of control to donors" (4). Additionally, as pointed out in Chapter 1, that current strategies by developed countries, based on market mechanisms and limited direct transfers, should be redesigned to go beyond Nash equilibrium and towards Pareto optimal to prevent developed countries avoiding CCAF transfers and making it a zero-sum game. This finding demonstrates efforts of control on the part of the elites, through the power of the better argument predicate, to affirm the desired outcome of delivering CCAF via projects over direct transfers, notwithstanding knowledge to the contrary. It is consistent with the theory, literature, and the researcher's earlier opinion.

The decisions of the AF, GCF and the GEF on projects/programmes hardly reflect any evidence of the SIDS - as a special category - for receiving CCAF within the UNCFM. In fact, allocation of CCAF is skewed towards developing and least developing countries, widening the category of countries that are particularly vulnerable, while implementation of projects/programmes are dominated by the international financial agencies over regional and national ones. This finding reflects the uncertainty surrounding the term ‘vulnerable’ and the obligation of developed country Parties under Article (4) of the Convention, driven by a dominant discourse that precludes any universal definition and the asymmetric power of financial choice in the hands of the elites. This is where the elites use the media and control of the international agenda, to extend knowledge constructed realities, similar to their dominant discourse, for subjects such as the SIDS. Consequently, there is no universal definition for the important term ‘particularly vulnerable’. In fact, the most recent Adaptation Gap Report (2020) though silent on this matter, has constructed a new discourse using the term ‘vulnerable’ as a descriptor. In it were found terms such as vulnerability of beneficiaries (39); vulnerable groups (52); vulnerable ecosystems (52); vulnerable sector and communities (60); and vulnerable populations (60). Note that from 33 search hits for the word vulnerable within the Gap Report, there was one reference to a term called ‘most vulnerable countries’ (84), without any definition or explanation. Further, the closest the Adaptation Gap Report came to defining particularly vulnerable was to explain vulnerability as “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected … [and] vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt” (Adaptation Gap Report 2020, IX).

These representations reflect a shift in the discourse of vulnerability to one that is less state centric, more demographic, and wide enough to include most developing countries, and in the process, challenging the special status of the SIDS. The conduct of the elites, in this context, is reflective of rationalists who, because of their belief in the separation of object from subject, pursue their interests independently at the expense of mutually constituting them for the benefit of all Parties (Keohane 1988).

The absence of clear prioritization rules for the particularly vulnerable countries, across the UNCFM, is a casualty of dominant discourse at the respective board meetings, based on coalitions of interests, notwithstanding the one country-one vote system at the AF and GCF. Young (1989) provided support for this conduct through his theory of institutional bargaining where actors pursue integrative bargaining under the conditions of uncertainty and unanimity and nonexcluability becomes a critical determinant of IREs, even though he agreed that "… consensual knowledge is not a guarantee for the emergence of international cooperation" (Young and Osherenko 1993, cited in Hasenclever et al 2002, 153). There is also support for not having a universal definition of particularly vulnerable. Klein and Möhner (2011), posited that there has been ambiguity about the meaning of 'particularly vulnerable' to the adverse effects of climate change ever since the phrase was introduced in the original UNFCCC (1992). Thus, after more than twenty years "… the political ambiguity about the meaning of 'particularly vulnerable' is as great as ever (17). Further, Klein and Möhner (2011, 15-22) suggested that the GCF adopts a 'no prioritization approach' and let the countries themselves determine their own vulnerability as practiced by the AF.

The fact that the World Bank can serve as trustee for the GEF and the AF, and at the same time function as an international AE, sums up the actions of the powerful over the SIDS, and others. A natural outcome is a dominance by the MIEs (UNDP, WHO, UNEP, IDB) of the procurement of financial services for the SIDS. It is therefore difficult to disagree with the view that power dynamics underlie the UNCFM's interest and motivations towards managing the global commons to the extent that it has been transformed into a representational mechanism for the agents of global capital, and a tool to promote neoliberal policies around the globe. As Snowdon and Karlsson (2021) pointed out, discourses can contribute to the "production and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups" (3). In support, Scoville-Simonds (2016) posited that adaptation finance reproduced the structures of development aid agencies, consequently, the vast majority of funding continues to flow through more traditional development aid channels. This finding suggests and reflects what appears to be deliberate efforts on the part of the elites, through the construction of a new discourse, that drowns out discourses and practices on arriving at a universal definition of the term ‘particularly vulnerable’. It is consistent with the theory, literature and the researcher’s earlier opinion.

The above analysis is also linked to the finding that, notwithstanding attempts at balanced representation on the boards of the UNCFM, their operational procedures are more akin to those of international financial institutions and not reflective of a climate finance mechanism based on the principle of CBDR, and facilitative of the SIDS. In support, the analysis of the coded discourse revealed that balanced representation was unequal due to the knowledge-power in favour of the authorized speakers from the developed country Parties. Richardson (2009) lent credence to this view when he stated that the climate finance discourse had been strategically framed around investment business models without much attention to socially responsible investment, equity, CBDR and ethics. Additionally, Branger and Quirion (2014) observed a possible conflict with CBDR where “a shift in part of the abatement costs [...] to non-abating countries” (56) may trigger a possible trade war by encouraging third countries to join the abating coalition, but not when it related to the SIDS, where CBDR works to its disadvantage. As pointed out by the GEF, the dominant driver of economic activity must be the encouragement to pursue commercially viable activities that also generate global environmental benefits (GEF-18 COP-2012). The conduct of the elites within the UNCFM is reflective of Young’s (1991) institutional bargaining, based on collective goods, where the elites persuade the collective to vote in their favour. It is difficult to envisage any CBDR favouring the advantage of the SIDS when they are also expected to provide global goods, NDCs and mitigation co-benefits. However, this finding appears to be also possible due to subjugated intersubjective understandings within the AOSIS, where it expressed that all Parties should contribute to the global effort to combat climate change based on CBDR. This finding suggests that the principle of CBDR is one sided and in favour of the elites. It is consistent with the theory, the literature, and the researcher’s earlier opinion.

Importantly, capacity building modules constructed by the agencies within the UNCFM were not institutional to the SIDS. Their impact was not levelized since they were designed and executed specifically in support of projects and programmes funded by the donors. This finding speaks to the fiction of capacity building within the SIDS. It is also linked to the finding which pointed out that the challenges in building capacity among SIDS were internally and externally driven, and for capacity building to make a meaningful contribution to the development of SIDS, it must be sustainable, institutionally driven and underpinned by a recognition that by collectively sharing knowledge and data generated by both SIDS and the developed world, the SIDS stand a better chance at accessing CCAF, and the developed world in combating climate change. Combined, these two findings reflect a recognition that there is a counter discourse available to the SIDS through their own subjugated knowledge generation. As pointed out before, power is diffused within the entire body politic. Foucault (1980), also provides support since the mechanism of power is expressed through "its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals … and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives." (39), which prompted Spivak (1988) to argue that Foucault's concept of power "… obliterates the role of classes, the role of economics, [and] the role of insurgency and rebellion" (75) in the production and reproduction of discourse.

Therefore, power is objective and subjective at the same time. In this regard, the elites used complexity in language to hide power hidden as knowledge through complicated texts and semiotics, linking the SIDS to international fiduciary standards from which they cannot escape, and to which they contributed subjugated knowledge in an attempt not to be labelled as corrupt and non-cooperative. What is observed is reflective of a classical principal-agent scenario where developing countries, as agents, simply adopted the positions of the principals or advanced the principal's own interests (Abadie et al., 2013; Gomez-Echeverri, 2013; Schenker and Stephan 2014; Shah 2015) with little scope for capacity building (Denton 2010). This position is supported by the Adaptation Gap Report (2020) which highlighted the need for more capacity building support for implementing entities and strengthened guidance for monitoring and reporting.

Successfully accrediting entities to the UNCFM is linked to country applicants meeting international fiduciary standards, including the ability to undertake a range of financial instruments such as grants, loans, equity, and guarantees, thus resulting in long delays in becoming accredited and a tendency for some developing country Parties to assign their projects to MIEs for implementation. This finding reflects power disguised textually which leads to possible exclusion of the SIDS from becoming accredited or, as revealed in Chapter 6, as significantly challenged in becoming accredited, to the extent that not more than two SIDS may have been fully accredited to the GCF. Interestingly, Said (1975) referred to this type of textual discourse, as violent. This power imbalance is compounded by the finding which revealed that the decisions of the COP, in relation to the UNCFM (GEF, GCF, AF,) because they are couched in weak non-directional language, are not geared to improve access to CCAF. Consequently, these entities operate as independent bodies within ideational structures comprising constructed interests and identities that exclude the SIDS. This finding links the weak oversight by the COP over the UNCFM to the challenges the SIDS experience in becoming accredited entities.

The decision to pressure the SIDS in meeting fiduciary standards that are quite onerous at their scale of operations is supported by Schalatek et al. (2015, 5) who suggested that, to access GCF funds, accredited entities will be required to "practice social and environmental safeguards and meet strong fiduciary standards to ensure good financial management", before funds are allocated. In the context of international fiduciary power, the SIDS are out matched and consequently unable to provide a suggested counter discourse, even though resistance is possible. In support of the elites and blame casting, Chaudhury (2020, 10) posited that "[t]he Pipeline of Projects from National Intermediaries Will Slow down over Time as Compared to International Intermediaries" [initial capitals original]. He ascribed this to a weak ecosystem of national accredited entities to develop projects independently, despite GCF training offered in project preparation and the significant competence and dependence on international accredited entities. This is reflective of Young's (1991) institutional bargaining where all are included but consensual knowledge is not required to achieve cooperation. This type of discourse constructed the SIDS as technically inferior and sets the stage for them to consider outsourcing their projects to MIEs. This finding is consistent with the theory and with the literature.

Even though it is all about adaptation for the SIDS, and adaptation is its highest priority, some climate change impacts cannot be addressed through adaptation and therefore loss and damage actions are also critical. And while the SIDS seem to link their survival to supporting high mitigation actions, particularly by developed and developing countries, the placing of adaptation and loss and damage in different boxes is also a survival issue for SIDS, but at the same time a recognized challenge to the UNCFM, which tended to link them both, as adaptation. This finding reflects the efforts by the SIDS at constructing knowledge through intersubjective understandings that would apply to all Parties within the UNCFM. The SIDS, by supporting the elites, expected in return the hegemon's support for its CCAF and loss and damage.

Instead, the loss and damage narrative ruptured the SIDS' CCAF discourse, opened an opportunity for the elites to treat loss and damage as if it were the same as CCAF, thereby linking it to mitigation *and* adaptation.

The analysis of the coded discourse found that the mitigation discourse was so dominant that it linked the success of adaptation to the success of mitigation. Durand et al. (2016) and Doelle and Seck (2020) lent credence to this view when they posited that it was easy to envisage difficulties scaling up finance to address adaptation and loss and damage in a UNFCCC regime that is seemingly rooted in the principles of voluntariness and marketization, particularly since these are costs associated with climate impacts beyond adaptation, estimated at being far greater than that for adaptation (Ciplet and Roberts 2017b). The conduct of the SIDS is reflective of the constructivist approach which rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of ideational, as well as material factors in human action, where their concerns are continuously socially constructed, shaped and being shaped by all Parties within the UNCFM (Ruggie 1998; Ruggie 2000; Ruggie and Kratochwil 1986; Wendt 1992, 1999; Reus-Smit 2009; Kratochwil 1989; Viotti and Kauppi 2012). However, this approach was met by the elites' pursuit of absolute gains in furtherance of cooperation against a common adversary- in this case climate change, and which was more conducive since each state had the opportunity of choosing the best option and were therefore better off cooperating (Hasenclever 2002; Snidal 1991).

While the Adaptation Gap Report (2020, VII) explained adaptation as the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects in human systems, and that adaptation sought to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities, there was no mention anywhere in the report of loss and damage. However, there was reference to a term called ‘limits to adaptation’ which the report explained as “[t]he point at which an actor’s objectives (or system needs) cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions” (IX). Is this the same as loss and damage? Further, a mere 3 % of Parties reported evidence of real reductions in climate risks posed to the communities where the adaptation projects were being implemented (XIV), which were expected to reduce impacts and costs associated with climate change (XI). In addition to the extremely low performance in reducing climate risks through adaptation interventions, it is also bewildering that the report, itself, was unable to “assess the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning as there is no consensus around definitions for and approaches to assessing these aspects” (XII). If there is no consensus on how to assess the effectiveness of adaptation planning, *a fortiori*, it will be also difficult to assess and plan CCAF for the SIDS that is adequate, predictable, and new and additional, especially since “[t]he fallout of the pandemic is expected to significantly influence the ability of countries to plan for, finance and implement adaptation actions (XII). It also appeared to be clear that adaptation is connected to climate science. Accordingly, IPCC (2021) posited that climate science knowledge informs climate-related risks and adaptation planning (31), and it is the same climate science that informs mitigation actions. This finding is consistent with the literature, theory and with e the researcher’s earlier opinion.

The objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, and it was always about mitigation, which is now a shared vision, even by the AOSIS. However, such emissions reduction should not be at the expense of clear adaptation for the SIDS, consequently the SIDS should ensure its language does not ultimately result in diminishing the historical responsibility of developed countries to provide CCAF. This is a finding that reflects the efforts by the SIDS at constructing knowledge through intersubjective understandings that would apply to all Parties within the UNCFM. The SIDS, by supporting the elites, expected in exchange, the hegemon's continued acknowledgement of its historical responsibility for climate change and its obligation to provide CCAF to the SIDS. Instead, the historical responsibility discourse shifted to developed country Parties 'taking the lead', opened an opportunity for the elites to reduce their responsibility for adaptation, and increased those of developing countries for mitigation, or put another way, the developed country Parties responsibility for mitigation went down while those of developing countries went up, including the SIDS. This conduct clearly links adaptation to mitigation and is also consistent with the finding that the developed countries have not voluntarily accepted their historical responsibility for the negative impacts of climate change caused by their economic development. For them, its more about avoiding the consequences of sole responsibility and promoting shared responsibility. In fact, they have shown a greater willingness to also place that burden on developing countries that are large emitters, and the SIDS, through mechanisms such as NDCs, leaving the SIDS as sitting ducks to the negative impacts of climate change from both developed and developing countries.

The analysis of the coded discourse revealed that the weight of the knowledge-power nexus among the authorized speakers within the UNCFM allowed them to construct CCAF as historically competing with financing for mitigation through a dominant mitigation discourse, drowning out the historical responsibility discourse for climate change - a central provision of the Convention. In fact, historical responsibility is not mentioned nowhere in the PA. What is evident is the shift to mitigation as the dominant discourse has seemingly resulted in historical responsibility being replaced by an 'emissions reductions principle', though not so stated. The net effect is the subsidizing by the SIDS of the costs of the developed country Parties' historical responsibility, and a bottom-up approach by all to reduce emissions. In support, Denton (2010) argued that developed countries should contribute between 65 - 85% of adaptation finance ($US 30 billion 2010-2012) due to their historical responsibility. Additionally, Bertilsson and Thörn (2020, 1-19) submitted that climate finance governance is seen as an all-too-important issue to be left to recipient countries and consequently, there is neglect of historical responsibility of developed countries and a requirement for developing countries to make themselves investable, notwithstanding pressures to the contrary from the climate justice movement. The conduct of the SIDS is reflective of the constructivist approach (Ruggie 1998; Ruggie 2000; Ruggie and Kratochwil 1986; Wendt 1992, 1999; Reus Smit 2009; Kratochwil 1989; Viotti and Kauppi 2012) which was met by the absolute gains approach on the part of developed country Parties (Hasenclever 2002; Snidal 1991). These two findings are consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's earlier opinion.

The AOSIS, as part of the G77+China grouping, has become the principal negotiating voice for the SIDS within the UNCFM. However, there is a view that its singular focus on climate change and climate change finance matters, emphasising vulnerability, operates to the detriment of other corresponding development issues which, to many, is the result of an intended or unintended drowning out of the SIDS' voice within the complex G77+ China grouping. Consequently, many questions arose as to whether the AOSIS was best placed to effectively negotiate on behalf of the SIDS. This finding speaks to a significant divide among the research KIs across all regions as to whether the AOSIS, the principal negotiating body for the SIDS, should remain within the G77 + China. This is a classical agent-structure dilemma, where some SIDS saw agents as mutually constituting structure in an iterative process. In this construct, there is no subordination and or subjugated positions. In fact, Foucault pointed out that one way in which "marginalized groups can disintegrate the monopoly of the dominant discourse … is to desubjecticate the dominant power" (Gang 2015, 55), equalizing all positions. This did not occur as the positions of the SIDS, as subjects, were overridden by hegemons (China, India, Brazil and South Africa). It is therefore difficult to measure whether intersubjective understandings created sufficient ideational structures of interests and identities reflective of the SIDS. At the same time, hegemons used the power available to achieve cooperation within the issue area. In the G77 + China, it appeared that institutional bargaining (Young 1991) and absolute gains, and rational choice game theories (Hasenclever, 2002; Snidal 1991; Keohane 1984; Keohane 1989) also prevailed. It is also difficult to determine if intersubjective understandings prevailed in the G77+China. This multi layered negotiation construct may well be disadvantageous to the SIDS. Further, the discourse surrounding whether the SIDS should continue within the G77 + China was not dominant on either of the divide within the coded discourse or the literature. This finding is consistent with the theory, but not with the literature.

The SIDS must move beyond prizing out development from contestations between ODA and CCAF and transition to a longer term political and economic integrated planning process, that obviates insularity and territoriality in the creation of a climate resilient society that aligns outcomes with existing development platforms such as the SDGs, CSME, SENDAI and the PA. This finding speaks to the need for the SIDS to construct a counter discourse to the dominance of contestations between ODA and CCAF. Such a move by the SIDS will provide a shift in the discourse and a resistance to the hegemon's control of knowledge production. This proposed move by the SIDS is also linked to the finding where the developed countries dominated neoliberal market system, based on high production and consumption patterns, are counterproductive to the development of the SIDS, given their demographics and lack of scale. Consequently, the SIDS need to look more within themselves and align their development processes and resources to better economic and development options, such as eco systems services, nature-based solutions and use of their power. Such a shift in discourse and knowledge production by the SIDS will also remove the 'guessing game' about ODA and CCAF that the elites use to control the SIDS.

A key issue that arose - beyond accepting that ODA is a commitment by the developed countries towards the developing countries - turned on what exactly is CCAF, an uncertainty due to the absence of a universal definition. What is known is the Convention refers to CCAF in obligatory terms. While this is so, a genealogy of the CCAF obligation norm pointed to issues that prevented it from becoming an obligatory norm. One of the challenges of the CCAF norm was its link to the dominant mitigation discourse, almost like a millstone around its neck that dragged it towards mitigation outcomes.

Though the norm cascaded, it was not allowed by the authorized speakers within the UNCFM to become a dominant discourse and thus completing the final stage of norm internalization and become a CCAF obligation norm. ODA, on the other hand, was a definitional issue for some countries and not a budget per se, while for others, it was budget. In any event, the consensus was that ODA and CCAF came from the same budget, even though Horstmann (2011, 1086-1096) suggested that the AF was unique by being independent of ODA. In that context, any pretensions by the SIDS for a separation of the two posed a great hurdle for it to cross.

The conduct of the SIDS has been the construction of a dominant discourse around separating overseas development from adaptation development, in order to separate CCAF from ODA. Bearing in mind that CCAF is not an obligatory norm, this type of discourse construction and dominance by the SIDS would be difficult to achieve. Lending some credence to this difficulty, Ayers and Huq (2009) and Klein and Persson (2008), posited that any clear separation of development from adaptation is less beneficial to developing countries. Additionally, the SIDS were seeking to construct an alternative discourse to eco systems services and nature-based solutions where the elites would depend on their knowledge-power advantage, through institutional bargaining (Young 1991) in favour of not separating ODA from CCAF. Importantly, developing countries generally agreed that ‘new and additional’ funding starts after developed countries would have contributed their agreed 0.7% of GNI to ODA (Stadelmann et al 2011; Brown et al. 2010) in the form of grants and concessional financing (LCui et al. 2014).

There is a shift in discourse within the adaptation field with the introduction of nature-based solutions by norm entrepreneurs who are the elites within the UNEP, and their associates. An entire chapter was dedicated to this new discourse (Adaptation Gap Report, 2020, IV). Importantly, the writers and producers of the Adaptation Gap Report (2020) used extensive semiotics to situate the discourse.

The pictures at the beginning of these Chapters constructed subliminal messages suggesting adaptation is for the poor but managed by the rich; adaptation can lift the poor out of poverty; it was the poor who suffered; and forested nations are important to adaptation efforts. Inside the Adaptation Gap Report (2020) there were several coloured tables, charts, graphs and illustrations that are difficult to follow, in addition to maps and pictures showing the devastating effects of climate change and the obvious need for adaptation. It was also important to note that, of the 50 plus authors of the report, none are from the SIDS, and only one each from a developing country and a regional institution respectively. Of the 40 reviewers of the report, no representation from the SIDS was noted, however there were 10 from the developing countries mostly from India, along with Uganda and Zimbabwe. This represented expressions of power by the elites through semiotics and the media which constructed the SIDS as subjugated objects.

According to the Adaptation Gap Report (2020), "… there is increasing recognition, both nationally and internationally, that nature-based solutions (NbS) can make important contributions to climate change adaptation, but there are few tangible plans" (Gap Report, XV), and "[m]ore than half of countries, including over 90 per cent of LDCs, refer to protecting nature as an important motivation for adaptation planning [and] have added elements of NbS to the adaptation components of their NDCs" (XV). Nature-based solutions are adaptation measures, among many in use over decades. Separating and highlighting them as distinct *for* adaptation constructed a new discourse, while rupturing the adaptation discourse, and facilitating the promotion of NbS, over time, as a dominant discourse. Even though it is constructed as a driver of adaptation, the Adaptation Gap Report (2020) presented a separate financial module expressed as "[an] NbS finance base for adaptation could be amplified, strengthened and diversified by deploying innovative mechanisms that combine public and private sources of funding" (XVII). In the context of qualifying for CCAF, NbS and adaptation financial modules appear to be equal contenders, and even on a collision course. More than likely however, such positions would not redound to the benefit of the SIDS. These findings are consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's earlier opinion.

Considering the above, the provision of adequate and predictable CCAF to SIDS that is new and additional was constructed around several emerging concepts and relationships within the UNCFM. The most important of these are: creation of structures and attitudes of dominance with the SIDS as subjects assisted by the SIDS, through subjugated intersubjective understandings within and among the SIDS; construction of dominant hegemonic discourses and suppression of counter discourses by the SIDS; uncertainty surrounding vulnerability and its determination left to the decision of each state, which challenges the special category of the SIDS; notwithstanding nonexcludability within the UNCFM, the interests of the elites came first since there was no need for consensual knowledge to achieve cooperation; the UNCFM being used as a tool to promote neo liberal policies globally and thus climate finance discourse has been strategically framed around investment business models; there are no appeal opportunities because the decision language of the COP is non directional; a preference by the elites for rational choice theorizing rather than the mutuality of interest and identities formation through intersubjective understandings; the construction of CCAF as historically competing with financing for mitigation; a shift in the discourse promoting all Parties as having responsibility for mitigating climate change; decreased emphasis on historical responsibility of developed countries for mitigating climate change, to responsibility by all Parties to mitigate; doubts whether the G77+ China is best suited to negotiate for CCAF on behalf of the SIDS; contestations over ODA and CCAF; absence of integrative planning on the part of the SIDS; uncertainty surrounding additionality and treating of the SIDS as subjugated objects; and shift in the discourse to NbS which potentially crowds out the prominence of adaptation. It is difficult to envisage, under these conditions, the provision of adequate and predictable CCAF to the SIDS that is new and additional.

7.5.2 Analytic Category 2: Changes Affecting Priorities

The second research question examines the perception that changes may have occurred within the UNCFM, particularly the GEF, GCF and the AF, that affected CCAF priorities for the SIDS. The research found that there are diverse opinions, particularly among SIDS/KIs, as to whether adaptation should be mainstreamed into development, and even though most KIs tend to agree that it should, and that agreement is largely conditional. This is also linked to the finding that while there is consensus that more climate finance is available now than before, the general view, among the SIDS, is that the amount available to them is inadequate to meet their adaptation needs, particularly evident from UNCFM reports indicating that projects requests far outstrip funding availability. Consequently, the SIDS are of the view that because adaptation doesn’t benefit the developed countries financially, they prefer to link scaling up of CCAF to mainstreaming climate actions into national budgets, rather than to the special circumstances of the SIDS. The analysis of the coded discourse revealed that the constructed discourse of mainstreaming adaptation became dominant and there was hidden power within the text that prevented the SIDS from separating adaptation from development, while the knowledge-power nexus of the elites affirmed that scaling up CCAF was being made difficult by non-mainstreaming activities of the SIDS. Harmeling and Kaloga (2011, 23-32) lent credence to the importance the elites attached to mainstreaming by pointing out that the World Bank’s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)[91] which received more than ten times the resources than that donated to the AF, indicated a “preference of many donor countries towards mainstreaming adaptation, rather than funding concrete projects” (26). Even CARICOM lent support to Heads who agreed to elevate the importance of the readiness programming of the GCF to include the mainstreaming of climate change in National Development Plans as a means of facilitating access to climate

[91] The PPCR was set up outside the UNFCCC process under the World Bank Climate Investment Funds portfolio. It receives funds from donor countries.

financing[92] (ISM 27 COCHOG held from 16-17 February 2016). The conditional views of most KIs in not wanting to mainstream adaptation into development was linked to their desire to separate ODA from CCAF. Denton (2010), Fankhauser and Burton (2011) and Eisenack (2012) lent support to the SIDS/KIs position when they argued that adaptation funds should be separate, constitute a stream and not mimic the governance structure of the ODA. However, this view was not shared by Ayers et al. (2014) who pointed out that mainstreaming is another way of supporting adaptation through ODA, though not one that necessarily results in additionality. However, Scoville- Simonds pointed out that mainstreaming was already being enforced:

> Yet more broadly, given adaptation finance's heavy reliance on traditional aid delivery mechanisms, one may indeed wonder about references to the 'challenge' or the 'need' to mainstream adaptation into development. What can be observed in the current adaptation finance architecture is rather a de facto mainstreaming of adaptation into development through the systematic reproduction of the roles of traditional development actors in adaptation decision-making and project implementation. In practice, it seems that 'adaptation-as-development' has become the accepted norm, despite the presence of alternative framings in the debate (Scoville-Simmonds 2016).

Notably, the Adaptation Gap Report also lent credence to mainstreaming adaptation. It was put thusly:

> Integrating or mainstreaming adaptation planning and action horizontally (across sectors) and vertically (across levels of administration) is increasingly recognized as an important component of effective adaptation planning. Such efforts help ensure that adaptation planning is comprehensive, avoids duplication of efforts or maladaptation and enhances synergies (Adaptation Gap Report 2020).

The Adaptation Gap Report (2020) speaks extensively about mainstreaming NbS into national planning processes, while mainstreaming climate related risks is the preferred term over adaptation. The report also speaks to the issues of scalability

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[92]CARICOM.org, https://CARICOM.org/mediacenter/communications/communiques/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twenty-seventh-inter-sessional-m

and long-term sustainability of NbS in similar terms to adaptation. The preference for climate related risks is also linked to increased financing:

> Bringing in new tools such as sustainability investment criteria, climate related disclosure principles and mainstreaming of climate related risks into investment decisions can help to monitor finance flows that contribute to adaptation, in addition to the potential to stimulate an increase in investments in climate resilience and to direct finance away from investments that increase vulnerability (Adaptation Gap Report 2020, XIV).

This kind of knowledge-power only serves to strengthen the stranglehold around the SIDS to mainstream adaptation, NbS, and climate related risks. Further, international public adaptation finance is slowly rising, but not at domestic levels. Current estimates for adaptation costs are in the range of USD70 bn, with the expectation of reaching USD140–300 bn in 2030 and USD280–500 bn in 2050, meaning the adaptation finance gap is not narrowing as a result of current efforts. Additionally, the ongoing COVID-19-19-19 pandemic is expected to further aggravate the finance gap by constraining public finances at both national and international levels (Adaptation Gap Report (2020, XIV). Even though, high levels of global mitigation may reduce adaptation costs by 75 per cent (Chapagain et al. 2020), it is also important to note that the benefits of investing in adaptation often outweigh the costs. For example, a USD1.8 trillion investments in the areas of early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure, improved dryland agriculture, global mangrove protection, and resilient water resources could generate USD7.1 trillion of benefits (Adaptation Gap Report (2020, 24).

Notwithstanding the above, many KIs explained that mainstreaming adaptation should be conditional. Accordingly, BD explained that "… integration needs to be done based on the country needs [and] not necessarily on the financing" and [i]f you're going to mainstream it, it should be additional" is what AC believes, while DT commented that "[t]hese should be additional funds for adaptation because the priorities of countries depend on so many different things". Further, HSC expressed an "… understand[ing] of the accounting for financial flows … but taking that argument aside, I don't see how you can practically separate […] development, how you cannot try to mainstream resilience into your development planning". JFC sees it as an obligation on the part of the SIDS, but also an opportunity for them to negotiate for another CCAF milestone:

> I don't know that we'll get around it by insisting on trying to debunk the argument of mainstreaming adaptation, because that's now a part of the climate narrative. And mainstreaming adaptation into development is in the Paris agreement, part of the adaptation goal itself … if we could somehow focus specific finance the same way we did it [for] mitigation [with] the hundred billion… then that is one way, at least tangible way to begin to kind of differentiate the adaptation from the whole bulk of development finance (JFC).

While adaptation projects have values exceeding USD25 million, suggesting that adaptation actions are becoming more comprehensive and potentially more transformative (Adaptation Gap Report 2020, XIV), the report reinforced the dominant discourse of "public adaptation finance in catalysing private adaptation finance" which protects upfront risks of investments (Adaptation Gap Report 2020, 24). This is another way of saying that governments (citizens) should pay for the damage caused by the private enterprises which are responsible for climate change. The conduct of the Parties revealed the construction, by the elites within the UNCFM, of a new discourse around NbS, and reinforcing the mainstreaming of adaptation dominant discourse through rational choice models of institutional bargaining and absolute gains. While there is a SIDS counter discourse of separating ODA from CCAF, it has not ripened into a dominant discourse to create any meaningful push back. The findings herein are consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's earlier opinion.

Even though there is an understanding amongst most SIDS that CCAF should be channelled through public sector grants mainly, the trajectory of the GEF is to transition from grant to non-grant financing for adaptation making adapting to climate change impacts even more difficult especially since the resources of the SIDS *have* already been reduced by these impacts. The GCF follows closely with leveraging (similar to co-financing) and moves towards grant equivalency funding, which creates an illusion of increased adaptation funding. This finding reinforces the dominant discourse that it is better for public finance to unlock private capital for CCAF, and it is linked to the two following findings. Firstly, while the UNCFM talks about public finance unlocking private finance and the SIDS have acknowledged that public finance alone will not be able to meet the bulk of finance required to deal with climate change, the SIDS have also importantly observed that crowding-in private finance also locks out CCAF. This is because private investors do not see adaptation measures as a revenue stream. However, where public goods do not attract markets, governments have a responsibility to step in with financial resources and minimise doubts about its availability. This finding is supported by Bowen (2011; 2014), Glemarec (2010) and Juergens (2012) who concluded that expanding the scale and scope of the CDM along with the use of international financial institutions' balance sheets were now useful financial mechanisms and therefore public finance may be necessary to leverage private finance.

Additionally, Gomez- Echeverri (2013) was quick to point that the role of public funds was quickly emerging as a catalyst for funding, rather than the main source of funding. As pointed out by SD, “when you have public goods for which you don't have any markets, then government should step in and basically do the public financing”. At the same time, Parks and Roberts (2009, 385-409) and Ciplet and Roberts (2017a), emphasised that this shift to private finance for CCAF disacknowledges the ecological debt owed by the developed world to the developing world, in particular the SIDS, while Whitley (2013) reminded us that there was still no universal agreed to definition for ‘private finance’. Secondly, market-based mechanisms are an integral part of the UNCFM, particularly for the AF which was meant to receive and provide funding mainly to the SIDS and LDCs from the now collapsed CDM. Additionally, the targeting by the UNCFM of private financing to meet public shortfalls resulted in a push towards non-grant financial instruments. Moreover, market-based mechanisms received a significant boost under the recent Paris Agreement, leaving doubts whether adaptation can be commodified and the extent to which the natural resources of some SIDS will play a central role. However, the AOSIS was careful to point out that that use of market-based mechanisms must not erode the environmental integrity of Parties' NDCs, individually or in aggregate (AOSIS 2117-SBSTA). As already pointed out, NbS, as a climate change solution, is a specific action being driven by the elites to compliment adaptation solutions.

These findings demonstrate that CCAF was underpinned from the inception of the Convention by a neoliberal based market system which is driven by rational choice models of institutional bargaining where non excludability is not equivalent to unanimity in reaching cooperation (Young 1991) and absolute gains, by the powerful, as the preference in furtherance of cooperation in support of climate change solutions (Hasenclever 2002; Snidal 1991). The weight of the market-based approach has seemingly dwarfed the efforts of the SIDS at constructing interests and identities through intersubjective understandings to produce a dominant 'public finance for CCAF' discourse. It also exposes the challenges that the SIDS face with not being able to operate at scale due to its small private sector, comparatively speaking, and consequent inabilities to attract the kind of venture capital needed to catalyze investments into adaptation and mitigation solutions. The fact that the SIDS are aware of not being able to adapt themselves out of this climate crisis has seemingly triggered risky political actions such as siding with the developed county Parties (historical polluters) against their G77+China partners in pushing for significant mitigation ambitions on their part, in a hopeful exchange for CCAF. These findings are consistent with the literature, theory, and the researcher's earlier opinion.

The research also found that within the regime of the UNCFM there is an inverse relationship between adaptation and mitigation which translates into more mitigation means less adaptation and, by extension, reduced adaptation costs, which does not reflect the reality of the SIDS. In fact, less adaptation would result in further loss and damage to the SIDS to which a monetary loss value is difficult to determine. Further, what the SIDS require is more adaptation actions alongside mitigation actions on the part of the large emitters of GHGs. This finding presents the dichotomy of the SIDS being caught between the dominant mitigation discourse and the adaptation counter discourse. The analysis of the coded discourse challenged the concept of more mitigation means less adaptation. In fact, what we are experiencing is less mitigation, and that means *more* adaptation is needed.

Consequently, linking CCAF to mitigation and equating adaptation to mitigation, as expressed in the PA, represents a betrayal to the SIDS by the developed country Parties. It is the classical knowledge-power dominance that favour the elites within the UNCFM. Lending support in favour of more mitigation are Markandya and Galarraga (2011, 66-74), Buchner et al. (2011), Persson (2011) and Lobell et al. (2008) who hold the view that more mitigation today saves future adaptation costs. While Eyckmans et al. (2016, 429) suggested that “if the North wishes to change the balance between mitigation, adaptation and consumption it should structure its transfers as ‘matching grants’, which are tied to the South’s own level of funding”. This is classical neoliberal financial dominant discourse which the SIDS cannot match due to fiscal constraints because of their heavy debt burden, occasioned by climate change that the neoliberals caused in the first place.

Adding to the fiscal burdens of the SIDS is the finding that co-financing ratios, which apply to mitigation and adaptation projects, represent financial sums greater than the project sums, and a part of the financial qualifications for project approvals. In essence, the SIDS must raise more funds than they require in order to qualify for what they actually require from the GEF and GCF. However, apart from being an integral part of the GEF and the GCF financing, they pose a burden on the SIDS in meeting such ratios. Brown et al. (2011) lends support to the effects on the SIDS of co-financing. They posited that high ratios are an indication that public finance was used to reduce risk to investments. That means the public finance is going to the large financial institutions to protect their investments and not mainly as CCAF for the SIDS. Of course, the dominant discourse is that public finance will unlock much needed private capital to fund adaptation. Consequently, the principles governing adaptation finance reflect the neoliberal justice construct which emphasises voluntary action, leveraging private finance and market-based strategies, and a refusal by wealthy countries to define commitments in relation to responsibility, developing country needs, liability, or historical debt. (Khan et al. 2020). Further, the Adaptation Gap Report (2020) confirmed that “[a]s of August 2020, US$3.73 billion in co-finance had been committed, mainly by national governments and MDBs" (30), in addition to confirmation that co-financing was a necessary ingredient for CCAF. It was put thusly:

> An analysis of NbS for adaptation financing through … the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Adaptation Fund (AF) and the International Climate Fund (IKI) shows a total investment of US$18.8 billion directly in support of climate change mitigation and adaptation over the last 30 years … supplemented by over US$75 billion in co-financing (57).

This finding suggests that the demand for co-financing from national governments is an additional fiscal burden on states such as the SIDS, and it is difficult not to conclude that the SIDS are being pressured to pay for its own adaptation. Reflective in this approach, is a reminder that the CCAF obligation norm did not ripen into an 'obligation norm', as expected. As pointed out by JC on the burden co-financing poses to the SIDS, "I think it should be grants, you are being placed back several steps, several times because, you know, a devastating hurricane passes by, [and] now you have to…take a loan to address a situation that you really did not create in the first place". These findings are consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's earlier opinion.

There is overwhelming recognition that accessing CCAF is made difficult for the SIDS by the elites within the UNCFM. The research found that the challenges the SIDS face in accessing CCAF do not fall exclusively on the part of the UNCFM, but to a lesser extent on the SIDS as well. However, in their attempt to protect themselves from risks in making CCAF available, the mechanisms of the UNCFM, whether intentionally or unintentionally, act as barriers instead of enablers, while the complexity of access procedures and capacity constraints of the SIDS results in implementation deficits and absorptive capacity negatives. Further, even as the SIDS grapple with solutions towards accessing CCAF, the application requirements by the entities of the UNCFM, to enable access to financing and accountability are complicated, repetitive, expensive, and frustrating. Consequently, the SIDS are of the view that it is difficult to credit progress seen in their countries to adaptation interventions, given that accountability measures are in the hands of UNCFM, and perhaps it was time that the SIDS themselves establish their own mechanisms to hold the UNCFM accountable for the processes they use to determine successful project application and implementation. Additionally, requirements imposed on the SIDS in accessing CCAF allowed the UNCFM to create structures that obscure opportunities for national agencies in the SIDS and, at the same time dominate structures of governance within them through linkages to NDCs, NCs, BURs, NAPAs, NAMAs and MIEs, creating in the process, transparency and fiduciary overload. To combat this type of dominance, the SIDS have situated themselves within the broader developing countries' frameworks, an action which unfortunately tends to dwarf their own voices within the international arena. These findings reflect the dominance of the knowledge-power nexus within the UNCFM underpinned by neoliberal instruments of control and extra territorial reach consistent with rational choice theory of hegemony within IREs (Cox 1981), and the struggle by the SIDS to construct a counter discourse through norm application, communicative actions and intersubjective understandings (Ruggie 1998, Ruggie and Kratochwil 1986; Reus Smit 2009; Kratochwil 1989; Viotti and Kauppi 2012).

Ahenkan and Musah-Surugu (2015), in their research, lent credence to the UNCFM acting as barriers to access due to fragmentation of funds across multiple financial institutions creating, in the process, a twin problem of non-awareness of some funds and different sets of requirements for access due to the multiple financial delivery mechanisms for CCAF. They reported, for example, that respondents thereto, revealed that "if Ghana wants to access most of the fund it qualifies to access it needs to also perform different preparatory activities, [and] provide different reporting and monitoring activities" (174), taxing their already strained capacity system. Additionally, the respondents indicated that if the private sector is not well involved it will be a huge challenge towards raising local funds for projects "which will help access much bigger international funds" (173-174). Additionally, Bhattacharyya (2013) points out that mechanisms such as the CDM and other innovations are unfriendly to countries like the SIDS due to their inability to operate at scale and benefit. Consequently, countries such as India, China, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico, are the ones who are able to access benefits from the

CDM. However, Aakre and Rubellke (2010) argued that CCAF was not meant to be subjected to the global benefits test and access should be easier for the SIDS. However, we need to keep in mind the hegemonic role of IFIs (Beltran et al. 2011; Bumpus & Liverman 2008). Further, Ayers and Huq (2009) and Möhner and Klein (2007) pointed out that CCAF for the SIDS will be inaccessible once GHGs continue to rise.

However, Doshi and Garschagen (2020), in their adaptation finance research between a donor (Germany) and a recipient (India), found that the international community model used in considering the distribution and allocation of such finance, based on a normative and political level to prioritize countries with high vulnerability, did not pan out as accurate. Instead, the researchers found other key factors. From a donor perspective they found consistency with development aid allocation models in relation to recipient need, donor interest, and recipient merit which include:

> [The] HDI, institutional capacity to manage resources, accountability, sustainability, absence of a conducive situation in the country, political priorities, behavior of other donors and diplomatic relations … recipient interest in climate change, signaled (sic) through country ownership and role in climate negotiations (Doshi and Garschagen 2020,15).

From the perspective of the recipient, it included:

> [Q]uality and relevance of the project proposals, political aspects, role of past projects and experience, and previous bilateral support. In addition, two constraining factors were highlighted: lack of technical capacity in project development and a silo culture and lack of transparency in decision-making (Doshi and Garschagen 2020).

This research brings into sharp focus the emphasis placed by the SIDS on being particularly vulnerable, as the marker for CCAF prioritization, revealing the necessity for other factors, some of which the research has found.

Importantly, DG lends support that the SIDS must shoulder some blame for not accessing CCAF. A critical factor was “our inability really to put the effort and … carry the fight to be able to access the financing”. Therefore, “[w]e’ll get the money and can’t use it” (JFC). As pointed out by one KI, “… there was a pilot of a simplified approval procedure and the GCF itself condemned its own procedure, saying basically we simplified paperwork, but we actually didn't simplify the process [laughter]" (JFC). Even CARICOM agreed to mainstreaming of climate change in National Development Plans as a means of facilitating access to climate financing. However, the promised direct access to SIDS, through NIEs, has not been the success story envisaged by the GCF. Like the AF, IEs are favoured over national ones, while new financial instruments will more than likely unlock private sector investments by equating financialization of climate finance governance with country ownership, in line with the desires of the elites within the UNCFM. These findings are consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's opinion.

The metrics surrounding prioritization of CCAF for SIDS do not reflect their realities, particularly their unique vulnerability due to climate change. In fact, what is being enforced by the UNCFM regime, as a benchmark for priority financing, are activities that provide measurements of emissions reductions and human beneficiaries in keeping with per capita GDP practice, emphasising in the process, alignments with environment and social policy safeguards, NDCs and the SDGs. However, the SIDS continue to argue, with some support from developed countries, that a vulnerability index was a much fairer means of assessing their eligibility for financing. In the view of the SIDS, good economic performance disqualifies them from concessionary financing, and bad economic performance signals capacity constraints in meeting UNCFM requirements for the same financial assistance.

This finding reflects a counter discourse by the SIDS to the dominant discourse of GDP as *the* measure of a country's economic status. The SIDS are very much aware that a high per capita GDP does not mean a country is not vulnerable. Guillaumont[93] lends some credence to the SIDS' position:

> If a vulnerability index is to be used in selecting certain countries for the allocation of long-term support by the international community, what needs to be measured is, naturally, the structural vulnerability, which essentially

[93] His paper examines the UN General Assembly's Economic Vulnerability index (EVI) as defined by its Committee for Development Policy.

> results from the size of the shocks that can arise and from a country's exposure to them (195) … [i]t seems reasonable to give equal weight to both the shock and exposure components so that the vulnerability index is an average of the exposure index … and the shock index … with equal weight given to trade shocks … and natural shocks (Guillaumont 2009, 204).

As GQB pointed out:

> [W]e don't think GDP per capita is always the best measure and that's been a step change of ours … what's the alternative? I don't know if we have come to a specific view as to what would be a better measure, whether it be the HDI, whether it be the vulnerability index. I think our broader view is that no one single index is perfect … remember when the GDP per capita index was put in, it was put in with the best of intentions. But, you know, obviously it's not really stood the test of time and the test of life, really.

However, there is still that connection to per capita measurement. While Guillaumont (2009) suggested the inclusion of low income per capita and a low level of human capital, the author also pointed out that "… once a country reaches a per capita income level well above the low-income threshold and has a relatively high level of human capital, although still vulnerable, it is likely to graduate from the list", which is precisely one of the problems the SIDS wish to avoid. Support for this position was lent by HSC who pointed out that a vulnerability index "… is very dangerous because it is a double-edged sword for a middle-income country like Barbados, because we always come across as not vulnerable as others. So, something is wrong with how we are going about developing these indicators". Guillaumont (2009) however, sees a vulnerability index as providing a relevant criterion for aid allocation among vulnerable countries. However, even though there is a proposal for the vulnerable index to be used as one of the criteria for aid allocation, the index must be widely recognized and accepted. The power being exhibited within this finding is textual resulting in the exclusion from decisions by the COP, matters such as a vulnerability index, as a measure of development. A similar observation lies within the regime of per capita GDP and the graduation of countries into and out of poverty. The less countries that are in the low per capita GDP bracket, the less financial resources, at very low costs, developed countries would have to mobilize to meet their commitments under ODA and the UNCFM. This finding is consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's opinion.

In light of the foregoing, the changes that occurred within the UNCFM regime, particularly the GEF, GCF and the AF, that affected priorities relating to the provision of CCAF for the SIDS surround the decision to pursue a market-based approach to the provision of CCAF, rather than the expected public financing by the SIDS. As a consequence, other changes occurred which affected priorities that include the consistent drive to have the SIDS mainstream adaptation and climate actions into national budgets; mainstreaming of climate related risks into investment decisions; introduction of sustainability investment criteria and climate related disclosure principles; transitioning from grant to non-grant financing for adaptation; mainstreaming NbS and climate related risks; linking access to neoliberal market fiduciary standards; the use of other factors beyond vulnerability to determine access and eligibility for CCAF; the non-internalization of CCAF as an obligation norm; targeting by the UNCFM of private financing to meet public shortfalls; pursuing of the construct that more mitigation means less adaptation and, by extension, reduced adaptation costs; the use of public finance as a catalyst to unlocking CCAF for the SIDS; the use of public finance, as a first choice to protect private risks to private capital in unlocking CCAF for the SIDS; the decision to link NDCs to unlocking CCAF for the SIDS; leveraging private finance and market-based strategies; creating the conditions for co-financing and leveraging ratios in order to access CCAF; and non-acceptance of liability for developed countries historical debt. It is therefore more likely than not, that these changes within the UNCFM affected the prioritization of CCAF for the SIDS that is adequate, predictable, and new and additional.

7.5.3 Analytic Category 3: Organization Behaviour

The third question seeks to determine the extent to which organization behaviour influences the actions of the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and GCF, in the provision of CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the UNFCCC and the UNCFM have characteristics of

IREs and IIs, which preclude them from humanistic actions (Hasenclever et al. 2002). However, since IREs are embedded in IOs, and the UNFCCC and the UNCFM are also IOs, *a fortiori* they conform to humanistic actions. Consequently, the UNCFM (IREs), ought not to be examined outside the rubric of the IOs within which they are embedded. Obviously, it was recognized that the UNCFM, being an IRE embedded in the UNFCCC (an IO), presented a dichotomous struggle that led to multiple layered actions due to the researcher's inability to determine if they (IREs and IOs) were mutually interacting, particularly since absolute gains were pursued by the UNCFM, as an IO. Put another way, uncertainty surrounds whether the UNCFM, in its functions as an IRE, was at the same time mutually interacting, when it functioned as an IO, though that was the expectation.

The UNCFM, as an IRE embedded within the UNFCCC, comprised a complex of four elements:

(a) actors that have physical qualities, such as staff, headquarters and resources, who effectively pursue a policy;

(b) a normative framework of principles and rules governing the organization;

(c) state membership of the organizations; and

(d) a bureaucracy with formal leadership at the center of the organization.

Each of these elements presented characteristics of organizational behaviour.

Importantly, the UNCFM, as a norm entrepreneur, was able to construct norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) using its IO status aligned to their specific agenda, and through cognitive frames, language and names. Consequently, the UNCFM acted as a cultural site of authority that diffused new norms, principles, and actors around the globe, supported by state power to spread the benefits of particular norms (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 712-715). The UNCFM had diffused norms such as 'public finance as a catalyst to unlocking CCAF', 'more mitigation means less adaptation', and 'co-financing and leveraging ratios in order to access CCAF'. According to Shannon (2000), norms and rationality are intimately connected and cannot be separated from normative influence or change.

Therefore, contesting norms against rationality or rational choice was unhelpful in explaining political processes observed in empirical research.

In this effort, the UNCFM, as an IO and independent actor, with multiple agendas and sources of agency, utilized its knowledge-power nexus and rational choice models, such as absolute gains and institutional bargaining, to diffuse these norms (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). However, while acknowledging that most IOs were created as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) questioned the extent to which IOs follow the purposes for which they were created. Specifically, in their view, IOs are social facts that respond, as a priority, to normative and cultural forces that shape how organizations see the world and conceptualize their own missions, and not as power drivers. In the result, the UNCFM, as an IO involved in norm generation and diffusion, developed distinctive cultures that led to dysfunctional behaviour that was pathological and bred by its own bureaucratic cultures, such as irrationality, rationalization~~,~~ universalism, organizational insulation, exclusion and dominant discourses, cultural contestation and the normalization of deviance, counter to the interests of CCAF.

The UNCFM functioning as an II, presented behavioural characteristics similar to when it functioned as an IO. Like IREs, IIs comprised norms, rules, ideas, beliefs and values that constituted the social world as structures, practices, identities and expectations about how the world worked and what constituted legitimate behaviour (Viotti and Kauppi 2012; Farrell 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020). Therefore, as pointed out by Hansclever et al. (2002), regime resilience was accomplished by institutions exhibiting staying power in the face of difficult and exogeneous challenges and they did manage to forge cooperation. With state power ceasing to be the sole explanatory factor and becoming part of what was to be explained (Aalberts and van Munster 2008), and that "… institutions reflect the power prevailing at their point of origin and tend[ing] … to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations" (Cox 1986, 219), the UNCFM began to experience intersubjective constraints on behaviour (Aalberts and van Munster 2008) with hegemonic structures operating as a fit between power, ideas and institutions (Hasenclever et al. 2002).

Its relationship, between and among its constituent parts reflected the application of intersubjective understandings between the SIDS, as agents, and the UNCFM as an ideational structure comprising identities and interests that favoured the elites within the UNCFM. In this mode, the UNCFM operated as a persuasive and dialogical leader seeking consensus among the Parties. In a second relationship, the UNCFM operated in pursuit of absolute gains and forged ahead with decisions even though there was no ‘true’ unanimity among the Parties, by applying Young’s institutional bargaining and theory of collective goods. In a third relationship, the UNCFM operated as a hegemon, but in this case with anarchy being socially constructed, subjective and intersubjective understandings worked to prevent a Hobbesian outcome. (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 284-285). However, the decisions of the UNCFM were made primarily for the benefit of the transnationally dominant social class and their allies (Hasenclever et al. 2002). What we therefore observed, was a pretense that intersubjective understandings were meant to benefit all Parties, SIDS inclusive, but recognized instead that it served the purpose of reducing the impact of hegemonic orders in order to achieve absolute gains. In its final relationship, the UNCFM had not ruled out a pursuit of relative gains which was made easier through its use of power via intertextuality and semiotics as demonstrated earlier in this chapter. While Mearsheimer (2001) acknowledged that IIs increased the prospects of cooperation in a given issue area, the author posited that there was little evidence that institutions can convince the great powers to act against the dictates of realism. However, there are other great and medium powers within the UNCFM that push it to seek absolute gains instead, and other lesser powers within it that continue to seek consensus through intersubjective understandings, albeit not always to the advantage of the SIDS. At this point, it appears that within the UNCFM there are mutually constituted interactions between agents and structures, albeit in a layered manner. This section concluded by positing the pursuit by the UNCFM of absolute gains; its operating as a bureaucracy; operating as an IRE; its construction and diffusion of norms; and the practice of intersubjective understandings, were all varied types of organization behaviour exhibited by it that influenced the provision of CCAF to the SIDS, that was not new and additional.

7.5.4 Analytic Category 4: Climate Finance Uncertainties

The fourth research question seeks to determine the contribution of uncertainty to the provision of CCAF that is not new and additional. Importantly, there is no new and additional finance. Climate finance comes from the overseas development assistance funding platform. For many donors, climate finance *is* development finance and reflective of a finding that challenges the dominant discourse of new and additional. The analysis of the coded discourse revealed that multiple references by the COP, GEF and GCF, in particular, to 'new and additional' represented an inferential and manipulative predicate aimed at presenting it as a common-sense view that the SIDS would simply accept. Lending support, Scoville-Simonds (2016) pointed out that there is no mechanism to prevent donors from systematically indicating, under the 'Rio marking' process, adaptation in every field of ODA activity thus making it appear as new and additional. However, funding for building resilience to climate change (which is additional to ODA) contributions must be distinguished from that for building resilience to climate variability which could be included in ODA contributions (Ayers and Huq 2009, 680; Klein and Persson, 2008). Ciplet et al. (2013) and Shrivastava and Upadhyaya (2014) also provided credence to this view by pointing out that additionality was also affected when bilateral funds, such as ODA, were offered with mitigation and adaptation labels as conditionalities, which in essence amounted to re-labelling, recycling or renaming them as new and additional. It is therefore better to channel new and additional funds through the AF rather than bilaterally (Haites, 2014; Fankhauser and Burton 2013) and seek clearer pathways to additionality from mechanisms such as auctioning under emissions trading schemes; export credits and insurance schemes (Pickering et al. 2013; Frank et al 2013, 4-46; Brown et al. 2010). However, the researcher established that most of, if not all, of the CCAF provided to the UNCFM comes from ODA.

An overwhelming majority of KIs felt that funds provided for climate finance are not new and additional. As pointed out by one KI:

> [T]he argument from the beginning was that the resources should be new and additional, but I don't see a lot of evidence that that is the case at this time. In a way much of the findings have been that the funds that we are seeing, that we are receiving is just rescheduled funds or reappropriated funds, some of which may be ODA … and therefore, there [isn't] that evidence, that much of it is really new (DG).

Lending support, OG pointed out that it was never new because what went into the GEF was almost predetermined. "You sort of knew that GEF had this particular budget". However, MP approached it differently and suggested that "it might just be an additional outcome of the same, of the same US dollar and that would be new and additional in a way because you may design something better so that you also get resilience outcomes out of it". The fact that the CCAF norm did not become obligatory, provides a better understanding of why CCAF is not adequate, predictable, and new and additional for the SIDS. What is evident is the power of the counter discourse which crowded out the knowledge-power influence of the elites (Foucault 1976) and crowded in (Hall 1997) counter discourses driven by the SIDS through the pursuit of intersubjective understandings within and outside the UNCFM, and academics across the climate change field. This counter discourse, which was constructed through knowledge had, as a necessary companion, its own power (Foucault 1976), and where there is power, there will be resistance (Gang 2015). This is linked to the finding that speaks to uncertainty within the UNCFM regime. In this regard, the research found that the mobilization and identification of CCAF for the SIDS, as captured by the SCF, was influenced by several predatory factors ranging from definitional and methodological issues, absence of disaggregated data, long term financial focus on mitigation, public and private finance for adaptation and mitigation, and a wide range and mixture of instruments and sources.

Consequently, the SIDS assert that only promises of CCAF are being made and the developed countries should consider using the same alacrity exhibited in addressing the COVID-19-19 pandemic to address adaptation financing. After all, if the environment is not protected, more bouts of COVID-19-19 will descend on us.

As pointed out in Chapter 1, there is uncertainty surrounding a range of definitions for climate finance. Further, wherever uncertainty is present it will affect the capabilities of Parties within the UNCFM, along a full performance spectrum, in the provision to the SIDS of adequate and predictable CCAF that is new and additional. Lending to the importance of uncertainty in decision making, was Samsami et al. (2015) who posited that uncertainty is the gap between what we know and what we need to know in order to make correct decisions, and in that context, where decision makers lack confidence that they understand what the major trends are, or, they are unable to assign probabilities to the likelihood of an event occurring, perceived environmental uncertainty exists affecting their decision making (Elenkov's 1977, 287-302). Consequently, the inability of the SIDS to produce sufficient knowledge to fill that gap and assign probabilities hinders its contribution to decision making under conditions of uncertainty, within the UNCFM. However, Brugnach et al. (2008, 1-16) posited that uncertainty was now an acceptable fact and decision makers need to find ways of adjusting their management techniques to adapt to unexpected conditions and that firms should only reduce uncertainty under stable environmental conditions, as it is quite possible that uncertainty may be functional in an unstable environment, particularly at the strategy-making level of the organization (Bourgeois 1985, 548-573). What is being witnessed within the UNCFM seems to mirror this observation, in that notwithstanding decades since the Convention, critical CCF definitions have not been settled, but decisions about CCF are being made continuously, notwithstanding the significant amount of socioeconomic and scientific uncertainties affecting climate change policy making (Lempert et al. 2004).

It is also important to note that uncertainty might be reduced using concepts such persuasive communication, dialogical learning, and negotiation (Brugnach et al. 2008, 1-16), which is an emphasis on intersubjective understandings. Saunders et al. (2015, 467-78) and Samsami (2015) lent support to this view, positing that the nature of uncertainty was behavioural and cognitive, which was not easily measured on a scale, but better understood through explorations and explanations. Uncertainty is therefore the reason why people retain money. Similarly, institutionalists see money, as an essential institution, where uncertainty plays a crucial role (Ferrari and Conceição 2005). Money move projects and uncertainty adds up as a contributing factor affecting the allocation of CCAF to the SIDS that is new and additional. As pointed out by Khan et al. (2020) "where there is ambiguity…powerful countries often creatively interpret expectations according to their own self-interests" (15). These findings are consistent with the literature, theory and the researcher's opinion. Considering the above, the researcher concludes that the uncertainties highlighted within the UNCFM contributed to the provision of CCAF that is not new and additional. Having regard to the extent of uncertainty within the UNCFM, and the fact that decisions are still being made thereunder, more than likely those decisions will reflect the views and objectives of the elites that control knowledge and power, and not contribute to distributive justice and the provision of CCAF to the SIDS that is adequate, predictable and new and additional.

7.5.5 Revisiting Assumptions from Chapter Four

This section revisits the assumptions made in Chapter 4 which were based on the researcher's professional experience, literature review and background in IR theory. They are now examined against the findings of the research.

The first assumption was that interactions among Parties within the UNCFM produced intersubjective meanings and understanding expressed through the formation of norms, interests, identity, structure and agency, contrary to the interests of SIDS. This assumption was based on the premise that the composition of the UNCFM regime reflected an asymmetrical association among the Parties. This assumption held true according to the findings associated with the Analytical Categories of Concepts Through Interactions and Organization Behaviour.

The second assumption was that dominant discourse was driven by the developed country Parties and imposed on the SIDS during the negotiation and decision-making stages of the COPs. This assumption was based on the ability of developed country Parties to be persuasive in encouraging the SIDS to confirm to their general thinking. This assumption held true according to the findings associated with the Analytical Categories of Concepts Through Interactions and Changes Affecting Priorities.

The third assumption was, with the absence of international agreed definitions of key CCAF terms, the UNCFM was unable to determine the amount of funds required for CCAF. This assumption was based on the premise that the absence of international agreed definitions of key CCAF terms would result in uncertainty within the UNCFM. This assumption held true according to the findings associated with the Analytical Category of Climate Finance Uncertainties. However, it was also held partially true under the Analytic Category of Changes Affecting Priorities where the Adaptation Gap Report provided a figure for CCAF notwithstanding its own acknowledgement that there was no agreed to international definition of CCAF.

The fourth assumption was that the shift from a bias in favour of public financing for CCA to one in favour of using public finance to unlock private finance and the concept of co-financing resulted in difficulties on the part of the SIDS to unlock CCAF from the UNCFM. This assumption was based on the premise that the SIDS had limited financial and human capacities to deal with such a complex financial mechanism. This assumption held true according to the findings associated with Analytical Category of Changes Affecting Priorities. Figure 7. 1 presents a display of the key research knowledge outcomes due to the interaction of findings, analysis, interpretation and synthesis.

(A)

Research Findings

(thirty one in toal)

This tells us the 'What'

Generated by:

1. Anlaysis of the perceptions held by KIs of actors conduct in the provision of CCAF.

2. Analysis of Reports on actors actions within the UNCFM (COP, GEF, AF, GCF and AOSIS).

3. Analysis of a genealogy of actions actions and structural changes within the UNCFM.

(B)

Analysis and Interpretation of Research Findings

This tells us the 'Why'

Achieved by:

1. Applyication of discourse analysis to actors' conduct to produce outcomes.

2. Application of cross-case analysis to actors' conduct to produce outcomes.

3. Application of a genealogy of CCAF within the UNCFM.

4. Application of constructivism to actors' conduct to produce outcomes.

5. Interpretation via triangulation and synsthesis of analytical outcomes, research implications and current CCAF discourse to generate the 'why' (research knowledge).

(C)

Research Knowledge

The 'Why"

1. Dominant discourse, a cause of unequal power relations, constructed the SIDS as subordinate, responsive to apeals, and financially disadvanteged.

2. SIDS' counter discourse of 'historical responsibility' produced by subjugated knowledge' did not mature into a dominante discourse.

3. The hegemon's grip on power, knowledge and intersubjective understandings resulted in his values becoming the 'commonsense' of the populations.

4. Power (textual and semiotic) is consensual, achieved through acceptance by the subjugated of the UNCFM textual outcomes (decisions, etc).

Figure 7. 1: Findings, Analysis and Interpretation, and Research Knowledge Matrix

7.6 Summary

This chapter analysed, interpreted and synthesised the findings that emerged in Chapter 6 and provided answers to the research questions surrounding perceptions held by KIs, triangulated by views expressed in documents about concepts through interactions; changes affecting priorities; organization behaviour and climate finance uncertainties. To conduct the analysis, interpretation and synthesis of the findings, three methods were applied to the coded discourse, namely, a Foucauldian driven discourse analysis and genealogy; a Ruggie inspired constructivism; and cross case analysis. The results from applying a Foucauldian driven discourse analysis and genealogy, and a Ruggie inspired constructivism were used along with cross case analysis to interpret and synthesise the findings, achieving data triangulation in the process. Resulting from the interpretation and synthesis of the findings were the details of the concepts through interactions; changes affecting priorities; organization behaviour and climate finance uncertainties surrounding the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF, and some explanations as to why this was so.

The aim was to produce a multi layered holistic and integrated synthesis of the findings. Importantly, making sense of large chunks of data and looking for patterns and themes proved challenging throughout the data analysis phases of the research, which was interlocking and not separate. Additionally, developing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data revealed was also challenging. Even though the assumptions were held, the following degree of caution was expressed. Though the research sample was reasonably large, comprising 32 interview transcripts and 94 documents, due to the nature of qualitative research the researcher refrained from making any generalizations and confined the findings to the research sites. Secondly, the focus was on how the findings explained the actions of Parties within the UNCFM. Thirdly, the emphasis was not on the KI’s per se, but how what they said explained the perceptions held relating to CCAF. Therefore, the implications drawn were specific to the SIDS and the UNCFM.

We do recognize that with the researcher-as-instrument, as expected in qualitative research, some bias may entail but this was minimised through critical reflections; data triangulation using multiple methods to capture the data; interpretation integrity through the use of multiple methods for analysing the findings; and note taking through memoing. Finally, we also acknowledge that others might tell this story differently hence the lengthy list of annexes to reduce bias and increase the credibility of the research.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this multi method qualitative study is to explore, with a sample of key informants, triangulated with documentary information, the perception that actions of Parties within the UNCFM, particularly the AF, GEF and the GCF, contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to the SIDS that is not new and additional. Neither is it disbursed on a timely basis. Grounded in IR theories, it is anticipated that, through an enhanced empirical understanding of key activities within the UNCFM, the SIDS, severally and individually, will be able to make more informed decisions and adopt better negotiating positions towards accessing CCAF. The level of analysis is the international system, and the units of analysis are the UNFCCC and the UNCFM, in particular the AF, GEF and the GCF.

The conclusions of this study emanate for the research findings and fall under the following four areas:

(a) concepts through interactions;

(b) changes affecting priorities;

(c) organization behaviour; and

(d) climate finance uncertainties.

Following is a discussion of the conclusions drawn from the research, recommendations, and a reflection of the study.

8.1 Conclusions

Looking at the various concepts that arose through interactions among Parties within the UNCFM, balanced country representation will not prevent structures of dominance prevailing within the UNCFM, and the SIDS should expect that developed country Parties will continue to direct and determine the use of CCAF. Additionally, vulnerability as a special category for the SIDS is likely to continue plaguing the UNCFM, due to the uncertainty about its meaning and measurement, and the influence of the LDCs and Latin American groupings in competing for equal categorization. Importantly, the SIDS should not expect the capacity building modules, built into projects and programmes, to serve their interests, and unless it is nationally and regionally driven, capacity constraints will continue among the SIDS. Further, the accrediting platform is not designed for easy access by the SIDS but rather control by the MIEs and IEs in order to dominate the procurement process. Consequently, the SIDS should not expect any type of directional language, from the COP, towards the UNCFM that would provide changes in the short term. The SIDS' support to the developed country Parties' push for developing countries to significantly reduce their emissions, and the resultant unequal support by them for provision of CCAF to the SIDS, will likely continue, principally because the objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, as a priority over adaptation. Consequently, there will likely be less effort to finance adaptation and loss and damage unless the science generated through the IPCC indicates it is pivotal to mitigation outcomes.

While the notion of historical responsibility remains among the SIDS, within the UNCFM it is only in spirit and the thrust is for all Parties, including the SIDS, to mitigate the effects of climate change. The international finance system and the politics of control will more than likely continue to use ODA as its principal funding assistance platform and the SIDS should recognize that there is no new and additional finance, and there may not be any, anytime soon. Therefore, any resistance or hesitancy by the SIDS in mainstreaming adaptation into development, as a means of separating ODA from CCAF, appears to be futile. What becomes clear is the requirement for an economic integrated planning process, that obviates insularity and territoriality in the creation of a climate resilient society that aligns outcomes with existing development platforms.

The neoliberal market-based system of the UNCFM, constructed around the CDM as a means of raising CCAF for SIDS, has failed. Therefore, little confidence will be placed in the new one (still undefined) that is located within the PA. To that end, the general view is that it will fail once the emissions market is based on excess emissions and not on emissions generally across sectors. Secondly, failure is anticipated if it is based (in part or exclusively) on adaptation which is difficult to commodify. Additionally, the neoliberal market-based system will continue to pressure and crowd out public finance, making CCAF more difficult to raise, and since the SIDS, because of scale, are unable to attract private capital, the new market based financial instruments available for raising CCAF will likely elude them. Further, because it is underpinned by projects as its main delivery mechanism for CCAF, the expectation is that the financial market will continue to underserve even though there is more finance available. Importantly, the complex fiduciary and transparency international systems will continue to prevent the SIDS from accessing much needed public CCAF, therefore the SIDS should not expect any changes to co-financing ratios and leveraging as prerequisites for accessing CCAF. Further, the climate change solutions trajectory will focus towards reinforcing the dominant discourse that more mitigation by all Parties means less adaptation by the SIDS. Additionally, the SIDS must recognise that developed country Parties and the UNCFM exercise extra territorial influence within their national finance systems through actions such as NCs, BURs, NAPAs, NAMAs, AML-CFT, and MIEs. Further, the SIDS should not expect changes to GDP, as a measure of per capita, in favour of a vulnerability index, because it seemingly facilitates control and manipulation of financial planning by the developed country Parties.

The hegemonic tendency of the UNCFM is expected to continue even as it exploits absolute gains and seek interpretive and intersubjective understandings. Therefore, the elites within the UNCFM are likely to continue preventing CCAF from becoming an obligatory norm as provided for under the Convention. At the same time, the elites will pressure the SIDS to provide outcomes favourable to them under the guise of consensus but facilitated by side payments. They will resort to intersubjective understandings to construct only those outcomes that suit them, such as ‘more mitigation means leas adaptation’, while they anticipate the SIDS continuing to play the role of subjects who need the elites to survive, even though better options are available to SIDS.

Based on the persistent climate finance uncertainties within the UNCFM, there seems to be no real intention to provide international agreed upon certainty to key financial terms. Therefore, definitional and methodological issues, and absence of disaggregated data in relation to CCAF sources and flows, are likely to continue, and only the developed country Parties will be able to make decisions under these uncertain conditions. With only the developed country Parties being able to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, the SIDS will continue to experience high transactions costs; capacity negatives; burdensome financial instruments and fiduciary standards; and efforts to commodify adaptation through the NbS platform. Additionally, the AOSIS as the main negotiation body for the SIDS, will be used by the more developing countries, therein, to achieve their objectives without any meaningful quid pro quo for the SIDS. Consequently, doubts surrounding the usefulness of the G77+China as the OASIS' negotiation platform for CCAF will remain.

Pursuant to the knowledge generated from this research, the SIDS have new insights into decisions contributing to CCAF and an empirical basis for collective negotiation of CCAF. While the previous studies referred in this research examined CCAF, within the context of physical institutional financial systems and frameworks, this research, in contrast, focussed on human interactions underpinned by the relationship between intersubjective understanding among actors, the behaviour of regimes, and the influence of structure and power that make up those financial institutions located within the UNCFM. To wit, this research examined perceptions surrounding the actions of actors within the UNCFM, namely the COP, AOSIS, GEF, GCF and the AF in the provision of CCAF to the SIDS that is adequate, predictable, and new and additional. The point of generation of the research findings (31) – a point at which the research could have ended - which revealed actors conduct that prevented the provision of adequate, predicable and new and additional CCAF, proved insufficient in providing the SIDS with any new insights into why actors, within the UNCFM, acted such manner. To achieve new insights and knowledge, the researcher adopted a novel multi (four) method to analyse and interpret the research findings. Specifically, the researcher applied discourse analysis, cross-case analysis, and constructivism to actors' conduct, and a genealogy of CCAF within the UNCFM, to the research findings to produce outcomes relating to power, knowledge, subjugation, intersubjectivity and discursive mechanisms. These were then interpreted via a triangulation and synthesis of the outcomes, research implications, and current debate on CCAF, to produce the research knowledge. Four key research knowledge outcomes were found: (1) Dominant discourse, a cause of unequal power relations, constructed the SIDS as subordinate, responsive to appeals, and financially disadvantaged; (2) SIDS' counter discourse, produced by 'historically responsibility subjugated knowledge' did not mature into a dominant discourse; (3) The hegemon's grip on power, knowledge and intersubjective understandings resulted in his values becoming the 'common sense' of the populations; and (4) Power (textual and semiotic) is consensual, and achieved through acceptance by the subjugated of the UNCFM textual outcomes, in particular its decisions re CCAF.

Armed with these new insights, the SIDS now have empirical data on why the provision of CCAF has been inadequate, unpredictable, and not new and additional, which put them in a position to set up a better negotiation machinery, using the AOSIS as lead. In this regard, the SIDS should be cognisant of their key issues arising from the knowledge centres (OAS, UNCFM, World Bank, et al.) which include the use of ODA for CCF and CCAF not new and additional; crowding out of public financing and a debt trap for SIDS via the use of private financing; adoption by the UNCFM of a neo-liberal market-based system to drive climate solutions; use of mitigation actions to unlock CCAF; requirement for public financing for adaptation measures; use of GDP as the principal measure of development, commodification of climate change solutions; and dependence on the more developed mitigation nations lobbying for CCAF on behalf of the SIDS. With this clarity on the key issues, the SIDS, conferencing among themselves yearly, should make decisions which includes the classification of CCAF as a development issue, acknowledgement that climate change created an ecological debt owed to the SIDS, acknowledgement of absence of distributive and procedural justice, adaptation forms part of an integrated and aligned development of the SIDS, the GCF not operating as an MDB, and quantifying the principle of CBDR for meaningful application to SIDS. Further, the SIDS should conference once a year prior to the COP and determine its negotiation positions. Broadly speaking, the SIDS' negotiation goals/positions should include development of an adaptation finance goal; adaptation to be considered a global public good; delinking mitigation actions for adaptation outcomes; establishment of an independent negotiation machinery/ secretariat, led by AOSIS; 'historical responsibility', on a reducing basis, should be tradeable as equity in reducing the SIDS' current debt; and public finance should be made available to the SIDS via direct transfers.

To operationalise the SIDS' decisions and negotiation goals, an upgrade of the current AOSIS negotiation machinery into a fully established secretariat would be required, capitalising on current infrastructure such as CARICOM and the Pacific Forum, who can use their political influence to raise funds, and institutions such as the CCCCC and SPREP for the technical support to AOSIS. The secretariat, though permanent, can rotate between the CAICOM and Pacific SIDS. The signal difference of this 'new AOSIS' negotiation machinery is its recognition that the existing UNCFM, aside from being insufficient, more importantly crowds out public finance, and this new machinery would be more holistic in its approach to negotiating for CCAF, as part of a wider mandate of an integrated and aligned development pathway based on the needs of SIDS, and not on the mere existence of available funding mechanisms. Consider including fit for purpose Bynoe comment here. This new negotiation machinery, to achieve its negotiation goals, would embark on using discursive power via narrative texts, semiotics, and speeches, across the knowledge platforms, to develop counter discourses. Pervasive use should be made of narrative texts and speeches towards adaptation finance and ecological debt becoming a dominant discourse; use of narrative texts and speeches towards new and additional finance and 'historical responsibility' becoming a dominant discourse. This will be buttressed by create alliances 'for benefit' with developed and developing country Parties and key financial institutions by leveraging the AOSIS powerful UNFCC voting power. The endgame of this discursive approach is for the SIDS' views to become the 'common sense' of its population, the international financial community and developed and developing country Parties, reducing in the process, the unequal power relations between the Parties. Table 8. 1 displays an AOSIS Negotiation Matrix.

Table 8. 1: AOSIS Negotiation Matrix

Knowledge Centres:*	**Key CCAF Issues Arising from Knowledge Centres:**	**SIDS' Decisions on Issues from Knowledge Centres:** **	**Key Adaptation Negotiation Goals:** ***	**Tools to Achieve Negotiation Goals:**
ODA and Development Financing	ODA used for CCAF/CCF, which is not new and additional	Classify CCAF as a development issue	Adaptation to be considered a global public good	Discursive power to develop counter discourse ****
Climate Financing	Crowding out of public financing and a debt trap for SIDS via private financing	Climate change created an ecological debt owed to the SIDS	Development of an adaptation finance goal	Narrative texts speeches and semiotics towards adaptation finance becoming a dominant discourse
UNCFM	Adoption of neo-liberal market-based system to drive climate solutions	Absence of distributive and procedural justice	Delinking mitigation actions for adaptation outcomes	Narrative texts speeches and semiotics towards ecological debt becoming a dominant discourse
Paris Agreement	Mitigation actions to unlock CCAF	More mitigation does not mean less adaptation	Public financing via direct transfers	Narrative texts speeches and semiotics towards new and additional finance becoming a dominant discourse

Table 8.1 ***(continued)***

Knowledge Centres:*	**Key CCAF Issues Arising from Knowledge Centres:**	**SIDS' Decisions on Issues from Knowledge Centres:** **	**Key Adaptation Negotiation Goals:** ***	**Tools to Achieve Negotiation Goals:**
AOSIS/SIDS	Public financing for adaptation measures	Adaptation forms part of integrated and aligned development	Independent negotiation machinery/secretariat led by AOSIS*****	Create alliance by leveraging the AOSIS powerful UNFCC voting power
World Bank/IMF/G20	GDP as the principal measure of development	Quantifying the principle of CBDR for meaningful application to SIDS	Historical responsibility on a reducing basis should be tradeable as equity in reducing the SIDS' current debt	Narrative texts speeches and semiotics towards historical responsibility becoming a dominant discourse
Global Financing	Commodification of climate change solutions	GCF should not operate as an MDB	Public financing via direct transfers	Narrative texts speeches and semiotics towards ecological debt becoming a dominant discourse

Table 8.1 ***(continued)***

Knowledge Centres:*	**Key CCAF Issues Arising from Knowledge Centres:**	**SIDS' Decisions on Issues from Knowledge Centres:** **	**Key Adaptation Negotiation Goals:** ***	**Tools to Achieve Negotiation Goals:**
G77+China	Dependence on mitigation nations lobbying for CCAF	Yearly conferencing	Independent negotiation machinery/secretariat led by AOSIS	Narrative texts speeches and semiotics towards new and additional finance becoming a dominant discourse

*The full range of issues are at Annex K, and Recommendations.
** The full range of decisions for SIDS are in the Recommendations.
*** The full range of negotiation goals are in the Recommendations.
**** Across all knowledge centres.
***** Use of current CARICOM SIDS and Pacific SIDS Development Infrastructure and Institutions and negotiation of matters beyond adaptation such as international trade, finance and development

8.2 Recommendations

The recommendations offered are based on the findings, analysis and conclusions of the research, and are for the following groups: (a) the SIDS; (b) the UNCFM; (c) the AOSIS; (d) and further research.

8.2.1 Recommendation for the Small Island Developing States

The SIDS should contemplate the following:

1. Using the power of their numbers, within the UN, UNCFM and other IOs, as leverage to access national, organizational and global channels to negotiate better CCAF outcomes.
2. Establishing a mechanism to hold the UNCFM accountable for CCF allocated for CCAF via projects and programmes and audit of the metrics used to determine successful application and implementation.
3. Aligning development processes and resources through integrated planning towards better economic and development options, such as eco systems services and nature-based solutions.
4. Transitioning economies beyond adaptation and towards climate resilience and low carbon pathways that align outcomes with existing development platforms.
5. Promoting the concept, that the CCAF made available to the SIDS should be considered public and grant based irrespective of its source, and tradeable on a reducing basis as a historical debt for CCAF swap.
6. Promoting the concept that the historical debt, on a reducing basis, should be tradeable as equity in reducing the SIDS' current debt.
7. Developing a cadre of trained negotiators to lead all negotiations, complimented by academic, political and technical staff.
8. Treating adaptation as development to be mainstreamed into national and regional development plans that align with the SDGs, CSME, SENDAI and the PA.
9. Treating data capture and analysis as an obligatory activity for national and regional institutions.
10. Developing and maintaining the various dominant discourses and semiotics required for the SIDS' messaging to become dominant within the UNCFM.
11. Advocating for the GCF not to operate as a multilateral development bank.

8.2.2 Recommendation for the United Nations Climate Finance Mechanism

The UNCFM should consider the following:

1. Providing public grant-based CCAF funding for the SIDS as opposed to depending on the neoliberal market-based mechanism, and ease the fiscal burdens on their economies.
2. Providing CCAF to the SIDS via direct transfers to programmatic activities within national budgets, consistent with mainstreaming climate actions into national budgets with an embedded auditor from the UNCFM, removing issues surrounding access and accreditation in the process.
3. Allowing financial, fiduciary and transparency standards to evolve over time, consistent with the development trajectories of the SIDS.
4. Reducing CCF uncertainties by providing definitions for key finance terms.

8.2.3 Recommendation for the Alliance of Small Island States

1. Establishing a full-time negotiation machinery for the SIDS that goes beyond adaptation, transitioning into a full and permanent secretariat that negotiates matters including international trade, international finance, mitigation and the environment.
2. Negotiating as one block for an adaptation finance goal similar to the USD100 bn CCF goal, pressing the case in the adaptation and finance negotiation groupings.
3. Developing a cadre of trained negotiators to lead all negotiations, complimented by academic, political and technical staff.
4. Developing a negotiations rule book with layered negotiation positions to be taken depending on the matters in issue, such as mitigation, adaptation, climate resilience, low carbon development and nature-based solutions.
5. Advocating for the SIDS to peak their emissions as developing countries on a trajectory, similar to other countries, in keeping with climate justice, or if there are not enough emissions at scale for such an action, there is nothing to mitigate and hence no need for NDCs.

6. Holding an annual conference, prior to the COP, that discusses matters beyond the COP but relevant to effective negotiation.
7. Advocating for the new CER mechanism to have a tax on the emissions themselves and not on emissions reductions. In that way revenue will be more predictable.
8. Quantifying the principle of CBDR into a formula or formulae that produces a value that can be linked and applied to the GDP, vulnerability, and debt to income ratios of the SIDS for meaningful application.
9. Carefully aligning the SIDS' international interests to critical global economic and political forces within the current neo-liberal system, as a measure towards increasing its capacity, scaling up and becoming competitive.

8.2.4 Recommendation for Further Research

1. A similar study should be conducted within the GCF, using the same criteria and a sample therefrom, to determine the extent to which the market-based approach to raising CCF affects the provision of CCAF to the SIDS.
2. A similar study should be conducted within the AF, using the same criteria and a sample therefrom, to determine the extent to which mainstreaming adaptation into development obviates the need for a separate provision of CCAF to the SIDS.

8.3 Final Reflections

As I close this research, it is apposite to pause and look back at the journey that has led me to this point. This was a journey filled with discoveries, revelations, enlightenments, and new convictions. For me, the complexities of the UNCFM were mind boggling, to say the least, while interacting with documents from the COPs and the visuals of actual negotiations left me with the impression that consensus would not always be an easy achievement. In many ways, the COPs are like a jungle filled with adventure and danger. However, it was indeed fulfilling and a joy to capture and share the thoughts of so many key informants, which I hoped you would have found pleasure in reading. My fondest hope is that I was able to unmask the challenges surrounding the provision of CCAF to the SIDS in a manner that allowed you to be demystified. Finally, I am grateful for the knowledge empowerment I received by conducting this research.

8.4 Summary by Chapters

Chapter 1 dealt with the background, the research problem along with the research questions, while Chapter 2 reviewed the literature surrounding adaptation justice, CCF, CCA, CCAF, culminating with a Literature Review Matrix, and Chapter 3 examined the literature surrounding IR and IREs theories, settling with constructivism as best suited for the research, and ending with a Theoretical Framework. Chapter 4 detailed the construction of the conceptual framework of the study, emphasising its ever-present nature and its influence on methodology, data analysis, and analysis and interpretation of findings, while Chapter 5 concentrated on the multi methods approach used in the research, concluding with a methodological framework. Chapter 6 revealed the research findings as seen through the eyes of the human and non-human participants and Chapter 7 gave an analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of those findings, answering the research questions in the process. Chapter 8 closed off the research with a conclusion and actionable recommendations which highlighted that unless the SIDS pivoted from its current posture, its fight for adequate CCAF will remain challenging, along with recommendations for the SIDS, UNCFM and the AOSIS. Chapter 8 also suggested areas for further research and the researcher’s final reflections.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

PART 1

Research Description:
My research *"explores the perception that actions of Parties within the United Nations financial mechanism (UNCFM), particularly the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable climate change adaptation finance (CCAF) to SIDS that is not new and additional"*.

Constructivism is the international relations approach (theory/paradigm) to this research. It is qualitative in nature and adopts a post-structuralist methodology and underpinned by a constructivist epistemology, ontology and methodology.

Principal Researcher:
Rear Admiral Gary Best, reading for a PhD in International Relations with the University of the West Indies.

Research Title:
"The social construction of climate change adaptation finance for SIDS: Epistemological, methodological and ontological challenges to provision of adequate and predictable climate change adaptation financing that is new and additional".

Activities:
You are invited to participate in a research study that explores climate change adaptation financing for SIDS. Your participation in this study requires an interview (semi-structured), during which you will be asked questions about your perception as it relates to the matters surrounding, the provision to SIDS, of adequate and predictable adaptation finance that is new and additional.

The questions are not sequential, it's your perceptions and answers that will guide the follow-on questions. The answer to one question may led to several follow-on questions. This type of semi-structured method avoids pre-set and pre-sent questions and allows the interviewee to flow uninterrupted.

Matters that connect to climate change adaptation finance include, but are not limited to, adaptation governance, adaptation finance justice, dominant discourse, overseas development assistance versus new and additional finance, challenges accessing adaptation finance for project execution, asymmetric relations among the Parties, identities and interests, role and actions of accredited entities, commodification and financialization of climate finance, historical responsibility for negative effects of climate change and donor recipient challenges.

The duration of the interview will be approximately 60 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be audiotaped and transcribed, the purpose thereof being to capture and maintain an accurate record of the discussion. Your name will not be used at all. On all transcripts and data collected you will be referred to only by way of a pseudonym.

This study will be conducted by the researcher Rear Admiral Gary Best, a doctoral candidate at the University of the West Indies, St Augustine. The interview will be undertaken, by Skype/Zoom, or in person, as applicable, at a time and location that is mutually suitable.

Risks and Benefits:

This research will hopefully provide to SIDs, with an empirical basis for the conduct of climate change adaptation financing within the Conference of the Parties and agencies connected thereto. Participation in this study carries the same amount of risk that individuals will encounter during a usual interview, which I classify as minimal. There is no financial remuneration for your participation in this study.

Data Storage to Protect Confidentiality:

Under no circumstances whatsoever will you be identified by name in the course of this research study or in any publication thereof. Every effort will be made that all information provided by you will be treated as strictly confidential. All data will be coded and securely stored (hard drive with password protection) and will be used for professional purposes only. Data will be stored for five years.

How the Results Will Be Used:

This research study is to be submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the West Indies, St Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. The results of this study will be published as a dissertation. In addition, information may be used for research purposes in professional presentation(s) and/or research publication(s) under the strict confidentiality clause above.

PART 2

Participant's Rights:

1. I have read and discussed the research description with the researcher. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures regarding this study.
2. My participation in this research is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw from participation at any time without jeopardy or harm.
3. The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his professional discretion.
4. If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed becomes available that may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the investigator will provide this information to me.
5. Any information derived from the research that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by law.

6. If at any time I have any questions regarding the research or my participation, I can contact the researcher who will answer my questions. The researcher's phone number is 592 623-9900 and email is bestgar2000@yahoo and gary.best@my.uwi.edu. I may also contact the researcher's supervisor, at Mark.Bynoe@sta.uwi.edu and marklbynoe@gmail.com.
7. If at any time I have comments or concerns regarding the conduct of the research, or questions about my rights as a research subject, I should contact the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, St Augustine at iirt@sta.uwi.edy; michelle.seeraj.seeraj@sta.uwi.edu; campusethics@sta.uwi.edu.
8. I should receive a copy of the Research Description and this Participant's Rights document.
9. Audiotaping is part of this research. Only the researcher will have access to written and taped materials.
10. I consent to being audiotaped.

My signature means that I agree to participate in this study.

Participant's signature: ……………………………. (Can be electronic if available) *

Date: ……/……. /………

Name: (Please print)

Or

I agree that a **return email from me will act as consent and a signature** and my agreement to participate. If so, kindly **state so** in your email reply.

Researcher's Verification of Explanation

I, Rear Admiral Gary Best, certify that I have carefully explained the purpose and nature of this research to **Name of Key Informant** who has had the opportunity to discuss it with me in detail. I have answered all his questions and he/she has provided the affirmative agreement (i.e., assent) to participate in this research.

Researcher's signature: ………………….

Date: 09/Dec/ 2020

* A return email indicating that I accept the conditions of the Consent Form will act as signature approval, if the KI is unable to sign and return form.

Note: The researcher included the date of the return email at the date of signature.

APPENDIX B: DATA TRIANGULATION INTERPRETATION AND SYNTHESIS



Figure B. 1: Data Triangulation Interpretation and Synthesis

APPENDIX C: CODING SCHEME

Table C. 1: Coding Scheme Development

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
1. September 2020. Coding scheme. After conducting the literature review the researcher developed initial frameworks that would guide the coding process. The Lit Review led to the research questions (the 'what'). The research questions led to the theoretical framework (the 'why'). The 'why' and 'what' of the research led to the Conceptual Framework.	1. Three key frameworks were developed by the researcher: Literature Review, Theoretical and Conceptual. Concepts emerged from the Literature Review and Conceptual Framework, some of which formed a priori coding themes. Categories emerged from all three frameworks which, when merged, formed the categories of the Conceptual Frameworks and limited a priori coding categories. At this stage the coding scheme comprised four categories and 13 alphabetic coding themes.
2. September 2020. The categories directly relate to the study's four research questions.	2. This preliminary version of the coding scheme is a predefined approach to coding and is primarily developed from the literature review combined with personal experience. Four broad analytic categories as they relate to the study's four research questions are identified: (a) "Relationships Through Interactions"; (b) "Changes Affecting Priorities"; (c) "Organization Behaviour"; and (d) "Climate finance Uncertainties".

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
3. October 2020. Eight thematic frames were developed by the researcher. A frame denotes a template that identifies a problem and offers a solution. The researcher identified them through evidence in discursive methods such as interview transcripts, statements of leaders, reports of meetings and publicity materials.	3. The frames are: (a) creation of structures of dominance; (b) construction of a dependency syndrome;(c) private finance as key instrument for CCAF; (d) neoliberal mechanisms to drive CCF solutions;(e) pressure for all nations to mitigate climate change; (f) coalitions of interests among the great powers; (g) uncertainty surrounding key CCAF terms; (h) commodification and financialization of CCAF.
4. November 2020. Eight thematic genealogies were developed by the researcher. Genealogy is a form of process tracing across historical periods, emphasising the techniques of power that operate within discourses, and the ruptures and disjunctures that obtain in IOs, IIs and IREs	4. The genealogies are: (a) Ruptures and disjunctures of discourse over research period; (b) structural inequalities based on meanings; (c) instruments that shift dominant discourse; (d) problematizing social construction of reality and knowledge; (e) tracing the effects of discourse on power; (f) legitimization of certain norms; (g) contestation over meanings via shifts in dominant discourse; and (h) continuities and discontinuities of discourse.
5. December 2020. The descriptors matched the coding themes. The themes and the descriptors are abstract in nature and are the likely answers the researcher anticipated from the key informants and from the documentary material when reviewed.	5. A pilot interview was conducted 03 Jan 2021 using NVivo software, coding across the a priori themes.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
6. March 10, 2021. Coding theme ‘adequacy’ evolved and was last modified on April 2, 2021.	6. March 10 to April 19, 2021. a. Under ‘adequacy’ seven coding sub themes evolved: (a) ‘accounting for climate change negatives’; (b) ‘finance capture’; (c) ‘incentive regime’; (d) ‘new and additional’; (e) ‘pledges’; (f) ‘sufficiency’; and (g) ‘transparency’. b. Under ‘finance capture’, one coding sub sub and two coding sub sub sub themes evolved, (a) ‘debt write offs’; and (b) ‘donor fatigue and ‘unfairness’, respectively. c. Under ‘pledges’ one coding sub sub sub theme evolved, ‘disparity’. d. **‘Adequacy’ coding theme consists of 11 alphabetic codes.**

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
7. March 11, 2021. Coding theme 'challenges with climate mechanism' evolved and was last modified on April 12, 2021.	7. March 11 to April 13, 2021. a. Under 'challenges with climate mechanism', 18 coding sub themes evolved: (a) 'a new mechanism'; (b) 'awareness'; (c) 'climate change suppliers'; (d) 'climate rationale'; (e) 'climate rationale'; (f) 'constraints'; (g) 'control'; (h) 'fiduciary standards'; (i) 'governance'; (j) 'guidance not decisions'; (k) 'issues with the AF'; (l) 'issues with SIDS'; (m) 'issues with the CDB'; (n) 'issues with the COP'; (o) 'issues with the GCF'; (p) 'issues with the GEF'; (q) 'key indicators'; (r) MDBs MIEs, RIEs and NIEs'; and (s) strategic priorities'. b. Under 'control', 13 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'bureaucratic dominance'; (b) 'coercion'; (c) 'dependency'; (d) 'directional'; (e) 'divide and rule'; (f) 'international greed'; (g) 'knowledge control'; (h) 'minilateralism'; (i) 'neo colonialism'; (j) 'pre-set rules'; (k) repressive international metrics'; (l) 'side payments'; and (m) 'top down'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
	c. Under ‘issues with the AF’, 17 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘accessing funds’; (b) accountability and control’; (c) accreditation’; (d) capacity building’; (e) ‘CER markets’; (f) ‘contributions’; (g) ‘current financial systems’; (h) ‘effects of COVID-19-19 19’; (i) ‘fund balance’; (j) fund raising’; (k) ‘governance’; (l) ‘links to the GCF’; (m) ‘links to the SDGs’; (n) ‘location’; (o) ‘measurement’; (p) ‘payment from the CDM’; and (q) ‘programme and project financing’. d. Under ‘issues with SIDS’, three sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘access’; (b) ‘needs’; and (c) ‘specific recognition’. e. Under ‘issues with the GCF’, 13 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘accessing funds’; (b) accountability and control’; (c) capacity building’; (d) ‘contributions’; (e) ‘current financial systems’; (f) ‘governance’; (g) ‘guidance from the COP’; (h) ‘independence’; (i) location’; (j) ‘objective’; (k) ‘operation policies’; (l) ‘projects and programme financing’; and (m)’requirements to receive, manage, programme and disburse’.

Table C. 1 *(continued)*

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	f. Under 'issues with the GEF', 15 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'accessing funds'. (b) accountability and control'; (c) capacity building'; (d) 'contributions'; (e) 'current financial systems'; (f) 'governance'; (g) 'LDCF'; (h) 'location'; (i) 'objective'; (j) 'projects and programme financing'; (k) 'project cycle'; (l) 'project data'; and (m) 'SCCF'. g. Under 'governance" ('issues with the AF' sub sub theme), eight sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) code of conduct; (b)' host country'; (c) 'implementation'; (d) 'legal status'; (e) 'meetings'; (f) 'observers'; (g) 'results-based management'; and (h) 'trustee'. h. Under 'governance' ('issues with the GCF sub sub theme'), six sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'advisers'; (b) 'implementation'; (c) 'indigenous people'; (d) 'meetings'; (e) 'observers'; and (f) 'Trustee'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
	i. Under 'operation policies' ('issues with the GCF sub sub theme'), eight sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'accreditation'; (b)' business model'; (c) 'capacity building'; (d) 'country ownership'; € 'investment framework'; (f) 'response to COVID-19-19 19'; (g) 'results management framework'; and (h) 'risk management framework'. Under 'accreditation', one sub sub sub sub theme evolved: (a) 'imbalance'. Under 'business model' sub sub sub theme, two sub, sub, sub, sub themes evolved: (a) 'independent evaluation unit'; and (b) 'private sector facility'. j. Under 'project and programme financing' ('issues with the GCF sub sub coding theme'), one sub sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ambiguous. k. 'Challenges with climate finance mechanism' coding theme consists of 106 alphabetic codes.
8. March 10, 2021. Coding theme 'climate justice' evolved and was last modified on March 17, 2021	8. March 10 to March 17, 2021. a. Under 'climate justice mechanism', **two coding sub themes** evolved; (a) 'distributive justice'; and (b) 'flattered expectations.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
9. March 21, 2021. Coding theme 'development issues' evolved and was last modified on April 20, 2021	9. March 21 to April 2021. a. Under 'development issues', 28 coding sub themes evolved: (a) 'a fresh view'; (b) 'accountability'; (c) 'adaptation measurement'; (d) 'adaptation policy'; (e) 'all about development'; (f) 'avoiding responsibilities'; (g) 'capacity'; (h) climate versus environment'; (i) 'deepening regional integration'; (j) 'implementation'; (k) 'institution failures'; (l) 'insufficient dialogue'; (m) 'lip service'; (n) 'lived experiences'; (0) 'low self-esteem'; (p) 'mainstreaming adaptation'; (q) 'mainstreaming adaptation finance into development'; (r) 'maximising values'; (s) mitigation versus adaptation'; (t) 'more mitigation means less adaptation'; (u) 'prejudicial rankings'; (v) 'realigned development'; (w) 'recent SIDS uptake'; (x) 'self-infliction'; (y) 'self-reliance'; (z) 'strategic partnership'; (aa) 'vulnerability'; and (bb) 'whole of government'. b. Under 'a fresh view', five sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'all we need is development'; (b) 'all we need is finance'; (c) 'identification of the need'; (d) 'ordinary language versus climate change language'; and (e) 'role of the UNFCCC'. c. Under 'adaptation policy', one sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) 'adaptation strategy'. Under 'adaptation strategy', one sub sub sub theme evolved: (a) adaptation plans'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	d. Under ‘capacity’, 12 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘data generation’; (b) ‘development’; (c) ‘financially independent civil society’; (d) ‘knowledge awareness’; (e) ‘knowledge generation and sharing’; (f) ‘misaligned to SIDS capabilities’; (g) ‘monitoring and evaluation’; (h) ‘mutual participation’; (i) ‘non exitance’; (j) recognition’; (k) ‘technical skills’; and (l) ‘to do the doing’. e. Under ‘mainstreaming adaptation’, three sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘mainstreaming social programmes into adaptation financing’; (b) ‘trust’; and (c) ‘wariness’. f. Under ‘realigned development’, two sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘integrated national planning’; and (b) ‘low carbon’. **‘development issues’ coding theme consists of 52 alphabetic codes.**

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
10. March 12, 2021. Coding theme 'financial access' evolved and was last modified on April 20, 2021	10. March 12 to April 20, 2021. a. Under 'financial access', 26 sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'a sense of dependency'; (b) adaptation finance delivery'; (c) 'aligning development to Paris Agreement'; (d) 'all about access'; (e) 'balance between adaptation and mitigation'; (f) 'burdensome requirements'; (g) 'complexity in language'; (h) 'conditionalities'; (i) 'consequences of language'; (j) 'ease of access'; (k) 'financial preservation'; (l) 'grants versus loans'; (m) 'high borrowing costs'; (n) 'homogeneous'; (o) 'implementation'; (p) 'income dilemma'; (q) 'issues with ODA'; (r) 'linking CCAF to mitigation by SIDS'; (s) 'liquidity dilemma'; (t) 'misalignment'; (u) 'prioritization metrics'; (v) 'private versus public financing'; (w) 'scale'; (x) 'skill match to funds requirement'; (y) 'structural dominance'; and (z) 'trust'. b. Under 'adaptation finance delivery', 10 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'competition'; (b) 'development benefit'; (c) 'elements'; (d) 'flexibility'; (e) 'leveraging adaptation finance'; (f) 'opportunism'; (g) 'politics'; (h) 'simplified procedures'; (i) 'transfers'; and (j) 'uncertainties.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
	c. Under ‘leveraging adaptation finance’, four sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘level of commitment’; (b) ‘overlap with ODA’; (c) ‘the pull’; and (d) ‘the push’. d. Under ‘transfers’, six sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) accounting’; (b) ‘direct’; (c) ‘multilateral entities’; (d) ‘programmatic’; (e) ‘programmes’; and (f) ‘projects. e. Under ‘direct’, one sub, sub sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ‘budget projects. f. Under ‘projects’, five sub sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘bilateral pathway’; (b) ‘development alignment’; (c) ‘hard projects’; (d) ‘political cycle’; and (e) ‘regional pathway’. g. Under ‘ease of access’, one sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ‘sleight of hand’. h. Under ‘grants versus loans’, one sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ‘fiscal space’. i. Under ‘issues with ODA’, four sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘classification’; (b) ‘climate finance’; (c) ‘definition’; and (d) ‘funding’.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
	j. Under ‘prioritization metrics’, 19 sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘balance between adaptation and mitigation’; (b) ‘co-financing’; (c) ‘country ownership’; ‘direct benefits’; (d) ‘environment and social safeguards’; (e) ‘gender sensitivity’; (f) ‘punishment for good performance’; (g) ‘graduation’; (h) ‘high risk’; (i) ‘human development index’; (j) INDCs-NDCs’; (k) linking climate change solutions to SDGs’; (l) ‘low emission and climate resilient’; (m) ‘multiple indices’; (n) ‘per capita GDP’; (o) ‘reduced attention to small states’; (p) ‘reduced GHGs’; (q) ‘technology transfer’; and (r) ‘vulnerability index’. l. **‘financial access’ coding theme consists of 126 alphabetic codes.**
11. March 11, 2021. Coding theme ‘financialization’ evolved and was last modified on April 18, 2021.	11. a. Under ‘finalization’, seven sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘avoided climate responsibilities’; (b) blended finance’; (c) ‘carbon tax’; (d) ‘commodification’; (e) ‘grants and concessionary financing versus loans’; (f) ‘monetizing’; and (g) ‘skepticism’. b. Under ‘commodification’, four sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) adaptation as an investible’; (b) ‘greater market share’; (c) ‘market-based approach’; (d) ‘private investors. c. **‘financialization’ coding theme consists of 11 alphabetic codes**.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
12. March 10, 2021. Coding theme 'hegemony' evolved and was last modified on March 14, 2021.	12. March 10 to March 14, 2021. a. Under 'hegemony', **three sub coding themes** evolved: (a) 'fragmentation'; (b) 'language dominance'; and (c) 'power'.
13. March 10, 2021. Coding theme 'interpretative understandings' evolved and was last modified on March 14, 2021.	13. March 10 to March 14,2021. a. Under 'interpretative' understanding **five sub coding themes** evolved: (a) 'bedazzled effect'; (b) 'ideational structures'; (c) 'lived experiences'; (d) 'mutual constitution'; and (e) 'norms'.
14. March 11, 2021. Coding theme 'negotiations' evolved and was last modified on April 20, 2021.	14. March 11 to April 20, 2021. a. Under 'negotiations' 21 sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'all about adaptation'; (b) 'always about mitigation'; (c) 'asymmetry'; (d) 'bilateral versus multilateral'; (e) 'enhanced technical expertise'; (f) 'harmonized groupings' (g) 'identity formation'; (h) 'interest formation'; (i) internal conflict'; (j) 'LDCs'; (k) 'measure of respect'; (l) 'misrepresentation' (m) 'multi negotiations approaches'; (n) 'negative influences'; (o) 'new democratic paradigm'; (p) 'one pot of money'; (q) 'responsibility'; (r) SIDS negotiation machinery'; (s) strategic engagement'; (t) 'UN process'; (u) 'united or new approach'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	b. Under ‘all about adaptation’, four sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘a lot about disappointed’; (b) ‘a lot about knowledge sharing’; (c) ‘a lot about loss and damage’; (d) ‘a lot about resilience’.
	c. Under ‘asymmetry’, two sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘climate finalization’; and (b) ‘knowledge generation’.
	d. Under ‘misrepresentation’, one sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ‘misrepresentation’.
	e. Under ‘responsibility’, five sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘corporate’; (b) ‘historical’; (c) ‘new emitters’; (d)’ personal’; and (e) ‘small emitters’.
	f. Under ‘historical’, two sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘bridging the responsibility divide’. and (b) ‘consequences’.
	g. Under ‘SIDS negotiating machinery’, four sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) ‘definition issues’; (b) ‘performance’; (c) ‘reality check’; (d) ‘the G77 plus China’;
	h. Under ‘the G77 plus China’, one sub sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ‘adaptation negotiations’.
	i. Under ‘adaptation negotiations’, one sub sub sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) ‘AOSIS’.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	j. Under 'AOSIS', eight sub sub sub sub sub coding themes evolved: (a) 'a lot about mitigation'; (b) 'conciliator'; (c) 'external influence'; (d) 'ransoming'; (e) 'refocus on adaptation'; (f) 'significant participation'; (g) 'strategic actions'; and (h) 'sufficient benefits'. k. Under 'united or new approach', nine sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) 'collective voice'; (b) 'human and natural capital investment return'; (c) 'radicalize change'; (d) 'reframing based on diverse interests'; (e) 'strategic alignment'; (f) 'strategic presence'; (g) 'targeted fresh view'; (h) 'total wealth approach'; and (i) 'whole of government approach'. l. Under 'radicalize change', one sub sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) 'institutionalize change'. m. Under 'institutionalize change", one sub sub sub sub coding theme evolved: (a) 'academic institutions'. n. **'negotiations' coding theme consists of 60 alphabetic codes.**
15. March 10, 2021. Coding theme 'predictability' evolved and was last modified on April 17, 2021.	15. March 10 to April 17, 2021. a. Under 'predictability', **eight sub coding themes evolved**: (a) 'definitional uncertainties'; (b) 'double counting'; (c) 'originating from CARICOM'; (d) 'relabelling'; (e) 'shifting goal post'; (f) 'timeless'; and (g) 'tracking difficulties.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
16. March 10, 2021. Coding theme 'structures of dominance' evolved and was last modified on March 16, 2021.	16. Under 'structures of dominance' **no coding sub themes** evolved.
17. March 10, 2021. Coding theme 'fatigue' evolved and was last modified on March 16, 2021	17. Under 'fatigue', **no sub coding themes evolved.** Coding period **March 10 to April 20, 2021** consists of **384 alphabetic codes**.
18. 27th April 2021. Coding Scheme Version 2. Four coding categories emerged. This was necessary to align and reduce the 384 alphabetic codes to a workable number under the four main coding categories from analysis and interrogation of data from the Lit Rev, Theoretical Framework and the Conceptual Framework.	18. 27th April 2021 to 8th May 2021. a. The four coding categories are (1) concepts through interactions; (2) changes affecting priorities; (3) climate finance uncertainties; and (4) organization behaviour. b. The data was recoded, and 11 modified coding themes emerged, along with 15 sub coding themes, 49 sub sub coding themes, and 85 sub sub sub coding themes under the coding category, 'concepts through interactions'. c. The data was recoded 14 modified coding themes, 39 sub coding themes, along with 40 sub sub coding themes, 10 sub sub sub coding themes and six sub sub sub sub coding themes emerged under coding, category 'changes affecting priorities'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
	d. The data was recoded and eight modified coding themes, 15 sub coding themes, along with 2 sub sub coding themes and 2 sub sub sub coding themes emerged under coding category, 'climate finance uncertainties'.
	e. The data was recoded, and three modified coding themes and five coding sub themes emerged under the coding category, 'organization behaviour'.
	Recoding period **27th April to May 07, 2021,** consists of four **coding categories** and **304 alphabetic codes.**
19. 27th April. Deleting of Coding Themes and recoding	19. a. Eight earlier coding themes were deleted: (1) Hegemony; (2) Fatigue (3) Interpretative Uncertainty (4) Bilateral v Multilateral (5) Harmonized; (6) Respect; (7) Multinational Negotiation; and (8) Negative Influence.
	b. 29th April. Recoded KIs, JF, GM and JFC (x 2) to coding themes 'transparency', 'projects', 'burdensome' and asymmetry' respectively.
	c. 29th April. Recoded KIs, DS, AS, and AC, to 'asymmetry', 'directional' and 'market-based approach' respectively.
	d. 29th April. Recoded GCF 2008 to 'issues with GCF'. Recoded AFB 2019 to 'accreditation'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
20. 10th – 12th May 2021. After extensive review, the researcher recognized that the four to five level coding depth was too cumbersome for data analysis and were reduced to a two-level coding depth, using NVivo QDAS. Recoding continued in order to tighten efforts at data analysis.	20. 2021-05-09, 23:41 Under code theme “Control’ Code themes deleted: ‘coercion’ recoded first to directional, ‘divide and rule, ‘neo colonial’, ‘top down recoded first to directional’, ‘knowledge control’ recoded first to bureaucratic dominance, ‘side payments’ recoded first to bureaucratic dominance. Note that ‘International’ may not end up in Data Summary under Control.
Coding scheme version 3: Based on a further round of discussions with an advisor and on emergent data from the open coding of pilot interviews, coding scheme is further refined and reduced	2021-05-10, 03:29 A new coding theme was created and named ‘adaptation finance constraints comprising ‘public finance unlocking private finance’, ‘mainstreaming adaptation’, ‘co-financing’ and ‘grants versus loans’
Coding scheme version 4. The researcher conducted three further interviews, open coded using version Coding scheme version 5: March 2021. As interviews are read, reread, and open coded, minor modifications are made with regard to certain descriptors. This version now constitutes the final coding scheme developed for this research. In line with qualitative research, the scheme remains flexible. As the researcher proceeded to use this coding scheme, he acknowledged that as new descriptors emerged from the data, they would be added;	2021-05-10, 03:57 Coding theme ‘all about development’ deleted after recoding contents into ‘mainstreaming adaptation’. 2021-05-10, 04:00 Coding theme ‘mainstreaming finance into development’ deleted after recoding contents to mainstreaming adaptation into development. Coding theme ‘mainstreaming social into adaptation finance’ deleted after recoding contents to ‘mainstreaming adaptation into development’.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
conversely, if descriptors became superfluous or redundant, they would be omitted from the scheme	Coding theme 'Trust 'deleted. Coding themes 'wariness' deleted after recoding contents to mainstreaming adaptation into development. Coding theme 'Mitigation versus adaptation' deleted after recoding contents to 'more mitigation means less adaptation'. 2021-05-10, 15:49 Word search transcripts for the word 'co-financing' and coded to coding theme 'co-financing'. 2021-05-10, 20:28 Coding themes 'definition parameter' 'relabeling', 'tracking difficulties', 'goal post shifting' 'contestation over meaning' deleted. Coding theme 'incentive regime', 'disparity', 'pledges, 'burdensome adaptation policies', 'accounting for climate change', 'debt write offs', 'originating from CARICOM', 'definitional uncertainties, 'double counting', 'transparency' , 'top down', 'adaptation measurement', 'avoiding responsibilities', 'climate versus environment', deleted. Coding theme 'sufficiency' changed to 'availability',

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	2021-05-10, 23:25 Re Coding category ‘Organization Behaviour’, the coding themes therein have very little data from coding done. Analysis/answers to this category may well arise from the application of discourse analysis through genealogy, the application of constructivism (norm formation, interest formation and identity formation) and cross case analysis to the data. 2021-05-11, 00:59 New coding theme ‘Issues within the UNCFM’ was created within the ‘concepts through interactions’ category. Coding theme ‘accessing funds’ recoded to ‘Access’ and deleted. ‘issues with the GCF’ recoded to ‘access’ and deleted. 2021-05-11, 01:30 ‘accessing funds under AF’, recoded to ‘access’ and deleted. 2021-05-11, 23:07 Content of code themes ‘code of conduct’, ‘host country’, ‘implementation’, ‘legal status’, ‘meetings’, ‘observers’, ‘results based’, ‘and ‘trustee’ recoded to ‘governance’ under ‘issues within the UNCFM’, and then deleted. Content under code theme ‘governance’ under Issues with the AF recoded to ‘governance under ‘issues within the UNCFM and deleted.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	Content under code theme 'governance' under Issues with the GCF recoded to 'GOVERNANCE' UNDER 'issues within the UNCFM and deleted. 2021-05-11, 23:07 Content of code themes 'advisers', 'implementation', 'indigenous people', 'meetings', 'observers', 'trustee' recoded to 'governance' under 'issues within the UNCFM', and then deleted. 2021-05-11, 23:07 Content of code themes 'LDCF', 'location', 'objective', 'implementation', 'meetings', 'observers', 'reform', 'results', 'trustee' and 'SCCF', recoded to 'governance' under 'issues within the UNCFM', and then deleted. Content under code theme 'governance' under Issues with the GEF recoded to 'GOVERNANCE' UNDER 'issues within the UNCFM and deleted. Contents from code themes 'programmes and projects' under AF, GCF and GEF recoded to 'programmes and projects' under 'issues within the UNCFM'. 2021-05-12, 00:37 Contents from code themes 'CER markets', 'contributions', 'current financial system embedded', 'effects of COVID-19-19', 'fund balance', 'fund raising', 'payments from the CDM measurement' recoded to code theme 'financials' under 'issues within UNFCM'.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme
	2021-05-12, 00:59 Contents from code themes ‘contributions’,’ independence’, ‘objective, ‘recoded to ‘financials’ and ‘governance’ respectively and then deleted. 2021-05-12, 01:13 Contents from code themes ‘business model’, ‘private sector’, ‘country ownership’, ‘investment framework’, ‘response to COVID-19-19’, ‘results mng framework’, and ‘risk management framework’ recoded to code theme’ financials’ under ‘issues within UNCFM’ and deleted. 2021-05-12, 01:27 Contents from code themes ‘capacity building’ under AF, GCF and GEF recoded to ‘capacity building’ code theme under ‘issues within UNCFM’ and then deleted. 2021-05-12, 01:32 Contents for code themes ‘accountability and control’ under AF, GCF and GEF recoded to ‘governance’ and then deleted. 2021-05-12, 01:40 Contents from ‘accreditation’ under AF, GCF and GEF recoded to ‘accreditation’ under ‘issues within UNCFM’ and then deleted. Content from code theme ‘guidance not direction’ recoded to ‘governance’. Contents from code themes ‘links to the GCF’ and ‘links to the SDGs’ recoded to code theme ‘governance’ and then deleted.

Table C. 1 ***(continued)***

Development Phases of Analytical Framework	**Explanations and Descriptions of Changes to Coding Scheme**
	Recoding period **May 10 – 12, 2021,** consists of f**our** coding categories**, seven** main coding themes**,** and **36 alphabetic codes.** Coding grids are drawn up to plot which codes are being utilized and how often. This sheds light on which descriptors are relevant and which are redundant. Three more descriptors are deleted: "writing skills," "tolerance or perseverance," and "status/recognition."
21. 10th May to June 2021. Recoding and collapsing continues with a view to reducing further the number of code themes to a relevant and applicable figure.	

APPENDIX D: ACTUAL EMAIL TO A KI

On Tue, Feb 2, 2021 at 4:52 PM Gary Best <bestgar2000@yahoo.com> wrote:

Dear Desmond:

I am Gary Best, I am a current PhD candidate at the University of the West Indies, St Augustine. I am reading for a Ph. D in International Relations. I am also the former Presidential Advisor on the Environment and Guyana's NDE to the CTCN. My research:

> *"explores the perception that actions of Parties within the United Nations financial mechanism (UNCFM), particularly the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable climate change adaptation finance (CCAF) to SIDS that is not new and additional"*.

The objective of the research is to provide SIDS with an empirical understanding of key characteristics within the UNCFM in order to enable more informed decisions and negotiations towards accessing CCAF for climate change adaptation within SIDS.

The research is at the stage of data collection, it is qualitative in nature and constructivism is the international relations approach (theory, paradigm). It adopts a post-structuralist methodology, underpinned by a constructivist epistemology, ontology and methodology.

There are three key components in adaptation finance delivery: Suppliers of Adaptation Finance; Receivers of Adaptation Finance and The Intermediaries (multilateral banks, IFIs, GEF, GCF, AF, UNFCCC, COPs). I believe that, as a specialist who operated within a major MDB, you can bring a rich perspective to my research.

The data capture method is via semi-structured interviews, which will last approximately 60 minutes and can be done via zoom. It will be recorded for transcription and analysis, the purpose thereof being to capture and maintain an accurate record of the discussion. No names will be used at all. On all transcripts and data collected reference will be only by way of a pseudonym. It is not fact finding, simply the perceptions held as it relates to my research area.

Interview questions include, but are not limited to, adaptation finance governance, climate justice, overseas development assistance, new and additional finance, adequacy, accessing adaptation finance, asymmetries, delivery of adaptation finance via project, role and actions of accredited entities, trust, private and public finance, commodification and financialization of climate finance, historical responsibility, grant financing and direct transfers.

Against this backdrop, an invitation is kindly extended to you to be part of my research by way of personal contribution or by providing official to be a key informant.

I do hope you find it convenient to accept. If there's acceptance, I should like suggest for an interview, the period of Thursday **4th to the 7th of February 2021 between 5:00 and 8:00.** However, I am flexible with the dates and times.

Attached also are the University of the West Indies' Consent Form and Ethics Approval.

APPENDIX E: UWI CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, WEST INDIES
CAMPUS RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
TELEPHONE: (1-868) 662-2002 ext. 82755 E-mail: campusethics@sta.uwi.edu

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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Complete Protocol Title: "The social construction of climate change adaptation finance for SIDS: epistemological methodological and ontological challenges to provision of adequate and predictable climate change adaptation financing that is new and additional".

Principal Investigator:GARY BEST

Co Investigator(s):

---

1. **Identification of project**

a. What is the purpose of this research?
This purpose of this research is to explore the perception that actions of Parties within the United Nations financial mechanism (UNCFM), particularly the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), contribute to the provision of inadequate and unpredictable CCAF to SIDS that is not new and additional.

b. How long it will take to complete this project?
This aspect of the research will be conducted over the next four months.

c. Why am I selected for this research?
Because you have expert knowledge in the areas surrounding climate change adaptation finance which would enrich my research findings.

d. Why is this document for obtaining informed consent important?
This document is not only an invitation for you to either consent or decline to participate in the research after understanding thoroughly about the research, but it is also a legal document which governs your participation in this research. For example, if you are under age of legal consent, there is a need for parental or guardian's consent, since they are the ones legally entitled to provide this approval. Additionally, this document speaks to the ways and means how the information you provide will remain confidential and secure

2. **Description of Procedures**

a. What am I expected to do in this study?
We expect you to participate, via skype or zoom, or in person if possible and Covid safe, in a semi-structured interview for about one hour about your perception in relation to the factors surrounding the provision of adequate and predictable climate change adaptation finance to small island developing states that is new and additional. .

b. Which procedures are investigational, which are routine? What is the expected duration, how frequently I have to participate and where will the activities take place?
Once you agree to participate, we will provide you with the research purpose, the main research questions, areas over which the questions are likely to cover. The interview will last for approximately one hour. It will be recorded and then transcribed for my analysis. The semi-structure interview allows you to flow and the follow up questions will come your answers. It is your perception that my research wishes to capture. That is why the research question is where we start and then I will let you flow, interrupting only to ask follow up questions. If it becomes necessary and to your comfort, I may ask some direct questions. You may choose any place that is convenient to you for a zoom and or skype interview. Only one interview will be conducted.

APPENDIX F: INFORMANTS’ CHARACTERISTICS

Table F. 1: Key Informants' Data and Interview Matrix

CODE	ORG	PROFESSION	DATE	TIME	DURATION/ MODE
JT	Caribbean SIDS Govt climate change office	Adaptation Project Practitioner from a Caribbean SIDS	13th Dec 2020	20:00	Zoom/ 1hr
PC	Independent Consultancy	A Consulting Applied Scientist from a Caribbean SIDS	21 Dec 2020	20:30	Zoom/ 1hr 8mins
AB	Independent Consultancy	Climate Change Consultant from a Caribbean SIDS	15 DEC, 2020	13:00	13:00/1hr/ In-person. Note taking format
DCU	UWI	Climate Change Researcher	8 Jan 2021	20:00	Zoom/1hr 7mins
TS	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Policy Specialist	29 Dec 2020	15:00	Zoom/ 1 hr 10 mins
JC	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Climate Change Professional	17 Dec, 2020	19:00	Zoom/1hr 28 mins
PBC	Caribbean Regional University	Senior Lecturer	12 Jan 2020	18:00	Zoom/ 1hr 18 mins

Table F. 1 ***(continued)***

CODE	ORG	PROFESSION	DATE	TIME	DURATION/ MODE
DS	International Environment	Natural Resource Management Practitioner, WWF	20 Dec 2020	19:00	Zoom/ 1hr 09
LC	International European Academic	Environmental Resource Economist	27 Dec 2020	19:00	Zoom/ 1hr 12 mins
VS	International Environment	Int’l Environment Professional	17 Dec 2020	1⁄5:00	Zoom /1hr
MP	International European Environment	Climate Finance Specialist	12 Jan 2021	10:00	Zoom/ 1hr 15 mins
AS	Caribbean SIDS Regional Organization	Environment Expert	19 Dec 2020	16:00	Zoom/ 1hr 27
CK	African LDC Environment Protection Agency	Environment and Climate Change Expert	15 Dec 2020	15:00 + 4hrs	Zoom/ 1hr
NS	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Environmental Scientist	18 Dec 2020	10:00	Zoom/ Audio/1hr
RT	Caribbean SIDS Env	Practical Conservationist	18 Dec 2020	20:30	Zoom/1hr 12 mins

Table F. 1 ***(continued)***

CODE	ORG	PROFESSION	DATE	TIME	DURATION/ MODE
GM	International private sector	Energy Development Engineer	7 Jan 2021	17:00	Zoom/ 1hr 3 mins
SD	AIMS (Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea	International Consulting Climate Practitioner	16th Dec 2020	09:00 +8hrs	Skype/1 hr 10 mins
SHC	Caribbean Regional University	Climate Change Expert	22 Dec 2020	20:30	Zoom/1hr
AC	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Adaptation Practitioner and Climate Change Researcher	11 Jan 2021	19:00	Zoom/ 1 hr 08 mins
TTW	Asian LDC	Climate Change Practitioner	15 Jan 2021	11:00 +10:30hrs	Zoom/ 46mins
OG	International Climate Finance	Climate Scientist	6 January 2021	07:30 am	Zoom/1hr 48 mins
CFC	Caribbean SIDS Env	Climate Change Negotiator	28 Dec 2020	19:00	Zoom/ 1hr 15 mins
JFC	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Climate Finance Negotiator	28 Dec 2020	16:00	Zoom/ 1hr 30

Table F. 1 ***(continued)***

CODE	ORG	PROFESSION	DATE	TIME	DURATION/ MODE
MG	Caribbean SIDS Env	Environmental Project Development Specialist	13 Jan 2021	19:00	Zoom/ 1hr 10 mins
DG	Regional Financial	Climate Finance Expert	21 Jan 2021	19:00	Zoom/ 1hr
HSC	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Advisor on Climate Change	19 Jan 2021	18:29hrs	Zoom /I hr 30 mins
BD	International Environment	Caribbean Natural Resource Management Specialist	05 March 2021	19:00	Zoom/ I hr 7 mins
DT	International Financial	Former economist of an international financial institution	25 Feb 2021	19:30	Zoom/ 1hr 13 mins
GQB	European Govt	Former High Commissioner	25 Jan 2021	15:00	Zoom/ 1hr 8 mins
LCA	North American Govt	Climate Finance Policy Analyst	02 Feb 2021	15:00	Microsoft Teams/ 1hr
WJN	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Former Min of Finance and Economist	22 Jan 2021	13:00	Zoom/ 1hr 11mins

Table F. 1 *(continued)*

CODE	ORG	PROFESSION	DATE	TIME	DURATION/ MODE
CRS	Caribbean SIDS Govt	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs	14 Jan 2021	19:30	Zoom/1hr 6 mins

# = 32 Key Informants	**SUMMARY ORGANIZATIONS** **# = 8** Caribbean SIDS Govt; **# = 2** Consultancy; **# = 4**; University; **# = 4** Int'l Env; **# = 3** C'bean SIDS Env; **# = 3** Reg and Int'l Fin; **# = 1** Reg Org; **# = 3** African Env Org; **# = 1** Int'l Private Sector; **# = 1** North American Govt; **# =1** European Govt; **# =1** Asian Env Org. **SUMMARY PROFESSIONS** **# = 5** Climate Practitioners; **# = 1** Consultant; **# = 2** Researchers; **# =1** Policy Analysts; **# =1** Policy Specialist; **# = 2** Professionals; **# = 1** Senior Lecturer; **# =3** Economists; **# = 3** Scientists; **# =2** Diplomats; **# = 3** Experts; **# = 1** Practical Conservationist; **# = 1** Engineer; **# 2** Negotiators; # = **3** Specialists; **# = 1** Advisor **TIME HORIZON** 13th December 2020 to 05th March 2021 **TOTAL INTERVIEW TIME** **Thirty-nine (39) hours and thirty-three (33) minute**s (2,372 minutes). The longest interview spanned one hundred and eight minutes (108 mins) and the shortest, forty-eight minutes (48 mins)

APPENDIX G: EXAMPLE OF nVIVO QDAS CODED PAGE



Figure G. 1: nVivo-QDAS Coding Display

APPENDIX H: DATA SUMMARY EXAMPLE

Table H. 1: Data Summary Table

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
	KIs	**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
1	AC	X		X	X	X
2	AS	X			X	X
3	BD	X			X	
4	CRS	X		X	X	X
5	CFC	X		X		X
6	CK	X			X	
7	DCU	X	X	X		X
8	DG	X			X	
9	DS	X		X	X	
10	DT	X		X	X	
11	GM	X	X			
12	GQB	X	X	X	X	

Table H.1 ***(continued)***

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
	KIs	**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
13	HSC	X	X			
14	JC	X		X	X	
15	JFC	X	X		X	X
16	LCA	X		X	X	X
17	MP	X	X	X	X	X
18	MG	X			X	
19	PC	X				
20	PB	X		X	X	
21	WJN	X	X	X	X	
23	JT	X	X			
24	LC		X			X
25	NS	A			X	
26	OG		X		X	X
27	RTC					
28	SD	X	X	X		X
28	SHC		X		X	X
30	TS					
31	TTW	X			X	
32	VS	X	X			

Table H.1 ***(continued)***

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
KIs		**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
	Responses	**27= (84%)**	**13= (40%)**	**12= (37%)**	**20= (62%)**	**12= (37%)**
A	AFB/					
	16/2011	X				
	19/2012	X				
	24/2014	X				
	26/2015	X				
	28/2016	X				
B	AFB/					
	16/2011		X			
	19/2012		X			
	24/2014		X			
	26/2015		X			
	28/2018		X			
C	AFB/					
D	AFB/					
	AFB/					
E	21/2013					
	24/2014					X
						X

Table H.1 ***(continued)***

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
	KIs	**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
F	GCF/ 4/2015	X				
G	GCF/					
H	GCF					
I	GCF/ 4/2015				X	
	GCF/ 26/2020					X
J	GEF/					
	23/2017	X				
	25/2019	X				
	13/2007	X				
	16/2010	X				
	18/2012	X				
	202014	X				
	21/2015	X				
	22/2016	X				

Table H.1 ***(continued)***

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
	KIs	**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
K	GEF/		X			
	23/2017		X			
	25/2019		X			
	21/2015		X			
	22/2016		X			
L	GEF/					
	22/2016			X		
	23/2017			X		
M	GEF/					
	23/2017				X	
	13/2007				X	
	16/2010				X	
	18/2012				X	
	20/2014				X	
	22/2016				X	
	GEF/					
N	23/2017					X
	29/2019					X
	16/2010					X

Table H.1 ***(continued)***

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
	KIs	**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
O	COP/					
	13	X		X	X	X
	16/Part2	X		X	X	X
	16/Part3				X	
	18/Part2			X		
	19/Part2			X		
	20/Part2	X				X
	21/Part3			X		
	22/Part2	X		X		X
	23/Part2			X		
	24/Part2	X		X		X
	25/Part2	X			X	X
	25/Part3	X				X

Table H.1 ***(continued)***

Category: Climate Finance Uncertainties						
Coding Theme**: Accounting for Climate Finance**						
	KIs	**Adequacy**	**Availability**	**Finance Capture**	**New and Additional**	**Predictability**
P	AOSIS/					
	2012/			X	X	X
	2013/	X		X	X	X
	2016/	X		X		
	2017/	X		X		
	2019/			X		
	Responses	**24 = 5AFB, 1GCF, 8GEF, 7COP, 3AOSIS**	**10= 5AFB, 5GEF**	**15=2GEF, 8COP, 5AOSIS**	**13=1GCF, 6GEF, 4COP, 2AOSIS**	**15=2AFB, 1GCF, 3GEF, 7COP, 2AOSIS**

APPENDIX I: CODEBOOK

Table I. 1: Codebook Descriptors

Name	Description	Files	References
Changes Affecting Priorities	CODING CATEGORY	0	0
Adaptation Finance Constraints	Global actions, structures and systems that hinder adaptation finance flows	0	0
Co-financing		19	94
Grants versus Loans		24	46
Mainstreaming Adaptation		36	125
More Mitigation Means Less Adaptation		26	53
Public Finance Unlocking Private Finance		31	87
Market-based Push		0	0

Table I.1 ***(continued)***

Name	Description	Files	References
Access Metrics		52	180
Burdensome Requirements and Accountability		22	51
Financialization		36	96
Prioritization Metrics		16	74
Structural Dominance		11	27
Transfers		27	124
Climate Finance Uncertainties	CODING CATEGORY	0	0
Accounting for Climate Change Finance	Concepts that challenge accounting for climate finance	0	0
Adequacy	Sufficient new and additional finance to match known cost of adaptation as determined by SIDS.	29	62
Availability		21	51
Finance Capture		34	73
New and Additional		37	100
Predictability		30	81

Table I.1 *(continued)*

Name	Description	Files	References
Concepts Through Interactions	CODING CATEGORY	0	0
Control	Actions and structures that influence results in a given direction	0	0
Bureaucratic Dominance		20	49
Directional Actions		28	78
International Greed		4	9
Minilateralism		14	28
Unfair International Rules		11	18
Issues Within the UNCFM	Activities within the UNCFM that challenge adaptation finance flows	2	4
Access		22	46
Accreditation		17	40
Capacity Building		14	40
Financials		29	122
Governance		28	125
Programmes and Projects		26	201

Table I.1 ***(continued)***

Name	Description	Files	References
Negotiation Metrics		2	4
All About Adaptation		38	108
Always About Mitigation		28	87
Developed Countries Must Pay		13	62
Responsibility		23	74
SIDS' Platform		40	192
Whole of Gov't Approach		1	4
Capacity		31	163
Integrated Planning		25	149
Strategic Alignment		23	134
Trust		10	21
Issues Within UNCFM		0	0
Organization Behaviour	CODING CATEGORY	0	0
Effects of Discourse on Power		0	0

Table I.1 ***(continued)***

Name	Description	Files	References
Ideation Structures	Structures that are not seen but influence conduct of actors	0	0
Identity Formation (2)		1	1
Interests Formation		2	4
Intersubjective Understandings		0	0
Mutual Constitution		0	0
Norm Legitimization		0	0
Problematizing Knowledge		0	0
Previous Themes		0	0
A lot about knowledge sharing re adaptation		0	0
A lot about loss and damage		0	0
A lot about resilience		0	0
Bridging the Res Divide- Personal - Small Emitters- Resp		0	0

Table I.1 ***(continued)***

Name	Description	Files	References
Challenges with climate finance mechanism		2	4
Climate Rationale		0	0
Corporate- Responsibility		0	0
Development Issues		0	0
Enhanced technical expertise -Neg Metrics		0	0
Fiscal Space		0	0
Justice and Fairness- Neg Metrics		0	0
One Pot of Money		0	0
Specific Recognition		0	0
Strategic Priorities		0	0

APPENDIX J: EXTRACTED RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Let me then ask you, do you believe that the project model of delivery, of delivering adaptation finance is the best model. I ask because adaptation finance delivery has essentially been projectized. Do you think the project model is the best vehicle for delivering adaptation finance, or do you have a view on whether direct transfers to national budgets is an option or any other option?
2. Do you believe adaptation finance is available and predictable?
3. Why do you think that the adaptation finance is unpredictable against the backdrop that the Convention obligates developed countries to provide predictable financing?
4. You mentioned difficulty to access the funds whether it's adaptation, whether it is GEF, GCF or AF, why is it, in your opinion, these funds are so difficult for the SIDS to access?
5. You mentioned, you mentioned, trust earlier, do you believe that the developed countries trust the SIDS with the management of adaptation finance?
6. There is a push back from the developed countries in in accepting the vulnerability index as a measure of a country's standing and there is still this preference for GDP, which is, you know, population and income. So, what is your view on the issue of SIDS seeing the vulnerability index as a better measure and instrument to be used in order to deal with adaptation finance, what is your view on that?
7. Has Paris pushed historical responsibility into the background because that word is not in the Paris agreement… compensation is not in the Paris agreement. There's a lot of argument about that. Liability is not there… what is the value of a historical responsibility at the moment within the context of adaptation finance?
8. One gets the view that the EU … may very well see themselves as subsidizing BASIC and subsidizing the BRICS, and they don't want to do that. And therefore, those negotiations, arguments and political points that are made between the G77 plus China consequently affect SIDS. So do you think that

SIDS and AOSIS should separate itself from G77 plus China? Do you think that's a good place to be, or do you think that the G77 plus China is a is a good platform for SIDS?

APPENDIX K: SUMMARIZED FINDINGS

Table K. 1: Summary Findings Matrix

Findings		
Finding 1: The rules set by actors within the UNCFM create structures and attitudes of dominance, preventing any meaningful compliance by the SIDS.	***Finding 2*****:** Notwithstanding balanced country representation within the UNCFM, minilateralism drives decision making.	***Finding 3***: A majority of the KIs indicated that developed countries prefer to direct the efforts of the SIDS at transferring and determining the use of CCAF.
Finding 4**:** The decisions of the AF, GCF and the GEF on projects/programmes hardly reflect any evidence of the SIDS, as a special category, for receiving CCAF within the UNCFM.	***Finding 5*****:** Notwithstanding attempts at balanced representation on the Boards of the UNCFM, their operation procedures are more akin to those of international financial institutions.	***Finding 6:*** The collapse of the CER market, as a mechanism for raising CCAF for the SIDS, revealed the vulnerability of market-based systems for raising finance and the importance of pledges and financing from private sources.

Table K. 1: Summary Findings Matrix *(continued)*

Findings		
***Finding 7*:** Capacity building modules constructed by the agencies within the UNCFM are not institutional to the SIDS. Their impact is not levelized since they are designed and executed, at significant costs.	***Finding 8:*** Accrediting entities successfully to the UNCFM is linked to country applicants meeting international fiduciary standards, resulting in long delays.	***Finding 9*:** The decisions of the COP in relation to the UNCFM (GEF, GCF, AF,) because they are couched in weak non-directional language, are not geared to improve access to CCAF.
***Finding 10*:** Even though it is all about adaptation for the SIDS, and adaptation is its highest priority, some climate change impacts cannot be addressed through adaptation and therefore loss and damage actions are also critical.	***Finding 11:*** While the objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations and it was always about mitigation, the SIDS should ensure emissions reductions by them do not ultimately result in diminishing the historical responsibility of developed countries to provide CCAF.	***Finding 12*:** The AOSIS, as part of the G77+China grouping, and the principal negotiating voice for the SIDS within the UNCFM, to many has had its voice drowned out. Consequently, many questions arise as to whether the AOSIS is best placed to effectively negotiate on behalf of the SIDS.

Table K. 1: Summary Findings Matrix *(continued)*

	Findings	
***Finding 13*:** The developed countries have not voluntarily accepted their historical responsibility for the negative impacts of climate change and, instead, promoted shared responsibility. To that extent, the historical responsibility of developed nations went down and that of developing countries went up.	***Finding 14*:** For capacity building to make a meaningful contribution to the development of SIDS, it must be underpinned by a recognition that by collectively sharing knowledge and data generated by both the SIDS and the developed world, the SIDS stand a better chance at accessing CCAF.	**Finding 15:** The SIDS must move beyond prizing out development from contestations between ODA and CCAF and transition to a more longer term political and economic integrated planning process, that obviates insularity and territoriality in the creation of a climate resilient society.
Finding 16: The developed countries dominated neoliberal market system, based on high production and consumption patterns, is counterproductive to the development of the SIDS, given their demographics and lack of scale.	***Finding 17:*** There are diverse opinions, particularly among the SIDS, as to whether adaptation should be mainstreamed into development. Though most KIs tend to agree that it should, that agreement is largely conditional.	***Finding 18*:** Co-financing ratios, which apply to mitigation and adaptation projects, are financial sums greater than the project sums, and a part of the financial qualifications for project approvals. However, apart from being an integral part of the GEF and the GCF financing, they also pose a burden on the SIDS in meeting such ratios.

Table K. 1: Summary Findings Matrix *(continued)*

	Findings	
***Finding 19*:** Even though there is an understanding amongst most SIDS that CCAF should be channelled through public sector grants mainly, the trajectory of the GEF and GCF is to transition from grant to non-grant financing and grant equivalency funding respectively, for adaptation, which makes adapting to climate change impacts by SIDS even more difficult.	***Finding 20*:** While the SIDS have acknowledged that public finance alone will not be able to meet the bulk of finance required to deal with climate change, the SIDS have also observed that crowding-in private finance locks out CCAF because private investors do not see a revenue stream from adaptation measures.	**Finding 21**: The view held within the UNCFM that there is an inverse relationship between adaptation and mitigation which translates into more mitigation means less adaptation, and by extension reduced adaptation costs, does not reflect the reality of the SIDS. In fact, less adaptation would result in further loss and damage to the SIDS.
***Finding 22*:** The challenges the SIDS face in accessing CCAF, do not fall exclusively on the part of the UNCFM, but to a lesser extent on the SIDS as well. However, in their attempt to protect themselves from risks in making CCAF available, the mechanisms of the UNCFM act as barriers instead of enablers.	***Finding 23*:** Most SIDS, recognizing that adaptation is a process, prefer direct transfers into national budgets for CCAF with specific links to a programmatic profile therein, separate and apart from ODA, whereas developed countries, due to past experiences opt for transfers via projects and programmes for greater transparency.	***Finding 24*:** Market-based mechanisms are integral to the AF which was meant to receive and provide funding mainly to the SIDS and the LDCs from the now collapsed CDM. However, market-based mechanisms have returned under the recent Paris Agreement, leaving doubts whether adaptation can be commodified.

Table K. 1: Summary Findings Matrix *(continued)*

Findings		
Finding 25: The SIDS continue to argue that a vulnerability index is a much fairer means of assessing their eligibility for financing. In their view, good economic performance disqualifies them from concessionary financing and bad economic performance signals capacity constraints in meeting the UNCFM requirements.	***Finding 26*:** The SIDS are saying that it is difficult to credit progress seen in their countries to adaptation interventions given that accountability measures are in the hands of UNCFM, and perhaps it is time that the SIDS themselves establish their own mechanisms to hold the UNCFM accountable for the processes they use to determine successful project application and implementation.	***Finding 27*:** The requirements imposed on the SIDS in accessing CCAF allow the UNCFM to create structures that obscure opportunities for national agencies in the SIDS, and at the same time dominate structures of governance within them through linkages to NCs, BURs, NAPAs, NAMAs and MIEs, creating in the process, transparency and fiduciary overload.
Finding 28: There is no new and additional finance. Climate finance comes from the overseas development assistance funding platform, since for many donors, climate finance is development finance.	***Finding 29:*** Without a specific CCAF goal, availability will continue to be inadequate through market-based measures and voluntary contributions.	***Finding 30:*** The mobilization and identification of CCAF for SIDS is influenced by definitional, methodological, and absence of disaggregated data.

Table K. 1: Summary Findings Matrix *(continued)*

Findings
***Finding 31**:* While more climate finance is available now than before, the amount available to SIDS is inadequate to meet their adaptation needs, Consequently, the SIDS are of the view that because adaptation doesn't benefit the developed countries financially, they prefer to link scaling up CCAF to mainstreaming climate actions into national budgets, rather than to the special circumstances of SIDS.