ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to describe and assess parliamentary control of the executive as exercised by the Jamaican House of Representatives from 1962 to 1970. The first part of Chapter I seeks to define parliamentary control. The second part lays down the four constitutional regulations upon which such control in Jamaica rests. These four regulations form the framework of this study.

The second chapter examines the control arising from the regulation that all government legislation be scrutinised by Parliament¹. Both Opposition and backbench influence are studied as well as the degree to which Parliament publicises political debate. The evidence is that Parliament is only able to exercise a significant degree of control (through a Select Committee) when it is politically expedient for the government to use such a procedure.

The extent to which M.P. s determine the business of the House is considered in Chapter III. It is found to be minimal, with sittings dominated by government business.

The most effective means of control, Question Time, is discussed in the fourth chapter. Yet the evidence here is that even this procedure has not realised its full potential. A case study of the Serv-Wel affair is included which illustrates how political dialogue can be focussed on Parliament.

The fifth chapter looks at financial control which in Jamaica rests upon Parliament's scrutiny of the Appropriation Bills and the work of the

¹. Throughout this thesis, "Parliament" when referring to Jamaica refers only to the House of Representatives.
Public Accounts Committee. The evidence of this chapter is that such control is negligible.

Parliamentary control in Jamaica as outlined in the preceding four chapters is, it is asserted in the Conclusion, far less than ought to be the case in a liberal-democratic political system. It is suggested that the Jamaican Parliament's role within the political system needs to be reconsidered if it is to exercise effective control over the executive.